

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 18TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF ETHIOPIAN STUDIES

MOVEMENTS IN ETHIOPIA ETHIOPIA IN MOVEMENT

VOLUME 2

Edited by Eloi Ficquet | Ahmed Hassen | Thomas Osmond

CFEE - AAU - Tsehai







Centre français des études éthiopiennes

Movements in Ethiopia, Ethiopia in Movement. Volume 2

Proceedings of the 18th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies

Éloi Ficquet, Ahmed Hassen Omer and Thomas Osmond (ed.)

DOI: 10.4000/books.cfee.1240

Publisher: Centre français des études éthiopiennes, Addis Ababa university, Tsehai Publishers

Place of publication: Addis-Ababa ; Los Angeles

Year of publication: 2016

Publication date: 22 juin 2023

Series: Corne de l'Afrique contemporaine / Contemporary Horn of Africa

Digital ISBN: 978-2-11-172314-6



<https://books.openedition.org>

Print edition

ISBN (Print version): 978-1-59907-136-7

Number of pages: 503

DIGITAL REFERENCE

Ficquet, Éloi, et al., editors. *Movements in Ethiopia, Ethiopia in Movement. Volume 2*. Centre français des études éthiopiennes, Addis Ababa university, Tsehai Publishers, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.4000/books.cfee.1240>.

This text was automatically generated on 1 mai 2024.



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ABSTRACT

In November 2012, the 18th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies was convened in Dire Dawa, a cosmopolitan city in the eastern lowlands of Ethiopia. This event gathered more than 300 international scholars from all disciplines of the humanities and social social sciences. Under the general theme of 'movement' these two volumes gather a collection of 70 papers that reflect recent trends in the field of Ethiopian studies. From local studies to regional and international perspectives, these studies question long term historical processes and current social and economic transformations. A number of contributions explore and give access to fresh sources of knowledge from unpublished or rediscovered texts and documents, from recordings of oral information, or from ethnographic observation. They also review literature, challenge conventional ideas and propose critical investigations on past and present issues, such as interethnic relations, women's role, development policies and their impact.

EDITOR'S NOTE

"This volume marks a new generation of thinking about Ethiopia, its cultures, its histories, and its modernities. Held for the first time in Dire Dawa and on its university campus, this international conference and its papers signifies the arrival of new scholars and new topics alongside venerable themes from the long tradition of Ethiopian studies. "Movement" is the right word and this volume reflects that meeting of the new and the traditions of scholarship. A most valuable read."

James C. McCann, Professor, Boston University and Fellow of the Ethiopian Academy of Science

"This is a welcoming addition to the expanding scholarly work in Ethiopian Studies. Organized around thmes that reflect its guiding idea of "movement," the 71 articles in the Proceedings bring to light new trends and raise new questions in Ethiopian studies that capture th multi-dimensional transformations taking place in contemporary Ethiopia. The editors have rendered, with their judicious choices and careful editing of the articles, an invaluable service to the scholars and the educated public interested in Ethiopian studies."

Maimire Mennasemay, Resident Scholar, Dawson College, Montreal

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Revisionism vs. Conservationism in the Horn and the Role of Ethiopia

Gian Paolo Calchi Novati

The conflicting nature of contemporary regional history
 Modern Ethiopia and the imperial state project
 The regional impacts of European colonial administration
 The Eritrean nationalism
 The plural stakes of the Ethio-Erythrean confrontation since the 1990s

The ‘Art of Not Being Governed’ in Ethiopia: Towards a more dynamic approach to the highlands/lowlands academic divide

Felix Girke

Geography and the historiography of Ethiopia
 Southeast-Asian parallels
 Deriving a theoretical model
 Conclusion: the model summarized and applied

New Trends, Old Views: The Ambivalent Centre/Periphery Paradigm in Ethiopian Studies

Jean-Nicolas Bach

A historical tradition rooted in the academic declensions of the centre/periphery paradigm
 Questioning the shortfalls of the centre/periphery perspective

Cultural neighbourhood in Ethiopia – and the World?

Echi Christina Gabbert and Sophia Thubauville

Cultural neighbourhood on a local level
 Cultural neighbourhood in a global perspective
 Closing remarks

From Clanship and Rituals to Maize Fields and Markets: Exploring the Transformations of the Bodi – Dime Relationship

Lucie Buffavand

Crosscutting clan identities in Bodi and Dime
 The reversal of the Bodi-Dime relation
 Agriculture and politics in the Dime foothills
 Conclusion

Manjo and Kafecho: Enemies or Brothers? Cultural Depiction of Intergroup Relations in Southern Ethiopia

Federica De Sisto

The Kaffa Zone
 The Manjo
 Changes in Manjo lifestyle
 Negative elements in the culture
 Bridging conflict through the search for commonalities in local culture
 Conclusion

Claiming Ethnic Identity: Petitions by the Manjo in the Kafa and Sheka Zones of Southwest Ethiopia

Sayuri Yoshida

The Manjo and Kafa societies
 The Manjo petitions
 Background and features of the Manjo petition
 Conclusion

Awi-Gumuz interethnic relations: from integrative traditional institutions to exclusionary ethnic federalism

Desalegn Amsalu

Ethnic difference between Awi and Gumuz
Traditional amity
Local Federalism and Ethnic Dichotomy
Conclusion

The Socio-Political Dynamics of New Migrant-Labour Brokers in Shashemene, Ethiopia

Atakilte Beyene

Labour brokerage
Data set
Seasonality of labour migration into Shashemene
Migrant labour employment systems in Shashemene
The legal brokerage system (*dilela*) in Shashemene
Brokerage as a means of livelihood
Migrants' livelihood options
Concluding remarks

Re-negotiating notions of place: Tigrayan migration to Addis Ababa

Markus Breines

Constructions of place
Subjective and intersubjective experiences of migration and place
The importance of place and home for migrants' movements
Conclusion

Multilingualism and identity in intercultural couples: The case of Ethio-French couples living in Addis Ababa

Véronique Miguel Addisu

Urban multilingual context for a qualitative enquiry
Identifying "others": individual and couple-hood issues
Making sense of tension: languages and roles in groups
Mixed couples: multilingual stance and identity
Personal identity, couple-hood and socialization: a complex system
Annex

English Language in Ethiopia: A Disruption Point in the Chains of Education for Development

Moges Gebremariam

Context, choice and chains of education: a narration of social change in Ethiopia
The English language and the educated class: The case of communication for production
Conclusion

Oral Storytelling in Ethiopia and the Links to Children's Literacy

Helen Papworth

History of storytelling in Ethiopia
Children's literacy in Ethiopia
The value of oral traditions for children's literacy
Conclusion

Women Living with HIV as Agents of Social Change

Carolina De Rosi

Gender issues in the HIV/AIDS situation: politics of action and legitimization
Women living with HIV and association projects in the city of Gondar
Conclusion

Mapping Decision-Making: The Case of Tigrayan Women's Contraceptive Use

Thera Mjaaland

Gendered aspects of religiosity
Negotiating reproductive choice in silence
Family planning; links to education and development
Concluding remarks

The Ambiguous Role of Women in Ethiopia: Female Role Change in Social and in Self-Perception

Angela M. Müller

Gender studies in Europe and the USA
Gender studies in Africa
Gender studies in Ethiopia
Conclusion

Gender and Election in the Newspapers' Narratives. The Case of the Fourth Ethiopian National Election of 2010

Agaredach Jemaneh

Data collection, sampling and analysis
Analysis of four samples
Structural description
Gender and gender relations in the electoral process: critical discourse analysis
True life experience: lamb as metaphor of leadership
Concluding remarks: inter-textual meanings

Kara Women in Motion: Putting into Action an Association for More Development, Power and Security

Nadine Brückner

Background
The Women Association Korcho Meena Maberno
The development and structural change of the association
Discussion

Schooling for Agro-Pastoralist Communities in the Sala-Mago District, South Omo Zone: Vignettes from the First Generation of Mursi Schoolgirls

Shauna LaTosky and Jana Zehle

Strategies for education in pastoralist communities in SNNPR
Moving from the Margins to the Centre
Realities and challenges of schooling beyond Mursiland
Concluding remarks

Marriage, Residential Movement and Cultural Innovation of Women in the Hamar-Banna-Bashada Cluster

Jean Lydall

Introduction: marriage and the movement of women
Residential movement and women as agents of cultural innovation
Residential movement and the preservation of traditions
Residential movement and the challenge to create a great homestead
Residential movement after marriage
Conclusion

Patriarchy Upside Down: Land and Love Calculations in Hadiya

Valentina Peveri

The parable of oppression
Transfers
Status and property
Love Calculations
The Story of B.
Rephrasing patriarchy?

The Challenges of Child Labour Migration, Voluntary Repatriation, Family Tracing and Reunification: The Case of Ethiopian Minors Repatriated from Yemen in 2011

Zelalem Tefera

General overview of population migration in twentieth century Ethiopia

Conceptual framework

Descriptive analysis of repatriation of Ethiopian minors from Yemen in 2011

Conclusion

Urban Redevelopment Project and Community Participation: The case of Senga Tera Fird Bet 1 in Addis Ababa

Ezana Haddis

Interpreting community participation

The initiation of the project

The administrative organization of the project

The planning process

Conclusion

Moving to Condominium Housing? Views about the Prospect among Caregivers and Children in Addis Ababa and Hawassa – Ethiopia

Agazi Tiemelissan and Alula Pankhurst

From an international research project to an inquiry centred on two Ethiopian towns

A study revealing the plural challenges of condominium housing

Conclusion

Land Degradation, Urban Crossroads and Migratory Trajectories: The Plural Social Dynamics of HIV Contamination in Kallu Woreda, South Wollo, Ethiopia

Nigusu Aboset

Food insecurity, unemployment and marginalization: the growing socio-economic deterioration of the family households in the Kallu Woreda

Poverty, seasonal migrants and sex workers: fostering HIV contamination through hazardous migration trajectories

Conclusion

The Challenges of Urbanization and Inter-Jurisdictional Cooperation in Addis Ababa and the Surrounding Towns of the Oromiya Region

Ketema Wakjira

Uncoordinated development strategies and contradictory urban policies: the institutional failure of inter-municipal cooperation

Identity claims and electoral stakes: an inter-municipal disorder cultivating the Federal/Oromo dilemma of Addis Ababa?

Conclusion

Urban Planning and the Contemporary Dynamics of Land Formalization in the City of Jigjiga

Rony Emmenegger

Urban planning history

Urban incorporation

Urban property

Conclusion

Livelihood diversification and rural underdevelopment: The challenges of household food security in Damota Gale woreda (Wolayta Zone, Southern Ethiopia)

Bereket Roba and Degefa Tolossa

The socio-economic roots of rural poverty in three sub-districts of Damota Gale

Challenging food insecurity and rural underdevelopment: the too limited off/non-farming contribution in the local household economy

Conclusion

Land Registration and Food Security in Ethiopia: From Federal Policies to the Rural District of Siraro (Oromiya Regional State)

Davide Chinigò

Marxist legacies and international compromises: a short history of land registration in the Ethiopian Federation
Land registration and food security in Siraro: the challenges of decentralization in a rural district of Southern Ethiopia
Conclusion

Food Aid Targeting in Ethiopia: An Ethnographic Study of the Early Warning System in the North-Western Zones of the Amhara Regional State

François Enten

The EWS as a consensual tool
The combinatory empiricism of experts
Food aid targeting in the villages
Conclusion

From Individual Food Security to National Food Self-Sufficiency: The Ethiopian Way, its Impact and some Future Scenarios

René Lefort

From “subsistence agriculture” ...
...to “farming as a business”
At grassroots level
A blurred picture
Conclusion: possible scenarios

Where Have They Come from and Where Might They Be Heading? A Comparison of Two Food-Insecure Sites in North Omo

Philippa Bevan, Samuel Urkato and Shiferaw Neda

Gara Godo 1995
Do'oma 1995
Gara Godo 2011
Do'oma 2011
The futures of Ethiopia's rural communities

Where Are Ethiopian Rural Communities Heading? Youth, Education and Migration in Two Food-Deficit Communities of Eastern Tigray and Kambata

Catherine Dom

The communities in 1995
The communities in 2012
Past and future trajectories

Agropastoralism in Transition: Comparison of Trajectories of Two Communities in Oromia and the Southern Region

Alula Pankhurst

Historical context and transformations until the late 1990s
The situation in 2012 and changes since the late 1990s
Comparing major similarities and differences
Trends and possible future(s)
Conclusion

Some Considerations on the Limits of Valuing Indigenous Knowledge in Development Interventions: The Case of the Garri Pastoralists of Southern Ethiopia

Francesco Staro

The quest for “indigenous knowledge”
Private water point among the Garri
Which / whose “indigenous knowledge”?
Conclusion

Agribusiness, Cultural and Social Changes in the Ethiopian Lowlands

Alain Gascon

A race to the western lowlands

Regional integration and/or land deprivation?

Conclusion

Epilogue

The Trend of Fiscal Arrangement in Ethiopia: Current Practices and Future Concerns

Solomon Negussie

Main features of fiscal constitution in Ethiopia

Some observed trends in fiscal arrangements in Ethiopia

Some future challenges

‘Ethiopian Studies on the Move’: Papers selected for the 18th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies

Compiled by Eloi Ficquet, chairman of the Conference

Revisionism vs. Conservationism in the Horn and the Role of Ethiopia

Gian Paolo Calchi Novati

p. 1-11

The conflicting nature of contemporary regional history

- 1 Geography determines politics as much as anything else in the Horn's history and social makeup (RUTH IYOB 2001: 107, CLAPHAM 1984, BAHRU ZEWE 2006a). The balance of power and quest for hegemony in the area present a multi-faceted picture with a number of inter-relations. The Horn has suffered tensions and permanent instability due to the unresolved conflicts between groups that, for reasons of nationality, linguistic and cultural affiliation, social status, etc., hold or are close to the power and the groups that, for the same reasons but with inverse accomplishments, are or feel excluded, exploited and marginalized. The "imperial" control exercised by Abyssinia-Ethiopia has intermittently been challenged by local resistance and opposition movements, entangled in their own plea to construct/reconstruct kingdoms and identities suitable to the characteristics and expectations of the subordinated groups.
- 2 First, come feuds between the powers that have demonstrated their capacity to master the human and physical ambit and on the other side the socio-political formations that did not have full access to sovereignty and resources. The ancient empires were replaced by modern states that, in turn, used might to the detriment of populations which have been, over time, absorbed into their jurisdiction through cooptation or mere coercion. The past myths were revived so as to preserve internal unity. Affinities of kinship and faith ignored political borders, generally poorly defined and not respected, and posed a threat to the imperial order. Religion was used as an incentive for expansion, conquest and vexation (LEWIS 1999: 69). Warfare, both intra- and inter-state, was in essence a continuation of politics by other means. The nature of internal relations, based more on hostility than co-operation, has endured throughout the

Horn's history, even when the Horn was invaded by or fell under the rule of external forces.

- 3 The second dimension of unrest is conflict at the regional level. Populations and states in the Horn compete much more frequently and fiercely amongst themselves than with foreign players. The stakes include land, water, economic resources and ports, but also non-material goods such as sovereignty and power. Traditions of statehood differ greatly from country to country. The very presence of concurrent models can threaten or destabilize the ruling governments.
- 4 The third level of tension or belligerence refers to the repercussions of the great policy and the transposition of international conflicts to the Horn. In this context, the Scramble for Africa played a special role, engaging a host of European powers in the second half of the nineteenth century. Although colonialism displayed all the traits of a foreign intrusion, in the fact that it constituted an alien jurisdiction activated from within. The European nations exploited local differences to achieve their own objectives and backed those who could facilitate their expansion. The colonial period in the Horn (1869-1941) marked the peak of direct interference by the external forces, eager to plunder local riches and strategic assets, access to the sea included. The main colonial powers in the Horn were Italy and Great Britain. Italy sought to occupy the land in order to establish settlers, whereas the principal imperative of England was the control of water: the Nile basin and the routes to India through the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. France broadly challenged the exclusive influence of Italy and Great Britain and established one small possession (the French Somali Coast, or the current Republic of Djibouti), which became a very important outlet for the entire region (CALCHI NOVATI 1997).
- 5 By the advent of colonialism, a minority of a different cultural and religious origin tampered with the already existing territorial and national assets. The coasts were highly desired. The previous system of domination and subordination between states and between the various groups within the states was subverted. By way of institutional and productive transformations, colonialism entirely redesigned the political, economic and cultural environment. Colonialism did not destroy the pre-existing hierarchies, but imposed technologically and politically superior authority with previously unknown cultural and institutional paradigms diverting internal dynamics. Hence, it was perceived and accepted in different ways by various groups according to their positions on the power ladder.
- 6 Outside influence was also manifested via the interaction with regional actors and global powers that, unlike the colonial powers, did not seek possessions or sovereignty in the Horn. During different periods, a number of countries emerged as external forces including Egypt, the Arab states of North Africa, the Arab Peninsula, the Middle East and after 1945 the superpowers at the top of the bipolar system. The Horn proved to be one of the most troublesome battlegrounds in the East-West competition for control of the Third World. Naval and strategic assets were more requested than interior. After the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of Russia from Africa, the United States remained in charge alone, and unopposed, at least until the rise of China.

Modern Ethiopia and the imperial state project

- 7 The Abyssinian Empire, later on to be Ethiopia, holds the geographical and historical core of the Horn. The various governments felt compelled by the sacred duty to defend the Great Tradition of the empire and did not tolerate any infractions upon the multinational and multiethnic composition, which is the outcome of a long history of meddling on several levels: trade, warfare, migration, religion, food taboos, exchange of services and marriage (LEVINE 1974: 40).¹ Throughout history, Ethiopia committed in a gradual and incremental process of centralizing the power founded on the Solomonid dynasty with the support of the army, the Coptic Church and a feudal order. The main economic resource was the cereal production for subsistence in the highlands. A crucial point was the access to the sea, threatened since the increasing expansion of Arabs and Islam.
- 8 The imperial narrative to justify the absorption of non-Ethiopian peoples as vassals that provided gold, ivory, incense and black slaves, was challenged in the rhetoric of the liberation fronts by the counter-myth of “Abyssinian colonialism” (OKBAZGHI YOHANNES 1997, LAUDERDALE and AMSTER 2005: 5). In reality, Ethiopia paid a heavy price for colonialism. The building up of the Italian colony of Eritrea prevented any possibility to recover the precious maritime coast. History animated the obsessive quest for Eritrea (*Mareb Mellash*) conducted by Menelik and Haile Selassie. “Ethiopia’s historical ruling elites have produced modern Africa’s most enduring idea of the state, replete with myths of biblical lore, the glories of ancient Axum (Aksum), and the splendor of Gondarine courts, to justify postcolonial conquest” (RUTH IYOB 2001: 109).
- 9 Sudan was considered a principal rival of Abyssinia for regional influence and for the waters of the Nile. Like Ethiopia, Sudan put up a robust centralized state, civilizing the less developed lands from north to south. Sudan’s self-legitimizing saga was the splendor of Kush-Meroe. Ethiopia and Sudan both spread their influence to the peripheries, at times coming up against strenuous rebellion. Ethiopia and Sudan were more able than other African polities to counteract colonial onslaught. The reformers who governed Ethiopia in the second half of the nineteenth century (the emperors Tewodros and Menelik) and the Mahdist State in Sudan implemented their own designs for centralization of power in the fissures left by the colonial partition of Africa also thanks to their ability to take profit from international diplomacy (CALCHI NOVATI 2005b). The inclusion of the peripheral non-Christians in Ethiopia and the non-Muslims or non-Arabs in Sudan, earlier merely nominal, became effective fanning potential hotbeds of resistance and conflict. As an effect of the expansion of the original center beyond the Semitic or Semitized area, Ethiopia is no longer a Christian nation (SHINN 2005: 96).
- 10 The imperial state project pursued by Ethiopia was opposed by the emirates and sheikhdoms that governed the lowlands surrounding the plateau. Christianity was intrinsic to the Abyssinian Court’s strategy. Because the areas encompassed by Ethiopia are largely inhabited by Islamic populations, religious diversity has been one of the main factors fueling the tension between Ethiopia and its neighbors since medieval times up to the founding of the Republic of Somalia in 1960. The historical charisma of Ethiopia found an opposition in the attraction power of Somalia that raised as a possible alternative center addressing the Somali-speaking communities living in the Ethiopian province of Ogaden and elsewhere in the enlarged Horn. The Muslim faith, and later also the Somali language, represented the principal basis for identity in the

frame of a political system that, in all other aspects, was extremely fluid, reflecting the anarchism and clanism typical of nomadic and pastoral populations.

The regional impacts of European colonial administration

- 11 The colonial interlude was decisive in shaping states and nations. The kind of administration introduced by the European powers modified or dislodged the pre-existing order. The colonial management of land and resources was more efficient but intensified the chronic instability due to protest against the occupation, loss of sovereignty and expropriation. Sometimes the resistance escalated into all-out war. The victory of Ethiopia at Adowa (or Adua) in 1896 stopped the advance of Italian colonialism. Ethiopia's independence was safeguarded by its capacity for national mobilization at a very critical moment for the integrity of the country (RUBENSON 1976: 408-9). Nevertheless, Menelik did not even attempt to rescue Eritrea. Such feat was beyond his military means, also taking into consideration the political and economic costs he had already endured in order to contain the offensive launched by General Baratieri's troops. Nevertheless, for the first time, with the October 1896 Treaty of Addis Ababa, an Ethiopian emperor recognized the colony of Eritrea, formally renouncing access to the sea (BAHRU ZEWEDE 2004). The defense of the Empire did not include *Mareb Mellash*. Eritrean nationalism will exploit this forfeiture at its profit.
- 12 The course for "pacification" employed by the colonial powers differed depending on the local circumstances. Colonialism as such, without much distinction from one power to another, stressed the importance of ethnicity since in a situation where a foreign culture is asserted, coupled with political dominance and taking over of national riches, clan and familial allegiances are immediate means of self-consciousness. While the rulers defended, on principle, their power and national liberty, colonialism was an opportunity for the subordinated groups to get rid of their previous masters. "The colonial experience left a lasting legacy either by separating subject peoples from the ruling centers and thus liberated them from traditional obligations or by institutionalizing previous relations of domination" (RUTH IYOB 2001: 113).
- 13 Just as it had played the Tigrayan card against the Showa in the confrontation with Menelik at the end of the nineteenth century, Italian colonialism continued to act along the lines of internal tension after the conquest of Ethiopia and the building of Italian East Africa (*Africa Orientale Italiana*-AOI). Italian authorities systematically squeezed basic elements of identity, such as religion, culture and language. Italy lacked the necessary financial and technical resources, as well as time, to fully convert the economy and society of Ethiopia. The Nile, the principal communication and trade route of the region, was beyond its range. Nonetheless, Italy, from the Small Ghebi in Addis Ababa, tried to change the mindset of peoples and states by manipulating the hierarchal balance between the elites and the major ethnic groups or nations (CALCHI NOVATI 2005a). The strategy was designed to deprive the established centers of power, particularly Ethiopia, of their own peripheries, giving the illusion of liberating the subjugated populations. The Deputy General-Governor of the AOI, Enrico Cerulli, a prominent scholar of the cultures and languages of the Horn, had always bolstered the

positions of Islamic populations at the expense of the Christian Semitic populations of the highlands.

- 14 Ogaden, a semi-desert area inhabited by Somalis, was separated from Ethiopia to which it had belonged from the late nineteenth century on, and annexed to Somalia.² Pan-Somalism – a project for the unification of the scattered members of a virtual Somali nation – got more vigor due to the incentives provided by colonialism. The northern territory of the empire was also cut off to enlarge the borders of Eritrea and pave the way for the evolution of the first-born Italian colony into a society prepared to reinforce its national identity and leap into modernity, forgetting Ethiopia (TADDIA 1986). The colonial government shaped its practices so as to highlight and promote the different local traditions and identities in a continuous interplay between administration and ethnography (SORGONI 2001: 231). Italy pretended to make use of scientific parameters, but racial prejudices and political objectives biased the reorganization undertaken during the short-lived AOI in order to overwhelm the patriotic resistance undermining the Shoan-Amhara elite that had been the pillar of Haile Selassie's empire.
- 15 The British Military Administration (BMA), operative in the former Italian colonial territories from 1941 until the decisions of the UN General Assembly took effect, also influenced the geopolitics of the Horn. Britain did not clear up the case of Eritrea at once. In an early stage it advocated partitioning the former Italian colony into a Muslim part to be joined with Sudan and a Christian part to be united with Ethiopia. The British carried on for a few years a separate administration of Ogaden and other scraps of Ethiopian territory, such as Haud, inhabited by Somalis and bordering British Somaliland, as it contemplated the idea of a Greater Somalia.
- 16 Colonialism left a durable imprint throughout the Horn. Ethiopia and Sudan had to resort to repressive measures or sheer force to control their peripheries, which were more riotous and turbulent than ever after being encouraged by the colonial experience to look for solutions of decentralization or separation (MARKAKIS 1998: 112). Around Mogadishu was established the first unitary Somali state that became the champion of Pan-Somalism. As far as Eritrea was concerned, it would have been very difficult to reconcile colonialism and post-colonialism. The Ethiopian monarchs of the twentieth century, Tewodros, Menelik and even Haile Selassie, all made access to the sea the keystone of their internal and external policy, to such an extent that this objective displaced the traditional drive for southwards expansion. Even in the UN debate over the ex-Italian colonies, the Ethiopian government did not insist upon its rights with respect to Somalia, where the Ethiopian rivers conclude their course, and focused all of its attention on Eritrea and its ports.³ Despite ethnic and linguistic affinities and the common footprints and ancient symbols transmitted by the *Kibre Negest*, pan-Ethiopian propaganda failed to conquer the hearts and minds of the Eritreans. Upon his return home from exile in England, Haile Selassie made appeals to both Ethiopia and Eritrea, but his words were caught differently on either side of the river that separated the two countries. The colonial administration in Eritrea, unlike Ethiopia, which was never colonized and truly tamed, had enough time to bring about a socio-economic and institutional reorganization. The feudal structure of landholding was disrupted by the introduction of private ownership and capitalist farming methods (TADDIA 1974 and 1979, HAILE MARIAM LAREBO 1994). The best lands were expropriated to facilitate the settlement of Italian families. The expansion of the cash economy

weakened the position of the traditional hierarchies, spawning the creation of a Western-oriented middle class.⁴ Under European rule, the Eritreans acquired a new mentality. For about half a century Italian was their *lingua franca*. The “unionism” (with Ethiopia) of the Christians of the plateau was contrasted by the “independentism” of the Muslims of the lowlands. UN approved a sort of compromise and established a federation between Eritrea, promoted to an autonomous unit, and the Empire of Ethiopia, that did not have any real chance of success (WRONG 2005).

The Eritrean nationalism

- 17 Italy defined boundaries of the political entities in the Horn, performing a typical function of colonialism in Africa: whereas Somalia was partially unified, Eritrea was divided by the Ethiopian Empire. Despite the absence of any real social cohesion, Italian colonialism managed over time to instil within the Eritreans an awareness of being a nation, especially among the city-dwellers or those who served in the bureaucracy and the army (ERLICH 1983: 4). The politicization of Eritrean society went on during the aforementioned British Military Administration, which lasted about ten years under a precarious and ill-defined mandate awaiting the verdict of the international diplomacy. Some historians and sociologists seem impressed with the economic progress, extension of education and political liberalization that occurred between 1941 and 1952 (TREVASKIS 1960). “For the first time in the history of Eritrea, the people were not only allowed but even encouraged to establish appropriate political organizations” (TEKESTE NEGASH 1997: 24). On the other hand, Britain cultivated factionalism and retained the schism between Islam and Christianity so as to prepare the division of the former Italian colony.
- 18 The political struggle to establish Eritrean nationalism was conditioned by notions borrowed from the European culture, but the principal points of reference were actually regionalism, communalism and religion. At the end of World War Two, the political body was still split along religious lines: “Christian highlanders, determined to break the link with Rome and fearful of Arab encroachment, looked to Addis Ababa for their salvation. In contrast, Arabic-speaking Moslems from the lowlands, worried about religious persecution if Eritrea became part of Christian Ethiopia, leaned towards independence” (WRONG 2005: 103). The nationalist project fully matured in reaction to the frustration of the Eritreans’ expectations, failure to provide for a decent standard of living, and the political oppression that followed the annexation by Ethiopia when the federal experiment was buried. Eritrean separatism was the political class’s response to re-colonization and to the Ethiopian government’s authoritarianism. In the war climate it would be relatively easy for the liberation fronts to project a national identity by simplifying the conflict: “we”, the fighters, on one side, against “them”, the Ethiopians, on the other, probably affecting the politics of the future independent government.
- 19 The guerrilla warfare instigated in the early 1960s by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) with the support of Egypt and other Arab states came to an end 30 years later, in May 1991, with the independence of Eritrea under the aegis of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF).⁵ David had defeated Goliath. In the very same days, the regime in Addis Ababa fell to the guerrilla headed by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The solidarity cemented by the war waged by the two winning movements

against the Derg inaugurated a period of detente on the Eritrea-Ethiopia front. The political consensus of the two governments depended on their capacity during the years of the war to provide their civilians with security and primary goods (PRENDERGAST and DUFFIELD 1999: 41). The EPLF supplied the TPLF with arms and logistical support. Eritrea's season of optimism, when everything seemed possible and the country knew an extraordinary euphoria and self-confidence, did not last long. To some extent, the "territorialization" carried out by Italy was rehabilitated with a posthumous, unexpected *revanche* of the colonial statecraft. Eritrea came back to its colonial separateness. The Republic of Somalia suffered the departure of the former British Somaliland that had merged with Italian Somalia in 1960, starting a new life as an independent state (albeit not recognized as such by the international diplomacy).

- 20 The border was essential for Eritrea's identity; its "nationhood" owed a lot to the establishment of the territory during colonialism. A border means either splitting or interplaying (GUAZZINI 1999). Colonialism had created or strengthened the border as a barrier enforcing a culture of written documents against African customs based upon facts. Reality or invention, Eritrea is to all effects an Italian artifact. Though there was always an aura of anti-colonialism in the Eritrean nationalist sentiment, colonialism actually made possible Eritrea's physical and moral detachment from Ethiopia. Italy and the powers have bargained the borders with Ethiopia and the old treaties were considered still valid by the rulers of independent Eritrea, after 1993. Since its vicissitudes, on the contrary, Ethiopia despised the colonial borders, which reminded the colonial usurpation and the loss of the access to the sea. For Ethiopia, colonialism represented a stigma that the authorities and popular sentiments never fail to evoke in opposition to Eritrea and its leadership in order to emphasize the authenticity, legitimacy and superiority of the Ethiopian state.

The plural stakes of the Ethio-Erythrean confrontation since the 1990s

- 21 The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia of 1998-2000 was a variant of the center-periphery dialectics and of the struggle between conservationists and revisionists (and diasporics) (MESFIN ARAYA 2000: 110).⁶ Officially, the conflict broke out because of a minor dispute over the border in an area where the boundaries had been negotiated by Menelik and the Italians in the final years of the 1800s.⁷
- 22 Addis Ababa had regained its central position. For the first time, the government in power recognized that Ethiopia was made up of a plurality of nations and sub-nations and that the periphery of the ex-empire had the same rights as the traditionally dominant elite. The undisclosed motive behind this re-thinking of Ethiopian statehood strangely resembled the strategy that had inspired Italian colonial politics: weaken and paralyze the Amharas as the interpreters of the perennity of Ethiopia and prop up minority groups with their own language. The ethnic federalism adopted by the Meles government for the new Ethiopia was feared in Asmara as a possible source of destabilization.
- 23 After the initial intimacy, the memory of the common war against the military regime in Addis as it had been lived by the two strong men of Addis Ababa and Asmara, Meles Zenawi and Isaias Afewerki, had become a source of uneasiness. It was humiliating for

Ethiopia to depend on, or give the impression of depending on, Eritrea, a small country that had been one of its provinces. The TPLF had originally looked northwards in defining its political mission, toying with the idea of Tigrayan independence or a Greater Tigray.⁸ But the EPLF's insensitivity to this cause persuaded Meles to instead face southwards and reconcile with Ethiopia.

- 24 The label of a "second independence war" employed by the Eritrean leadership in order to mobilize people's enthusiasm was baseless. The war which erupted in 1998 did not put Eritrea's sovereignty into question. In the new scenario, it was no longer vital for Ethiopia that *Mareb Mellash* make up part of its territory, provided Eritrea does not take on the role of a competing center. What was and is at stake between Ethiopia and Eritrea are resources (transit commerce and possibly smuggling, use of the ports) and immaterial goods as supremacy at the regional and international level.
- 25 Ethiopia has not taken full advantage of its semi-victory on the battlefield. A bloodshed conflict did not fulfill the principal political objective: ousting Isaias Afewerki. The ports remained a prohibited fruit. The fate of Massawa and Assab, now in the hands of an archenemy, weighs as a nightmare in the post-imperial Ethiopia too. In addition, the international commission charged to settle the boundary dispute stated that Badme, the most sensitive bone of contention, belonged to Eritrea.
- 26 In such a tense context, Meles Zenawi, who didn't abide by the verdict of the commission without suffering any international sanction, felt the "obligation" to launch a war in order to neutralize the "threat" irradiated by the turbulence in Somalia. Somalia cannot replace Eritrea in the regional policy of Ethiopia. The would-be access to the Red Sea across Somalia (the corridor to Zeila) implies a hegemonic remit on Somalia, which is doomed to ignite fierce opposition in the name of the historical rivalry between the two neighbors. Invading Somalia was a false step that for a while gathered the national sentiments of all the Somalis, behind the resistance headed by the Islamists. After all, Ethiopia cannot embrace on its turn the revisionism in contrast with its long tradition of *status quo* sponsor.
- 27 The target of the post-independence revisionism of Eritrea's government is undermining the strategic equilibrium throughout the Horn in an essentially anti-Addis perspective. Isaias doesn't miss any opportunity to embarrass Ethiopia (CALCHI NOVATI 2007). Eritrea pushed its revisionism up to bandwagon with the Islamic Courts and Jihadists linked to al-Qaeda in Somalia. In different circumstances, from the Cold War to the war on terror declared by George W. Bush and carried onward by Obama, Ethiopia has served the function of "Southern Tier", as a proxy of the USA. So, Ethiopia drove to recompose order in the Horn revitalizing the longstanding relations with the United States. The independence of Eritrea, the "missing link" to transform the Red Sea in an "Arab lake", was never totally safe for the strategic interests of the West and Eritrea cannot challenge the United States and Israel on this point. The risk for the both sides is confusion between the national causes and the global ones, increasing dangers and instability.

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FOOTNOTES

1. The case of the book is that the integration of non-Ethiopian populations into the Empire has been an act of subordination and of assimilation of populations already possessing historical affinities (p. 26). Contra, other authors overturn the thesis of the Great Tradition and support the theory of invention of the state or the nation (HOLCOMB and SISAI IBSSA 1990, SORENSON 1993).
2. A territorial adjustment in favor of the Somalis or Somalia occurred at the end of WWI, when Italy and England agreed after long and complex negotiations to give Italy sovereign power over Jubaland and Kisimaio (CALCHI NOVATI 1985).
3. Eritrea was the topic of two out the six memoranda composed by the Negus's advisor for juridical affairs, the American John Spencer, that Haile Selassie submitted to President Roosevelt at the February 1945 encounter in Egypt: one reconstructed the story of the sovereignty along the coast of Eritrea over the previous ten years and the other defended more generically Ethiopia's right to access to the sea but with an insistent reference to Eritrea (CALCHI NOVATI 1988, SPENCER 1987).
4. The origins of Eritrean nationalism are controversial and variously treated in literature (ALEMSEGED ABBAY 1989, POOL 2001, REDIE BEREKETEAB 2001, RUTH IYOB 1995, SORENSON 1991).
5. Formally the independence was proclaimed in May 1993 after a referendum.
6. Mesfin Araya argues that the two enemy and brother states suffered from a crisis of hegemony connected to the process of state-building carried out by the two Fronts in Addis and Asmara, each with its own story, a process that Mesfin himself calls a "passive revolution".
7. However, the underlying motives of the war were definitely more complex than the occasional *casus belli* (RUTH IYOB 2000, TEKESTE NEGASH and TRONVOLL 2001, JACQUIN-BERDAL and PLAUT 2004, BAHRU ZEWE 2006b).
8. The TPLF's program in 1976 called for the establishment of an independent republic of Tigray, but the EPLF's reaction to this design was decisively negative, and it pushed its brother-party, which at the time was perhaps its little brother, to instead fight for a democratic Ethiopia.

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The ‘Art of Not Being Governed’ in Ethiopia: Towards a more dynamic approach to the highlands/lowlands academic divide

Felix Girke

p. 13-25

Geography and the historiography of Ethiopia

- 1 The history of Ethiopia is complex for different reasons, more than the history of other nation-states might be. It encompasses millennia, in some places, and decades, in others, and has to contend with the interactions of an ever-changing multitude of individual and collective actors active in an expanding and retracting dynamic region, who are sometimes moving in and out of the historical record. As an anthropologist, I approach the Ethiopian historiography full of curiosity, as a source, as a context which provides the interpretive frame for the contemporary processes I am empirically researching: the south-western fringe of Ethiopia, the lowlands of the South Omo zone, a region often described in terms of amazement, considering the bewildering variety of linguistic and cultural variation, and the minuscule size of ethnicized polities found there today.
- 2 Even from this voluntarily chosen sideline, some observations regarding tendencies and patterns in the historiography of Ethiopia as it pertains to other disciplinary work are in order. Namely, to social and cultural anthropology, fields of research are already connected to history in a very essential way: heritage, ethno-genesis, genealogy, mythology, collective memory or trauma, and the grown web of group relations (cf. GABBERT and THUBAUVILLE 2010) are just some of the anthropological fields in which one cannot not draw on historical insights and partly methods. Having established this interdisciplinary entanglement, I want to go further. Anthropology is renowned for and defensive of its comparative tradition and aspirations (e.g., FOX and GINGRICH 2002) –

while specific comparative projects are often viewed controversially, the dedication to this ideal remains one of the discipline's rallying points. Accordingly, this paper traces a potentially fruitful analogy between Ethiopia and Southeast Asia, with the greater aims of (1) strengthening the relation between history and anthropology and (2) aiding a broader movement from ethnography towards explanation in the anthropology of Ethiopia.

- 3 But yet another field has to be added as a necessary component to our intercultural mix: a number of *Ethiopianist* scholars have already commented that in the historiography of Ethiopia, geography has not been taken sufficiently into account. To underwrite this claim, I offer some quotations.¹ Consider Clapham's contention, after exhausting some possible paradigms in his search for "a unifying history of the Horn":

But if the unifying theme is to be found neither in culture nor in conquest, it must be found instead in geography: in the ecological region defined by the twin plateaux bisected by the Great Rift, together with the neighbouring lowlands whose fate has been deeply affected by their intermediary position between the highlands and the sea. ... the sharply contrasting environments of highland, lowland and intermediate zones have shaped the peoples, cultures and political structures of the region as a whole. (CLAPHAM 2002: 47)

- 4 An earlier voice, Harold Fleming, in commenting on D. Levine's polarizing *Greater Ethiopia*, noted that the geographical work that had been done in Ethiopia in the early 20th century was little regarded by those writing the grand 'Semiticist' histories of the region (1976: 260f). The reason he gives for this disregard is that other paradigms were preferred in making the idea of "Ethiopia" into a coherent whole – such as "cultural traits" by Levine himself. The nitty-gritty of geography with its very material empirical basis apparently stood in the way of grand(er) theory aimed at the theme of "fundamental Ethiopian unity" (1976: 266). But beyond pointing out blind spots, Fleming is not above naming candidates regarding the "obvious causes of Ethiopian political integration and cultural similarity" (1976: 267):

... the physical environment. There is a real Ethiopia, a territory well marked from others, an entity visible from the air. [...] [I]ts normal condition is separation by a clear geographical gap or change, either mountain or desert. True, there are sharp changes within Ethiopia, for example across the major river valleys, but rarely does the traveller lose sight of the common set of plateaus and mountains. I suspect that Ethiopians share this perspective; many that I know personally certainly do. (FLEMING 1976: 268)

- 5 While many Ethiopians whom I know have never seen a plateau,² the claim is at least helpful in pointing out just how much the physical environment has the potential to shape a (collective) Self. Finally, while not explicitly criticizing those who came before him, John Markakis puts emphasis on the relevance of geographical features in the strongest terms:

A clear distinction can be drawn physically and otherwise between the highlands, both north and south, and the surrounding lowlands, and a line can be drawn on the map to trace the escarpment that marks the boundary between them. Vital differences in geomorphology, altitude, flora and fauna endowment have shaped ways of life that are fundamentally different. No real effort was made to bridge the chasm until the coming of the 21st century. (MARKAKIS 2011: 15)

- 6 What might be the single most relevant geographical feature hinted at in these quotes is the clear and yet complex difference between the Ethiopian high- and lowlands.³ This binary stands at the centre of my problematic, and it was recently and very visibly

identified as one of “The last two frontiers” of Ethiopia (MARKAKIS 2011), as a long-standing and unyielding barrier to projects of national integration.⁴ The history of that (second) frontier and its staying power matter a great deal for the national integration process:

[N]ature in the lowland periphery posed every imaginable obstruction to integration. It created immense obstacles to transportation and communication that have yet to be overcome, and presented mortal hazards to the health and welfare of highlanders who have ventured there; as a result, very few have done so. The pastoralist economy did not lend itself easily to surplus extraction, while the peripatetic mode of life and independent ways of the herders defied efforts to control them. Consequently, the process of integration halted at the edge of the escarpment for nearly a century, and resumed only at the turn of the 21st century. (MARKAKIS 2011: 44)

- 7 The actors driving state-building considered integrating the lowlands “uneconomical” (2011: 134), a view that is only changing now in the face of the “lowland’s resources – land, water, minerals – [which] are expected to play a primary role” in Ethiopia’s “escape from poverty” (2011: 358). This general neglect went along with a historiography “written to celebrate the exploits of state builders and rulers” (2011: 19). The frontier, then, exists, and is geographical as well as socio-political, and influences images of Self and Other on either side of it.
- 8 While this is relevant to research, and people seem aware of it, there is little theoretical engagement with the precise structure and location of the frontier, and little analysis of how, through which mechanisms, it shaped the contemporary societies anthropology deals with.
- 9 The arguably analogous pattern found in Southeast Asia is developed most expressively in the recent work of the political scientist (with strong anthropological and historical bents) James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed* (2009). He, too, finds a strong conceptual and practical divide between highlands and lowlands, between state centres and marginal tribal populations. Interestingly, for his insights to apply to Ethiopia, he has to be turned on his head.

Southeast-Asian parallels

- 10 Scott is interested in what he calls “shatter zones”, at first recognizable by means of these features: “The diagnostic characteristics of shatter zones are their relative geographical inaccessibility and the enormous diversity of tongues and cultures” (2009: 8). Already at first glance, this characterization is a dead ringer for the diversity well familiar from South Omo.⁵
- 11 What else does Scott have to say about shatter zones? An alternative term he uses is “zones of refuge ... regions of bewildering ethnic and linguistic complexity” (2009: 7), and the use of the term “refuge” indicates that “shatter zones” do not simply exist; they are caused by human action. To understand this dynamic, we need to realize what the “other” is to Scott’s “shatter zone” – it is the centralized state. Now, “state” here does not refer to only the largest formations; “state” refers in general to dense agglomerations of population under a strong leadership, which are expansionary, which by means of sedentary agriculture create a surplus to sustain a ruling class (including a non-productive religious elite), which have at least some basic bureaucracy

(Scott emphasizes writing, see below), and which hold an officially-sanctioned ideology that only their way of life is civilized, and that everybody else is – by default – a barbarian, on a lower scale of human social evolution. Such centres, the term I will be using to strip away the assumptions which go along with the use of “states”, are marked in their desire for manpower: they need people to work the highly intensive fields (*padi* rice in the Southeast Asian example), for general labour, and they need soldiers. As Scott emphasizes, by means of their bureaucracy and hierarchy, centres “possessed a singular strategic and military advantage in their capacity to concentrate manpower and foodstuffs in one place” (2009: 5). For this to work, then, these centres had to maintain coercion over their realm, extract taxes, and control populations, whom they sought to standardize in terms of culture, religion and ethnicity. Here is where the “zones of refuge” come in: not everybody considered this the best life. At all times, according to Scott, people were wont to elope, individually and in (kin) groups, and would seek to establish themselves beyond the reach of the centre, somewhere where they would not be taxed, and would not have to serve in wars fought between centres for the benefit of their rulers.

- 12 Hence, people sought refuge in an ungoverned periphery, “a periphery that was composed as much of refugees as of peoples who had never been state subjects” (2009: 7). This periphery, this frontier, presented an opportunity just as much as a problem for the centre: unruly, hardly docile, but rather unorganized, the self-governing people there could be raided and enslaved by the superior military of the centre, but – more problematically – their lifestyle “represented a constant temptation, a constant alternative to life within the state” (2009: 6). Even-handedly, Scott points out that a “wealthy and peaceful state centre might attract a growing population that found its advantages rewarding” (2009: 7). One direct consequence of this dynamic is that it denies the basic civilizational-evolutionary narrative of the centre – as Ernest Gellner called it in his *Saints of the Atlas*, this “marginal tribalism” derives from the “inconveniences of submission” and seeks to “withdraw from political authority. [...] Such tribalism is politically marginal. It knows what it rejects” (1969: 1-2, quoted in SCOTT 2009: 30). For Scott, it is “deliberate and reactive statelessness” (2009: x). Recognizing the complementarity of hills and lowlands ecology, and the resulting economic relations, he explains even more explicitly what might well have been the viewpoint of the people entering the “zones of refuge”:

These stateless people were not, by and large, easily drawn into the fiscally legible economy of wage labour and sedentary agriculture. On this definition, ‘civilization’ held little attraction for them when they could have all the advantage of trade without the drudgery, subordination, and immobility of state subjects. (SCOTT 2009: 10)

- 13 Having said that the centre is expansionary, intent on growth always, why is the periphery where these alternative social projects are implemented, not simply absorbed and integrated? The answer is geography. In Southeast Asia, the shatter zones are all found in more elevated areas, whereas the centres are located in the lowlands where the ecological conditions suited for the intensive *padi* agriculture are found. The hills do not lend themselves to rice farming easily; they produce less surplus than the lowlands, they are decentralized and difficult to access (especially with an eye on extraction, as the centres were wont to have). Their occupants were mostly engaged in “foraging, hunting, shifting cultivation, fishing, and pastoralism,” modes of production “fundamentally intractable to state appropriation,” making them “fiscally sterile”

(2009: 5f). This is to say that in the highlands, the lowland centres could not gain permanent footholds in any efficient manner, as the entire mode of production and governance was predicated upon relative ease of transport and feasibility of intense agriculture.

- 14 These potentially tempting aspects of the Southeast Asian highlands had of course to be gainsaid by the dominant discourse – most pithily, in Scott’s words, this had the effect that “‘Hilliness’ per se is disqualifying” (2009: 100) in the value system of the lowlands. More broadly, it was the case that the rather egalitarian political system of the highlands was disparaged for not having a “court and the king at its apex” (*Ibid.*), that the modes of production were labelled as primitive, and that their lack of literacy was a “diagnostic feature of the condition of barbarism” (2009: 220). Obviously, these are all ideological acts of (auto-?)persuasion: neither social evolution nor any other normative frame will truly illuminate these clear distinctions between high- and lowlands. It is at this point that Scott makes his most innovative point: the refugee populations have not only made a choice in their “deliberate statelessness”, in absconding from the control of the centre – their social organization and their mode of production are results of choices, too: it is “secondary primitivism”:

Their subsistence routines, their social organization, their physical dispersal, and many elements of their culture, far from being the archaic traits of a people left behind, are purposefully crafted both to thwart incorporation into nearby states and to minimize the likelihood that state like concentrations of power will arise among them. State evasion and state prevention permeate their practices and, often, their ideology as well. (SCOTT 2009: 8)

- 15 So, these people are not “backward” at all – they have over time adapted to a natural as well as to a macro-political environment. Consider the typical “swiddening” (shifting) crops Scott mentions: maize and cassava are his prime examples (once they were introduced from the new world). Both can be termed “escape crops” for their advantages in practiced “state evasion.” Maize “matured quickly; it could be used as fodder; it stored well if dried”, etc. (2009: 201); but most of all, maize grows under all sorts of conditions, is rather hardy, and can thus be used to colonize zones in which other staple crops would find neither sufficient water nor nutrients. Cassava, in turn, “could be grown almost anywhere under an amazing variety of conditions. [...] It is ideal for opening up new land; it is drought resistant; it will tolerate soils in which virtually nothing can be grown... [...] ... it can be allowed to ripen and left in the ground until needed” (2009: 205f). It requires “the least labour for the greatest return” (2009: 206). The existence of these crops created opportunities, and left people with choices; the existence of these crops, at the same time, was “a threat to state-making” (*Ibid.*). Beyond these very material elements of centre evasion, there is also social organization to consider:

Social structure, like agricultural technique, is not a given; it is substantially, especially over time, a choice. Much of that choice is in a broad sense political. [...] Social structure, in this view, ought to be seen not as a permanent social trait of a community but rather as a variable, one of the purposes of which is to regulate relations with the surrounding field of power. [...] Broadly speaking, whenever a society or part of a society elects to evade incorporation or appropriation, it moves toward simpler, smaller, and more dispersed social units... (SCOTT 2009: 207f)

- 16 This entails a preference for flat hierarchies and a-cephalous leadership – where there is no local chief, even indirect rule is severely hampered. Most anthropologists are familiar with E. Leach’s *Political Systems of Highland Burma*, certainly one of Scott’s

inspirations, where it is argued that the Kachin hill tribes were oscillating between allowing strong leaders to emerge and rule, and subsequently overthrowing them again in favour of an egalitarian system (1954, compare GIRKE 2011). Here, people tend towards certain kinds of social structure that are today described as “illegible”, that is, difficult to even properly conceptualize from a typologizing and classifying bureaucratic logic. In the shatter zones, people will be able to plausibly represent a number of “identities”, and usually speak several languages for the purposes of trade or communication with outsider populations. So not only can people undetectably (for an outsider) change their spots; on a collective level, structural dissimulation goes even further by “producing a simulacrum of chiefly authority without its substance” to merely act as liaison with the centre (2009: 213).

17 Some other points from Scott are worth reiterating:

1. “[A] distinction in political status is ethnically coded as if it were a fundamental difference in kinds of people and not a political choice. [...] Ethnicity and tribe began, by definition, where sovereignty and taxes ended” (2009: 32). This is relevant in that it reveals one mechanism of “othering” which certainly served well to discourage further out-migration: if those others in the hills are understood as ethnically (read: essentially) different from the self, the attractiveness of their way of life is lessened and one incentive to join them is removed.

2. Scott also talks about “dissimulation”, the process by which people actively make themselves “less similar” vis-à-vis each other or the state: “the more or less purposeful creation of cultural distance between societies” (2009: 173f). This is relevant in that it shows how polities stake out claims over ecological niches and habitats, and strengthen their identity claims by the “adoption and maintenance of linguistic differences, of distinctive histories, of differences in attire, burial and marriage rites, housing styles, forms of cultivation, and altitude” (*Ibid.*). This idea should supersede naïve culturalist approaches which assume that customs and material culture form a coherent whole and are a given (and not a taken) of communal life.

3. Even literacy, that great benchmark, might at times have been conveniently “forgotten” by populations removing themselves from the state. Scott treads rather carefully here, as evidence is thinner than elsewhere, but just the suggestion that societies could be *post-literate* rather than non-literate is bold:

If swiddening and dispersal are subsistence strategies that impede appropriation; if social fragmentation and acephaly hinder state incorporation; then, by the same token, the absence of writing and texts provides a freedom of manoeuvre in history, genealogy, and legibility that frustrates state routines. (SCOTT 2009: 220)

18 Of course, it does not need abandoning literacy to manipulate the past. There lies a power in forgetting if one wants to start over, as “any genealogy, even in oral form, represents a strategic positioning vis-à-vis other groups” (2009: 235): it entails normative and empirical claims, and enables “status-building”. To forget genealogy is an important levelling device and serves to prevent the emergence of hierarchies, just the thing these escape populations of Southeast Asia had been fleeing *from*.

19 To summarize, shatter zones then have to be conceptualized as hugely complex, historically emergent constellations of migration as well as autochthony, within which people always keep an eye out for an encroaching centre, as well as their marginal

neighbours. There is little homogeneity even within polities styling themselves for practical reasons a “tribe” or some such; “processes of cultural drift and differentiation” (SCOTT2009: 264) ensure that any attempt to trace coherent and bounded group identities must run afoul of both intentionally deceptive agendas of state evasion as well as adaptive practices which care little about typology and un-ambiguity.

- 20 I have not yet mentioned a central one of Scott’s objectives – the demarcation of what is there called “Zomia”, an immense part of Southeast Asia marked by its altitude. Zomia provided space for people to establish their zones of refuge, to escape from the lowlands centres, and is therefore marked by very similar structural processes all over, despite fundamental cultural and linguistic differences between the various populations. Zomia provides his examples, and by focusing on this refuge of the disenfranchised, he also seeks to “write in” the occupants of the highlands into the narratives of Southeast Asian political history, from which they have been largely absent, in favour of the lowlands states and petty kingdoms, which left a so much more tangible documentation. In this context I want to briefly turn to Scott’s expert critics. A thorough and even-handed review of his book raises the following issues:

Its evidential base is often too weak to support its theoretical superstructure. Despite or because of its claims to be ‘an anarchist history’, its view of the Southeast Asian state is curiously a-historical. Most critically, in analysing upland behaviour, the book leans to mono-causal explanations focused on lowland provocation, to the virtual neglect of dynamics within the highlands themselves. (LIEBERMAN 2010: 336)

- 21 The review points to “factual errors that do not touch Scott’s main thesis directly nonetheless erode his credibility as a guide to pre-colonial society and history” (2010: 337). Furthermore, Scott’s emphasis on the role of manpower for the political economy of the day is allegedly overstated (2010: 338). Finally, “[e]vidence for massive, sustained flight from the lowlands to Zomia is thin. Evidence for deportations from Zomia to the lowlands is better, but still limited. And the implications of both types of displacement are ambiguous” (2010: 339). This strikes at the heart of Scott’s argument – are the people of the highlands not actually a “fugitive population”? It turns out that some of them probably are, while some of them probably are not (2010: 339f), so that the criticism targets not so much Scott’s model as such but rather its applicability to all the cases to which he applied it, i.e., it is the postulated uniformity of the Zomia region that is doubtful. It is for this reason that I fear to tread in the field of Ethiopian historiography, or of the Horn as a whole. I have little interest in trying to recreate an African version of Zomia. Instead, I pursue a methodological approach by developing a (sensitizing) model that can be tested against contemporary empirical reality.

Deriving a theoretical model

- 22 Scott is aware of the comparative potential of his approach: “The comparative study of such shatter zones of refuge would, despite their geographical, cultural, and temporal dispersion, share a few common, diagnostic characteristics” (2009: 329; see also 2011). Specifically, he mentions “ethnic and linguistic complexity and fluidity” in “remote, marginal areas”; “subsistence routines that maximize dispersion, mobility, and resistance to appropriation”; and societies that “present to the outside world a kind of formlessness that offers no institutional point of entry”, marked by “strong, even

fierce, traditions of egalitarianism and autonomy both at the village and familial level” (2009: 329).

- 23 A model, as I am pursuing it, needs to do two things: it must be based on significant correlations suggesting a causal connection, and it must specify the conditions of its own applicability. In this perspective, the list above offers a good start for the second of these tasks. How do we know we might be facing a shatter zone? What does diagnosing a shatter zone tell us about how to deal with the empirical facts on the ground?
- 24 The way to apply this to the Ethiopian context is apparent. While the Southeast Asian situation is reversed in a purely formal way, with the Ethiopian centre stably located in the highlands, and the lowlands being the problematic frontier, the homologies are striking. In the presence of great cultural and linguistic diversity combined with relatively small and little structured social formations at a place where topography changes significantly, then, the model sensitizes us to look anew at things long familiar, and encourages us to rethink our previous understandings. Where we saw social evolution or historical continuity before, where we saw stable formations over time, where we saw cultural specificity or diffusion of traits, we are now forced to discard any *a priori* assumptions (often supported by people’s self-characterization) about some sort of “natural” development: we need to look at practices, discourses and ideologies as possibly the results of choices in the *longue durée*.
- 25 The problem, of course, is the thin historical record in Ethiopia, once we leave the highlands of the Imperial core; reconstruction of earlier or ongoing escape mechanisms must therefore proceed carefully. However, we do find some support for such a project in the by now classic work of Kopytoff, and the recent *magnum opus* by Markakis, both of whom try to establish a sense for the patterns in which the African frontier needs to be understood.
- 26 Kopytoff’s introductory contention predates Scott’s work considerably, and makes much of the same points. Disavowing the historically continuous development of “tribes” out of some essentialist “ethnic germs”, he appreciates that groups in the periphery are the result of *bricolage*:

The frontier perspective here is that of the local frontier, lying at the fringes of the numerous established African societies. It is on such frontiers that most African polities and societies have, so to speak, been ‘constructed’ out of the bits and pieces – human and cultural – of existing societies. This posits a process in which incipient small polities are produced by other similar and usually more complex societies. (KOPYTOFF 1986: 3)
- 27 Rather than talking about “states”, his term for the centre is the “metropole”, from which people split off as “frontiersmen”, bent on colonizing some more virgin territory. His stance is less anarchist than Scott’s; rather than ascribing to people a desire to escape domination by a state, he suggests that “traditional African societies were characterized by a social dynamic that periodically ejected people out of their kin groups, communities, and polities” (1986: 16, 18), a much more neutral rendering. He is less concerned with the reasons for departure, though he does mention the “the movement of the disgruntled, the victimized, the exiled, the refugees, the losers in internecine struggles, the adventurous, and the ambitious” (1986: 18), and more interested in the events at the eventual destination reached by the frontiersmen – how do they legitimize their conquest? How do they (re-)conceptualize the inevitably encountered indigenous populations? Kopytoff’s data from all over Africa suggest that

there are, in fact, patterns to these schisms away from the “metropole”. Relevantly, for him it is not a given that the frontiersmen will establish a truly alternative social project. They may, in fact, remain culturally conservative and maintain close ties to their “metropolises” and even guard customs and “pre-existing conceptions of social order” more closely than the heartland does (1986: 33). He also sees the political formations and modes of production as “manpower systems”, usually unwilling to let go of population, and thus always in the business of denigrating and disparaging other modes of livelihood. His approach is well-suited to deal with the inherent problematic of historical consciousness:

It is a commonplace observation that, in Africa as elsewhere, historical accounts often contain contradictions because various elements and factions in a polity advance those versions of the charter that are most favourable to them. But the contradictions in the charters of African polities went beyond that. Some of their consistent inconsistencies were systemic responses to the contradictory needs embedded in the very genesis of the polities as frontier formations: their charters sought to embody both independence and links with other polities, much as they embodied the contradictory perspectives of the ruler and the ruled. The two features were not unrelated. (KOPYTOFF 1986: 74)

28 Kopytoff turns out to be a strong proponent of the frontiersmen’s creativity, their political skill, and the basic fact that the population of the frontier must always be understood as relating to the centres they split off from.

29 Another scholar of (East) Africa, John Markakis, looking at the ethnical as well as empirical and methodological question of the highland-lowland frontier of Ethiopia, would seem to agree with Scott’s characterization of “shatter zones” and their relation to the state:

Sharing an ecological niche and living in physical proximity, they interact in many ways and have common historical experiences. Even so, they defend their distinct identities and cultural integrity with tenacity in the face of an onslaught from many sides to ‘civilise’ and integrate them into the state that claims them as subjects. (MARKAKIS 2011: 65)

30 But even he does not examine very closely the possibility that the fact that “the pastoral economy did not lend itself easily to surplus extraction” (2011: 44) might have resulted from the *choices* made by actors in the periphery in regard to their mode of production, their social formation, and their habitat. He hints at the important role of population shifts (2011: 27-29), and his periphery exhibits “ways of life that are fundamentally different” (2011: 15), but that they might be so in deliberate reaction to the imperial centre remains at best unsaid.⁶

Conclusion: the model summarized and applied

31 Shatter zones are diagnosed by cultural and linguistic diversity, and located at some topographic barrier, most likely a shift between altitudes. The population of such shatter zones consists of autochthones as well as of descendants from recurrent and possibly ongoing waves of migration. To establish a new sociality on the frontier, which aides in the political project of state evasion, people find it useful to adopt escape crops, selectively forget their history and genealogy and possibly adopt new roots and claims about their past and kinship ties. These populations usually seek to level hierarchies among them, adopting rather egalitarian systems, and are often very ready

to adopt newcomers into their established kinship structures. These populations are aware of centralized states and proto-states in their vicinity, and react to them in a considered, distrustful and deliberate way. They value their autonomy, and underline it by dissimulation. The centres, in turn, disparage the inhabitants of tribal zones as ‘barbarians’ and ethnicize them to further highlight their otherness, all in order to reduce the attraction of the frontier to their own disgruntled subjects. At times, the centre will be able to coercively exploit the shatter zone, while remaining unable to integrate it into its apparatus for mostly economic and geographical reasons. At times, the relationship might change and the centre might appear attractive (when prosperous and peaceful), leading to re-migration from the frontier.

32 Below, I offer three brief examples from the existing South Omo ethnography that point to the potential of transporting Scott’s model to Ethiopia. The geographical aspect of this frontier is clear – the Omo Valley is as low as 400-odd m NN in the Kara and Dassanech territories – and the historical rulers and settlers have generally considered the South Omo ecology as hellish. At the same time, all the narratives on migration towards the Omo Valley point downward, the river and the unclaimed or untamed lands providing the destination of the arrival stories. More such examples could be easily assembled, especially from David Turton’s work on the migration of the Mursi (see TURTON 1979 and later works).

- Already in the 1970s, Strecker pointed out how the Hamar changed their mode of subsistence “after the Ethiopian conquest” to rely more on mobile pastoralism and less on sedentary agriculture “in order to escape systematic exploitation” (1976: 49f), a clear evidence of an escape practice. He contends that the Hamar should not be reduced to being pastoralists, even if that part of their livelihood appears more striking, as they have a “deeply determined cultural interest in cultivation” (1976: 50), and pursue pastoralism for pragmatic reasons.
- The depth of Kara genealogy is severely limited. While this is often blamed on the catastrophic events of sleeping sickness and flood (cf. BASSI 2011), it is nevertheless striking that for many people, the third ancestor generation is already considered irrelevant or unknown. This corresponds to assessments timing the arrival of the (proto-)Kara in the Omo Valley around the 18th (or early 19th) century, and supports the assumption that they represented a group splitting off from a larger South Omotic cluster in the hills to the East (GIRKE 2011).
- South Omo is well-known for the strategic interdependences found – the Arbore, for example, require honey for essential rituals, but (until very recently) refused to produce it themselves, instead having to rely on exchange with their Hamar and Borana neighbours, uncertain allies at the best of times (see MARKAKIS 2011: 72 on “markers of exclusiveness”). This adoption of such diagnostic features seems the result of a choice to distinguish oneself from one’s neighbours and thus to support one’s claims to identity and autonomy (compare GIRKE 2008, Ch. 5).

33 Based on the available ethnography, these three examples illustrate how James Scott’s work on the “shatter zones” in Southeast Asia might provide the anthropology of Ethiopia with the opportunity of going beyond the descriptions of cultural “heartlands” (compare KOPYTOFF 1986: 5). Scott suggests that the so-called “tribes” have been aware of larger reference frames for a long time, and of what greater proximity to the centre they might locally cause: their whole existence might in fact be predicated upon this realization. His interpretation stresses that their livelihood does not reflect any

putative 'barbarian' or 'primitive' social organization, but rather results from their political choices. Sensitized by geography, Scott refuses to take for granted that the habitat of marginal groups is merely coincidental or given. In this perspective, their ambivalent 'marginality' only constitutes one part of a potentially much larger dynamic: while 'downwardness' in Ethiopia might be negatively charged and conflated with backwardness vis-à-vis the centre, as is 'upwardness' in Southeast Asia, the act of moving down and away from a symbolically and geographically elevated centre can be regarded as a choice. Though this application of Scott's model in Ethiopia remains preliminary and testable, the interdisciplinary sensitizing device it promotes may soon open new roads of academic questioning.

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FOOTNOTES

1. This paper neither sets out to disparage specific scholarly projects, nor to reinvent the wheel. Instead, it draws together seemingly disparate strands of thought to open up a perspective on ethno-genesis and the linguistic, cultural and structural patchwork found in much of the Ethiopian periphery. I quote general reflections on Ethiopian history rather than specific ethnographies, even as the latter serve as the prime beneficiaries of the model advanced here. I do not want to criticize those who came before, but sensitize those who follow.
2. Of course, there are "many rural societies in the highlands which are just as politically marginal as the south ... This shows that ultimately the notion of centre-periphery relations should not be based on geographical and structural criteria, but primarily on the a model of the structure and distribution of political power" (ABBINK 2002: 157). Markakis supports this: "What distinguishes the centre from the periphery is not simply geography, though this is often a salient feature. [...] What defines the periphery is its marginal position in the power structure of the state" (2011: 7). But this is no general indictment of geography-minded approaches, just of those naively correlating linear distance with marginality. The proposed model neither focuses marginality as such, nor is it primarily concerned with power relations; where it is, it looks at how geography factors in what Abbink calls the "model of the structure and distribution of political power".
3. Markakis calls it a "multi-faceted contrast" (2011: 23).
4. Markakis locates this other frontier – the "first" to the lowland periphery's "second" one – between the highland centre and the highland periphery, as if echoing Abbink (see fn. 2). However, *pace* Abbink, Markakis leaves no doubt that at the second frontier, "the integration process has barely begun", and there it faces "greater obstacles" (2011: 15).
5. The wording is also reminiscent of Jensen's "Volkstrümmer Südbessyniens" (1936), by which he mostly meant the interstitial Oromo populations the Frobenius-Expedition encountered.

“Volkstrümmer” is no longer a current term in German; a brief search indicates that it used to be applied mostly with a pejorative intent, referring to populations who once might have been complete “Völker”, but (presumably) got “zertrümmert” (shattered, quite literally) by other, stronger populations. The implicit normative criterion and social Darwinist model is very much lacking from Scott’s use of “shatter zones”.

6. He does pick up Turton’s story of the Mursi, who in the early 20th century were traumatized by direct contact with imperial troops and the existence of a much larger context which they had not fathomed – their “Mursi-centric world-view” was shattered (MARKAKIS 2011: 358, TURTON 2004: 15ff). According to Turton, they then embarked on a “strategy of avoidance” (2004: 16), quite clearly related to Scott’s evasive techniques. Even as the Mursi might not have had contact with the Ethiopian state proper, it is hard to imagine that during their migration, evocatively surmised by Turton, they did never have contact with a more centralized polity.

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New Trends, Old Views: The Ambivalent Centre/Periphery Paradigm in Ethiopian Studies

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p. 27-40

- 1 How the center/periphery relations in the Ethiopian political space has been understood in Ethiopian studies can only be explained in a historical perspective taking into consideration the representations transmitted by European and Arab travellers, as well as Ethiopian Muslim or Christian writings since the Middle Ages (DERAT 2003: 31-49). This mental map has also been dominant in contemporary Ethiopian studies (SHERMAN 1979, TRIULZI 1984, DONHAM and JAMES 1986, JAMES *et. al.* 2002). Considering the social, economic and political trajectories of the Ethiopian state in terms of centres and peripheries has become a “Great tradition” of the Ethiopian studies.¹
- 2 The interpretation of state formation through centre/periphery models echoes the Western scholars’ theories considering state formation as a process of monopolization (ELIAS 1975), resulting from empire-building (EISENSTADT 1963, GALTUNG 1980, GODELIER 1980), collapse (ROKKAN 1980, ROKKAN and URWIN 1983) or internal colonialism (HECHTER 1975). These works propose specific readings of the complex processes of state formation, in which the centre/periphery dichotomy is essential. In essence, the ‘centre’ is seen as a ‘core’ expanding its domination towards, or permeating the ‘peripheries’, with the latter either resisting the “embryonic state” or benefiting from the opportunities it offers (EISENSTADT 1980: 674, ROKKAN and URWIN 1983). It is worth noting that this process is not only physical (military, administrative or financial), but also symbolic (BOURDIEU 1993). It underlines the plural representations of the state and determines the behaviours of the state and non-state agents. Thus, the centre/periphery perception of the political space is rooted in an asymmetric relationship of coercion, domination, dependence, resistance or negotiation.
- 3 Such a perception bears strong political, religious or mythological symbolism that shapes the mental maps of a political space and its subjective frontiers (GOTTMAN 1974,

STRASSOLDO 1980). The centre-periphery *theme* offers a very fluid and open access to competing representations of our societies and the process through which they were built, from Plato, Montesquieu, Tocqueville or Weber, to the contemporary *models* of this duality, across different ideological or disciplinary backgrounds (COMPAGNA and MUSCARA 1980, BACH 2011). Initially modelled to interpret the development of national or international political systems – through liberal theories or neo-Marxist approaches of dependency, the centre/periphery perspective has been criticized for its evolutionist, dualist, diffusionist or functionalist trends and was almost abandoned during the last decades (HARVEY 1973, MCKENZIE 1977, BADIE 1984, BOURMAUD 1997). However, as a common mental map, the centre/periphery *theme* is still very present in the current academic field of the Ethiopian studies. This article precisely argues that the centre/periphery *theme* may be relevant only if the centre/periphery prism and its *models* are submitted to a critical examination, which is the aim of the article.

- 4 In Ethiopian studies, the centre/periphery theme mostly derives from academic, ideological and political biases considering the ‘modern’ Ethiopian state as the extension of a political core (the Shāwa region) towards its conquered peripheries, since the second half of the 19th century. It is believed that the current Ethiopian state has its roots in the empire built by Menilek II (r.1889-1913) whose borders have remained almost unchanged (except Eritrea’s independence in 1993). This historical trajectory gives the Ethiopian state something particular: contrary to the majority of the African, European or Asian states, Ethiopia has inherited the territorial legacy of Menilek’s expansion, through the transformation and re-invention of an empire into a ‘modern’ state within the same borders. But territorial inheritances, as well as imperial historiographies, symbols and mythologies, are still more or less violently contested by Ethiopian opponents or rebel fighters from the conquered peripheries (like the Somali Ogaden National Liberation Front for example) (MEDHANE TADESSE 1999; MERERA GUDINA 2006). In the core of these interpretations of history and state building that shape today’s Ethiopia, the centre/periphery dichotomy is still determinant. This might be partly explained by the still centralised practice of power by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) since 1991.² The 1995 Constitution that established the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was supposed to break with the past imperial and military centralism. Nevertheless, many studies have demonstrated how centralized the regime has remained (TRONVOLL and VAUGHAN 2003, BARNES and OSMOND 1999, PLANEL 2008, ABBINK and HAGMANN 2011).
- 5 The centralized regime of the EPRDF also partly explains why Ethiopian politics and Ethiopian studies have so great difficulties in rethinking the political and mental map of Ethiopia out of the centre/periphery dichotomy (JAMES *et. al.* 2002). Precisely, this duality is still used to qualify the conflicts between the central government and its opponents in the regions, stressing the strong continuity between the past and present conflicts opposing a ‘centre’ and its ‘peripheries’ (GEBRU TAREKE 2009: 85, MARKAKIS and FUKUI 1994).
- 6 This paper aims at explaining the imposition of this mental map. Anchored in the geographical and historical representations of Menilek’s conquests from central Shāwa, this perception had been fuelled by contesting academic and political historiographies. As a turning point in the shaping of Ethiopia’s political space, the reign of Menilek II largely conditioned the centre/periphery vision of the state and non-state agents. However, this perspective presents several shortfalls, limiting its capacity to fairly

interpret the conflicting history that shaped the Ethiopian state formation since the 19th century.³

A historical tradition rooted in the academic declensions of the centre/periphery paradigm

- 7 Nowadays, the idea of a ‘Christian core’ surrounded by ‘Muslim peripheries’ remains obvious in the academic field of Ethiopian studies. Fostered by the recent emergence of radical Islamist movements in Somalia, the studies on the Ethiopian Muslim ‘peripheries’ tend to be systematically associated with instability and political threats (ABDUL MOHAMMED 2007).
- 8 Nevertheless, as Manuel João Ramos rightly notices, “these long-accepted assumptions about the view of the ‘beleaguered Christian fortress’ have been progressively challenged by recent historiography (HUSSEIN 1992, 2000, CARMICHAEL 1996, BRAUKÄMPER 2002, MARKAKIS 2003) and by a string of sociological, anthropological and political studies on Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia (ABBINK 1998, FICQUET 2007, DESPLAT and ØSTEBØ 2012, among others)” (RAMOS 2013: 14).
- 9 Thus, whereas the very ancient presence of Islam in the region is today clearly attested, the growing popularity of the current claims on the founding Christian ‘Eternal Ethiopia’ (LEVINE 1965) unveils both the ideological and the performative nature of the centre/periphery fictions, in the past and present historiographic tradition of the country.
- 10 In the beginning of the 1870s, Menilek, the then king (*negus*) of Shāwa, started a vast military campaign, the success of which inaugurated the emergence of the contemporary modern Ethiopian state and the transformation of the former imperial marches into new international borders (MARCUS 2002). This military, political, economic and mental map was confirmed with the foundation of Addis Ababa as the capital city in the 1880s (marking the end of the itinerant court), the establishment of commercial and diplomatic representations in this new centre, and the completion of the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway, two decades later. Since then, the Ethiopian political space has been mainly perceived from the perspective of a radiating centre, where Addis Ababa, Shāwa, the State, the Amhara-Tigray culture, and the King alternatively appear as the historic centre (CLAPHAM 1975, SHERMAN 1979, BUREAU 1985: 1381). The traditional distinction between *agär* (“country”) and *dar agär* (“far country, frontier country”) seems to have exercised great influence, where *dar agär* appears as the “periphery” as opposed to *agär*, *i.e.* the “centre”, the core of the State, the Christian Orthodox Church and the *Habäsha* culture (ASMELASH BEYENE 1984, BUREAU 1993: 53, FONTRIER 1999: 11, GASCON 2006: 73).
- 11 Sherman (1979) also focuses on the history of centre/periphery relationships in Ethiopia. Interestingly, he is the first to propose a definition of the Ethiopian “centre” out of its relationships with its peripheries. Based on Shils’s conceptions of the “central institutional system” and “central value system”, Sherman defends a societal approach, considering that the economic, political, religious and cultural policies radiate from the state – defined as a ‘centre’ – and impact the whole society – or ‘periphery’. Sherman also values the importance of Menilek’s reign in the building of a strong cultural centre, incarnating the Christian Amhara kingdom of Shāwa, and radiating toward its

peripheries. However, this author also notices the limited capacity of the centre to control its peripheral provinces – even during the excessively centralized military regime of the *Därg* (SHERMAN 1979: 37).

- 12 Two seminal works in Ethiopian studies went further by proposing a dynamic classification of centre/periphery relations, considered as the core of the Ethiopian state-formation process (DONHAM and JAMES 1986, JAMES *et al.* 2002). Combining historical and anthropological approaches, *The Southern Marches* (DONHAM and JAMES 1986) focused on the process of incorporation of Southern *regions* in Menilek's young empire, out of which Donham distinguished three distinct types of peripheries: the "semi-independent enclaves", the "*gäbar* areas" and the "fringes peripheries" (DONHAM 1986). The "semi-independent enclaves" emanate from the conquest of the end of the 19th century, in which local rulers benefited from various degrees of autonomy, so that Donham called them "semi-independent rulers" (DONHAM 1986: 37). Commercial interests of the "centre" may have determined the degree of autonomy of these "semi-independent rulers" in the rich regions situated along commercial routes. The resources of Menilek's empire were locally collected from the poor populations, who had already suffered from the raids of slave traders (JAMES 1986), while the local rulers could improve their political autonomy by developing their relationship with their neighbours or farther regional partners (JOHNSON 1986, TRIULZI 1986).
- 13 In the beginning of the 20th century, these "semi-independent" peripheries of the highlands coexisted with what Donham calls the "*gäbar* areas", in reference to the tax system introduced by the imperial administration in the conquered areas. The state remained the owner of the land, but the governors and soldiers sent by Addis Ababa to settle in these regions collected taxes (DONHAM 1986: 39). These local elites allied to the Crown, imperial agents and soldiers rewarded with plots of land in the South, constituted an 'intermediary' class, between Addis Ababa and the peasants (GEBRU TAREKE 1996). Contrary to the *gäbar* system in the north, these settlers in the south ruled over much diversified populations, through a sort of feudal administration (GEBRU TAREKE 1996).
- 14 The 'peripheral fringes' were mostly lowlands, inhabited by hunters or pastoralists. The relations between these provinces and the centre (Addis Ababa) became more fluid and radically changed with the Battle of Adwa and the introduction of formal international borders. Donham summarizes the relations between the Abyssinian "core" ("centre") and its peripheries as follows:

"Abyssinians, that is, those who spoke Semitic languages and who were Orthodox Christians, lived in a certain territory – what I have called the core. But Abyssinian power, and during the twentieth century, Shewan power in particular, was never thought to be limited to that sphere. Rather, it radiated out from the centre. The people who happened to reside in the far peripheries were not Abyssinians, but they were reserved for Abyssinian domination." (DONHAM 1986: 43)
- 15 *The Southern Marches* interestingly stress the local participation of the submitted groups, creating alliances with the imperial administration and playing between local and imperial levels in order to keep a certain degree of autonomy (see also GASCON 1995: 86-89). As for the 'traditional' local leaders, the imperial machine represented a great opportunity, even though it could also pose a threat.
- 16 About two decades later, *The Southern Marches* were followed by another compilation of articles, embedded in a similar centre/periphery framework (JAMES *et al.* 2002).

Clapham's contribution completed Donham's by distinguishing four criteria on which the nature of the peripheries depended: religion, economic structures, local production and its export value, and the strategic value of the peripheral region (CLAPHAM 2002: 13-15). What is noteworthy in Clapham's presentation is the way he underscored the interdependence between centre/periphery relations and the relation between two "centres" (Asmara and Addis Ababa for example, as related to the Tigray-Addis Ababa relation). Another interesting contribution of the *Remapping Ethiopia* was the importance given to representations of the territories by state and non-state agents, recalling that centre/periphery relations are not only physical or geographical, but also immaterial (ethnic, religious, symbolic). Above all, these fascinating works confirm how dominant the centre/periphery paradigm has been in Ethiopian studies, and that it has never been called into question since then. In fact, Ethiopian studies have participated a lot in disseminating the view of a centre surrounded by different types of peripheries.

- 17 Another reason for the imposition of this mental map, as Triulzi noted, comes from the way Ethiopian studies have been structured (TRIULZI 1984). For a long time, historians and political scientists have mainly focused on the central Ethiopian authorities, through the study of royal chronicles and modern institutions. The other perspective mostly emerged from anthropology and history and progressively represented a "new 'peripheral' school", focusing on local studies (TRIULZI 1984: 359) – the combination of the 'centre' and 'peripheral' perspectives finally merged in 1986 with the *Southern Marches* (DONHAM *et al.* 1986), leading to a renewed understanding of centres and peripheries in the Ethiopian state formation.
- 18 The political interpretations of the 19th century also influenced the building of the contemporary political cleavages on the competing interpretations of Menilek's conquests. Three remaining tendencies can be distinguished (MERERA GUDINA 2003: 96-97). The first relates to the thesis of "nation building" and considers that the imposition of religious, linguistic and cultural values radiating from the Highlands (Amhara especially, and Tigray) has been necessary to the (re)building of Greater Ethiopia. A second thesis argues that different Ethiopian 'nationalities' have been "oppressed" since Menilek's conquests. This thesis is demonstrated in the Ethiopian student movement and the well-known text written by Walleign Mekonnen, published in the *Struggle*, a leftist journal, in 1969. This ethno-nationalist thesis remains the core of TPLF's discourse, through the liberation of the oppressed Ethiopian nationalities within a democratic federal state. The "colonial thesis", which considers the peripheral peoples as colonized since Menilek's conquests, is the third interpretation of the empire-state inherited from the 19th century Ethiopia (LUBIE 1981: 95, ASAFA JALATA 1998, LEENCO LATA 1998, 1999, CAYLA-VARDHAN 2000). In the 1960s, this thesis took a political dimension – and even earlier for the Somali and Oromo nationalisms (GEBRU TAREKE 1996: 71) – through the Ethiopian student movement, the radicalisation of the Eritrean question or the economic policies implemented by Haile Selassie.
- 19 The debate crystallized in the 1960s-1970s, when the "national question" emerged as a major priority within the Ethiopian student movement (BAHRU ZEWDE 2010: 97-115). The failure of the multinational project defended by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP)⁴ and the victory of the TPLF-EPRDF led to the birth of the ethno-national regime in 1991-1995.
- 20 In spite of the several interpretations it generated, the centre/periphery perspective has remained a common representation of the Ethiopian political space and history. In

this singular state formation, the historical interpretations of the founding events that occurred in the last decades of the 19th century have largely conditioned the dominant centre/periphery readings of the Ethiopian state (CLAPHAM 1975: 3), with the promise of revealing the “secret of modern Ethiopian history” (DONHAM 1986: 24).

Questioning the shortfalls of the centre/periphery perspective

- 21 While they frequently mobilize the notions of ‘centre’ and ‘peripheries’, the historical studies of the long academic tradition in Ethiopia rarely attempt to explain the complex material, political and symbolic articulations they might implicitly perform. Likewise, most of these studies do not discuss the multiple – and sometimes contradictory – ideological dimensions of the centre/periphery framework, especially those related to state formation issues. Indeed, by generally considering that ‘centre’ and ‘state’ were almost synonymous, the academic literature has mainly focused on remarkable geographical centres, like Aksum, Lalibäla, Gondär and then Addis Ababa. From these successive ‘radiating’ centres to the more or less autonomous peripheries, the metaphor of the concentric circles has largely shaped the classical representations of the Ethiopian political space. This diffusionist perspective seems very close to the classical Western theories of the founding ‘centre’ or ‘core’, defining the state formation process in both ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries (ZOLBERG 1968, HOFFMAN 1980, GALTUNG 1980). Similarly, these ‘centres’ or ‘nodal areas’ (DEUTSCH 1966) are considered as the strategic and economic entity, conditioning the integration of their “peripheries”.
- 22 However, centralization and state formation are two different processes, and the development of the former does not automatically imply the formation of the latter. Badie and Birnbaum show that a state, as an institutional and cognitive centre, could be either strongly institutionalized and autonomous from its dominated society – as the French case shows – or, in the opposite, be institutionally weak but symbolically or cognitively very strong – like Great Britain (BADIE and BIRNBAUM 1982: 173-217). These differences are explained by previous political, economic, social, ideological and religious forces, from which the state institutions emerge through a long-term process.
- 23 By revealing its quasi-feudal nature or the weakness of its national bourgeoisie, several scholars have convincingly analysed the complex and singular emergence of the ‘modern’ Ethiopian state (BAHRU ZEWDE [1984] 2008: 6-119, GEBRU TAREKE 1996, MARKAKIS [1974] 2006). Nevertheless, the state formation process has remained associated with the development of one particular centre (Addis Ababa) and the capacity to develop its coercion or domination over its peripheries. Embedded in *Tocquevillian* interpretations (SKOCPOL 1985), this unilateral radiating conception of the state has rather focused on the material and symbolic impact of the political centre on its populations, and neglected the role of the peripheries in the negotiation of state norms, ideologies and institutions. The image of ‘radiation’ itself denies the capacity of the ‘peripheries’ to innovate (GOTTMANN 1980: 205-208). Moreover, it totally ignores the fact that these ‘peripheries’ were often former political centres that actively took part in the (re)negotiation of the national political order, among the plural state and non-state actors (MIGDAL and SCHLICHTE 2005, HAGMANN and PÉCLARD 2011).

- 24 The confusion of the different economic and political levels of analysis is another recurrent weakness of the centre/periphery perspective. The stratification of different dimensions (economics, politics, and identity) makes a dynamic articulation difficult. Markakis's materialist lecture of conflicts between the Ethiopian state 'centre' and its 'peripheries' in terms of concentric circles illustrates this bias: "The match [between resource rarefaction, ethnicity and conflict] is nearly perfect, and it is no coincidence" (MARKAKIS 2003: 362). The way Markakis defines the state as a conflicting actor, arena and object seems very convincing (FUKUI and MARKAKIS 1994, MARKAKIS 2003). Nevertheless, this restrictive centre/periphery relationship confuses the relations between perceptions, behaviours and territories (LAPONCE 1980: 149) and fails to reveal the diverse social networks that federate or oppose the state and non-state agents. Rather, in many Ethiopian historical studies, the term 'periphery' often carries identity markers and cultural clichés, related to the rural landscapes and communities. Here again, geographical, political and socioeconomic dynamics are statically superimposed (MACKENZIE 1973: 61).
- 25 The centre/periphery interpretations of the violent conflicts closely involved in state formation are also highly limited. The classical Ethiopian historiographies often associate them with the centripetal and centrifugal forces that shaped the long conflicting history of the Ethiopian centres and their peripheries. Through a tenacious provincialism inherited from previous regimes, these common interpretations implicitly bind together 'marginalization' and 'peripheralization'. However, this provincial feature does not fit with the historical dynamics of the Ethiopian polity. For example, the 1943 *Woyane* insurrection against Haile Selassie in Tigray can hardly be compared to the TPLF's struggle against the *Därg* in the 1970s and 1980s (GEBRU TAREKE 2009: 81-83). Within thirty years, the changes in the state structures, administration and ideology are too important to limit the causes of the latest conflicts to the resurgences of the past. In addition, the anthropological studies conducted by Freeman and Pankhurst in Southern Ethiopia show that these 'peripheral groups' have never been totally "marginalized", but participated in the economic, social and political development of the dominant groups, through several mechanisms (FREEMAN and PANKHURST 2003). Therefore, far from being synonymous (MCKENZIE 1981), the processes of 'peripheralization' and 'marginalization' also seem too blurry to unveil the roots of the contemporary conflicts in Ethiopia.⁵
- 26 These biases can be explained by the difficulty of defining the terms 'centre' and 'periphery' and in what specific situation their relation is understood. The term 'centre' often remains associated with the 'state', while 'periphery' is rather used to qualify what is merely inside this 'centre'. Bahru Zewde, in his seminal *History of Modern Ethiopia*, applies the latter to very different situations and agents: one can read in a few pages "peripheral regions", "peripheral intellectuals", and "peripheral nationalities" (BAHRU ZEWEDE 2007: 93-110). While the "centre" often statically superimposes quite different notions, like state, regime, government, authority, and geographic situations. In this centre/periphery perspective, how may one analyse both Tigrayan-based and pan-Ethiopian nationalist discourse of the TPLF (TRONVOLL 2009)? Should the famous Oromo notables – like *ras* Gobäna, who led Menilek's military campaigns – be positioned within the 'centre' or the 'periphery'? From the last decades of the 19th century, to the current federal regime, the several centre/periphery typologies seem unable to cope with the recurrent contingencies of the Ethiopian history.

- 27 Moreover, the centre/periphery perspective basically legitimizes the dominant positions claimed by the agents of the 'centre' (BENDIX 1996: 396). The more or less explicit trend to associate 'centre' with 'modernity', and 'periphery' with 'backward tradition' performs the founding normative and ideological biases of these centre/periphery frameworks. Within and beyond the Ethiopian configuration, state formation generally combines 'traditional' and 'modern' dynamics in both political centres and peripheries (COULON 1972: 1067, BADIE [1984] 1994: 124-125). Schwab's study of the land tax reform implemented during the reign of Haile Selassie shows how reformers and conservators coexisted and competed in the Parliament and the imperial administration (SCHWAB 1972). All along the Ethiopian history, Levine points out how tradition is an integral part of modernity, and *vice versa* (LEVINE 1972: 17). Far from opposing 'modernity', 'tradition' is rather a matter of perception (MARTIN 1992: 17-18), though its putative 'backwardness' often legitimizes the modernization of the state by its central agents.
- 28 Thus, the current 'developmentalist' or 'diffusionist' governmental discourses (BACH 2011: 466-511) are still fostering the centre/periphery fictions in the Ethiopian federation. Indeed, by staging the opposition between a 'modern centre' and 'backward peripheries', these discourses seem to legitimize the economic and political reforms implemented by the EPRDF, and the transformation of Ethiopia into a new 'developmental state' (MESFIN GEBREMICHAEL and VAUGHAN 2011, KELSALL 2013).

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FOOTNOTES

1. Clapham referred to a historiographical "great tradition" in Ethiopian studies as related to a certain focus on the Ethiopian state and its supposed Aksumite origin (CLAPHAM 2002).
2. The EPRDF was formed under the auspice of the TPLF at the end of the 1980s. It took its definitive form at the beginning of the 1990s and comprises four political parties: the TPLF, the Amhara National Democratic Movement, the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation and the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Front.
3. This paper is mainly based on the research I recently conducted on these centre/periphery issues in contemporary Ethiopia (BACH 2011).
4. The EPRP opted for the armed struggle against the *Därg* very early. At the end of the 1970s, it also had to fight against the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in Tigray, the two

movements defending an incompatible view of the military strategy to adopt and a diverging conception of the Ethiopian nation. The TPLF eventually expelled the EPRP from Tigray at the beginning of 1978 and has not allowed it to come back into the Ethiopian party system after 1991.

5. In the opposite, the interdisciplinary perspectives associating anthropology with history and political science might be much more relevant (see DEREJE FEYISSA and HOEHNE 2008).

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Cultural neighbourhood in Ethiopia – and the World?

Echi Christina Gabbert and Sophia Thubauville

p. 41-49

- 1 The paper provides an introduction to the concepts of ‘cultural neighbourhood’ and ‘cultural neighbour’. While extending the application of the concept from a regional context between ethnic groups of southern Ethiopia to a wider national and global horizon we ask if cultural neighbourhood could be a useful approach to challenge the increasing presence of global actors, like foreign investors, -qualified specialists and workers from abroad or global cooperations in (Ethiopia and other) African host countries towards a respectful collaboration between local communities and foreign counterparts.¹
- 2 After introducing definitions of neighbourhood and cultural neighbourhood, the paper questions, if national or global neighbours can be considered cultural neighbours or if the prevalent asymmetry of such relations contradicts not only the ideal but also the intrinsic meaning of an empathizing cultural neighbourhood.

Cultural neighbourhood on a local level

- 3 In the volume *To Live with Others. Essays on Cultural Neighbourhood in Southern Ethiopia* (GABBERT and THUBAUVILLE 2010), we introduced the concept of cultural neighbourhood mainly to describe interethnic relations between the groups and fractions of southern Ethiopia where cultural and ethnic diversity are part and parcel of interethnic communication. The volume ends with three articles that concentrate on the widening of the concept of cultural neighbourhood to a national and global context.²
- 4 When defining the role of the neighbour we agree with Roth (2011), who places neighbourly relationships ambivalently between peace and violence. A neighbour can be helper and friend but also envier, harmful and adversary. In any case, whether he might be friend or foe, the neighbour in a cultural context can be seen as the familiar other who is near and remote at the same time (SIMMEL 1955, WOOD 2000). Therefore,

cultural neighbourhood is a community that traverses ethnic boundaries. Cultural neighbourhood denotes a “community of place” (TÖNNIES 2001:25) that is as much a spatial fact as a mode of interaction.

- 5 Essential features of cultural neighbourhood are patterns of social and spatial organisation like common habitats, intimate contact and mutually intelligible customs and modes of communication as well as cognitive processes such as knowledge about the ‘Other’ (ZITELMANN 2012). Cultural neighbours are aware of and interested in each other, they face each other, get used to each other and develop intimate acquaintance of each other’s differences and similarities. For all this, cultural neighbourhood needs time, effort and creativity. The will to reach understanding for the neighbouring ‘Other’ may be most obvious in the general respect neighbours display for each other.
- 6 Whether acting peacefully or hostile, a person’s or a group’s behaviour in a given setting is mostly predictable for the cultural neighbour, because their neighbourhood dwells exactly on the mutual knowledge of each other (SCHLEE 2008). Cultural neighbours therefore can well be friends and allies, who cooperate in peaceful ways as well as be enemies, who are respected for their strength and virility. Not seldomly marriage happens between members of enemy groups, because they are respected as equivalent marriage partners. Bondfriendship as institutionalized friendship can be seen as an icon of cultural neighbourhood, because it not only traverses ethnic boundaries but also hostile relations between ethnic groups. Bondfriendship (GIRKE 2010) as well as, trade (SAGAWA 2010), co-residence and adoption (GABBERT 2010b), intermarriage (THUBAUVILLE 2010), clan membership and ritual powers historically cross-cut the ethnic boundaries and can facilitate emerging forms of alliances. The mentioned cross-cutting ties are further remarkable features of a fruitful interdependence which in former times superseded institutions like markets or emergency aid. If harvests failed in the mountains, grain was available from the plains and vice versa. Such interdependency and complementarity also supported cultural diversity and made variety structurally and economically significant.

Cultural neighbourhood in a global perspective

- 7 After having established the concept of cultural neighbourhood in a regional perspective the application of the concept in a national and global context is more than a scholarly extension of our approach on contact phenomena, it is a challenge and appeal to processes that are presently taking place not only in South Omo, the regional focus of our initial research on cultural neighbourhood, but all over Ethiopia, Africa and the world, e.g. when looking at the emergence of new global markets, transnational migration, knowledge transfer and economic policies.
- 8 In contrast to a familiar cultural neighbourhood, for different socio-cultural environments in Ethiopia, behaviour of unfamiliar, national or global neighbours, who have increasingly become realities in a spatial sense, like the state, missionaries, NGOs and international entrepreneurs etc., are less based on mutual respect and understanding but are characterized through asymmetry especially concerning power relations. A major problem in communication is the lack of mutual knowledge, which is partly caused by the limited time the two parties have to get to know each other. Time-saving technologies in the current information age have neither provided global

actors with more time (HYLLAND 2001) nor with comprehensive information, which is necessary for interaction and mutual understanding of new neighbours. This leads to an unpredictability of the 'Other' followed by misunderstandings and misbehaviour (GABBERT 2010a). Moreover, national and global neighbours carry their own missions and interests to regionally defined cultural neighbourhoods. The complex interplay of symmetrical and asymmetrical neighbourhood relations from early times until the present is part and parcel of group interaction in Ethiopia. Whereas a familiar neighbour, just as a familiar landscape, provides safety and reassurance, unfamiliar neighbours, depending on their appearance, can induce insecurity. The reassurance provided by a regional cultural neighbourhood therefore can also be cultivated especially in times of uncertainty. Recent examples can be found in pastoralist societies whose cultural integrity is challenged by current development politics (GABBERT 2012:222ff).

- 9 It is important to emphasize that the ethnic groups of Southern Ethiopia have never been closed, 'pure' traditional societies, as which they have often been depicted in the national discourses, travellers' accounts and tourist brochures. Anthropological work about the area has shown how cultural rules are constantly being re-evaluated and changed, and it can be asserted that southern Ethiopia has always been a place characterized by a constant flux of things, people and ideas (GABBERT 2010a: 15, 22, SOBANIA 1980). But at the same time the people of southern Ethiopia, comparable to their pastoral neighbours in Kenya, have always much lived up to their ideal of cultural integrity amongst themselves and in regard to outsiders.
- 10 Cultural self-esteem triggers the contact points where potential friends, enemies, paternalistic others or itinerant voyeurs are met, identified and criticized, and are possibly integrated or if necessary kept at bay.
- 11 In the past decades, temporary visitors have become more frequent in southern Ethiopia. Among them are NGO and state representatives, administrators, missionaries, tourists, TV teams, photographers, businessmen and anthropologists (LATOSKY and LOUREN 2010, LYDALL 2010, GEBRE 2010). Naturally, all of these people have their own objectives or missions, imported from outside the cultural neighbourhood of southern Ethiopia. Therefore, initially all of them lack the thorough knowledge of their counterparts' cultures. Yet these visitors also have opportunities to gain or lose face, to develop mutual knowledge and to respect or ignore it (Strecker 2006). More recently these partly ephemeral neighbours, such as NGO's and TV teams (LATOSKY and LOUREN 2010) coming and going with ever changing staff, invisible and even more remote neighbours, e.g., the arms industry (whose presence was not spatially visible but actually reflected in the arms that reached Southern Ethiopia), scarce personal in remote and sleepy police posts and health stations have been joined by neighbours in a much more concrete sense and in a much more rapid pace. Administrative units and police have increased their presence, foreign investors bring international staff with them, schools, universities and hospitals have been constructed and are operated largely with teachers and nurses from other regions of Ethiopia or from other countries.
- 12 In the following we would like to move on from our former examples on cultural neighbourhood in the South Omo Region to show the interplay of global neighbours in larger Ethiopia at two examples: international investment and the Indian-Ethiopian cooperation in higher education. Both examples can be understood within Ethiopia's

striving for rapid development which is reflected in the countries' current five year 'Growth and Transformation Plan' for the years 2010 to 2015 which aims at economic development (see EPPLÉ and THUBAUVILLE 2012).³ This extensive plan for development and economic growth is based on the UN millennium declaration that Ethiopia signed in 2000.

Foreign investment

- 13 "The global anticipation of food insecurity has prompted widespread corporate investment in food crops". Additionally "fears of rising and volatile fuel prices and peak oil [...] have promoted increasing reliance on, and demand for, new forms of resource extraction for fuel security" (WHITE et. al 2012:627f).
- 14 In Ethiopia these and other economic trends have become investment reality during the past decade. Foreign and domestic investors have started to cultivate recently leased land all over Ethiopia, e.g. for sugarcane production which serves both as ethanol and sugar; several hydropower plants are under construction with international participation; international oil firms are measuring oil reserves with the aim to construct drilling sites to extract leads at different locations in Ethiopia.
- 15 On the other side of these development efforts more than often local communities lack information on the investment schemes planned for or implemented on the territories that have been home to their families and ethnic groups for centuries. In any case communities who live in these areas and who had been practicing subsistence economies are and will be significantly effected by large scale commercial investments, resettlement schemes and the direct impact of changes within their territories - territories which within only one decade have become commodities in the global scramble for land, food and fuel. The complex net of political and economic stakeholders who often direct their concerns without ever having seen or met their "host communities" seems to make it impossible to continue a global cultural neighbourhood that relies on mutual knowledge about the 'Other'.
- 16 While there are efforts on the way to generate guidelines for good governance, e.g., in land lease issues,⁴ we want to add to the discussion by questioning the potential of a notion of a cultural neighbourhood across the globe in contact zones between unfamiliar neighbours, such as investors and local communities. Here we could ask which are the incentives and instruments that work to develop mutual understanding between spatial distant neighbours. Some investors already integrate their "host communities" in their corporate responsibility programmes. This carries the potential of a growing understanding between contact partners, yet one cannot underestimate that due to asymmetric power relations and the lack of cultural and economic understanding between investors and their "host communities" the cultural integrity as well as "the social, environmental and food needs of local populations" cannot be safeguarded.⁵ As things are now, the inherent conflict potential in these areas is foreseeable. Therefore, remembering the qualities of cultural neighbourhoods, as we have described on the micro level, might contribute important aspects when aiming to reach responsible and peaceful cooperation in an increasingly globally entangled world.

South-South cooperation in education

- 17 The cooperation in education between Ethiopia and India has a long tradition dating back to the times of Haile Selassie when Indian teachers played a major role in building up the Ethiopian Secondary School System. Today Indian university lecturers are needed for Ethiopia's fast growing university sector. Starting from 1997 policy papers of the Ethiopian government have dealt with the expansion and reform agendas of the higher education sector and its influence on development and poverty reduction (ASHCROFT and RAYNER 2011:54). In 2004, the Federal Republic of Ethiopia established twelve new universities in addition to the existing nine. Together with the upgrading of several colleges to university status, Ethiopia expanded the number of universities to currently 31. After upgrading colleges and opening new universities Ethiopia suffers a shortage of academic staff. Not only the fast expansion of the higher education sector, but also continuous brain drain and the poor payment of local academics add to this problem (THUBAUVILLE 2013). It is estimated that 70 % of faculty in the new universities are qualified only to bachelor's degree level (ASHCROFT and RAYNER 2011:30). India, on the other hand, produces a high surplus in academics.
- 18 Ethiopian universities currently recruit Indian university lecturers through Indian placement agencies. The universities consider the lack of academics only as a temporary problem and therefore offer two-year-contracts only to Indians. At the moment about 1,200 Indian lecturers teach at Ethiopian universities. The salary of Indian academics -according to the pay scale for foreign academics of the Ethiopian Ministry of Education – is much higher than the one for local lecturers. It is, furthermore, tax free and there is no restriction on the amount repatriable to India (THUBAUVILLE 2013). It is obvious, that these jobs are meant to attract people for a short period only. Many lecturers come without spouse and children, as they know they will return after two years. The long-term plans as well as the long-term investments of these academics are meant to be in their home-country India, to where they also transfer up to 80% of the salary which they earn in Ethiopia (THUBAUVILLE 2013).
- 19 These changes caused by the academic cooperation and exchange of the two countries bring in many new constellations of global neighbourhood. As research on middle-class expatriats, like the Indian university lecturers in Ethiopia, has so far shown, expatriats do not at all live a cosmopolitan life, if cosmopolitan stands for having close contact with foreign cultures. On the contrary many middle-class expatriats' lives are fundamentally structured by boundaries that they actively construct, maintain, and negotiate. The boundaries of question here are primarily those of race, nationality, class and gender (FECHTER 2007:35). Much of the expatriates' time is spent in limited spaces and their contact with the outside is rather scarce (FECHTER 2007:42). As Indian university lecturers in Ethiopia work on two-year-contracts, they do not have much intention, time and possibilities to either make close social contacts or culturally adapt to their new environment. This means that they, while living in an Ethiopian neighbourhood, presently do not actively play a role as cultural neighbours, but spent most of their time by themselves or at university where they interact only with a very restricted, group of other lecturers and university students. Longer term studies will show how the interaction of these new neighbours will develop.

Closing remarks

- 20 On a local level it seems that the differences of neighbours – whether they are geographical, cultural, economic or political – form meaningful relations of interdependence. On a global level, on the other hand, the imbalance of power and the lack of mutual understanding overshadows the aspired complementarity. Moreover, the cultural diversity necessary for complementarity is even at risk when economic growth and development contradict cultural diversity (EPPLÉ and THUBAUVILLE 2012).
- 21 Even though the spatial allocation of the people southern Ethiopia and greater Ethiopia is not at all static (GABBERT 2010a: 16, SAVÀ and THUBAUVILLE 2010, Turton 2005), migration and changes took place at a much slower pace in the distant past compared to the more recent examples. Trying to find new spatial niches is not necessarily endangering a functioning cultural neighbourhood. However, the rapid economic and political decisions and changes that have been outlined above in the form of foreign investments and international cooperation in the higher education sector, have so far not provided enough time for people to get to know each other. The resulting missing intimacy on the micro level leads to a lack in respect and understanding that again results in further problems on the macro level, which endangers the calculated benefits of development in the economic and educational sector. Additionally, new arenas with inherent potential for conflict are emerging and need to be addressed in a holistic manner. As neighbourhood is manifested through place as much as through time, in order to achieve sustainable and peaceful changes in a global context, sufficient time and spatial contact with local partners and cultural experts is needed. Today global neighbours have become realities all over Ethiopia, while still lacking the social attributes we have marked out for cultural neighbourhood.
- 22 Therefore, above all, good knowledge about each other and sufficient time is crucial for achieving good results in economic development, politics and education. But how can knowledge about each other be generated in times of rapid changes? How can local communities be sensibly involved in project planning? And how can the time needed be “acquired” while e.g. market instruments and educational aims are being designed for fast growth and fast business moves? There is much need for researchers economists and policymakers to be concerned not only with the immediate effects of global development directions but also with the long-term perspectives for pastoral, agricultural, cultural and educational futures (see also WHITE *et al* 2012: 620). Many questions have to remain open for the time being, others we want to address in the upcoming research that wants to involve scientific, economic, political and cultural neighbours from all fields and nationalities.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Passages of this article have in the meantime been published in GABBERT 2014
2. Most articles evolved from long-term research financed by the Special Research Project 295 at Mainz University lead by Prof. Ivo Strecker, the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle directed by Prof. Günther Schlee and the Center for African Area Studies at Kyoto University. All institutions and therefore all contributors share a common research e at the South Omo Research Center in Jinka.
3. For the complete document see: http://www.vliruos.be/media/1829405/growth_and_transformation_plan.pdf
4. http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/Dealing_with_disclosure.pdf
5. http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_Ethiopa_Land_Investment_report.pdf:3

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From Clanship and Rituals to Maize Fields and Markets: Exploring the Transformations of the Bodi – Dime Relationship

Lucie Buffavand

p. 51-68

- 1 This paper intends to explore the transformations over the last century of the relations between the Bodi and the Dime, two small neighbouring groups of South-West Ethiopia, whose respective populations are both estimated around 8,000 people¹. These neighbours can be opposed in every domain. While the Omotic-speaking Dime live in sedentary settlements in the highlands, where they mainly raise crops on stone terraces, the Surmic-speaking Bodi are pastoralists inhabiting the lowlands, though these mainly cattle-herders also partially depend on farming. In the past, the Dime probably constituted an assemblage of independent chiefdoms. Their society still bears the signs of a highly hierarchical system, which is totally alien to the Bodi. Inter-marriage between the two groups is nonexistent.
- 2 Since the Dime mountain range stretches all along the eastern edge of the Bodi lowland, the history of almost every Bodi section and Dime chiefdom is closely intermingled along several encounters and partnerships, although the partners of the past are not necessarily today's neighbours. Each locality has then developed different modalities of alliance and neighbourhood.
- 3 In the literature, the Bodi-Dime relation has been essentially depicted as a one-sided domination, marked by the large-scale Bodi attacks of the late 1960s and 1970s, which profoundly affected the Dime society (FLEMING 1994, TODD 1979, FUKUI 1994). However, in spite of their recurrent presence in the local memories, these domination issues and armed conflicts do not fully reflect the shared history of these two groups. In this perspective, this paper proposes to question another side of the historical relationship


that bound the Bodi to the Dime groups, by investigating several forms of alliance and cooperation that also federated them along the 20th century.

- 4 This dyad of ethnic groups brings to mind a parallel situation in the same Ethiopian region, the Suri-Dizi relation (ABBINK 1993, 2000, 2001, 2006 and 2009). On the west side of the Omo, the pastoralists Suri have repeatedly killed the weakened Dizi highlanders. Nevertheless, as the founding myth of consanguinity federating the Suri and Dizi leading families,² the Bodi and Dime ruling clans tend to share common clan identities.
- 5 This study reveals the contemporary dynamics of the Bodi-Dime relationship, oscillating from brotherhood to unilateral domination, along the environmental, political and economical contingencies of the local and regional contexts.

Crosscutting clan identities in Bodi and Dime


- 6 Looking at the great disparities between the Bodi and Dime in language, culture, and even physical appearance, crosscutting clan identities among them may at first seem unlikely. However, recent ethnographic works have shown that the small ethnic groups of Southern Ethiopia – and beyond – are composed of clans of various origins, which are distributed among different ethnic groups.³ For example, Unseth and Abbink (1998) have unveiled a common identity shared by several clans, belonging to geographically and linguistically different groups, like the Dizi, Me'en (Bodi and Tishana), Suri and Majangir.⁴ In this article, I will examine such clan connections in the unexplored configuration of the Bodi and Dime.
- 7 In the Bodi and Dime web of clans, I will only focus on the chief clans, because, as it will be shown later, they have forged specific alliances, grounded in their common clan identity. In both the Dime and Bodi societies, the term “chief” is associated with offices of quite different scope. Before their conquest by the northern Christian *Habasha* kingdoms, the Dime were organized into seven independent chiefdoms, some of which also had chiefs at the village level. Their chiefs held great power in the political, juridical as well as the spiritual domains (TODD 1978: 315). Nowadays the remaining chiefs are only responsible for carrying out the rituals ensuring the well-being of the land and the people. Among the Bodi, the chieftainship is mainly ritual. The people of the northern Bodi section, called the Chirim, have three ritual chiefs (Mugey, Kirimbile, Kamtu). The people of the southern sections, called the Mela, have also three ritual chiefs: Biolugu and Gunalemu – both from the same clan – and Kori. When a chief is installed, he takes the name of one of his ancestors; in the local narratives, the name of the ruling chief is then used to refer to the lineage, as well as the historical chiefs of the previous generations.

Map 1: The Bodi and Dime Territories



- 8 In Figure 1, the origins of the respective Bodi and Dime chief clans are presented. Five of the seven chiefs and two village-chiefs in Dime state that they have the same clan origin than the Bodi chiefs – although the names of the Dime and Bodi clans were all different.⁵ They argue that they come from one common place and claim their original unity. They all declare that they originated from Say, a chiefdom in Eastern Dizi, throughout different routes – some simply crossing the Omo River, down the Say Mountains, others passing by Ch'ara or Konta.⁶
- 9 In the south-eastern Dime territories, there used to be two other chiefdoms: Bubsu and Ishema. Ishema is now depopulated and there are just a few dozen of people living in Bubsu. Their chiefs are not believed to have a common identity with a Bodi ritual chief, although the chief of Bubsu has an alliance with Gunalemu.
- 10 The inhabitants of Ducha, in the western Dime territories, also left their settlement and moved to other locations. The location names in Dime refer to both a settlement and a larger chiefdom; only Woydi and Gacha are two villages located in the chiefdom of Dinga.
- 11 The origin from Say of the chief clan of Mela was first convincingly depicted by Fukui (1988). The fact that all these clans place a putative origin in Say does not necessarily mean that they were originally Dizi people – that is, Omotic speakers. Linguistic evidence show that the linguistic ancestors of the Bodi are to be placed west of the Omo River, neighbouring the Dizi mountains on their south-east (EHRET 1982: 22): the Say chiefdom may have been surrounded by proto-Bodi speakers.⁷ In Dime, the chiefs of foreign origin took the office from “autochthonous” clans as they were recognized to have more spiritual powers. Till today, coming from Say seems to be somehow the mark of a noble origin.⁸

- 12 The observation of the systematic alliance between the Bodi and Dime chiefs, founded on claimed common origins, raises two hypotheses. On the one hand, it could have been an essentially political alliance on the model that prevailed at the time, such as the alliance between the Suri and Dizi chiefs. The common origin may then have been fabricated where it did not exist to imitate those historically founded – a reference to Say adding to the prestige.⁹ On the other hand, if the claims of common origin are all historically true, the migrants from Say were then stemming from outstanding clans, recognized for their “skills of chieftaincy” (KOPYTOFF 1987: 28), taking up the chief office wherever they moved. Figure 1: Claimed origins of some of the Dime and Bodi chiefly clans



Designed by L. Buffavand.

Two brothers

- 13 Cultural elements that could support the claim of common origins are rather scanty. They mainly consist in oral histories;¹⁰ peculiarities or taboos that would have singled the concerned clans from the rest of the ethnic group were not found. Considering the lack of evidence, Unseth and Abbink concluded that these groups “seem numerically to have been too small to allow such differentiation” (UNSETH and ABBINK 1998: 105). Indeed, the majority of the Bodi clans reckon an origin outside of their present boundaries, from virtually all directions.
- 14 By exploring the oral history of the Dime lineage of Derkaro and the Mela lineage of Biolugu, I managed to gather rich data related to their claims on a common origin.
- 15 There were probably successive waves of migration from Say to what is now the land of Bodi and Dime: in the local historical narratives, different characters, all sons of Dobulkama in Say, set out to cross the Omo, one after the other. Here is a narrative on

one of those first migrants, which I collected from Bodi elders. It points to the rivalry from the very beginning between the brothers from Say, who latter split into what were to become the Dime and the Mela:

Dobursuruchuy followed his brother Derkaro to Komorutia.¹¹ He took his child, called Oymeloch.¹² ‘Oymeloch, come, let’s go and see our brother who went to Gerfa.’ They reached there and they talked to Derkaro. The child saw a big bell in Derkaro’s house and asked: ‘This bell is just like ours?!’. Derkaro asked:

‘Dobursuruchuy, you have a bell like this one? Take it and bring it’.

– I will not bring it!

They took some grass and made a rope. Derkaro tied the penis of Dobursuruchuy, his brother. He wanted to pee. The urine started to ‘eat’ him. He said: ‘Oymeloch, look for the bell, run and bring it. I may die! Run and bring it and on the way hit the rock with it, so that the Dime can hear it and then release me’. So, Oymeloch got up and ran to Komorutia, took the bell, and ran back to Gerfa. The bell arrived and they released Dobursuruchuy (Bodi elders, January and March 2011).

- 16 The story continues: Dobursuruchuy is the father of all Me’en sections and his favourite son is Oymeloch, the youngest one; so he sends the other sons away and Oymeloch settles in the lowland of the vicinity, while Dobursuruchuy stays in Gerfa.
- 17 These bells from Say have to be seen as objects of ritual significance.¹³ The fight over the possession of the bells tells of the struggle among the brothers from Say, over the monopoly of ritual powers. Derkaro, the present chief in Gerfa, says that the Bodi elders of the Biolugu lineage keep asking him if he still has the bell that his ancestor took away from them. Those elders believe that if they get the bell back, they will have the power to “finish” the Dime.

Breaking the rock

- 18 A more commonly told story of the separation of the people coming from Say, both in Mela and Dime, is the following:

Derkaro arrived in Dama¹⁴ and was soon followed by Biolugu. [According to the Bodi:] Derkaro said: ‘I am a Such¹⁵ and I eat *ensete*. This is lowland, I come from the highland where there is only *ensete*, Biolugu you stay here and I go up into the mountain’. [According to the Dime:] Derkaro was staying on a stone, the Biolugu were seated on the soil. Biolugu and his people ate tree sap and smeared their body with mud. Derkaro said: ‘What are you doing? I do not want you!’. When Derkaro went into the mountain, the path was blocked by a rock. He hit the rock with a big bell and it parted to leave a narrow space for them to pass.¹⁶ When he arrived in the mountain, he decided to settle only when he could see, in spite of the distance, the mountain of Say where he came from, (so that) They could communicate the death of their respective chief by lighting a big fire the smoke, which could be seen from the mountain on the opposite side of the Omo (Bodi and Dime elders, June and November 2011).

- 19 The cliché¹⁷ of the breaking of the rock to provide a passage is also found in the narrative of the coming of the last migrant from Say and the mythical founder of the Mela polity, Tugolony.¹⁸ Before reaching the Omo, his way was barred by a rock. One of his followers hit it with a hoe and it parted. When they arrived on the banks of the Omo River, the water level was too high; his follower threw a spear and hit right into a tree on the opposite bank. Then, the waters parted.¹⁹
- 20 The reference to the rock is found again in Majangir, the northernmost Surmic-speaking group: a clan called Meelanir (a name which seems to be derived from “mela”)

is the only clan in Majangir whose people say their ancestor was a baby found inside a rock (STAUDER 1970 in UNSETH and ABBINK 1998: 108-109). The Mela as a whole (not only the chiefly clan) commonly say that they came from the rock. For them, it is a reference both to the creation of the first Mela, as human beings, and to the rock broken at the passage of their great ancestor Tugolony – the origin of their own humanity and the beginning of their polity.

- 21 In contrast to some ubiquitous clichés in the local oral history (e.g. the partition of waters in East Africa, by means of a spear hitting a tree in both Mursi and Mela), the cliché of the rock breaking is found only among the groups relating themselves to a same origin in Say – although not all those groups. In Dime, the names of the clans considered as “autochthonous” indicate that they came from the soil, from a calabash, etc. Future investigations on the cliché of the rock breaking could bring more substance to the common origin claimed by the groups who mention it in their oral tradition.
- 22 Other cultural elements pointing out the origin of the chiefly clan of Gerfa in Say are found in rituals: when the Gerfa people hit an ox with a stone for a sacrifice, they raise the stone first in the direction of Say. The head of the ox is then also directed to Say.

Map 2: Surmic and Omotic linguistic groups mentioned in this paper



- 23 I have focused so far on the connection between Derkaro and Biolugu; as for the other pairs of Bodi and Dime clans, I could hardly find anything to substantiate their claim of being one, not even a somewhat elaborated story of common origin.²⁰ In the forging of alliances between the Bodi and Dime chiefs, geographical closeness as well as common clan identity have been taken into account. For instance, Gunalemu, who is from the same clan as Biolugu, is not allied with Derkaro but with the chief of Bubsu, his immediate neighbour. Biolugu is also allied with the chief of Uth'a although the origin

of the latter suggests he may have a connection with the Bodi chief Kamtu. Uth'a was the Dime chiefdom which was above all the others; the Mela have always dominated the Chirim. The Biolugu-Uth'a alliance may then have been the strongest among the strongest.²¹ Following Schlee who considers that the "contractual nature of alliances (is) a question of degree" (SCHLEE 2008: 30-33), the Bodi-Dime alliances can be thought of as grounded on clanship identities, neighbouring ties and contractual alliances, all elements being differently combined in each case.

The workings of the alliance

- 24 Kopytoff, in his frontier's perspective on African policies, stated that "to be a frontiersman is to be an entrepreneur" (KOPYTOFF 1987: 40). Moving into a new area, one needs to make alliances with the neighbouring polities to secure one's position. It is difficult to know what led the Bodi chiefs to make alliances with the Dime chiefs in the first place; but it can be assumed that those alliances worked as diplomatic channels, connecting the two groups by institutionalized means.
- 25 The alliances were particularly manifest during rituals of installation and burial of the chiefs. Biolugu and Derkaro used to attend the ceremonies of each other. Biolugu had to come with an ox to be sacrificed. For the installation of the chief of Irka in Dime, Mugey, his Bodi counterpart, was supposed to provide the ritual wooden game board and some carnelian beads, along with an ox to be sacrificed.
- 26 Contrary to the Surma who "recognized the rain-making powers of the Dizi chiefs" (ABBINK 2001: 130), the Bodi did not depend on the Dime chiefs for the rain rituals. Their own chief fulfilled this function. However, in some cases the Bodi requested the ritual help of their Dime ally. The chief of Dinga had the precedence over Kamtu in a ritual carried out at a hot spring, where the cattle of both leaders were brought to drink its water. The Dime chief drove his cattle first and carried out his ritual. Only when he had left the place could the Bodi chief bring his own cattle and conduct his own, different, ritual. The right side of the oxen that were sacrificed there was given to the Dime, the left side to the Bodi.
- 27 Parts of land used by both Bodi and Dime were recognized as belonging to the latter, who therefore had to carry out the necessary rituals for the success of the harvest or the well-being of the cattle. Until the Derg regime, the Dime held cultivation sites at the Omo, and the Bodi of Mugey and Kamtu had to ask their permission and blessings to go and cultivate with them. The same goes for grassland in Dime, where the Bodi brought their cattle during the dry season.
- 28 The Dime ritual precedence in the use of land resources confirms that the Bodi of the north (the Chirim) may have arrived in their present territory well after the last wave of migrants to Dime from Ch'ara and Konta had settled down. When the Chirim had penetrated east of the Omo, the Dime occupied most of the lowland where they raised cattle. The Dime and Bodi oral traditions recall one episode of war which ended with the best fighters of both sides becoming friends: a Dime from Woydi and a Bodi follower of Kirimbile. It suggests that the Dime could impose respect but not so much as to annihilate their neighbors, who steadily settled in the lowland.²²

- 29 From then on and until the northern conquest, no war broke out, aside from small raids. If a Bodi killed a Dime, the matter was settled by the chiefs and the killer was expected to pay a blood price.

The reversal of the Bodi-Dime relation

Stereotypes

- 30 The Dime looked at the newcomers with contempt:
- “In the past, when the Bodi came to ask for beer, they would stand outside, on the road. They would call us, they wanted beer, we would bring it to them in a different calabash to the one we use, a broken one, and we would give it to them outside, at the gate. They would drink it, say good bye and leave. They did not enter the house, neither the compound” (Chief of Gacha, October 2011).
- 31 Back then, the Chirim had their stronghold close to the Omo, and the Dime considered them as related to the Kwegu, a group of hunters and fishermen who also cultivate along the river.²³ The Dime society was a hierarchical one, placing great importance on matters of purity and avoidance. Whether such a hierarchical system can be called a caste system was the object of scholarly debate (see for instance TODD 1977 and PANKHURST 1999). What deserves to be noted here is that the “highest impure caste” was that of the hunters (TODD 1977: 406) – whose ranks may have been swollen by the Kwegu repelled by the Bodi advance. The Bodi’s status in Dime eyes appears to have been not too far from the hunters’ status, who also used to live in the lowland. It was not possible for the other Dime “caste” to let the hunters, as well as the Bodi, enter their houses, let alone drink a beer in the same vessel as them.

From brothers to clients?

- 32 Ignoring for the moment the successive trend of events, and bearing in mind the inter-ethnic ties founded on common clanship, Fukui’s following remark comes as a surprise: “According to Mela oral history, they [the Gerfa] also were conquered by the Mela, and have now become their clients” (FUKUI 1994: 45). When Fukui was doing his fieldwork in the 1970s, the Mela did not inform their ethnographer that some of their clans share a common identity with some Dime clans, but instead claimed that they had conquered them. In all Fukui’s publications about Mela oral history (for instance Fukui 1988), it never appears that Derkaro, the Dime chief, also came from Say before the founders of the Mela polity. Dave Todd, who has been the only anthropologist to conduct lengthy fieldwork in Dime, did not notice the old clanship ties either. He wrote: “The main institutionalized relationship between Bodi and Dime is that of associateship between men” (TODD 1979: 214). Masako Fukui, who had accompanied her late husband in his early field research, vividly recalled on a visit in Bodi in 2011 how the Dime women would go down from the mountains to the Mela cultivation sites along the Hana river, with pots of beer loaded on their head which were to be drunk by the Mela while the Dime would clear the fields of the Mela of vegetation. Had the Mela “conquered” their fellow clansmen?

From mutual help to betrayal and suspicion

- 33 Some eighty years before the Mela were to enjoy free Dime labour, the Mela were facing an internal fission. After the Arsit clan of the Mela chiefs had split into two competing lineages, the Gunalemu and the Biolugu, the ruling chief of the first had killed the chief of the second. The son of the killer wanted to kill the son of the victim again. The Biolugu chief took refuge in Gerfa: Derkaro hid him in his granary. The followers of Gunalemu came soon after, tracking their victim. Derkaro hosted them, and during the night, with the help of his people, killed them all. Biolugu was saved by a Dime clan brother at the expense of another clan brother.²⁴
- 34 When Basha, the son of the Biolugu chief rescued by Derkaro, took the chief office, the army of Menelik II had then conquered and subjugated the Dime into the *gebbar* system: the Dime had to work for the northern settlers.²⁵ The lowlands where the Bodi lived were of limited interest to the settlers. Todd explains how the situation favoured the Bodi: the northern traders sold guns and munitions to the Bodi for cattle and hunting products while the settlers made sure their Dime servants had no access to arms (TODD 1979: 217). However, duties related to inter-ethnic clan relationships continued: the brother of the chief of Gerfa went to the funerals of Basha's mother. Basha asked him to bring the bell that his ancestor had taken from them. As he did not obey, Basha cursed him and the Dime man died shortly after. Later on, the chief of Gerfa himself tried to take refuge in Say, in his clan brothers' place, after he refused to pay tribute to the northerners and his people had tried to kill the one who was sent to collect the taxes. On his way to Say, he was stopped by Basha who offered him to stay to drink honey wine and to eat meat. Basha was on friendly terms with the head of the northerners. He sent a messenger to them and they came to catch the Dime chief, and later killed him. Basha wanted the Dime of Gerfa to fear and respect him.
- 35 The son of Basha, Oykabul, continued to bully their Dime neighbours. The Dime remember when he came to Gerfa through the northern road instead of the road that passes through the broken rock, the road that should be taken by the Bodi. Oykabul demanded to be received as a lord, he took some sheep, beat some people. Derkaro asked him: "You did not come through the road of the broken rock, are you a Northerner? Are you a foreigner? Do you want to take my chieftainship off me?"²⁶
- 36 Oykabul died only two years after he was installed as a chief. The following chief did not go to the installation of the last Derkaro in Gerfa eight years ago, in spite of the repeated invitations of the Dime.
- 37 He invokes his old age, but the Dime suppose he is afraid to go to Gerfa after what happened to his brother Oykabul. He is afraid of the cursing power of the Dime.
- 38 In the 1970s, the anthropologists working in Bodi and Dime were not made aware of the shared clan identity among the two groups. On the Dime side, this shared identity may have been of little value in face of the ceaseless killings. On the Bodi side, people who had become their clients could not be regarded as the equal partners of the former alliances. From this time perhaps has emerged a set of stereotypes on the Dime that still holds today: the brown Su (*Such de gidangi*), brown with dust and mud, who does not wash himself, who does not shave his hair, who does not wash his milk containers and who shares his meal with his children²⁷ – that is, who does not follow the codes of hygiene and self-respect of a Bodi man.²⁸

- 39 As intriguing as it may be, Biolugu's betrayal should not come too much as a surprise because his clan has gained a reputation for endless fights among brothers when power and influence is at stake. This is yet an example of Biolugu striving to suppress a rival lineage. Very conveniently, he did not have to kill the Dime chief with his own hands, and was not deemed responsible for shedding the blood of a clan brother.
- 40 In other areas, the treatment was more severe: the Chirim killed their fellow clansmen in Dime. In their account of these first unusual killings, the Dime of Irka tell that, as usual then in case of inter-ethnic killing, they went to the Bodi chief Kirimbile for explanations.²⁹ Much to their surprise, the killer bluntly stated he had to kill someone so that his favourite ox, which was sick, could recover. Fukui provides dreadful examples of such killings (1979: 172-175).³⁰ The idea that a sick favourite ox could recover if its owner killed a member of another group, or that its death had to be revenged by killing, seems to have taken shape at that time, when the Dime had become easy preys. The Dime of Irka at first demanded a blood price for their dead people, but Kirimbile would not press his people to honour it. The Bodi did not have to fear for retaliation or punishment.
- 41 The Bodi could ignore their clan ties in the process of establishing a new type of inter-ethnic relations in which they had the upper hand. Schlee provides a case study of Gabbra raids on Rendille despite the existence of common clan identities, proving that crosscutting ties does not necessarily prevent conflicts (SCHLEE 1997). However, members of a Rendille clan of Gabbra ancestry could seek refuge among their Gabbra clan brother, and eventually be assimilated. What is striking in the present case is that the Bodi did not seem to think they should refrain from harming their fellow Dime clansmen. They have operated a shift in their identification (ELWERT 2002 in SCHLEE 2008: 45-46): the inter-ethnic clanship level was overshadowed by the ethnic level.
- 42 It has been said that the Dime then faced extinction (Fleming 1994), and that they were only saved by the timely appeal of a visiting anthropologist to the authorities, who jailed some Bodi chiefs, together with the outbreak of a war with the Mursi, which distracted the Bodi from their attacks on Dime (TODD 1979: 222-223). But the Dime agency had been overlooked. They had to foster a new kind of alliance with the Bodi to continue to exist as a polity.

Agriculture and politics in the Dime foothills

- 43 We now have to turn to another aspect of Bodi-Dime relationships: the Bodi hold on cultivation sites on the western slopes of the Dime highlands.
- 44 The Bodi have different areas of cultivation: flood-retreat cultivation on the Omo River banks and rain-fed cultivation in the bush (especially along the Hana and Gura rivers) and on the Dime foothills. At an altitude of 800 to 1300 meters, the Bodi cultivate maize on stone terraces, which could have been erected long ago by the Dime.
- 45 It is not easy to date the arrival of the Bodi in areas inconsistent with cattle herding, the core of their culture. They may have been driven closer to the highlands by a series of drought that made cultivation in the lowland less reliable, and/or they may have had to rely more heavily on cultivation because of cattle epidemics. Abbink notes that the Suri went into closer contact with the Dizi highlanders at the end of the 19th century (2001: 130), a period of both drought and epidemics. The Bodi encroachment into the

Dime highland has to be seen in the context of a general movement of the pastoral populations of the Omo valley northward and eastward, triggered by the drying of the Omo basin during the last century.³¹

Offering land

- 46 The Dime people of Irka tell the story of the first Bodi who came to cultivate near their settlement in a quasi-mythical tone:

The chief's ancestor went to consult a spirit medium in a far away place. 'I am alone in my land, where are the people? The forest is 'eating' me. – Go back home and there, a person will come from the west. Will he be a Kwegu? Will he be a chief? When he comes, first, smear him with clay³² and stay together. Share the land with him'.

Kummuli, the elder brother of Basha from the Biolugu lineage, could not become a chief because he was born without a foreskin.³³ He went to Irka. The chief recognized him as the person the spirit medium predicted would come. He smeared him with clay and made him his eldest son. He was given land to cultivate with his people (Dime elder from Irka, October 2011).

- 47 Kummuli must have arrived in Irka in the 1930s, at a time when the Dime were facing a demographic decline. Some people had been killed during the conquest by the Northerners, some were taken away as slaves in other areas, and some fled to other regions.³⁴ The Dime may have been in need of a larger work force. Vegetation in Dime highlands grows fast and dense, and scavengers are numerous. When many people cultivate on a wide stretch of land, they can better protect their crops.
- 48 The collaboration on cultivation sites developed into a new political alliance. The Dime of Irka suffered from the ceaseless attacks of the people of Kirimbile, their former allies. Having established a relation of close neighbourhood with a member of the Biolugu lineage, they could appeal to the protection of his people. During the Derg regime, the Biolugu chief held a ritual together with the Dime of Irka to make them "his" Dime. The relations between the Mela and the Chirim were then very tensed and the Dime could easily play on the internal differentiation among the Bodi. An attack on the Dime of Irka by the Chirim would be tantamount to a declaration of war to the Mela. The Biolugu chief could then say: 'I am the sun' because of his irradiating influence among a large part of the Dime. This also reveals the northward expansion of the Biolugu's followers into the territories formerly held by the Chirim.
- 49 Todd, who had seen the Bodi agricultural settlements developing closer to the Dime villages in the early 1970s, related this Bodi migration to their continuous attacks on Dime: "The war [of the Bodi against the Dime] has therefore enabled the Bodi to establish agricultural settlements in the Dime foothills" (TODD 1979: 224). If the armed power of the Bodi certainly put them in an advantageous position to obtain cultivable land in Dime, the movement started long before and the Bodi had first acquired the land left by a shrinking Dime population. However, the migration was put on a larger scale with the drought and famine of the early 1970.³⁵ The drought was so severe that some Bodi people were settling in the Dime highlands only to survive on the wild tubers which grow in the forest. But in later years, as the rain allowed them to cultivate in the lowland again, the Bodi left some of the agricultural settlements they had established in the Dime highlands. Even the children of Kummuli, the first Bodi settler in Irka, stopped working on their father's land. The Chirim, who until recently had very

few cattle, relied more heavily on cultivation and maintained semi-permanent settlements in intermediate altitudes.³⁶

Up and down

- 50 In the last decade the movement has been reversed: if the Bodi had gone up into the Dime mountains before, now the Dime come down. The land in intermediate altitude (around 1000 meters high) is becoming more attractive to them. They have a two-fold system of agriculture: they cultivate wheat, teff, ensete and coffee in high altitudes, maize and, increasingly, sesame at a lower altitude. Sesame has been introduced as a cash crop first among the Konso settlers.³⁷ It was soon adopted by the Dime and also the neighbouring Bodi. Whereas coffee used to be carried on donkeys to the markets in nearby highlands, sesame is transported by trucks to be traded in Addis Ababa. The Dime, therefore, need easier access to roads in the lowlands. On the other hand, the Bodi are now less inclined to cultivate in the Dime foothills. A clash with Konso settlers in 2010 has since then prevented the Bodi from coming to some of their cultivation areas, sandwiched between the Dime and the Konso. In their cultivation site of Shiki, the few remaining Bodi now need the Dime to help ward off baboons and other species of vermin. The Dime are then investing these areas again through ties of bond-friendship, and are cultivating side by side with the Bodi.

Belonging

- 51 Talking with the Dime of Irka who saw their place deserted by the Bodi, one gets a sense of the ambivalence of their relations. The horrors of the past Bodi attacks and their persistent stealing habit are condemned, but the Dime seem to regret that they are not here anymore. The Bodi left their cultivation sites close to Irka, which soon became covered with vegetation, and the trail that goes to the lowland disappeared under the grass. 'We stay in our forest, they stay in their bush, we live separately'. Their efforts to maintain a highland market under the Derg regime were thwarted by the policemen affected in Hana who needed supplies. They forced them to go down to the Hana market to sell their goods and jailed the ones who tried to revive their own highland market. The Bodi now hardly go to the Dime market of Irka but they, as well as the Dime, mostly frequent the better-supplied Konso markets. Irka became a periphery, far from the northeast hub of Dime and depleted of its Bodi neighbours. Hence, their desire to belong again to a denser neighbourhood, which contrasts sharply with what Todd considered as their feelings in the 1970s: "they certainly have no desire to live in daily contact with the Bodi" (TODD 1979: 223). Another notable example is the one of Garo: devastated by the Bodi attacks in the late 1960s which drove many Dime to seek refuge and to settle among the neighbouring Basketo, the village was attached to the Basketo district. The Bodi remorselessly continued their raids on the ones that they did not anymore considered as their neighbours, for the Dime of Garo only attended the markets in the Basketo area. The Dime of Garo finally asked the administration to be re-attached to the Dime and Bodi district, to be part of this neighbourhood again.³⁸

Conclusion

- 52 The past order of the Bodi-Dime relations, based on alliances between the local chief clans and the claim of a common origin, has been shattered by the conquest of the Dime by the Christian Northerners, leading to their contemporary pitiful condition. Turned into the victims of undifferentiated killings by the Bodi, the only way out for some of them was the negotiated access to cultivable lands during severe droughts. The ties of close neighborhood based on shared cultivation sites seem to have become an even more relevant basement for the building of alliances between the two groups.
- 53 This study shows the fragility of inter-ethnic clan identities in South Omo, when they involve highly differentiated groups and when a powerful third party comes into the picture – but also questions the future of this relation. Because the Bodi will be permanently resettled close to the Omo, according to the Ethiopian government's plan, they could lose their places of encounters with their age-old Dime neighbours.
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FOOTNOTES

1. This paper is the result of a research conducted among the Bodi between October 2010 and December 2011, including two stays in Dime in June 2011 and October 2011. This short research in the Dime territories would not have been possible without the help of Yalew Ayele, who masters the Dime as well as the Bodi languages and has a great knowledge of the region. I would like to thank the Dime and Bodi peoples, who helped me to understand the intricacies of their relations. My fieldwork was financed by the Max Plank Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale.
2. Suri and Dizi chiefs believe to be the descendants of a same Kwegu mother (ABBINK 2006: 232).
3. The most extensive work on crosscutting clan identities has been done among Cushitic-speakers of Northern Kenya (SCHLEE 1989).
4. The last three groups are Surmic-speakers.
5. Only the clan names Aris in Dime and Arsit in Bodi bear some resemblance.
6. The Ch'ara and Konta people are Omotic-speaking groups living in the north (see map 2).
7. In the local tales of origins, "Say" refers loosely to the Dizi chiefdom as well as to the proto-Bodi speakers living at the edge of it. The dominant moiety of the Mela polity is composed by clans all coming from Say. If "Say" strictly refers to the Dizi chiefdom, half of the Mela clans were at first Omotic speakers who assimilated a Surmic-speaking group, adopting their language in the process. Another possible scenario would then be a wave of migration of proto-Bodi speakers surrounding Say led by one or a few Dizi clans.
8. This was impressed upon me when a Dime man in Gerfa from a clan whose name means "came out from the ground" and believed to be autochthonous claimed to me that he came from Say before the current chief's clan did.
9. "Inter-ethnic clan relationships are so useful that they have to be invented where they do not exist" (SCHLEE 1993: 596).
10. Gabbert highlights the role of oral histories in the maintenance and creative reactivation of cross-cutting ties (GABBERT 2010: 19).
11. Komorutia is the name of a place in Mela land, close to Gerfa in Dime.
12. "Oy" is a prefix used in old Bodi language before the groups' name; "meloch" is the singular form of Mela. Therefore, Oymeloch stands for the ancestor of the Mela.
13. Till today, Biolugu keeps special bells in his calves's house. It is believed that if he puts them outside, the rain will stop.
14. Dama designates two hills in what is now Mela land, not far from Gerfa.
15. "Such" (plural "Su") is the name given by the Bodi to the Dime, to all the other highland cultivators and to the people who live in town and who have no obvious connection with the administration – that is, who have neither cattle nor political, juridical nor military power. It carries a derogatory meaning.
16. This passage can be visited. It seems to bear the special significance of the places of origin: illegitimately born babies were thrown there and clay used for rituals was collected nearby.
17. The term "cliché" was coined by the oral literary scholar Harold Scheub and designates a stereotyped pattern of action in oral history.

18. To complicate the matter, Haberland reported an opposite migration. The oral history he collected in Dizi tells of the son of a Dime chief who decided to leave his homeland because he was refused chieftainship. When he reached the Omo river, the waters parted, as well as the rock on the western side, and he soon became chief of Say (HABERLAND 1993: 166-167, 260-261 and 300). The chief of Mash in Dizi also claims ascendancy from Dime. Haberland seemed puzzled by the insistence of his Dizi informants on the fact that the chief of Say originally came from Dime, and, drawing from Fukui's material, supposed they may actually come from Mela. However, Deguchi, who carried out research in Say, was told that the ancestor of the chief of Say came from Shako (Omotic-speaking group in the north) (DEGUCHI 1996).

19. This latter cliché is also found in the oral tradition of the Mursi (TURTON, unpublished manuscript).

20. It is striking that the Chirim, contrary to the Mela and the Mursi, do not have a well-known myth of their first crossing of the Omo. This, I believe, has to do with their transient presence on their current territory, having been repelled several times by the Mela to the western side of the Omo. In other words, it is still not quite sure that they have definitely crossed the Omo.

21. Only Kori in Mela can say: "I have no Su". However, the people of Kori used to cultivate along the Mako River until the beginning of the 20th century, and there is reason to believe that an inter-ethnic alliance with the neighboring Aari had existed. One Mela informant living in the Oso valley, between Dime and Aari, told me that Biolugu and Gunalemu were "relatives" of the chief of Shido (Siida?) in Aari, but I was not able to have this information confirmed by other Mela or Dime.

22. Interestingly, at the end of the story the Dime fighter goes with the Bodi one to the latter's home and discovers that his diet is different from his own; he concludes that it is what makes the Bodi fighter so strong.

23. I want to relate this broad categorization of the Chirim together with the Kwegu to an intriguing motif in South Omo: the motif of the black ant. The Dizi call the Suri "Surma", and "Surma" in their language also designates "a kind of black lowland ant" (ABBINK 2006: 235). Similarly, Girke notes that the Kara, who call the Kwegu-speakers of their area "Moguji", also used the word "moguji" to refer to a species of ant (GIRKE 2009: 124). In Bodi, "yidi" is a kind of ant as well as the name given to the Kwegu. In the last two instances the Kwegu people's name seems to be associated with a species of ant by their (dominant) neighbours. It could be that the Dizi, by employing the same word for an ant species and their Suri neighbours, assimilate the Suri with the Kwegu, just as the Dime used to include the Chirim in the same category as the Kwegu.

24. The current chief of the Gunalemu lineage, upon his installation in 1974, held a ritual together with the Dime of Gerfa to forgive the massacre of his ancestors.

25. For a fine description of the history of the *gebbar* system in the neighbouring Aari, see NATY 1992: 104-140.

26. Todd reported on similar harassments, which could end tragically (TODD 1979: 214).

27. In Bodi, commensality between a father and his children is strictly forbidden.

28. The Dime also have stereotypes on the Bodi being dirty and uncivilized. For instance, in the oral history of the split between Biolugu and Derkaro, the Dime version notes that the Dime were standing on stones whereas the Bodi were on the ground, and it expresses disgust at some Bodi habits such as the smearing of bodies with clay.

29. The Dime call it *tsimi*: after the Bodi had killed a Dime, the Dime went with coffee to "their" Bodi chief and talked. The chief then scolded the young Bodi men and the Dime were left in peace for some years, till the next killing. These negotiations were still going on under the Derg regime.

30. Fukui has been criticized for his statements on the hopeless state of affair of the Bodi-Dime relationship (STRECKER 1991). Fukui came at a time when, indeed, war was the main preoccupation

of the Bodi (raids in Dime and Konta, war against the Mursi), but, adopting a positivist approach, he failed to historicize it.

31. The Mursi case has been amply documented by Turton (1988).

32. Smearing the newcomer's body with clay is a performative ritual which would make him the son of the chief.

33. A chief in Bodi must have a body devoid of any scars caused by spear or bullet and anomalies such as aposthia.

34. Naty also points out the demographic decline in Aari under the *gebbar* system and the subsequent abundance of land (1992: 162).

35. Turton reports that in the neighbouring Mursi, the early-1970s drought had been the worst in living memory (TURTON 1985: 334).

36. The two cultivation sites of Narma and Shiki became a distinct district under the Derg, and hence recognized as Bodi settlements. Whereas I was hardly able to find a Mela who is fluent in Dime, many Chirim who have spent most of their life cultivating in the highlands are bilingual. In short, the less cattle they have, the more likely they are to speak the Dime language.

37. The Konso originally live some two hundreds kilometres east of the Bodi land. Five thousands of them were resettled in Bodi in 2003 as part of a governmental resettlement program.

38. GIRKE (2010: 92) stresses that administrative boundaries contribute to alienate groups which were once part of a regional neighbourhood from one another.

AUTHOR

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Manjo and Kafecho: Enemies or Brothers? Cultural Depiction of Intergroup Relations in Southern Ethiopia

Federica De Sisto

p. 69-81

- 1 Throughout Ethiopia there are numbers of marginalized minority groups who are defined by occupation or notional occupation (e.g. smiths, potters, tanners and weavers). The dominant farming population articulates the exclusion of these groups of craftworkers by giving them different labels and treating their occupation as polluted and polluting.
- 2 While there is no shortage of scholarly theorizing about these discriminated groups there is a surprising dearth of rigorous ethnographic data about the way their subordination is culturally carried out. The assumption that their discrimination is merely lack of economic development and fair distribution of political power, and therefore can be solved by economic packages and political reforms, is one sided. Such an analysis fails to understand the complex social formation, attachments, interaction, and structure found in traditional societies in the same way that it fails to understand the power of oral tradition in the process of inclusion/exclusion from citizenship.
- 3 This paper will investigate the dual role of local discursive practices in branding policies of exclusions as legitimate but also in bridging intergroup tensions, through the ethnographic case study of the occupational group of the Manjo living in Southern Ethiopia.
- 4 The Manjo are a small discriminated group who are dispersed across the wider geographical areas in the Kaffa zone. They live among the cultivating majority Kafecho. The oral narrative of Kaffa, through negative narratives, myths, rituals and stereotypes, shapes the individual and group identity of the people and contributes in feeding intergroup prejudices and negative images of each other. Enemy images based

on destructive narratives distort individuals' and groups' thinking by influencing negatively cognitive processes such as attention, memory and attribution. Despite the preponderant presence of these destructive cultural elements, still there is space for interaction among the two groups. This same culture can in fact, also be considered the most powerful connector among local capacities for peace. It contains the seed of peace in the form of presently less explored constructive narratives and rituals. Digging into personal stories and oral traditions, positive cultural components have indeed been found. These elements could contribute to bringing about the shift from divisions to commonalities and to reorient the mutual perceptions from negative to positive.

- 5 Producing an ethnography of narratives from below, this paper, based on my PhD research, aims at contributing to a better understanding of the dynamics of exclusions and discursive practices of occupational groups but also to opening up creative possibilities for inter-group dialogue.

The Kaffa Zone

- 6 This paper is the result of ten-month fieldwork in the Kaffa zone of Southern Ethiopia in 2008.¹ Kaffa, where this research has been conducted, is one of the 13 zones of the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples' Regional State (SNNPRS), often referred to as the Southern Regions. With 56 ethnic groups, the region is home to the most diverse and inter-mixed of Ethiopia's ethnic populations. In addition to a mixture of relatively 'local' or 'indigenous' ethnic groups, the area has a significant population of more recent immigrants.
- 7 Kaffa's administrative centre is Bonga, a multiethnic town of about ten thousand inhabitants. According to the 2007 census, Kaffa has a population of 858,600 people.² The vast majority of the inhabitants of Kaffa are the Kafecho. Other groups in the area are the Dawro (who have established themselves among mideastern areas of Kaffa), the Nao (a semi-nomadic group living in the Southern Kaffa), the Chara (who live north of the Omo River, in eastern Kaffa) and the Meen (who live in Southern Kaffa). Kaffa is also home to a more recent wave of immigrants, such as Amhara, Oromo, and Tigray, brought in the zone at the time of the resettlement programme of the Derg regime (PETROS 2003 and 2001).³ Kaffi-noono, the Kafecho language, is the most widely spoken language of Kaffa (CERULLI 1951).
- 8 According to research conducted before the Derg era, Kaffa society had a social hierarchy similar to the caste system (KOCHITO 1979; LEVINE 1974). At the top of the hierarchy were the Kafecho, followed by groups defined and discriminated in terms of their occupation such as blacksmiths (Kemmo), weavers (Shamano), tanner-potters (Manno) and hunters (Manjo). The Manjo in particular are considered as the most discriminated people of Kaffa.

The Manjo

- 9 The Manjo, also known as Manja or Menja, live as a marginalized group of former hunters within the Kafecho farming group in the Kaffa zone. They are also found in the neighbouring zones of Sheka, Bench Maji, Dawro, Konta special *woreda* of SNNPRS, and according to Yoshida (2009) also in some parts of Oromia and Gambela regional states.

Tekle (2005) notes that no effort has been made to conduct their population census. Even the national census programme that is conducted within every decade does not provide an accurate estimate. The only source of data/information is an unorganized counting found at the *kebele* level for estimation (TEKLE 2005). The difficulties in assessing these data are due to the fact that in the governmental records the Manjo are not listed as a distinctive ethnic group, but as caste within the Kafecho. According to a recent study by Yoshida (2009), their number in Kaffa varies from 10,000 to 12,000 people. By percentage this amounts to 1.1%-1.4% of the total population of Kaffa zone. This figure contrasts with the 2007 estimate provided by the Kaffa zone council, according to which the Manjo and the rest of the occupational minorities are believed to account for 5-10% and 1% respectively of the total population of Kaffa.

- 10 Despite the fact that the Manjo are not officially recognised as a distinctive ethnic group, but rather referred to as a caste within the Kafecho, in everyday life they are treated as a separate group; terms 'Kafecho' and 'Manjo' are mostly used dichotomously.
- 11 Judging by their physical appearance, the Manjo are described as significantly different from the Kafecho: low in height, with strongly curled hair, with low and wide noses, prominent lips, and very dark skin colour (YOSHIDA 2008). On a psychological level they are considered by the large majority of the people of Kaffa as inferior to the Kafecho and in some cases even not human at all.
- 12 The two main reasons given for the Manjo 'sub-humanity' are:
 - *-Eating habits.* The alleged eating-habit of the Manjo is the most central aspect upon which their discrimination is based. The Manjo is a group of former hunters who used to live in the forest mainly on hunted meat, notably porcupine, Colobus monkey and wild pig.⁴ They are also believed to eat the meat of unslaughtered animals. In Kaffa zone, and Ethiopia in general, people who eat or touch certain meat or the dead bodies of unclean animals are to be regarded as unclean themselves and banned from society. Overall, the Manjo's social position is severely constrained by the imposed tradition of deeply dividing stratification based on birth-ascribed occupational status conceptions of pollution and purity.
 - *-Behaviour.* The Manjo are believed to dislike education and to prefer their children to work at a very early age instead of sending them to school (GUANCHE 2007). Yoshida (2008) notes that this group is also seen as pagan and polygamist, extravagant, with a low sense of morality. The other widely diffused accusation is their unhygienic character: the Manjo are accused of not washing their body and to give off an unpleasant smell, sometime caused by skin diseases (YOSHIDA 2009). Additionally, some Kafecho also mention that the Manjo have a limited intellectual capacity that does not enable them to surmount full administrative and political competency (TEKLE 2005).

Changes in Manjo lifestyle

- 13 In recent years, the Manjo diet has changed drastically. Conversion to Christianity, rapid deforestation,⁵ the dwindling of wild animals, and the official banning of hunting by the government are all factors that contributed to a change in their lifestyle (YOSHIDA 2008; PETROS 2003). The increased contact with non-Kaffa people may also have played a

role in it by exposing the Manjo to more equal patterns of intergroup relations. Nowadays, even if some Manjo still carry out hunting, they must travel a long distance to find areas with abundant populations to hunt big games (YOSHIDA 2008). Members of this group mostly buy meat at local markets (TEKLE 2005). Today the poorest among the Manjo survive collecting firewood and burning charcoal for sale. The large majority combines these activities with farming, although agriculture and animal husbandry are still done on a small scale compared to Kafecho farmers. Apiculture is another source of cash income and the Manjo are well known for being skilled and knowledgeable in this field (VAN HALTEREN 1996). However, despite changes in lifestyle, the unjust and prejudicial treatment to which the Manjo are subjected is still manifested in many aspects of community life.

- 14 The following paragraphs constitute an attempt to comprehend the triggers of the discrimination of the Manjo through an exploration of the role of cultural elements in perpetrating policies of exclusion. The potential of the same cogs of local culture in lessening the discrimination will also be explored.

Negative elements in the culture

- 15 Negative present and past narratives told across time and generations are believed to constitute the main justification upon which the discrimination of the Manjo has been based. Prejudices against the group are in fact perpetrated through the use of destructive myths, stories, rituals and metaphors.

Creation myths: grounding the discrimination

- 16 Myths are stories shared by a group that are a part of that group's cultural identity (MALINOWSKI 1926). In the Kaffa society these ancient stories play a key role in shaping the social identity of the people and are considered by all community members, including younger generations, as the ground upon which the discrimination of the Manjo lies. The redundancy of variants of creation myths told by elderly people implies a strong wish to use them as an ideological justification for the low status of the Manjo.
- 17 Among the Kafecho tradition of the Manjo origin and identity, one of the most widely spread is the one told me by an elderly Kafecho.

“An unmarried girl secretly had sexual intercourse with a dog. When she became pregnant was banned from the village from her parents. Eventually she gave birth to a baby boy by a riverside. Upon maturing, her son hunted wild pigs, monkeys and baboons in the forest and with their meats fed himself and his mother. After some time, they left the valley and went to live in a village. The boy did not change his eating habits; he kept hunting and eating the meats of wild animals. The people saw it and did not like his behaviour. They told him and his mother to stay away from their houses and chased them into the forest, where they lived for the rest of their life. This is how the Manjo were created” (W. Personal interview. July 24, 2008).

- 18 Common is also the myth of the Manjo's banishment to the forest as a result of their greed. There are many versions of this myth, the most popular being the one recalled by a Manjo elder during an *eddir*⁶ meeting:

“The first king was Manjo. The Manjo king had ninety-nine wives. He was a good king, honest, compassionate and respected by his people. One day he saw the beautiful wife of his servant and wanted to make her his hundredth wife. To do

that, he killed his servant and for this reason was cursed by God and chased to the forest where he hunted and ate monkeys and wild pigs to survive. Consequently his status was lowered by God and the Manjo became the lowest clan in Kaffa" (Field notes, September 16, 2008).

- 19 Another variant of the creation myth was offered by a Kafecho *Alamo*:⁷

"Two brothers (in some versions seven), were travelling along the Baro River. They became very hungry as they ran out of food. One of the brothers then went to the forest and ate bad things during the trip, such as monkeys and worms. The other one waited to get to the closest village before eating. Since then, the first brother has been ostracised" (X. Personal Interview, June 13, 2008).

- 20 Two variants of the creation myth provide a different explanation of the discrimination. A Kafecho interviewed, recounted the peaceful and smooth transfer of power from Manjo to Kafecho clans. In this variant is stressed the fact that the Kafecho never fought for the position of supremacy but it was given to them.

"When human beings were created, there were three groups in Kaffa: the Matto, the Minjo and the Manjo. The Manjo were the strongest group and cruelly ruled Kaffa. Full of themselves, they decided to build a state for themselves and left the area. At that time, the other two clans, the Minjo and the Matto, intermarried and gave birth to a new strong and numerous clan from which we [the Kafecho] descend. The new people neglected the Manjo for revenge against the treatment they ancestors were given by this clan. Starting from that time, the Manjo are not welcome to our house. The reason is found on the life they conducted when they left the area. They became different from all the other groups as they ate wild animals and from that time do not care about their personal hygiene" (Y. Personal Interview, November 18, 2008).

- 21 In a second variant the Manjo, original inhabitants of Kaffa, are believed to have been the first rulers of the area prior to the coming of immigrant clans. It is often assumed that after their defeat and consequent submission to the immigrants who had relatively better technology and stronger political structure, this group might have been drawn in the forest and started eating and hunting wild animals in order to survive. Historians like Huntingford (1955) consider this last version close to what actually happened. Language and attitudes reflect the negative myths and reinforce stereotypes.

Destructive stories

- 22 LeBaron (2003) argues that storytelling is an ancient universal activity that conveys the cultural logic of participants in a way that much communication about conflict may not. According to the words and images evocated, feelings could be redirected towards peaceful ends or could foment the mutual negative image of actors in conflict.
- 23 Only a few negative stories were collected from the Kafecho side regarding the Manjo and all related to superstition or episodes of violence. Contact with a Manjo was primarily associated with contraction of diseases and bad luck. The stories also related to the alleged aggressive attitude of the Manjo. The Manjo, on their side, had their own stories to tell and all related to the discriminating treatment received from the Kafecho. Their stories recalled scenes from marketplaces, where their products are sold at a price lower than Kafecho's. Other episodes were from the after-church ceremony where at times the Manjo are forbidden to eat and drink with the Kafecho. Also stories from schools were told, where apparently Manjo children are bullied by non-Manjo children and teachers.

Negative rituals

- 24 In a classic definition, Turner (1969) describes rituals as the social phenomenon of shared experiences entrenched in human interaction and cultural performances. Generally speaking, a ritual is an action that has symbolic meaning (GUSFIELD and MICHALOWICZ, 1984). For centuries, people have used ritual communication when words alone were not sufficient. Rituals provide containers for feelings and answer the need to get together on special occasions (e.g. marriages, funerals, ordinations). LeBaron (2003) maintains that rituals are able to liberate participants from everyday patterns of interaction and for this reason they could be symbolic tools for conflict transformation. She states that when a ritual happens, identity and cultural meanings are addressed and can also be shaped. In Kaffa, rituals cover a prime role in the practice of discriminating the Manjo. The field-work found the same rituals that were identified by other scholars (e.g. PETROS 2003). It has been found that during weddings and funerals, which are two of the most common and important rituals in the life of the two groups, the discrimination of the Manjo is clearly manifested. The Manjo are not allowed to marry the Kafecho and when they can participate in wedding feasts they normally have to keep far from the other guests and usually eat from broken pottery. At funerals, the Manjo are not permitted to carry the coffin when a Kafecho dies. In everyday life the Manjo are not permitted to shake hands with the Kafecho and during meals or during the traditional coffee ceremony special utensils are used for them.

Reinforcing discrimination through verbal expressions and metaphors

- 25 The Kafecho generally use derogatory terms and metaphors⁸ to depict their superiority to the Manjo. These short paragraph highlights the point. A well-off Manjo recounted that when a Manjo meets a Kafecho in the street he/she has to greet the Kafecho with the expression ‘*showoch qebon*’ meaning ‘may I lie on the ground for you’. While many Kafecho denied this story, or referred to it as something that happened in the past but not nowadays, both Manjo and Kafecho confirm the perceived sub-humanity of the first. In the area, the Kafecho are still known as *donjo* (master) or *asho* (human being) in contraposition to the Manjo *gonde-yaro* (people of the bad clan), who are considered as subhuman and at the same level as animals.
- 26 Expressions like ‘stinker like a Manjo’, ‘black as a Manjo’, or ‘donkey like a Manjo’ are also offenses used by the Kafecho to insult people who respectively lack personal hygiene, are dark-skinned or who are believed to be stupid. For a disorganized and short lasting dance some Kafecho used the expression ‘like the dance of Manjo’.
- 27 The Manjo also use derogatory terms and negative metaphors to refer to the Kafecho. The dominant group is associated with foreign investors coming to Kaffa to exploit its resources. As foreign (from outside Kaffa and from outside Ethiopia) businessmen start extensive tea and coffee plantation in the area allegedly taking land away from the Kaffa people with support of the government, in the same way the Manjo say that a long time ago their land was stolen from them by the Kafecho.

Bridging conflict through the search for commonalities in local culture

- 28 Despite the presence of cultural elements fomenting mutual hatred and resentment, the same culture of Kaffa also contains the seed of peace in the form of presently less explored constructive narratives and rituals.

Positive myths

- 29 Unpacking the assumptions embedded within myths is a powerful way to re-imagine history (LEBARON, 2003). At the same time bringing to the surface positive myths so far hidden can bring a major contribution to the process of envisioning a new future for the Manjo-Kafecho relation.

- 30 Some positive myths were found during interviews with elders from both groups. These myths mostly refer to the time when Kaffa was ruled by a king and the Manjo served as gatekeepers of the kingdom, and guards of the supernaturally frightening royal grave sites. A Kafecho told the following myth:

“The king wanted to test the honesty of the Manjo guarding the gates of the kingdom so he travelled to the area undercover. The Manjo detected his presence by the smell brought to them by the wind. They were particularly concerned about his health and their care about him was tangible by the words used to refer to the king. The king, having heard their conversation, went close to them and said: ‘May your tribe reproduce because you are honest and are worthy of my trust’” (Z. Personal Interview. October 14, 2008).

- 31 Another Kafecho recounted this other myth:

“There was only one group in the Kaffa kingdom who was allowed to guard the graves of the kings in the forest. This group was the Manjo. They had supernatural power and freely moved inside the forest in harmony with nature and spirits. All the other inhabitants of the kingdom were not allow approaching the royal graves and were also not brave enough to dare trespassing the cultivated land to enter into the forest” (K. Personal Interview. July 3, 2008).

- 32 A Manjo mentioned one more myth:

“The Manjo provided the king with all sorts of goods found in the hazardous and unsafe forest. They were well considered by the king despite their low status. Their bravery was particularly appreciated for their skilful techniques to kill elephants for their tusks. All what they got from the forest was brought to the king, they never took advantage for themselves” (C. Personal interview. November 16, 2008).

- 33 Overall, the Manjo are depicted as brave, loyal, trustworthy, generous and somehow feared because of their connection with the supernatural.

Constructive stories

- 34 While destructive stories perpetuate a negative image of each other, constructive stories nourish positive feelings of mutual tolerance and brotherhood. Listening to positive stories helps in the process of opening up possibilities for bridging conflict.
- 35 Most of the constructive stories collected during field-work emphasise the honesty and trustworthiness of the Manjo. Like the one below recalled by a Kafecho.

“One day I sold three cows in the market for a very good price. On the way home I had a bad feeling and looked into my pockets to be sure to have with me the money earned. With my great disappointment I realized that the cash wasn’t there. I was desperate and started crying. Then a Manjo came out of the blue and gave me the money I had lost. He said that he was sitting outside his house when he saw me passing by and something falling off my pockets. After I walked away he went to see what it was and seeing the money run after me to bring them back” (J. Personal Interview. October 20, 2008).

- 36 The Manjo’s hard-working attitude, physical strength and loyalty were also among the most cited qualities attributed to this group by the Kafecho.

“There was a time during the harvest when I barely could sleep. The crop was so abundant that I had to ask for help. None of my Kafecho neighbours came to help me. They were jealous of my good luck. The Manjo instead did not hesitate to come in my succour. They are hard-working and loyal” (L. Personal Interview. July 12, 2008).

- 37 The group is also known for being good at keeping secrets.

- 38 Positive stories were also collected from the Manjo’s side. These stories show the human side of the Kafecho:

“It is not true that the Manjo and the Kafecho cannot be friends. I tell you a secret: I do have a Kafecho friend. She invites me to her place for coffee sometime and we talk about our sons and our lives. I tell her my worries and she tells me hers, we share tears of happiness and tears of sadness” (B. Personal Interview. October 5, 2008).

“Once I was coming home after a bad day at school. I am normally a happy person and people who know me noticed my awful mood. A Kafecho whom I knew by face was concerned about me and asked what happened. I did not reply, I just said I did not have a good day. Then he tried hard to get me back into a good mood. He made jokes and strange faces. I laughed” (T. Personal Interview. September 26, 2008).

- 39 On the whole, this small sample of stories shows the existence of a world of interconnectedness that can create the basis of a new shared story that honours important elements and values of each set of cultural understanding (e.g. empathy, friendship, loyalty, honesty).

Positive rituals

- 40 During field-work four positive rituals were identified. One had to do with breastfeeding practice. Kafecho children are breastfed often by Manjo women whose milk, among other qualities, is believed to bring health, physical strength and a long-life to the new born. The breast milk of a Manjo woman is also considered as curative for a disease called *aadii* (probably caused by malnutrition).

- 41 The second ritual is related to greetings. Meeting a Manjo as the first person in the morning is notably a sign of good luck for the day, while meeting a Manno is believed to be a sign of bad luck.

- 42 Furthermore, when there is a sacrifice to the nature spirit, the Manjo would be called upon to clear up the path into the forest and chop wood.

- 43 Taking part in the life of the Manjo and the Kafecho I came across another ritual. During harvest time, the Manjo and the Kafecho have a farming support system calls *dabo*. In this way they help each other collecting the crop. During *dabo*, Kafecho farmers sing a song entitled “Kafecho-none”, that can be translated into English as “we are the

people of Kaffa”. The same song is sung also by the Manjo in the same occasion although not together with the Kafecho. Symbolically and literally in the words of the song, the message was sung:

We are wonderful people
 Who can fight the hyenas, and kill elephants with our spears
 We have the ability to plough the fields until the seeds turn into fruits
 We struggle with hyenas until they die
 With their tails we sweep the floor
 With their raw meat we feed our boys
 We are the people of Kaffa
 Wonderful men

- 44 This song which linked music with history, identity, and landscape has potential to provide the positive, beautiful and unifying image that community members in Kaffa need to hold on to. It calls upon a collective social identity that unites the two groups into one. Through it, the Kafecho and the Manjo may acquire a sense of ‘regional’ identity, as it made the listeners recall common origins of the people of Kaffa. Hunting and farming, the two most antagonistic activities in Kaffa, are converted through the words of the song, from conflicting into complementing. The people of Kaffa, the Manjo and the Kafecho are described as able to hunt wild animals like hyenas but also to cultivate the land successfully. Apparently, the unique features of each group’s identity disappears to the benefit of a higher identity represented by being the proud inhabitants of the same land.
- 45 A beloved piece of music, then, becomes a window onto a worldview because it connects people to places, time, history, and identity. It speaks to people’s souls while exciting their senses as well. This improvised ritual, together with the other elements discussed so far, could also contribute in the shift from conflicting to mutual inclusive identities.

Conclusion

- 46 To understand the life of people who are in this process of interaction it is essential to comprehend what influences their ideas, their individual and group identity and subsequently their actions (KOROSTELINA 2007). The exploration and understanding of the local culture and its destructive elements that sustain the discrimination of the Manjo, becomes a compulsory step to take in the process of enhancing understanding of the local reality and dynamics and trying to tackle the cultural dimension of violence. At the same time, the search for constructive cultural elements shared by both groups will enhance efforts to recognize the value and peculiarity of each identity and culture but also to contemplate the concept of a new shared ‘We-ness’.

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FOOTNOTES

1. The research findings presented in the paper are part of my PhD project entitled: 'Striking a balance between local capacities for peace and external intervention in conflict: The case of the Manjo in Southern Ethiopia'. Data were collected from March to December 2008 in the Kaffa zone through the employment of an ethnographic approach. The ethnographic approach was based on

participants observation and semi-structured interviews. A total of 63 interviews were held. The following criteria were elaborated for the definition of the sample: Small size, to acquire more detailed information; Variety of views, informants should be from different social groups; Representatives of the social setting (e.g. prominent members of Church and traditional institutions, as well as youth); Representatives of the various formal and non-formal institutions shaping the local context; Gender sensitivity. In addition, the definition of the sample was based on two key ideas: The sample should include informants from the Manjo as well as from the dominant Kafecho group; The sample should be stratified in order to record differences in views and social status within each group. As the sample should be rich in information, informants who were better at expressing themselves, reflecting and articulating their knowledge were selected (JOHNSON and CHRISTENSEN, 2008). This argument affected the balance of the well-being and gender criteria as information in the end, was mainly collected where it was the most comprehensible for the research. Letters of the alphabet (e.g. A, B, C) are used throughout the dissertation to identify participants and prevent any connection between quotes and participants. The letters in use do not correspond to the initial of participants. This research approach was integrated with a secondary literature review and field notes. The use of field notes, containing descriptions and ideas that exceeded the initial scope, helped corroborate or contradict the outcomes of interviews and participant observation and broaden the original lists of questions.

2. Data provided by the Kaffa zone Information and Culture department.

3. In the mid-1980s this military government embarked on forced resettlement and villagisation as part of a national programme to combat drought and famine (CLAPHAM 1988). Resettlement involved the relocation on a permanent basis of people from the north drought-prone areas to the green south and southwestern part of the country (OFCANSKY and LAVERLE 1991).

4. The name 'Colobus' derives from the Greek word for 'mutilated,' because unlike other monkeys, Colobus monkeys do not have thumbs. They have black fur, long white mantle, whiskers and beard around the face and a bushy white tail (AFRICAN WILDLIFE FOUNDATION 2009).

5. The economy of Kaffa is nowadays driven mostly by tea and coffee production. Land is being rapidly depleted as a result of clearing for agricultural expansion by local farmers and large scale for coffee and tea plantations. Access to the forest has therefore become contentious (TEKLE 2005).

6. The *eddir* is a funeral association. It ensures a payout in cash and in kind at the time of a funeral for a deceased member of the family and of the group (DERCON, BOLD, DE WEERDT and PANKHURST 2004). This traditional funeral association is strictly organized with leaders democratically elected. The *eddir* members live in a geographically defined area, and every month or every two weeks contribute a certain amount of money to offset the expenses of burial cost (VAN HALTEREN 1996). The *eddir* is also called a self-help association, because its function often exceeds burials. It is consulted through its leaders to solve disputes. The disputants refer the matter of dispute to the *eddir* leaders, the leaders will enquire into it, and later discuss with the whole *eddir* or some delegates, and will pass judgement.

7. From unknown time the vast majority of people of Kaffa believe in the possession spirit known as *eko* which comes to a person after his/her father's death. Once the person is chosen by an *eko*, he/she becomes an *alamo* (one who can communicate with ancestral spirits) and the spirit will appear through the person until death. In ordinary life, before a spirit possesses the *alamos*, they lead a life like anyone else in the community. But when possessed they become a changed personality and do not exercise their own actions anymore but those of the spirit (PETROS 2003). People would consult the *alamo* for many reasons, usually related to marriage arrangements, health and general well-being. This possession cult of *eko* has a strong connection with food taboos and the discrimination of the Manjo (PETROS, 2003; VAN HALTEREN 1996). The *alamo*, for instance, is expected to observe various food restrictions: refrain from eating sheep, chicken and cabbages and from eating in the presence of other people, exceptions are however made for

fellow *alamos*. *Alamos* are always against the Manjo because of the alleged eating habits of the latter, and the Manjo consider the *alamo* a major factor in perpetuating segregation and discriminatory practices against them. No Manjo for instance can enter the house of a Kafecho *alamo*, they have to sit outside the fence during consultation. Furthermore, one way of bringing the wrath of *eko* upon a person, is to allow Manjo into their house or to eat with them. The *alamo* makes sure that any violation of this role would be punished. At present the behaviour of the *alamo* has not changed when compared with the past (YOSHIDA 2009).

8. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a metaphor as follows: “A figure of speech in which a name or descriptive word or phrase is transferred to an object or action different from, but analogous to, that to which it is literally applicable; an instance of this, a metaphorical expression”. Metaphors are literal images that structure human thought processes (HAYAKAWA 1978).

AUTHOR

Federica De Sisto

Claiming Ethnic Identity: Petitions by the Manjo in the Kafa and Sheka Zones of Southwest Ethiopia

Sayuri Yoshida


p. 83-99

- 1 Ethiopia contains many minority groups, consisting of hunters and craft workers, including the Wayto among the Amhara, the Waata among the Oromo, the Manjo among the Kafa, and so on. Although these minorities play important roles in their societies, they have low status and are excluded by the majority. The drastic changes that occurred in Ethiopia during the twentieth century have changed the livelihoods of minority groups consisting of hunters and craft workers. Some have given up their conventional subsistence activities, hunting or making crafts, and have begun farming. The relationships of these minorities with neighbouring majority groups are also changing (e.g., GAMST 1979). When the difference between the minority groups and the majority groups become less, how does the identity of the minority groups change?
- 2 This article examines the kinds of changes experienced by minority groups and discusses how they demonstrate their new identity focused on the petition drives organized by one minority group, the Manjo, who are former hunters living in the Kafa and Sheka zones of the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Regional State (SNNPRS). Since the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power, the federal government has followed a policy of ethnic federalism. The new Constitution, enacted in 1994, acknowledges that all nations, nationalities, and peoples have an unconditional right to self-determination, including a right to secession. Article 39 defines the complex concept of nation, nationality and people as a group of people who have, or share in large measure, a common culture or similar customs, a mutually intelligible language, a belief in a common or related identity and a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory. Based on this definition, affirmative measures for minority nationalities and peoples are introduced. Recently, zonal and regional governments have given these groups priority in education and employment. As a result, some members of these

groups have completed their education and secured jobs with their local administration. The purpose of this affirmative action is to correct imbalance among the ethnic groups in the local administration.

- 3 However, the combination of the federal system and the right to self-determination has created new political units, with their own political and cultural autonomy, which have caused problems and conflicts regarding the language used for education and administration in border areas.¹ Some researchers have identified the policy of self-determination deriving from the “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” provision as the problem. Abbink has argued that the Constitution has tried to reify something that is, by nature, fluid and shifting: ethnic identity. Intentionally or not, this provision further strengthens ethnicity as a political identity and as a vessel for “democratic rights” (ABBINK 1997: 172–173). Pankhurst and Freeman insisted that the concerns of marginalized minorities such as hunters and craft workers have been little considered in “ethnic politics” since most of them are dispersed social categories rather than localized ethnic groups. In recent years, some of the minority groups have begun to fight for political representation (PANKHURST and FREEMAN 2003: 340, 354). Although the Constitution guarantees the rights of nations, nationalities and peoples, the minorities under examination have become even more marginalized and increasingly deprived of access to economic and political resources.
- 4 The Manjo have long been discriminated against by the Kafa and Sheka. In 1997, several Manjo individuals gathered to create a petition to the zonal, regional, and federal governments asking for the abolition of social discrimination in the Kafa and Sheka zones and requesting recognition under the “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” provision. In 2002, the Manjo attacked the Kafa in an attempt to end discrimination. In 2008, the regional government tried to settle the Manjo issue through a resolution. The government admitted the existence of social discrimination against the Manjo, but rejected the idea that the Manjo are covered under the “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” provision.
- 5 This article focuses on the Manjo living within Kafa society, because most of the Manjo involved in the petition drives migrated from the Kafa zone, from the middle of the twentieth century. First the Manjo are described, and then an overview of their historical situation within Kafa society is presented, focusing primarily on their social roles and status during the period of prosperity experienced by the Kafa Kingdom up until 1897. Changes that occurred during this period will also be described, and explanations of contemporary social relationships between the Manjo and the Kafa will be offered. Following this, details of the Manjo in Bach’i *qäbäle* will be outlined and their petitions discussed. There follows an examination of the geographical, social, and historical background, and the logic underpinning their petitions and claims to ethnic identity. Finally, I will argue that the Manjo’s claim to ethnic identity is based on the use of various resources that could also be employed in politics.

Fig. 1. Location of Bach’i *qäbäle*



Map made by the author based on the map prepared by the Zonal Finance and Economic Development Desk and Sustainable Poverty Alleviation Project in Kafa.

- 6 I conducted fieldwork in the Kafa zone on several occasions between 2005 and 2010. The total length of my stay in Ethiopia was 28 months.² The people involved in the petitions are identified by their real names as they requested, which clearly shows that the Ethiopian government is aware of both the petitions and the names of their representatives.

The Manjo and Kafa societies

The Manjo minority in the Kafa society

- 7 The Manjo are a minority group living in pockets of the Kafa, Sheka, Bench Maji, and Dawro zones, and the Konta special *wäräda* in the SNNPRS. Some Manjo also live in the Oromiya and Gambela Regional States. There are no census data on the Manjo population because they live within the majority culture and are considered members of the majority ethnic group. Nevertheless, the Manjo do have a separate identity. Sometimes the Manjo are given different names according to the areas they reside: the Manjo in the Kafa and Sheka zones, the Manja among the Amhara and the Dawro, the Bandu among the Bench, and the Manji among the Majangir. Furthermore, the Manjo is equated with the Wayto around Lake Tana, the Waata in the Oromo, the Fuga in the Gurage, and the Geemi in the Dizi or craft workers like blacksmiths, tanners and potters.
- 8 The population of the Kafa zone is 874,716, the majority of whom were Kafa in 2007. In 1991, the area was divided into four zones: Kafa, Sheka, Bench, and Maji. In 1996, these four zones were organized into the Kaficho Shekacho zone and the Bench Maji zone. In 2000, the Kaficho Shekacho zone was subdivided into the Kafa zone and the Sheka zone.
- 9 In general, people who speak the Kafa language, *Kafi-noono*, are known as *Kafa*. However, within Kafa society, people differentiate themselves as *Gomoro*, *Manno*, or *Manjo*.³ The majority call themselves *Gomoro* (hereafter referred to as Kafa). The Manno are tanners. The Manjo were formerly hunters and are known as *aaddoo*. The Manjo and the Manno reside in all 11 *wärädas* that constitute the Kafa zone. An estimated 10,000–12,000 Manjo live in the Kafa zone,⁴ inhabiting nearly every *qäbäle*. The Manjo living in the Kafa zone have their own clans, which number more than 30 and differ from the

Kafa clans. Although the Manjo in the Kafa zone speak *Kafi-noono*, both groups claim that their languages differ, stressing distinctions in intonation. Most Manjos consider themselves to be an indigenous ethnic group that differs from the Kafa.

Historical situation of the Manjo

- 10 The Kafa Kingdom, which existed in the Kafa zone until 1897, was ruled by the *Minjo* clan of the Kafa. However, oral traditions state that the first king of the Kafa Kingdom was a Manjo. Some of the traditions refer to the *Matto* taking over the throne after the Manjo king was dethroned, and to the *Minjo* ascending the throne after the *Matto*, and holding it until 1897.
- 11 The Kafa Kingdom was ruled by *Kafi taatoo*, the Kafa king. The *mikkerecho*, councilors to the king, were the most important court officials. Standing above all *mikkerechos*, *Ketema rasho* was the chief councilor and *de facto* king when the king was elsewhere (ORENT 1970b: 283). *Rasho* means “chief” and is usually used in a manner similar to *Ras*, the title used for nobles in Amharic.
- 12 The land of the Kafa Kingdom, *Kafi showo*, was divided into 18 districts called *woraf*.⁵ Each *woraf* had a district head called the *Woraf rasho* (e.g., *Decha rasho*, *Gesha rasho*, *Gawata rasho*, etc.), whose duties included collecting taxes and maintaining security. The *woraf* were divided into provinces or clan territories called *guudo*, and *guudo* were further sub-divided into areas called *xuggo* and hamlets called *gafo*.⁶
- 13 The administrative structure of the Manjo differed from that of the Kafa. The Manjo also had their own king, *Manjo taatoo*,⁷ who was selected from the *Dallo* clan (identified as *Aache Dallo*)⁸ by the *Kafi taatoo*. Although the *Manjo taatoo* attended the *Kafi taatoo*, the Manjo could not participate in politics in the Kafa Kingdom. Their authority extended over the Manjo only. Similar to the Kafa king, the *Manjo taatoo* had his *Manjo rashes* in all 18 *woraf*s (HUNTINGFORD 1955: 136). Under each *Manjo rasho* were *Manjo guudos*. The *Manjo taatoo*, *Manjo rasho*, and *Manjo guudo* served functions such as collecting taxes, managing conscription, distributing prizes to warriors who contributed to war victories, and administering justice. Although *Manjo taatoo*, *Manjo rasho*, and *Manjo guudo* had social status, they were considered inferior to the Kafa and were not treated as the equals of the latter.
- 14 One remarkable example can clarify the *Manjo taatoo*’s position and role. The Kafa Kingdom was frequently at war against neighboring kingdoms such as the Kullo, Gera, and Jimma. Persons who contribute to the victory in the war were given reward by the Kafa king. Rewards varied and sometimes consisted of a patch of land, women, slaves, or horses. Kafa and Manjo warriors were given the same amounts and types of rewards. However, the manner of receiving the reward differed, with the Kafa receiving their prizes from the *Ketema rasho* and the Manjo receiving their prizes from the *Manjo taatoo*. Also, the *Manjo taatoo* played a number of roles in ritual ceremonies.
- 15 The Manjo played important roles in the Kafa Kingdom. The Manjo served as beaters during hunting expeditions including the Kafa king and *rasho*. As payment, they received the meat of whole animals. It was said that they ate any kind of animal (CERULLI 1930: 234). The Manjo customarily guarded the border of the Kafa Kingdom. When enemies approached the border, a Manjo guard struck a drum, *hokko* or *gonno*, producing sounds that spread quickly to alert other Manjo guards. The Manjo were also

assigned to guard the grave and the palace of the Kafa king (BIEBER 1908: 186). The royal burial site of Kafa kings was located on a mountaintop in Shosha and was guarded by men from the Manjo and Kafa. The Manjo also guarded the houses of some Kafa *rashos* and *alamos*, or a medium of *eqo*, spirits. According to Cerulli, Manjo men served as messengers to the Kafa *rasho*. Because the Kafa language had no established orthography, the Kafa *rasho* customarily had Manjo men carry his messages to another Kafa *rasho* (CERULLI 1930: 234).

- 16 Some Manjos owned their own land, which was given to them by Kafa kings in reward for wartime services. Indeed, some patches of land are still known as the “land of the Manjo”, *Manjo guudo*. Land could be obtained not only by participating in war but also by excelling in certain tasks.

The transitional period of Kafa society

- 17 In 1897, Ras Wolde Giorgis conquered the Kafa Kingdom and incorporated it into the Ethiopian Empire. Thereafter, Kafa was governed by the Amhara, who were sent by the central government. Although the last Kafa king was dethroned and some *mikkerechos* were dismissed, *Ketema rasho* was appointed as governor by Ras Wolde Giorgis (KOCHITO 1979: 19). Governmental districts were reorganized based on the *worafo* of the Kafa Kingdom. According to Huntingford, the Manjo who were the most faithful adherents to their overlords were firmly attached to the *Ketema rasho*, even in 1928 (HUNTINGFORD 1955: 136). However, after the fall of the Kafa Kingdom, the role of the Manjo was reduced.
- 18 In 1936, the Italians arrived to occupy the Kafa, and most Amhara immigrants with northern Ethiopian origins fled back to the north. The Italians, because of their policy of resolving disputes among indigenous populations as a bulwark against the Amhara and northern Oromo, encouraged the Kafa people to identify the land markers that define their lineage (e.g., certain trees, rocks, hillcrests) and to re-establish their traditional land claims (ORENT 1970a: 229).
- 19 One Kafa informant recalled how the Italian government re-established the previous structure of the Kafa Kingdom.⁹ According to the informant, the Italian governors summoned the dispersed descendants of the Kafa king. Abba Qasto, a nephew of the last Kafa king, was taken to Bonga and seated on the throne as the “Kafa king”. The Italian governor replaced the administrative structure with the previous structure of the Kafa Kingdom, restoring the *Worafo rashos* as well as the former *Manjo taatoo* and *Manjo rashos*. The Manjo were required to supply the Italian governor with live wild animals, leather, honey and other goods. The Manjo living in the *worafo* hunted and gathered those, and the *Manjo rasho* collected those and took to the *Manjo taatoo* in Bonga. The *Worafo rashos* also brought items collected from the Kafa. Subsequently, the *Manjo taatoo* delivered these goods to Abba Qasto, who finally handed them over to the Italian governor.¹⁰
- 20 After the Italians left Ethiopia in 1941, positions such as *Manjo taatoo*, *Manjo rasho*, and *Manjo guudo* were abolished under the Ethiopian Empire.

The changing lifestyle of the Manjo

- 21 Before the Derg era, the Manjo primarily hunted and gathered food for a living. The Manjo men hunted wild boar, bushbuck, porcupines, colobus, buffalo, leopards, elephants, and so on. These animals were targeted primarily for food, whereas others were captured for selling, e.g., civet cats, and the hides and fur of certain animals.
- 22 Today, the living environment of the Manjo has changed greatly, and hunting is rare. One of the reasons for this is the increased protection of wild animals and forest resources enacted by the government in 1980. Hunting seems to have declined only where wild and big animals have decreased. After 1991, many Manjo converted to Protestantism and stopped eating wild animals quoting words from the Bible that prohibit the consumption of wild boar, colobus, etc. Nowadays, the Manjo no longer hunt but rather buy meat at the market.
- 23 Manjo women used to make earthenware at home. Women made plates, pans, pots, and water jugs and sold them at local markets. Nowadays, many Manjo women have stopped making earthenware as a way to generate income and usually make these products only for their own use at home. One of the reasons for this is the increasingly widespread use of kitchen utensils made of aluminum and plastic and the decreasing demand for earthenware. Another reason is that the Manjo believe that their practice of making earthenware is one of the reasons the Kafa discriminate against them.
- 24 Today, most Manjo engage in farming. The lifestyle of the Manjo no longer differs from that of the Kafa farmers who cultivate staples for food, including maize, sorghum, wheat, barley, *tef*, *ənsät*, beans, and so. Some Manjo cultivate coffee as a cash crop and keep bees, and some are even wealthier than the Kafa. Like the Kafa, the Manjo have cows, bulls, goats, sheep, fowl, horses, and so on. Those Manjo who do not own enough land to farm may make their living by selling firewood and charcoal. In this respect, the Manjo are now far from being “hunters” (YOSHIDA 2008: 49–50).

The relationship between the Kafa and the Manjo

- 25 Kafa society manifests various restrictions related to status, age, sex, physical condition, death, menstruation, childbirth, and relationships among groups (i.e., the Kafa, Manjo, and Manno). Certain restrictions are also observed with respect to greetings, meals, communal labor, spousal choice, and burial grounds.
- 26 Before the Derg regime, the Kafa did not treat the Manjo as equals. Up to the present, relationships between Kafa and Manjo individuals are characterized by ambiguity. While the Kafa refuse to allow the Manjo into their homes, if a Manjo comes to a Kafa house asking for food, the Kafa will give the Manjo something to eat. The Kafa believe that they will be blessed if they satisfy the hunger of a Manjo.¹¹ Similarly, if a Kafa meets a Manjo in the morning, the Kafa sees this as a sign of a good day.¹² The Manjo are believed to be blessed and have the status of *showe kabbo* (elders of the land). Thus, although the Kafa prefer not to share their residential and burial spaces with the Manjo, they will ask the Manjo to sow the first seeds of a planting season. If the Manjo do not have seeds, the Kafa will supply some. It is said that if the Kafa start sowing before the Manjo, the seeds will not grow well.¹³ Likewise, the Kafa avoid having meals with the Manjo or using the same tableware as used by them. Marriage between the

two groups is strictly forbidden. Nevertheless, a Kafa woman may ask a Manjo woman to suckle her newborn baby, believing it will make the baby grow well.¹⁴

- 27 However, in general, the mutual avoidance characterizing the relationship between the Kafa and the Manjo has been viewed as a focal problem. During the Italian regime, the government tried to treat the Kafa and the Manjo equally. For example, the Italian government prohibited the following manner of greeting: when a Manjo met a Kafa on the road, the Manjo had to step aside, bow and greet the Kafa with the phrase “*showocchi qebona* (literally, let me die for you).” Nevertheless, five years was too short to change their relationship dramatically. The Derg government also viewed these restrictions as aspects of a “harmful culture” and tried to abolish them. Specifically, the Derg held several meetings to improve the relationship between the Kafa and the Manjo. However, the top-down policy was not successful.
- 28 The Manjos’ social position and way of life have changed drastically since the Derg era. Although the lifestyle of the Manjo today is the same as that of the Kafa, some Kafas still look down on and oppress Manjos. The Kafa and the Manjo generally differentiate themselves from each other. The Kafa despise the Manjo and do not include the latter in their own category of *asho* (people). They also oppress the Manjo and attribute certain flaws to them with respect to eating habits, physical features, and certain characteristics. Typically, the Manjo are described by the Kafa as dirty, disgusting, ignorant, stupid, primitive, backward, animal-like, and sub-human. Despite the negative stereotype images of the Manjo, it was difficult for me to find any differences in their lifestyles. Indeed, these images of the Manjo lack a substantial basis in reality, and the Kafa use derogatory images and idioms only to justify their discrimination against the Manjo.
- 29 Recently, the differences that characterize the daily relationship between the Kafa and the Manjo have expanded in scope to include issues related to official participation in their society. That is, not only do few Manjos have posts on *qäbäle* committees but also few hold posts as *wäräda* or zonal administrators, and only a few Manjos finish school. Most of the Manjos born before the Derg regime had little education because most Manjos who wanted to go to school were denied access to classrooms by the Kafa. In general, the Manjo believe that most Manjo are treated unfairly by government officials and policemen when problems between them and the Kafa arise. Thus, the relationship between the Kafa and the Manjo is characterized by discrimination and denial of rights.

The Manjo petitions

The Manjo in Bach’i qäbäle

- 30 The Manjo who started the petition movement live in Bach’i *qäbäle* of Yeki *wäräda*, the Sheka zone. Originally, Bach’i *qäbäle* was part of the Sheko land and ruled by the Sheko landlord, *balabbat*. After its incorporation into the Ethiopian Empire, this area was governed by the Amhara, although the Sheko landlord retained the position of *balabbat*. During this time, some people from the Amhara, Gurage, and Oromo had come to open up and work in coffee plantations and started to trade in coffee. Some Manjo worked in the coffee plantations that opened during Haile Sellasie’s regime.

- 31 The population of Bach'i *qābāle* exceeds 10,000 and includes almost 1,450 households. Many ethnic groups live in this *qābāle*, including the Sheko, Majangir, Amhara, Kafa, Manjo, Oromo, Bench, Sheka, Gurage, Tigrey, and so on. Although data on the total Manjo population are unavailable, the percentages of Manjos who attend school are available. Bach'i *qābāle* contains two schools, Bach'i and Seri. In Bach'i school, which has eight grades, Manjo children accounted for 13.2% (260) of the 1,960 students in 2009. In Seri school, which has four grades, Manjo children accounted for 30.8% (202) of the 655 students in 2010. These percentages show that the Manjo have a more pronounced presence in Bach'i *qābāle* than in the Kafa zone.
- 32 Before its incorporation into the Ethiopian Empire, only a few Manjo lived in this area. My research on 212 Manjo households in four hamlets revealed that all members of these households had migrated from other areas. In total, 108 individuals in the 212 households had migrated, and 104 were the second or the third generation at this location. Only one person migrated during the Italian era. Thirty-three householders migrated during Haile Sellasie's regime, and 81 other householders were their sons, grandsons, or great-grandsons. A total of 25 householders migrated during the Derg regime, and seven householders were their sons or grandsons. Forty-nine householders migrated during the EPRDF, and 10 were their sons. Except the person who migrated during Italian era, most of the Manjo migrated to Bach'i *qābāle* to escape from oppression by the Kafa.
- 33 The Manjo who migrated during the Haile Sellasie regime was the primary force behind the petitions. Under the Haile Sellasie regime, some Manjo families migrated from Bitā *wārāda* to Bach'i. The story behind this migration was explained by Manjo migrants and their sons. The present Bitā *wārāda* used to be ruled by *Bitā rasho* Atturuse, and the Manjo who lived there were ruled by *Manjo rasho* Haggiti of the *Shookko* clan who worked under *Bitā rasho*. One day, *Bitā rasho* Atturuse ordered *Manjo rasho* Haggiti to go to Bonga, a journey of several days on foot. There was a rumor that *Bitā rasho* Atturuse had a plan to kill *Manjo rasho* Haggiti during his trip because the Kafa had become irritated by the fact that, after the Italian regime, the Manjo had started to act as if they were their equals. Thus, it is said that *Bitā rasho* Atturuse put the Manjo in their place. *Manjo rasho* Haggiti heard the rumor, was afraid of dying, and escaped to Bach'i. The Sheko *balabbat* gave him and his followers enough land. The Manjo received the land, started their life there, and blessed the Sheko in return.

Representatives of the Manjo

- 34 The Manjo living in Bach'i *qābāle* started a petition following an incident in 1997 in which one Manjo man visited another Manjo man, Alemayehu Aragi. The first Manjo individual had come from Chana *wārāda* and said that, "The government is looking for Alemayehu Aragi." At that time, Alemayehu Aragi was in Tepi. A Manjo man, Geneme Kelli, overheard this message and went to Tepi, where he met Alemayehu Aragi and told him what he had heard. They returned and called the Manjo men who live in Bach'i *qābāle* to discuss the event. After a few days, four Manjos, including Alemayehu Aragi and Geneme Kelli, visited Chana *wārāda* to meet the original Manjo man. However, they did not meet him, and the Kafa told them to come again. Their second visit to Chana *wārāda* ended in the same way. As a result, the Manjo came to believe

that the Kafa were intentionally withholding information and decided to start a petition addressed to the government.

- 35 They immediately organized a committee with a chairman, vice-chairman, accountant, secretary, and other officers. In June 1997, the committee, which consisted of the 207 Manjo elders who lived in Bita *wäräda* and Yeki *wäräda* in the Kaficho Shekacho zone (the present-day Kafa and Sheka zones), appointed two Manjo men, Alemayehu Aragi and Alemayehu Ambo, as their representatives. These individuals were educated and Amharic-literate. Alemayehu Ambo was a grandchild of *Manjo rasho* Hayano. *Manjo rasho* Hayano was a brother of *Manjo rasho* Haggiti. Alemayehu Aragi worked as a sanitation expert, and Alemayehu Ambo worked as a member of a *qäbäle* in the Derg.
- 36 The petition was supported by the Manjo living in Bita *wäräda*, Decha *wäräda*, Chana *wäräda*, Gesha *wäräda*, and Yeki *wäräda*. Financial support came primarily through the committee, members of which visited the aforementioned Manjos to solicit support for, and contributions to, the petition drive. Some Manjo individuals directly gave Alemayehu Aragi and Alemayehu Ambo 1–10 birr for their coffee.

Content of the petitions

- 37 The Manjo have been circulating petitions directed at local, regional, and federal governments from 1997 to the present. In total, they have made their petitions more than 40 times. There have been more than 100 documents, all written in Amharic. The Manjo committee members copied and retained almost all of the petitions; with their permission, I photographed these along with related documents during the research I conducted between 2005 and 2010.
- 38 In 1997, the Manjo made petitions to the zonal and regional governments and the Kafa Sheka People's Democratic Organization (KSPDO). The Manjo argued that their right to be treated in accord with the "Nations, Nationalities and Peoples" provision was being violated, that they were discriminated against by the Kafa and the Sheka, and that they were deprived of opportunities to be employed as administrative officials, teachers, police, and so on. The Manjo requested permission to form an organization to seek both recognition and their rights.
- 39 In 1998, the Manjo petitioned the zonal and *wäräda* governments and the KSPDO, claiming that they had been treated as wild animals or barbarians and oppressed and deprived of their rights and freedom in the Kafa and Sheka zones for a long period. Moreover, as per the "Nations, Nationalities and Peoples" provision, the Manjo claimed to have a different history and identity from those of the Kafa.
- 40 The Manjo did not file any petitions between October 1998 and September 2000, reportedly because six Manjos who were involved in the petition had been jailed, and other Manjos feared arrest. During this time, Alemayehu Aragi and Alemayehu Ambo visited all *wärädas* in the Kaficho Shekacho zone to investigate the customs and habits of the Manjo and compile the oral traditions that were part of Manjo history.¹⁵ They also counted the number of Manjo individuals and clans.
- 41 During this period, the Manjo also allied themselves with the Majangir and Sheko around Bach'i *qäbäle* with respect to their rights and status. The Manjo, Majangir, and Sheko met weekly at various homes or at the Protestant church. Alemayehu Aragi and Alemayehu Ambo proceeded to establish the Manjo's own political party, the Manjo

People's Democratic Party in Awasa. However, this initiative failed because Alemayehu Aragi and Alemayehu Ambo joined the party of the Sheko and Majangir without the consent of the aforementioned Manjo committee in Bach'i *qābāle*. The Manjo ended their partnership with the Majangir and Sheko in 2000 because the movement focused only on the Majangir and Sheko, groups with their own language, culture, and political party as well as many educated members.¹⁶ It is clear that the Majangir and Sheko provided the Manjo with important knowledge, including techniques related to petitioning and information about the Constitution.

- 42 In 2000 and 2001, the Manjo returned to filing petitions not only with the zonal and regional governments but also with the federal government and several organizations including the House of Peoples Representative, the SNNPRS, the EPRDF Office, and the Ethiopian Radio Organization, amongst others. Their most important goals, to achieve recognition under the "Nations, Nationalities and Peoples" provision of Article 39, and to have their own representatives in the House of Peoples' Representatives under Article 54 of the Constitution, were clearly articulated. For instance, Alemayehu Aragi and Alemayehu Ambo, the representatives of the Manjo in the Kafa and Sheka zones, argued that the Manjo are a minority group with a population of almost one million individuals in more than 40 clans living in the SNNPRS and Oromiya and Gambela Regional States. Although the Manjo had had their own king and administrative structure in the past, they did not have the rights and status accompanying recognition according to the "Nations, Nationalities and Peoples" provision.

The attack by the Manjo and the attitude of the government

- 43 The zonal government initially cooperated with the Manjo. When the Manjo asked permission to organize a meeting to educate other Manjos about the situation, the zonal government granted permission and sent letters to all *wärādas* in the Kaficho Shekacho zone. However, after 2000, the government cracked down on the Manjo's petitioning, citing its supposed illegality. The police searched several Manjo houses in Bach'i *qābāle* and, although nothing was found, some Manjo men were arrested. The Manjo interpreted these actions as signs that the government hoped they would abandon the idea of petitioning.
- 44 During February 6–12, 2001, a meeting that included representatives of the Sheko, Majangir and Manjo, and government officials of the SNNPRS, Sheka zone, and Yeki *wärāda* was held in Tepi. The meeting focused on two questions related to the Manjo: Is the violence directed at the Manjo a result of their presumed sub-human status, and do the Manjo qualify as a nation, nationality and people? The government's responses to these questions held that the social position of the Manjo was related to the history and culture of the Kafa and that little information about the Manjo was available. Thus, the government did not make any decision.
- 45 In March 2002, the Manjo living in Bach'i *qābāle* of Yeki *wärāda* and Woshero and Shota *qābāles* of Bitā *wärāda* launched an attack against their Kafa neighbors. Many Kafa were killed and their houses burned to the ground. The impact of the attack was tremendous, and many Manjo were taken into custody. After the attack, discrimination against the Manjo in the Kafa zone became a human rights issue, and a number of NGOs initiated campaigns to abolish discrimination against the Manjo (YOSHIDA 2008: 57). Because of the incident, the Manjo could not continue to organize petitions. In 2005,

the Manjo re-started petitioning the zonal, regional, and federal governments by appointing new representatives to achieve their goal of improvement in the social status of the Manjo in the form of official recognition as an ethnic group and an end to the discrimination perpetrated by the Kafa.

- 46 After the incident, the regional government researched and discussed the Manjo issue. It studied the discrimination against the Manjo as well as the Manjo's claim that they were a nation, nationality and people in the context of the social, economic, historical, cultural, and political situations in the Kafa and Sheka zones. On May 21, 2008, the regional government resolved the Manjo issue. The decision was documented in "A Decision concerning the Identity Request of the Manja Community (*Yä Manja mahbäräsäb yä-mannənät təyaqen asmälkəto yä- täsättä wəṣane*)." The regional government concluded that there was social discrimination against the Manjo. However, they rejected the idea that the Manjo are a nation, nationality and people after examining the Manjo's claim that they qualify for this status, according to Article 39 of the Constitution, based on their historical background, lifestyle, customs, language, identity, and place of domicile. Although the regional government accepted that the identity of the Manjo differs from that of the Kafa, they did not find other differences between the two groups. Indeed, the regional government concluded that the Manjo did not have their own history, culture, language, and area of domicile. Finally, they concluded that the main problem was the lack of "good governance".
- 47 The regional government sent the document to the Kafa and Sheka zones and to the representatives of the Manjo. The decision was also reported in a newspaper. However, the Manjo have not accepted this decision and have continued their petitioning to this day.

Background and features of the Manjo petition

Geographic features as grounds for the petitions

- 48 The Manjo living in Bach'i *qäbäle* differ from the Manjo living in other areas. The Manjo in other areas of the Kafa zone are not as active politically as are those in Bach'i *qäbäle*. Most of the Manjo in Bach'i *qäbäle* migrated from the Kafa zone because of discrimination by the Kafa. Bach'i *qäbäle*, which has the largest population in Yeki *wäräda*, contains many ethnic groups living next to one another. The area around Bach'i *qäbäle*, in the Kafa and Sheka zones, is prosperous and well-suited to coffee cultivation. Historically, many people came to this area to do business. Many of the Manjo who migrated to Bach'i *qäbäle* started to cultivate coffee as a cash crop. As a result, differences between the living standards of the Manjo and other ethnic groups, including the Kafa, decreased. Additionally, the Manjo living in this area are wealthier than those living in other areas.
- 49 The multi-ethnic situation in this area made the Manjo conscious of their relationship with the Kafa and led them to complain about the Kafa's discriminatory treatment toward them. There is no doubt that their consciousness increased as a result of the Majangir incident. The Majangir, an ethnic group living primarily in the Gambela, Oromiya Regional State, and the SNNPRS, revolted in Tepi in April and May 1993. According to Sato, the Majangir, who claimed to be indigenous to Tepi, were dissatisfied with the distribution of administrative posts and the demarcation of the

border (SATO 2002: 191–193). After this incident, the Majangir worked in cooperation with the Sheko and continued their political movement to secure an appropriate regional border and the rightful distribution of administrative power based on their right to self-determination. Not only did the Manjo engage in discussions with the Majangir and Sheko from 1998 to 2000 but they also attacked the Kafa in March 2002. Indeed, this attack occurred on the same day that the Majangir and the Sheko attacked their Sheka neighbors, the *wäräda* administrative office, and the police station in Tepi.

- 50 Needless to say, literacy in Amharic is essential for writing a petition. The Manjo living in Bach'i *qäbäle* have more education and exposure to Amharic than do the Manjo living in other areas. Although the mother tongue of the Manjo is the Kafa language, many can speak, read, and write Amharic fluently. Amharic is important as a medium by which to communicate with their neighbors: the Sheko, Majangir, Oromo, Bench, and so on. Their Amhara neighbors, who migrated to Bach'i *qäbäle* from Wello in 1985, under the Derg resettlement policy, influenced the Manjo to master Amharic.
- 51 The location of Bach'i *qäbäle* further supported the Manjo. Bach'i *qäbäle* is located on the causeway to Tepi, which is approximately 23 kilometers away. Tepi is connected to Addis Ababa by public transportation. Until 2006, a domestic flight connected Addis Ababa and Tepi, making it very convenient to travel between these locations. Cash income from coffee cultivation provided financial support for the Manjo's petitions.

Historical and cultural features of the Manjo

- 52 Certain historical and cultural features distinguish the Manjo from other minorities. According to their oral traditions, a Manjo was “the first king” of the Kafa Kingdom, and the Manjo were the “first people” in Kafa. These oral traditions explain why the Manjo are “indigenous people” who differ from the Kafa, who have deprived them of positions and land.
- 53 Historically, the Manjo were differentiated from the Kafa by the regional administrative structure and were ruled by the Kafa king through *Manjo taatoo*, *Manjo rasho*, and *Manjo guudo* during the Kafa Kingdom and the Italian regime. In fact, some Manjos still remember the name of *Manjo rasho*. One of the key persons behind the petitions, Alemayehu Ambo, is a grandson of *Manjo rasho* Hayano. There are also many other descendants of *Manjo rasho* Hayano in Bach'i *qäbäle*. This means that *Manjo taatoo*, *Manjo rasho*, and *Manjo guudo* are not ancient history to the Manjo who file petitions. Some descendants of *Manjo rasho* are conscious of their ancestry, culture, and history; this consciousness enhances support for the leaders of the Manjo political movement.
- 54 These historical and cultural features of the Manjo have been included in academic works written by foreign researchers and in Amharic books noting differences between the Kafa and the Manjo. The Manjo have referred to these studies to justify their claim that they are a nation, nationality and people. In his interview, Alemayehu Ambo often referred to the Amharic book *Kafa and its History from 1390 to 1897* by Antonio Shechi, which was written by Takle Shaligito Shaqo, a Kafa man (TAKLE 1992/93). The book quoted Bieber and Cecchi. Although Alemayehu Ambo did not read the original book written by Bieber and Cecchi, he talked about it as if he had read it. Many Manjo have much interest in academic works by foreigners.

Logic of the Manjo

- 55 The Manjo circulated petitions in 1997 in an effort to improve their social status and abolish discrimination in the Kafa and Sheka zones. However, in 2000, the Manjo emphasized their Constitutional status as a nation, nationality and people, with their own culture, history, language, and identity that differed from those of the Kafa.
- 56 The petitions outlined the evidence supporting the Manjo's status as a nation, nationality and people, with their own culture, history, language, and identity. For example, the Manjo have their own clans, which differ from those of the Kafa. Additionally, there is a strong taboo against marriage between Manjos and Kafas. The Manjo were influenced by the division between the Kafa and Sheka zones in 2000, which was caused by the Sheka's insistence that their language differed from that of the Kafa. Indeed, the Manjo described *Kafi-noono* and *Sheki-noono* as different dialects. They argued that if the government recognizes *Sheki-noono* as a separate language, it should do the same for the Manjo language, *Manji-noono*.
- 57 Although no census of the Manjo has been taken, Manjo leaders insist that their population in the SNNPRS, Oromiya, and Gambela Regional States numbers more than one million. Alemayehu Ambo said the Manjo population in the Kafa and Sheka zones was 108,932. Additionally, Manjo populations in each regional state numbered approximately 500,000 in the SNNPRS, 150,000 in Oromiya, 150,000 in Amhara, and 200,000 in Gambela.¹⁷ These figures were calculated by Alemayehu Aragi and Alemayehu Ambo when they visited the Kafa and Sheka zones and researched the Manjo's population, culture, oral traditions, and so on between 1999 and 2000.
- 58 There are two versions of how the Manjo estimated their population in the absence of census data. First, Alemayehu Ambo and many other Manjos who participated in the petition drives explained that the Manjo, Manja, Bandu, Waata, Wayto, and Fuga are the same except for their names. They insisted that, historically, numerous Manjos migrated from the Kafa zone to many parts of Ethiopia because of the Kafa settlement. The Manjo who migrated to each area took on other names: the Manja, Bandu, Waata, Wayto, and Fuga. Today, some Manjos have married Bandus, and both parties recognize their common origin. The Manjo, however, have no relationship with the Waata, Wayto, or Fuga, and no precise census data on the populations of the Waata, Wayto, and Fuga exist.¹⁸
- 59 Second, the Manjo's claim is related to Article 61 of the Constitution: "Each Nation, Nationality and People shall be represented in the House of the Federation by at least one member. Each Nation or Nationality shall be represented by one additional representative for each one million of its population." Indeed, the Manjo have been seeking positions as teachers, police officers, and representatives at the Congress of the Representatives of the People of the federal government. Because the Manjo constitute a nation, nationality and people, the Manjo deserve representation at all administrative levels. Nonetheless, it is difficult to deny that the Majangir and Sheko advised the Manjo about the petitioning process.
- 60 The Manjo have attempted to present themselves as different from the Kafa by using a logic that refers to their culture, history, language, and other factors, and to the Constitutional definition of nations, nationalities and peoples. In other words, the

Manjo claim they are a nation, nationality and people because of their ability to demonstrate their specific character, a feat that can also be used for political purposes.

Conclusion

- 61 In this article, I have discussed the Manjo's petitions to abolish social discrimination against them and their request to be recognized as a nation, nationality and people. I have devoted special attention to the details and background of the petitions.
- 62 The lifestyles of minorities who have traditionally served as craft workers and hunters have changed. The Manjo were hunters and played important roles in the Kafa Kingdom. After 1897, however, the Manjo lifestyle and the role played by this group declined. Today, the Manjo no longer hunt, and their standard of living is the same as that of the Kafa. However, the Kafa look down on and oppress the Manjo. The Manjo feel that they are being deprived of their rights, and they are struggling to abolish the discrimination perpetrated against them by the Kafa. However, Ethiopia provides little social security for, and few policies to help, minorities who experience discrimination.
- 63 The difference between the Kafa and the Manjo might be understood in terms of the meaning of "nation, nationality and people". The Manjo have been underscoring the many original differences between themselves and the Kafa with respect to culture, history, language, clans, identity, and so on. However, it should be noted that there is no appropriate term for describing minorities such as the Manjo, who live with another ethnic group with whom they share a culture and a history and who differ from the majority with respect to their identity.
- 64 Needless to say, the petitions put together by the Manjo relate to the social and political situation in Ethiopia. They reflect the problems associated with a policy of self-determination that is based on ethnicity. The petitions used differences between the Kafa and Sheka as the basis for claims that the Manjo differ from these two ethnic groups. Research by foreign scholars has also supported these claims. Thus, claims to a distinct ethnic identity can have a strong impact on the government. It can be said that the petitions were the process by which the Manjo became conscious of their own culture, history, language, and identity in that they enabled them to redefine themselves according to the Constitution. Indeed, the Manjo have been trying to position themselves in present Ethiopia as a nation, nationality and people.

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FOOTNOTES

1. For example, five ethnic groups live in the Benishangul Gumuz Regional State, and half the population of this area are the Berta and Gumuz. This state is characterized by conflict between the Berta and the Gumuz caused by regional governance (BREMS & VAN DER BEKEN 2008). In the SNNPRS, the Welayta pressed claims for separate administrative recognition in 2000 (VAUGHAN 2006). Recognition as a nation, nationality and people is rare, and the only example of such recognition is the Silte, who were recognized as a nation, nationality and people, totally distinct from the Gurage, in 2001 (NISHI 2003).
2. My field work from 2005 to 2006 was funded by Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan. The research was

conducted under the “Historiographical Investigation of Ethnic Conflict in Northeast Africa” project (Project Leader, Prof. Katsuyoshi Fukui, Kyoto University). The fieldwork, conducted from February to March 2008, occurred under the aegis of the Global COE Program at Nagoya University: “Hermeneutic Study and Education of Textual Configuration” (Project Leader, Prof. Syoichi Sato). The research performed from 2008 to 2009 was funded by a Research Fellowship for Young Scientists (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science). I conducted research in 2010 through the Shibusawa Ethnological Foundation for graduate students. The IES also supported my research.

3. Some people identify themselves as Maniyo, a group living in the eastern part of the Kafa zone. Most Maniyo women are potters and some Maniyo men are blacksmiths. It is said that the Maniyo use the evil eye, and the Kafa discriminate against them.

4. This estimate was provided by the Head Administrator of the Kafa zone in 2005. In terms of percentages, this amounts to 1.1–1.4 % of the entire population of the Kafa zone. On the other hand, researchers and NGOs have attempted to estimate the Manjo population. Van Halteren (1996: 4) “guestimated” that the Manjo account for 5–10% of the entire population of the Kafa and Sheka zones. Action Aid Ethiopia, an NGO that has engaged in projects for the Manjo since 2005, estimated the Manjo population to be 7,111 in Chana *wäräda* and 4,064 in Gimbo *wäräda*. Based on these data, the Manjo constitute 4% of the total population of Chana and Gimbo *wärädas*. Population figures for the Manno are unavailable.

5. There were initially 12 districts, which were then divided into 18 districts.

6. Interview with a Kafa man, Bekkiyo Gindecha *qäbäle*, Addio *wäräda*, June 29, 2008.

7. In *Kafi - noono*, *taatoo* means king, and it is translated as *nəgus* in Amharic. The word *taatoo* also means chief and leader (e.g., *Geppe taatoo* is a ritual leader of *dejjo*). In the Kafa Kingdom, the Nao, who were also conquered by the Kafa, had their own king, *Nao taatoo*. Cerulli insisted the *Nao taatoo* has the status of a sub-king and thus was a vassal of the Kafa king (CERULLI 1956: 91). With respect to the similar historical courses followed by the Manjo and the Nao, it seems the *Manjo taatoo* was allowed to maintain his position so he could play several roles for the Manjo.

8. *Aacho* means gold in the Kafa language.

9. Interview with a Kafa man, Modiyo Arara *qäbäle*, Decha *wäräda*, November 13, 2008.

10. Interview with a Manjo man, Awasho Olla *qäbäle*, Decha *wäräda*, December 30, 2008.

11. In contrast, when a Manno comes to a Kafa home requesting food, the Kafa have a bad feeling. Because the Kafa consider that the Manno are not blessed.

12. Meeting a Manno in the morning is seen as an omen of a bad day.

13. Interview with a Kafa man, Angiyo Qolla *qäbäle*, Addio *wäräda*, September 28, 2008.

14. Interview with a Kafa man, Bitä Genet, Bitä *wäräda*, January 1, 2010, and with a Manjo man, Bach'i *qäbäle*, Yeki *wäräda*, December 12, 2009.

15. Interview with a Manjo man, Tepi, January 27–28, 2006.

16. Interview with a Manjo man, Bach'i *qäbäle*, Yeki *wäräda*, December 16, 2009.

17. Interview with a Manjo man, Bach'i *qäbäle*, Yeki *wäräda*, September 24, 2005.

18. The Wayto are not mentioned in the 2007 census. However, the past two censuses reported the population of the Wayto as 3,816 in 1984 and 1,515 in 1994. Zerihun noted that the population decrease is probably attributable to a redefinition of their ethnicity (ZERI HUN 2010: 1162).

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Awi-Gumuz interethnic relations: from integrative traditional institutions to exclusionary ethnic federalism

Desalegn Amsalu

p. 101-115

- 1 Awi¹ and Gumuz are two ethnic groups in northwest Ethiopia. Based on the current administrative regionalization of ethnic federalism, Awi primarily live in Awi Administrative Zone² (AAZ), found in the western fringe of Amhara National Regional State (ANRS), while Gumuz live mainly along the eastern part of Benishangul Gumuz National Regional State (BGNRS). Thus, the two ethnic groups inhabit territories contiguous to each other.
- 2 Moreover, Awi and Gumuz coalesce in one another's region. CSA (2007) shows that of 670,847 people in BGNRS, 28,467 (4%) are Awi. On the other side, of the total 981,491 people in AAZ, 13,074 (1%) are Gumuz, 595,721 (60.6%) Awi and the rest are Amhara. The borders have high concentration of both ethnic groups. But, the Gumuz settlement into AAZ shortly ceases while the Awi spread into virtually all parts of BGNRS, though the farther from the border is the sparser.
- 3 The subject of this paper is the dynamics of interethnic relation between these two ethnic groups, essentially in their contiguous and mixed settlements. The paper has three general objectives. First, it briefly sets a background to apparent cultural and physical differences between these groups. Second, it shows how, in spite of the differences, these ethnic groups have developed striking friendly relationship with each other. Third, it discusses how the current local federalism has created ethnic dichotomy and therefore set back the long-standing good relations. The article largely depends on fieldworks carried out in 2009/2010 and partly on a visit later in 2011/2012.

Ethnic difference between Awi and Gumuz

- 4 Ethnic difference between Awi and Gumuz is not only wide-ranging that includes every aspect but also so obvious that shows for any guest observer. But, here only their difference in language, dressing codes, religion, dietary laws, and physical characteristics is highlighted. As some aspect of ethnic identity is dynamic that changes in time (e.g. religion), typical characteristics for 20th century Awi and Gumuz is shown here.
- 5 Language is one of obvious markers of ethnic difference between ethnic groups in general and Awi and Gumuz in particular. Awi speak Awngi, belonging to Cushitic family. On the other hand, the Gumuz language is known as Gumuz ostensibly classified into Ethiopian Koman languages under the Nilo-Saharan phylum (BENDER *et al.* 1976).
- 6 The difference between the two ethnic groups is also shown by their dressing codes. The Awi consider wearing cloths that expose their body immodest. Women wear a loose blouse that drapes over the whole body. On the other hand, the Gumuz women just tuck their waist to cover only around their genitals in a piece of cloth known as *tiča*, originally made from bark.³
- 7 As the result of a long process of integration and interaction with the highland Christian kingdom, the Awi have developed profound Orthodox Christian identity and are pious Christians (TADDESSE 1988a: 10). On the other hand, the Gumuz believe in many gods known as *mussa* under a larger omnipotent *rébba*. Few examples of gods include *mussa-bagamba* (god of mountain), *mussa-dama* (god of rain), *mussa-golenga* (god of whirlwind), and *mussa-aja* (god of water).⁴
- 8 Dietary law is also another serious distinguishing factor between the two ethnic groups. The Awi are repulsed by even the thought of eating some Gumuz foods; and molded by Judo-Christian laws, their culture labels many Gumuz food items and more as inedible. But the Gumuz have several food sources.⁵ Wolde-Selassie (2004) lists numerous variety of crops and plants domesticated by hoe cultivation, thirty-one animals and twenty-one birds hunted from wild sources, as well as eighteen fruits, twelve leaves, and three root plants harvested from natural forest.
- 9 In terms of phenotype, in skin color, while Awi call Gumuz *gagri*, an Awngi term meaning “dark-skinned”, Gumuz call them *shuwa*, a Gumuz term that generally labels all people with fair complexion.⁶ Awi have relatively lankier hair while Gumuz possess short frizzy type. Awi have variable nose structures though frequently possess straight and narrow at the base while Gumuz have short broad at the base and flat noses. Awi have generally thin lips while Gumuz have thicker.
- 10 In spite of their conspicuous dissimilarity, concomitant stereotypes to each other and conflicts to one another mainly at early periods of their contact, the two ethnic groups have reciprocally developed remarkably favourable perception and strong local bond institutions between them. Before the coming of current ethnic dichotomy and ensuing interethnic strife, the relationship between Awi and Gumuz can be an exemplary case of how ethnic groups can freeze their difference and naturalize peaceful relationship.
- 11 After 1991, a new order of ethnic-relation was implemented among ethnic groups in BGN RS. Through constitutional dichotomization of ethnic groups living in this region such as Awi as non-owners of the region and Gumuz and other perceivably

autochthones groups as “owners”, the traditional inclusive relationship has been overridden by exclusionary local federalism and consequently new interethnic conflict.

Traditional amity

- 12 The amicable relationship between the two ethnic groups can be observed from various dimensions. This includes their mutual perception of common biological origin and/or earliest geographical neighbourhood, institutionalized bonds between individuals and families across ethnic lines, and favourable intermingling at communal level.

Perception of common origin

- 13 There are various myths that show common origin of Awi and Gumuz, narrated at various places where the two ethnic groups live in neighbourhood and/or mixed settlement. Two widely known and elaborate myths of one showing common biological origin and another old geographical neighbourhood will be described here. It is also to be noted that it is not possible to attribute the myths to either ethnic group. Elders of both narrate them with only some insignificant discrepancy.
- 14 Let's begin with the story of common biological origin. One day, a mother gave birth to three children. Upon their birth, God came to visit them all. But to pretend to have only one baby, the mother hugged one on her arms, concealed another behind a large black baking clay plate in the kitchen, and hid the third in the bush. God became angry toward the mother. While He blessed the one whom he found on the arms of the mother to remain “red”, He cursed the one hid in the kitchen to be “black” as he was hidden in the darkness, and another in the bush to live in the wilderness. The “red” baby gave rise to the Agāw generation, the “black” baby to the generation of Gumuz, and the bush baby the kingdom of wild spirits.
- 15 After this, the mother continued to care the black and the red babies together. She used to dress them both with long cloth that covered their whole body. But one day, the black baby got rid off the cloth while his brother comforted with it. The mother put the cloth onto the black baby again but still removed it. Confused with the new behaviour of the baby, alternatively she dressed him with *tiča* only to cover the genital region and leave the other naked. Then he slept in rest unlike his brother who had already rested in cloth covering his entire body. That is why until today generations of the two ethnic groups keep different clothing custom.
- 16 One day, when they were younger, the two brothers went for a horse-riding contest. During the ride, the black boy fell down while the red one won. Consequently, the black boy was again considered as cursed to remain inferior to his brother.⁷
- 17 When they grew older, the two brothers also began to develop different food preferences. The red brother learnt to be selective while his brother had not discriminated any. The difference existing in dietary code between the two groups is therefore rooted in ancient past.
- 18 Another day again, the two boys got rifle in exchange of salt bar. When both of them were shooting at aim, the black brother missed while the red one did not. The black brother then put the rifle away and made his own one in bow and arrow using which he

shot the aim like the red had done with the gun. Since then, they developed different preferences and ability to weapons.

- 19 As usual, when the two brothers were playing in a field, they were brought with a cord for their neck. The red consented to tie the cord while the black didn't. From this time onwards, the red maintained the cord as a symbol of his identification as a Christian, while the black became a believer in "traditional" religion.⁸
- 20 In addition to the perception of common biological origin but differing cultural and physical characteristics, another version of story showing geographical neighbourhood, social contact, and later friendship between the two ethnic groups also prevails among both sides. The story from both informants goes as follows. The Agäw inhabited areas east of River Durra,⁹ while the Gumuz existed to the west. The two ethnic groups lived side by side but they didn't know each other concealed by massive jungle. But one day, an Agäw man saw a Gumuz on another side of the river. Inviting him for introduction, he tied a bar of salt at the tip of a long stick known in Awngei as *zénq*. Then, he tasted the salt and passed it onto the Gumuz looking at him. The Gumuz reached onto the salt bar and tasted it as he had seen demonstration from the Agäw. But he threw away puzzled for a strange taste from a strange man. The Agäw man demonstrated the same for the second time and the Gumuz man became better acquainted with the salt. After demonstration for the third and fourth times, the Gumuz started to demand himself the salt from the Agäw. He invited the Agäw to his home and the friendly relation established in this way by the two men became a symbol of friendship between the two ethnic groups at large.¹⁰

Individual relations

- 21 There are also different types of special individual bonds one can explore between members of the two ethnic groups both in cross border and mixed settlements. *Mijim* is a Gumuz institution meaning (in Gumuz) "a special friend". They use this institution to form an exceptional bond typically with members of Awi. It is different from an ordinary acquaintance they can have with any person else, known as *wādaj*. It is an intense and easily unbreakable tie which even passes to descendents of the bonded individuals/families. It carries strong moral commitment for mutual support and cooperation between two individuals at personal and family level.¹¹
- 22 *Anguatsaḡu* (adoption in Awngei) on the other hand is the Awi institution which they in turn establish relation with Gumuz. This institution creates a "child-parent" relationship where the adopter is considered as a father, while the adoptee as a child. In a special ceremony, the prospective child swears to "never speak falsity; not to offer the father stolen meat or owe him stolen money".¹² The father swears back to "be a good father and to never give the child away". This institution also establishes moral obligation for mutual support between individuals/families holding this relation.¹³
- 23 *Abälji* (God parenthood, in Awngei) is another Awi institution by which a person, usually an adult, of respective sex takes interest to act as a Godparent of newborn baby of the same sex. In interethnic relation with Gumuz, Awi have extended this mechanism of creating individual relation which, like other institutions, secures mutual support.¹⁴ This institution has also facilitated Gumuz conversion to Christianity, and the Awi are seen by the former as evangelizers.

Communal relations

- 24 Harmonious communal interaction is also appealing. One can observe neighbours sharing coffee ceremonies the Gumuz are adapting from Awi, sharing some daily meals, and evening jokes that are all attractive. Common celebration of holidays and religious feasts (also which the Gumuz adapted from Awi) such as *Mäsqäl* (Finding of the True Cross), Easter, New Year and *Sänbäte* (a Christian feast on the day of Sabbath) are also alluring.
- 25 In markets, one can also observe the two ethnic groups affably exchanging various crops which each of them are traditionally known for specialization and which are produced by distinct ecological niche respective to each ethnic group. Moreover, they carry each other items for exchange at household or just for a gift.
- 26 Awi are also the major incumbents of positions in offices in BGNRS, including posts in harsh-climate rural villages. While the Gumuz are hostile to other ethnic groups particularly to “Wällo”,¹⁵ they have welcomed Awi to every village, for example, as teachers at primary schools.
- 27 The Gumuz, until today, aptly reject marriage between the “black” (Gumuz) and the “red” (non-Gumuz) saying it is like marriage between the goat and the sheep, which is impossible because of their nature. However, it is not uncommon to see them intermarrying with Awi prior to and more positively than any other ethnic group.¹⁶

Remarks by other researchers

- 28 Even though the Gumuz region has attracted many scholars, there is no research directly conducted on the nature of Awi-Gumuz relations. Some researchers have made only passing remarks while they discuss some other issues. Yet, these remarks show that even if conflicts between the two ethnic groups existed, there has been a naturalized favorable relationship through a long period of interaction.
- 29 Dessalegn (1988:131) discusses involuntary massive resettlement and its consequence on the autochthonous Gumuz way of life. On the way, he notes about the interethnic relation between Awi and Gumuz. In his observation, though Gumuz are hostile towards the settlers, “for a generation or more the Biga [the Gumuz] have maintained amicable or at least tolerant relations with the Agau who live on the higher altitudes and with whom they trade”.
- 30 Gebre (2003: 54), who also conducted studies on issues of the resettlement, settlers, and indigenous population in Metekkel, makes frequent records of the nature of interethnic relation between Awi and Gumuz. He states despite the fact that a history of hostility exists between the two ethnic groups, Gumuz have naturalized relations with Awi. Moreover he says while Gumuz have been antagonistic towards other settlers, they have willingly welcomed ever increasing number of Awi farmers into their territories.
- 31 Bazezew (1991: 6) also makes a brief intervention into description of interethnic relations between Awi and Gumuz in his work about a history of Chagni town. He states “The Gumuz accepted the over-lordship of the Agäw since antiquity”. He adds: “The Agäw-Gumuz relations were not limited to the economic sphere. They had also many social contacts, for example, at times of wedding and mourning”.

- 32 Berihun (1996) in his MA thesis discusses interethnic relation between Gumuz and settlers in Metekkel particularly in Metntawuha. On the way, he makes frequent mentioning of interethnic relation between Awi and Gumuz. For instance, he mentions about *mijim* relation and confers that this type of relation exists commonly with Agäws than with the settlers (1996: 101). He mentions cases when Awi and Gumuz made common front against settlers (1996: 135). He also adds that Agäws are involved in many public and government services among Gumuz. They are involved as Development Agents, teachers, and civil servants, living the same life with Gumuz, which is not the case for other settlers (1996: 144). Moreover, he reports that Agäw are chosen as arbitrators to resolve conflict between Gumuz and the settlers (1996: 144).
- 33 Berihun (1996) also says that conflicts between Gumuz and the settlers are typically characterized as inter-ethnic/inter-group. On the other hand, Gumuz do not usually attribute their conflict with Agäw as interethnic/inter-group. In the course of incorporation of Gumuz into the central state, Agäws were facilitators of breakthrough of the highland Amhara rulers. During this time, Gumuz used to rebel against Agäw, but such rebellion was attributed as defence from the central state rather than defence from Agäw per se (1996: 145). Berihun also substantiates his argument that Agäw are converting Gumuz into Christianity and thus they are perceived as evangelizers of the latter (1996: 144). Moreover friendly relation between the two ethnic groups is evidenced by the beginning of Gumuz inter-marriage with Agäw that the former never do with other ethnic group members (1996: 146).
- 34 Berihun (2004) represents another rich ethnographic resource about Gumuz. In this PhD thesis, he touches upon few points that indicate the nature of Awi-Gumuz relations. He states that Awi have helped Gumuz in many respects during the harsh days of slavery; and this has favored towards creation of special bond which he referred to as *miža*.¹⁷ During those days, Berihun points out:
- The Agäw friends came to the Gumuz villages with salt, beans and other consumables to their bond friends. If a Gumuz wanted to travel to the market, the Agäw friend escorted market the Gumuz and took him to his house in the cover of darkness. The Gumuz would stay in his friend's house until he had also collected what he needed. The Agäw host took the responsibility to defend the Gumuz if problems occurred...
- 35 In general, Berihun (2004: 282) exclaims:
- The relation between Agäw and Gumuz seems important to many aspects... However, I have not discussed the subject in further details as my dissertation has delimited this aspect of relation due to space and time.
- 36 Alemneh (2004) discusses an historical overview of Agäws of Gojjam to 1941. In his research, he remarks in passing that the interethnic relation between Awi and Gumuz is amicable. He observes:
- Concerning Gumuz-Agäw relations, there was a striking feeling of brotherhood between the two ethnic groups. The former brought cotton to the highland markets and engaged in regular trade with Agäws" (ALEMNEH 2004: 13).
- 37 He mentions, however, that there were occasional conflicts caused as the result of intermediary role of the Agäw in the process of the state expansion to Gumuz.

Traditional conflicts: causes and characteristics

- 38 It has already been suggested that the good-natured relationship described in the foregoing section should not obscure conflicts between the two ethnic groups. First, killing for honor on the part of Gumuz is a traditional cause of conflict between the Gumuz and the Awi as well as among Gumuz themselves. For Gumuz, killing for heroism used to be culturally justified. For example, one who has killed someone, including a Gumuz, receives praise in different public occasions, otherwise disparaged at public and by his wife. A killer receives appreciation and festivity from villagers. He receives a bodily scarification at his neck, the number of scars representing the number of persons he has killed. At home and in public ceremonies, he is served food and drink with unique plate and pitcher.¹⁸
- 39 Second, the tradition of pay-back killing is rampant. The Gumuz traditionally maintain “an-eye-for-an-eye” way of getting revenge. If a Gumuz kills another Gumuz, the family of the victim kills the perpetrator himself or an equivalent family member in a similar way. For instance, if a person is killed ruthlessly by the mutilation of body part(s), they avenge by killing one similar in sex and age the same way as one has been killed mutilated.¹⁹ In case of conflict with Awi, they also revenge a disputant(s) in the same way as they are inflicted.
- 40 Third, various “minor” cases also cause conflict between the two groups. For example, intoxication, personal hostility, insult, and even allegation of improper stare may result in killing and counter-killing. Informants from both ethnic groups believe that the Gumuz do not contemplate the outcome of their measures. Whenever they get drunk, they just stand up and inflict upon anyone who gazes at them. But when they are sober, they regret that they have killed a friend.²⁰
- 41 Fourth, violation of ethics of relationship is often reported to be the cause of conflict. Gumuz represent Agäw as duplicitous who manipulate, aggressive but “easygoing” Gumuz personality. They say they have learnt techniques of farming and many other things from Agäw. But, they regret “we have also learnt theft from them”.²¹
- 42 In addition to the above causes, there are also others mostly resource-based. Since a long time, Gumuz have received massive state-sponsored re-settlers and self-initiated spontaneous migrants. The unchecked movement of people has put pressure on the host environment and their slash-and-burn way of livelihood. This has in turn caused frequent conflicts of various magnitudes (GEBRE 2003). Awi are also one who has spilled over to the Gumuz region through informal migration and have sometimes entered into resource-induced conflicts.
- 43 One of the basic characteristics of these conflicts is they are never generalized as interethnic. They are considered conflicts occurring between two individuals or groups which can be mediated by elders of either or both ethnic groups. This is very unique from the Gumuz perception towards Amhara settlers commonly known as Wällo. An informant remembers a recent case of quarrel between individuals of the two ethnic groups. A drunkard Gumuz said an Agäw “*guşiwa*” which means “fuck you”. The Agäw was irritated and shortly the two went to fight each other in which the Gumuz killed the Agäw. The next morning, the Gumuz realized that he had killed his colleague by the whim of drink. He then repented and surrendered himself to the police. Had he killed a “Wällo”, he would say “I have not killed *šumla*.²² I killed one who came to invade us”.²³

Local Federalism and Ethnic Dichotomy

- 44 In Article 2, the 2002 Revised Constitution of BGNRS explicitly classifies ethnic groups which are “owners” of the region from non-owners. It reads, “[e]ven though it is known that there are also other ethnic groups, the owners of the region are Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao, and Komo”.²⁴ It is obvious that the dichotomy into “owners” and otherwise non-owners is meant to delineate some rights/privileges exclusive to owners. This very distinction has reversed the traditional basis of relationship between ethnic groups within the region, including the Awi and the Gumuz. The following points illustrate how this is happening.

Regeneration of negative yesterdays

- 45 The history of Agäw-Gumuz relation dates back to the Axumite period. During the reign of Kaleb (493-534), Axum had developed commerce in the Gumuz area. Agäws were the immediate neighbours who were entrusted over the trade route through which gold was transported (TADDESSE 1972: 26). Later when the capital of Ethiopian Empire rested in Gondär in 1636 (BAHRU 2002:10), the Agäw-Gumuz relation extended to a different role. After they had been subdued themselves, Agäw chiefs became spearheads for subsequent expedition of Gondärian Kings to the Gumuz (TADDESSE 1988b). During King Teklehaymanot of Gojjam (1881-1901), Agäw military chiefs were also empowered as front line tax collectors from the Gumuz region (ABDUSSAMAD 1995: 57).
- 46 There are two events that are raised as negative-yesterdays in the historical relationship between Agäw and Gumuz. First, Agäw chiefs were accused of working as slave raiders in the Gumuz region in favor of the highland state. Together with Amhara chiefs, they were the ones who used to drive slaves to Dangila (ABDUSSAMAD 1995: 62) and Kilaj,²⁵ two of the slave transit markets in the area. Second, Agäw chiefs were also designated as tax collectors in the Gumuz region and abused through culturally incompatible system of tax collection. Gumuz are slash-and-burn cultivators. They moved from one place where they had paid their tax to another where tax had not yet been collected. They did not have experience of keeping paper receipt to prove their payment. Rather, they kept knots on the rope to help them remember that they had performed their obligation. Every time they paid, they made knots so that they knew how many times they had paid. The tax collectors did not approve this mechanism of justifying payment, thus, they required them to pay again.²⁶
- 47 Yet, there have been balanced opinions of Gumuz that neutralize such sentiments of the past. In the slave raid, Gumuz were themselves major participants. While they captured young boys and girls from villages, Agäws transported them to slave market. The involvement was equal. Even more, when their children were to be captured, the Gumuz hid them in the Agäw households. For example, the holes were dug in the cage with the size of a nominated slave. The children were put into it, covered by wooden plunks and cooped by animals. When the raiders came, they checked the entire home and went back without finding one. According to many Gumuz elders, they are rather grateful to Agäw.²⁷

- 48 However, the negative side of their relationship has been more politicized after 1991. As indicated already, the BGNRS constitution divided Awi and Gumuz into non-owners and “owners” respectively. More ideological ethnic sentiments also went to circulation. A feeling of past humiliation, exploitation, and suppression has reemerged assigning a historical role of one as a victor and the other as a victim. “What you have fooled and exploited us so far is enough” is a common recourse by Gumuz today.²⁸

Challenges to livelihood

- 49 In mixed settlements of BGNRS, Awi highly rely on land they get through gifts from individual bonds. They also get through rent and traditional inheritance from their family who had settled earlier in the region. After the discourse of ethnic federalism was heated, there has been, however, a gradual evolvement of resistance against, at least, arbitrary encroachment of all “outsiders” and dispossession of land from those who already live there.
- 50 There has been rising frustration among the Awi in BGNRS in getting deprived of land as livelihood mechanism. Agäw informants complain that Gumuz snatched the land the former possessed from their fathers who had lived in the region. For example, an informant said he had eight plots of land which he had possessed from his father who had settled in the region during Haile-Sellasse I. Five was already taken away by a Gumuz who claimed the land had been originally his forefather’s. He was worried about the future when he cannot get the chance even for leasing.²⁹
- 51 An experience of another informant also explains more. He witnessed new challenges for the Agäw living in Gumuz villages. He says “[t]he Gumuz have now started to exhibit strange behavior. Often times, they raise that we are also ‘foreigners’ who should be propelled to our own region”.³⁰

Occupational discrimination

- 52 BGNRS absorbs the civil service personnel from other ethnic groups because of lack of trained manpower in its own region. Awi have been the major incumbents of employment in the region. This is due to the discussed traditional harmony between the two ethnic groups as well as geographical neighborhood and mixed settlement. There are many primary school Awi teachers who freely work without any hostility from the Gumuz side. There is no ethnic group from non-owners who can spillover into remote villages of Gumuz as strong as the Awi do. A saying in Amharic goes “*agäwnna aräqé yäläläbät yäläm*”, meaning, there is no place [in the Gumuz area] where you cannot find Agäws and *aräqé* (traditional liquor).³¹
- 53 But, this tradition has been changed since recently, particularly after shortage of trained manpower has been mitigated through increasing human development in the region. Currently, one can observe ethnicity as an explicit criterion in announcements for vacancy. For this purpose, ethnic groups are classified into two, such as autochthonous and non-autochthonous. Autochthonous (Amharic: *näbar/ täwälaj bihëräsäboč*) are owner ethnic groups while others are non-autochthonous (*näbar/ täwölaj yalhön*) and thus non-owners to the region.

- 54 Despite the constitution excludes Agäw from “owners”, one can understand different opinions from informal discourse regarding the consideration of them in the civil service. Some, including the Gumuz themselves, propose that Agäws should not be considered as aliens like other ethnic groups. Rather, they should be considered as natives or at least should be considered first from other non-natives. The second view states that they are equally non-natives. This is in line of the argument that Awi have their own administrative zone in ANRS, and hence, their fate should be determined there. Each is to enjoy maximum right in its own designated region.
- 55 Until recently, Awi have significant role in the civil service particularly in bordering *worädas*.³² Informants however complain that new incumbents are sometimes accepted only if the post is not preferably filled by natives. Those who hold the positions today are those already employed at earlier times before this ethnic factor had not become a ground for qualification.³³ The problem is not unique between the natives and the non-natives. Depending on which particular zone or special *woräda* a particular ethnic group dominates, similar problems also exist in the region between other ethnic groups who are considered natives to one zone or *woräda* but not to others.³⁴

Political discrimination

- 56 Since 1991, much strife has been witnessed between BGNRS and the non-native ethnic groups in need of representation to secure their rights in the region. While the autochthonous ethnic groups have their own representatives in the local and regional politics, the non-autochthonous groups do not. The legal base of this argument can be seen from both the 1995 and 2002 constitutions of BGNRS which do not give any guarantee for representation of the non-owners. The power problem exists even within the natives themselves such as Gumuz, Berta and Shinasha but it is more serious to non-natives.³⁵
- 57 One argument by non-owners to run for election in BGNRS was based on article 38 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. This article grants every Ethiopian the right for election. The non-natives argued that they have been denied this very constitutional right. The region on the other hand took knowledge of local language as a precondition. As there are the non-natives born and bred in the region who are fluent like the natives, this was taken to be a mere pretext to refuse to answer the question. This case was submitted to the House of Federation for constitutional interpretation. The House has ruled out that there should not be limitation of such right unless lack of knowledge of local language practically prohibits a candidate.³⁶
- 58 For various reasons,³⁷ the 1996 constitution of BGNRS was revised in December 2002. The new constitution is more considerate to the issue of protection for non-owner ethnic groups. Art 45(3) of the revised constitution states “representation of other [non-owner] groups shall be given special consideration. Particulars shall be determined by the law”. Representation existed in 2007 was two for Amhara, two for Oromo, and one for Agäw. However, informants complain that neither the number of representations is fair nor it has even been fully implemented.³⁸
- 59 Moreover, confrontation between Amhara resettlers in Pawé and the region had been culminated by granting Pawé Special *Woräda*, autonomously self-administrative entity which had not been under any zone in the region. But, the designation of Pawé

“special” has been already lifted reversing the debate to original status and implying that there is to be no “special” reserve for ethnic groups who are non-owners to the region.

New conflicts and their characteristics

- 60 The following case of “peace conference” took place in October 2008 in the border region between the two ethnic groups illustrates the case concisely. In this conference, residents from six *qābālés* in Metekkel Zone, BGNRS, and three *qābālés* in Guangua Worāda in AAZ did participate. The reason the conference was called was to halt growing tension existing between the two groups. Homicide and robbery across the borders and in mixed settlements were officially reported as causes of tension and conflict.
- 61 In the peace conference, different symbolic objects were prepared. These were *gemero* (a thorny plant), arrow, gun, charcoal, skull of a snake, wood stormed by thunder, five broad leaves of sycamore tree, and a sheep slaughtered and the bones broken. The participants were sworn to stop problems that destabilized peace between the two ethnic groups. They swore stepping in queue over these objects, all one after another. Traditionally, the objects signify different meanings in making oath. In stepping over *gāmāro* they swear “to let its thorns grab the offender while trying to escape through it”. By the arrow they approve that “the culprit’s weapons may miss targets against others but others’ not miss him”. In the charcoal, they curse “the traitor be doomed to darkness”. Stepping over the snake they vow “the perpetrator be bitten by snake and poisoned by its venom”. And the broken bones convey that “the oath breaker be wrecked like the bones of the sheep one steps over”.³⁹
- 62 There are some critical points we can learn from this case. The first one is that it shows, clearly, the existence of tension. And the tension arose as the result of lack of certainty in belongingness by one party, and a desire to remove non-indigenous ethnic group by another. There has been rampant killing as the result of cultural behavior discussed above and no conference has ever been called for this type of conflict. Rather, there are new problems related to ethnic discrimination and it is this nature of conflict that was intended to be primarily addressed in the peace conference. We understand this from the declaration of the conference itself. Local expert opinions indicated that in addition to agreements to stop problems officially declared in the conference, the two groups also came into agreement such that splitting settlements of both ethnic groups existing in one another’s territory would stay free from civil disturbance. That means an agreement was reached that the Awi living in the bordering BGNRS would stay in the place they exist in the Gumuz region; and the Gumuz living in AAZ also stay there.⁴⁰ This suggests that the root problems were not theft, robbery and killing, but they are manifestations. In the words of informants “[t]he problem came after the policy declaring ‘each in his region’”.⁴¹
- 63 Informants further explained their concerns that illicit trafficking of guns on both sides was on the rise. The Awi living in BGNRS accumulated firearms from the Gumuz region⁴² and transported them to accumulate with the Awi counterparts in the highland areas. The Gumuz also accumulated in their villages. As a result, there was an arms race each to have adequate stock because they thought to defend or one another

at a time when serious conflicts arise. According to informants, the situation would disrupt cohesion between the two groups.⁴³

- 64 The second point which follows from the case is whether or not the conference was successful. Informants indicated that it brought temporary relief. But, the problems were regressing. After the agenda of peace conference lost its fashionable concern, the problem stood back at its original feet. An informant explained “[a] trespass of a livestock into territory of either ethnic group in the border can cause quarrel even after the conference. If someone crosses the border to collect firewood or cut trees, there would be trouble. The problem is very delicate”.⁴⁴
- 65 Along with the traditional conflicts existing between the two ethnic groups, there were also institutions of conflict resolution, the above case as an example. They were very effective in binding individuals or groups entering into reconciliation. The analysis of post-conference reality however shows that the practices are gradually being eroded and their power over disputants no longer or less binding. Besides, as I have mentioned in another section, traditionally, conflicts between Awi and Gumuz have been attributed to be between individuals. The main characteristic in these conflicts is however being interethnic.

Conclusion

- 66 The paper suggests that despite the Awi and the Gumuz maintain broad ethno-cultural distinction, they have developed traditional institutions which forged favorable relationship between them. But, the research also shows how ethnic based federalism has shattered traditional/moral basis of interethnic relations between the two ethnic groups. Ethnic-based policies may differ significantly in their intended purpose. Some discriminate while others remediate. Discriminatory policies deny or withdraw some rights from some ethnic groups while remedial policies mandate equal opportunities for all ethnic groups including those who might have been discriminated earlier. Ethnic based division between the Awi and the Gumuz in BGNRS, as “owners” and otherwise as non-owners suggests the first characteristic. Some rights are reserved only for “owner” ethnic groups and therefore non-owners are deprived of them. Unlike earlier individual conflicts, this has created discontent, mutual mistrust, and new interethnic conflict.
- 67 Thus, it is recommendable that such ramification be reconsidered. Besides, long-standing folk-based amicable institutions be taken into account to build peaceful relation among the two ethnic groups. In addition to top-down state imposed policies, local moral institutions of common-hood shall also be embraced into the discourse of building harmonious interethnic relations.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Among the Gumuz, they are better known as "Agäw". Different literatures also designate them in "Agaw", "Agäw", "Agau", "southern Agäw" and "Gojjam Agäw". I primarily use "Awi" for

it is the official name of them today and “Agäw” is rather a generic name applicable to other sub-ethnic groups of this phylum. But, when I discuss issues from the perspective of the Gumuz or literatures, I interchangeably use the two terms.

2. “Zone” is the second level (below regional state) in the regional administrative hierarchy of Ethiopia.

3. Interview: Belay Mekonnen, 62, Mandura, November 2009.

4. Ibid.

5. Interview: Simeneh Tessema, 53, Mandura, December 2009.

6. Interview: Belay Mekonnen, *op. cit.*

7. There is ethnic hierarchy between the two groups. Gumuz generally see Awi as “superior” and more “civilized” than them, and Awi see Gumuz as “backward”. So the story about the horse ride seems to have been created to institute this status.

8. Interview: Belay Mekonnen, *op. cit.* This story is repeated among many informants with minor variation from one narrator to another and from one geographical neighborhood to another.

9. This is a river currently dividing the two groups in southern tip of their contiguous territory.

10. Interviews: Abebe Abera, 78, Zigem, March 2010; Kwe Jigali, 80, Zigem, November 2009.

11. Interview: Belay Mekonnen, *op. cit.*

12. Among both ethnic groups, theft and loyalty are chief values. Particularly, they are literally venerated among the Gumuz.

13. Interview: Kassahun Adgo, 67, Mandura, December 2009.

14. Interview: Mekuriaw Hailu, 43, Mandura, April 2010.

15. It is the name generalized to state-sponsored majority Amhara Muslim resettlers from Wällo region. The Gumuz consider them as “invaders” because they are taken to be mainly responsible for the destruction of the Gumuz environment and way of life.

16. Interview: Belay Mekonnen *op. cit.*

17. Note that *miža* is used in this paper as *mijim*.

18. Interview: Kassahun Alemu, 37, Zigem, March 2010.

19. Interview: Tagele Reta, 46, Zigem, March 2010.

20. Interview: Aba Woregna Zewdu, 80, Zigem, March 2010.

21. Interview: Kwe Jigali, *op. cit.*

22. The Agäw are also called *šumla*, the Gumuz designation of a relationship based on common blood.

23. Interview: Belay Mekonnen, *op. cit.*

24. Unofficial translation from Amharic source.

25. Interview: Kwe Jigali, *op. cit.*

26. Interview: Aba Woregna, *op. cit.*

27. Interview: Belay Mekonnen, *op. cit.*

28. Interview: Tadele Zegeye, 62, November 2009, Mandura.

29. Interview: informant A, anonymous.

30. Interview: informant B, anonymous.

31. Interview: expert informant A, anonymous.

32. “*woräda*”(singular) is the third level (below *zone*) in the regional administrative hierarchy of Ethiopia.

33. Interview: expert informant B, anonymous.

34. Following the amendment of the Constitution in December 2002, earlier geographically defined zones (administrative levels next to the region) have been replaced by nationality administrations (Art. 74(1)). This even more complicates ethnic claims given no administration can be ethnically homogenous. It has not however been yet implemented.

35. Interview: expert informant C, anonymous.

36. See the decision passed by the House of Federation on March 2003.

37. According to the new constitution, the rationale for revision is to determine the functions and accountability of state organs in a clear manner as the existing situations required.
38. Interview: expert informant B, *op. cit.*
39. Interview: expert informant A, *op. cit.*
40. Interview: expert informant B, *op. cit.*
41. Ibid.
42. Since early times, the Gumuz lowland is known for circulation of firearms, some informants suggest, that come across Ethio-Sudanese border.
43. Interview: expert informant B, *op. cit.*
44. Interview: expert informant B, *op. cit.* : informant C, anonymous.

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The Socio-Political Dynamics of New Migrant-Labour Brokers in Shashemene, Ethiopia

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p. 117-128

- 1 The change in the scale and functions of towns in Africa is accompanied by evolving institutional socio-economic practices. In this paper I will address brokerage and the recruitment of new migrant labour in the town of Shashemene, Ethiopia. Brokering migrant labour is a relatively lucrative economic activity in the town and competition among the brokers to attract new labour migrants is intensive. Claims over the brokerage system involve processes of negotiations, grouping, cooperation and conflicts when defining boundaries concerning who should have the right to conduct brokerage of migrant labour. This is going on in the setting of institutionalization of both the system of brokerage and the terms of contract of labour recruitment. This paper addresses the conditions and processes that are shaping the brokerage system and the changes being introduced, in the town of Shashemene, in the actual contract systems in terms of ensuring security for employees and employers, enforcement of contract, reporting of underage migrants to the local authorities, registry of migrants, and income and tax declaration to the town administration.
- 2 The expanding urban areas of Ethiopia are attracting employment and migration. In the late 1980s, Ethiopia was under-urbanized, even by African standards. According to OFCANSKY and BERRY (1991), only about 11 percent of the population lived in urban areas of at least 2,000 residents. However, during the last two decades rates of urbanization have picked up. In 2008, the urban population in Ethiopia constituted 17% of the total population and the rate of urbanization over the last two decades has been 4, 3%.
- 3 The process of urbanization, however, is associated with chronic problems of unemployment and underemployment. In 2004, the national unemployment rate (defined as the share of the labour force that is without work but available for and seeking employment) was 23%. There are different reasons for this high unemployment rate. Migration of people into the towns, including rural-to-urban migration, low

agricultural growth and slow economic progress in urban areas are some of the major reasons. Rural areas of Ethiopia are experiencing a long-term process of de-agrarianization as present needs are greater and more diversified (DEJENE AREDO 1994). De-agrarianization results when rural people's participation in non-agricultural activities relative to agricultural activities increases. In Ethiopia, the balance between non-agriculture/agriculture shifts for two reasons: 1) the pressure on land in rural areas is high; and 2) risk avoidance through diversification of the economic base of households (GABRIEL ABEBE 1994). Out-migration from rural areas can be seen as one such diversification strategy.

- 4 Shashemene is a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic town in the region of Oromia with a population of ca 105,000 (2007). It is located 260 km south of the capital city, Addis Ababa. Its location is strategic as it connects five major economic, agricultural and political regions. In 2008, ca 20,000 people were estimated to enter and leave the town daily. North of Shashemene is the capital city, Addis Ababa, where flows of goods and services is influencing Shashemene. As a capital city, it is also a source of new business ideas, 'urban cultures' and other social practices influencing Ethiopian towns like Shashemene. To the east are the Bale and Arsi regions which are known for their extensive and productive agriculture production of cereal crops. South and southwest of the town is the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State. This regional state is known for its coffee, horticulture, vegetables, spices and chat production. Kembata'na Hadiya, Wolayta, and the Gurage regions are known for their high population densities and are areas where out-migration is common. These geographic, agricultural and demographic factors are important factors influencing the town Shashemene as an important centre of commerce and migration.
- 5 In this paper, we will discuss the processes of labour migration into Shashemene. We will specifically focus on the new migrants: the processes they undergo to get employment. This includes the brokerage system, contract formalities, and how they access brokers and employers. The paper also explores the social struggle among the brokers to get access and entitlement over the rights to settle contractual arrangements between the migrants arriving in Shashemene and their potential employers who also are coming to or communicating with the brokers from different areas.
- 6 We want to underline that outright labour migration is but one of many different forms of urban migration and that only a portion of the labour migrants will turn to brokers for help in securing employment. There are other patterns of migration, and the causes for migration often are be non-economic – caused by events within social networks, family relations and gender issues, etc.

Labour brokerage

- 7 Labour brokers play an important role under conditions in which potential employers and potential employees are unknown to each other. Because of its character as a communications node, Shashemene will attract many job seekers who arrive with no previous connections to the place, simply trusting their luck. Under such conditions, brokers can play a vital role for a number of reasons. First, the social and economic conditions of many of the new migrants arriving in the town is so compelling that the migrants desperately need to get a job immediately. This is very difficult and too costly

for most migrants to manage on their own. Some employers face similar challenges. Many of the clients of brokers are owners of small-scale businesses, such as restaurants, coffee houses, etc. Failures in securing labour for such activities, even for a day, can be too costly to afford.

- 8 Second, the labour market is poorly institutionalized. The migrant labour is operating in the informal economy sector, which engages the absolute majority of economically active persons. In many cases, searches, screening and contracts for employment are still carried out instantaneously and through direct contacts, and they are generally unorganized.
- 9 Third, although Shashemene is the centre for migrating labour, the town is not the only destination for migrants. The geography of the employment destinations is the whole southern region extending from Moyale to Bale up to Addis Ababa. There is no way that migrants could get information and contact about employment opportunities in the many different urban places of this vast region. Organized brokers are the only organizations that keep records of skills of those who are in search of job and those who are in search of workers, serving as key information ‘banks’ for both potential employers and potential employees. Mobile phones have become crucial communication tools under these circumstances.
- 10 Fourth, the issue of security and protection is crucial. This issue cannot be guaranteed by the employer and the employee alone. They need a third party. Some of the migrants are vulnerable due to lack of information about potential labour markets, lack of knowledge about scale of payments, lack of experience, or due to economic and social deprivation they have experienced. Such migrants may become exploited and abused. Organized brokers can play a third-party role by issuing a written contract agreement for both the employer and the employee.
- 11 Under these conditions, the brokers play multiple roles for both the employers and the employees as they reduce cost of information, and facilitate search, negotiation, screening, coordination, and enforcement of contracts.

Data set

- 12 This paper is part of an on-going research project of Shashemene town. The project aims to understand the transformations and changes of the town during the latter half of the 20th century by studying changes in labour dynamics, household structure, gender, livelihoods, ethnicity and migration using data sets from 1965, 1970, 1973, and 2008/9.
- 13 Much of the data for this paper comes from field research conducted between April and July 2008 in the town. Various research methods, including structured survey and key informant interviews, were used to generate data and information. During this period a survey was conducted on 362 randomly selected households where basic social and economic data of the households and life histories of the heads and spouses of the households were collected.
- 14 *Survey:* A specially focused study was also conducted on the brokers. In Shashemene, thirty-three households were identified as registered and legally recognized brokers. Basic data was collected for all of these. Of the totally thirty-three brokers, thirteen

were randomly selected and interviewed. Personal and household related information was gathered.

- 15 *Register:* Local register and statistics of the brokers were also crucial sources of data. The brokers were organized into two associations. Each association had a registry of their activities that included statistics on migrants who came in contact with them searching for jobs; skills and qualification, average number of days they were hosted in the brokers' house while waiting to get a job, gender statistics, etc.
- 16 *Basic data of migrants:* Data was also collected from forty-two migrants. These people were recent arrivals and were hosted at the brokers' houses waiting to find jobs. Those who were present during the survey of the household were also interviewed.
- 17 *Focus group discussions:* Focus group discussions were conducted with members of the associations as well as with those administrative bodies of Shashemene who were closely working with the brokers, such as the Peace and Security Official of the Arada Kifle Ketema.

Seasonality of labour migration into Shashemene

- 18 The flow of migrant job seekers into Shashemene is seasonal. School periods and agricultural seasons influence both the supply and demand for labour. During the period September – April, all schools in Ethiopia are open and children are attending classes. The school season, in general, is a major cause of labour shortage in many households. The summer break was described as a season of low demand for labour in the town. During the break, students take over available jobs often from their families and relatives.
- 19 Agriculture was another major factor affecting labour demands in Shashemene. The main agricultural season is between May and December when the rural population in general is busy working on their farms. Of the different agricultural activities, harvesting of crops, such as coffee picking, and agricultural trading were mentioned as significantly affecting the flow of job seekers into the town. The season for harvesting food crops is between October and November, and the season for coffee picking is between November and January. Harvesting seasons are critical as crops need to be picked and stored as effective and as quickly as possible by the rural smallholder farmers. This absorbs much of the rural labour. Large coffee plantation run by the government and the private sector are also important rural labour absorbers during harvesting seasons.
- 20 The harvesting season is associated with increased marketing activities. The period between October – December is the peak season for agricultural trading, both in intensity and volume of trade of agriculture products. This is associated with high mobility of goods and people and these absorb a significant part of the rural labour. The period between March and May was described as economically least active and not much happens with the flow of labour.
- 21 Other social processes indicated as influencing the flow of people into the town were holidays. Meskel holidays (which fall in September) were particularly indicated as important. The Easter holiday was characterized as the season when people in general go back to their village to celebrate with their families. For many people, it may be the only and obligatory time in a year to visit their relatives back in their village. During

this occasion, the migrants provide information, inspiration and networks to individuals back in their village. As a result, the period just after the Easter holiday was described as *the season of new migrants* of Shashemene. During the Easter holiday, marriages and relationships also take place where successful migrants come back into Shashemene with their new partners. The description of the season as *the season of new migrants* may signify the importance of *connections and relations* in migration. The period between February and April was described as the season when new migrants come on *their own and independently*.

Migrant labour employment systems in Shashemene

- 22 Local labour recruitment is diverse and complex. One can identify three main types of labour recruitment that take place in Shashemene, namely, direct recruitment, 'illegal' recruitment and recruitment through the 'legal' brokerage system.
- 23 *Direct or on-spot recruitment:* This recruitment form is one where a potential employer directly identifies the employee and sets an agreement with him/her. This type of recruitment is dominant in daily labour wages and short-term employment. Such forms of employments are less risky as regards trust on the scale of payment and quantity of the work to be done. Scales of payments of the different skills are commonly known and both parties are aware of them. Not surprisingly, this type of employment includes daily labour such as simple masonry, carpentry, etc. These kinds of jobs have relatively clear and measurable quantities of work a man can accomplish per day and the corresponding daily payments are relatively none-negotiable. In other words, the cost of negotiation is very low. There are also cases where the quantity of work and the corresponding payments are directly negotiated on the spot. Digging a garden or upload materials on truck for transportation are some examples.
- 24 Migrants may avail themselves of these types of jobs as they move from place to place. There were cases where employers recruited new migrants directly at the bus stations. But, generally speaking, the migrating people coming to the town in search of jobs are primarily interested in longer-term employment. It is this type of job seeker who is of interest to the brokers, both the legal and illegal ones.
- 25 *'Illegal' brokerage:* The 'illegal' brokerage and employment refers to individuals who are not members of the recognized brokerage system (discussed below) that carry out brokerage activities. The brokers in this case do not have the legal basis to effect an agreement between the employer and the employee. They do not take any responsibility for any consequences that may follow for either the employer or the employee. These 'illegal' brokers also lack placement facilities to accommodate new arrivals. They are often themselves poor, young and unemployed men. They are present at the bus station waiting for new arrivals to find them and ask them if they want a job. Their activity is very erratic and depends on the orders and demands they get from employers. They sometimes have good network connections to potential employers and are well informed of their needs.
- 26 *Legal brokerage and employment system:* This is said to be the dominant type of recruitment which the majority of both migrant labour and employers use. There are various reasons for this. First, the brokerage system has the network for employers from the different directions of Shashemene, connecting potential employers and

employees from different places. Mobile phones play significant role. Employers from distant areas can access brokers through telephone to get information whether there are people that they could employ or any information regarding the potential employee's skills, salary scales they demand, health condition, etc. Employers can also inform brokers about their needs in advance. When the right person is identified, employers could come and effect an employment contract. The following section will focus on this particular system of recruitment.

The legal brokerage system (*dilela*) in Shashemene

- 27 *Location and number of broker households and associations:* There are thirty-three formally registered households working in labour brokerage in Shashemene. All of these households are located in one of the seven Kifle Ketema, namely Arada. Arada is the heart of Shashemene where the bus station is located. So, vicinity to the bus station is crucial aspect of the brokerage. In fact, all of the 33 households are located around the bus station. To guide and attract the migrants, the households are identified by a poster and sign indicating the name of the association, telephone number and number of the household (as the picture below).
- 28 The 33 households are organized into two associations, namely Hibret General Brokerage Plc (founded in 2005) and Chernet General Brokerage Plc (founded in 2006). The associations are recognized by the finance bureau, the court and the administration of the town municipality as legal and economic entities. The legal entitlement enables them to receive and accommodate new job seekers in their houses and then connect them with employers. They can operate openly.
- 29 *Conditions to get official license of brokerage:* Brokerage has been taking place for many years and without supervision from authorities in Shashemene. In fact, most of the legal brokers have been working for many years and one person has been working in this sector for 34 years. But, since 2005, the Shashemene town administration is enforcing conditions for brokers, to get organized and licensed. The process itself and its objectives are complex as I will describe these below. But, the following are the conditions to get a license.
- 30 *Resident and housing facility:* To get a license, a broker must be a resident of Shashemene and must have a housing facility. The facility is to temporarily accommodate migrants who come in contact with them in search of jobs. Depending on the demand for employment, the number of days for waiting could extend up to two weeks.
- 31 *Establish an organization:* Licenses are issued to a group of people who organize themselves in an association and not on individual basis. Brokers are demanded to establish an organization having the following functions: 1 chairman, 1 deputy, 1 registrar, 1 cashier, 1 controller and 2 members of the association. These organizational structures play a more administrative role. The actual brokerage activities are carried out by the individual households themselves.
- 32 *Restricted intrusion:* Brokers are not allowed to have direct influence on the migrants. This includes that brokers are not allowed to be at the bus station and meet new arrivals. Forceful retention and assignment are prohibited.
- 33 *Pay taxes:* Licensed brokerage associations are obliged to declare their incomes and pay taxes to the town administration.

- 34 *Effect contractual agreements:* Contractual agreement between the employer and the employee are signed and the brokers serve as third party. For this purpose, they use a standard contract form that states the details of the contract, conditions, and addresses of all the three parties. The form is stamped and it is used as a guarantee and evidence in any dispute that may arise.
- 35 *Reporting of migrant children:* Registration and reporting of underage workers is also a strong condition put on the associations by municipal authorities. Brokers are obliged to immediately hand over children to the police station.

Brokerage as a means of livelihood

- 36 Economically, brokerage is a means of livelihood. The general practice is that when the brokers connect an employer to an employee, the employer pays a sum of money, normally 30 Birr per employee. The number of migrants each broker attracts varies. According to the informants, factors such as years of experience, reputation, trustworthiness, location and visibility of the house, housing facility, and networks and communication facilities are factors determining success of brokerage.
- 37 The average number of migrants each broker received during the period July 2007 and June 2008 was 232. The potential gross income of each broker households is on average 6,960 Birr per year. The least successful members of the associations attracted 60 migrants during the same period. This generates a potential gross income of 1,800 Birr. The most successful brokers, on the other hand, attracted as many as 750 migrants. This can generate up to 23,000 Birr.
- 38 There are, however, costs associated with the legal brokerage system. Provision of shelter/housing, water and to some extent food to the migrants staying at the brokers' house were mentioned as the major ones. The average number of days job seekers of all types stayed with the brokers waiting to get an employer was 11. As will be discussed below, all job seekers may not be successful in getting jobs in the end and this incurs costs to the brokers. Despite this, the brokers need to establish a reputation among the migrants to attract new comers. This involves investment.

Migrants' livelihood options

- 39 The migrants arriving in Shashemene and those who come in contact with the brokers in general do not have a strong social network in Shashemene, such as relatives who could help them. So, they are the most vulnerable section of the society. Upon arrival in Shashemene, new migrants have no resources to cover their lodging and living expenses on their own. Most of them do not have the money to support themselves. They rely on hopes for future employment. Until then, the brokers are crucial sources of the means of survival.
- 40 When they arrive in the town, the wage scales are set and there is little room to influence them. According to the informants, the remuneration for jobs of the qualifications indicated are non-negotiable, particularly jobs requiring less qualifications. Annex 1 indicates the set standards used by the brokers.

Selective screening of migrants

- 41 My data indicates that brokers' practice systematic selection and screening processes. There are gender differences. Broker households received more (35%) male than female migrants. The average employment rate for women is slightly greater (94%) than for men (91%). Similarly, the average number of waiting days at the brokers' house for a job is shorter for women (7 days) as compared to men (9 days). These statistics generally indicate that the demand for women may be greater than for men.
- 42 Another interesting observation was that the willingness of brokers to incur costs of accommodation depends on the potential employability of the migrant. The average number of days returnees stayed at the brokers' house was almost half (4 days for both sexes) of the successful ones (7 and 9 days for both sexes). This indicates that brokers actively screen migrants. Migrants that appear to be unpromising in getting jobs are rejected from the brokers' house quite early. These migrants may be the most vulnerable groups of people. How they cope needs to be studied further.

Concluding remarks

- 43 Brokerage of migrant labour arriving in Shashemene is a source of livelihoods for many households. As a centre of commerce linking different parts of the southern region, Shashemene is popular with migrants and employers. For many years, individuals have been participating in brokerage on their own and independently. However, brokerage in Shashemene increasingly involves intense competition among the stakeholders. People who have been working in the sector for many years are being threatened by new people participating in the sector. One clear example of this is perhaps the age composition of the two associations. Hibret General Brokerage Plt is constituted of older people (average 46 years) who have been working in the sector (see figure below). This group of people first organized themselves and asked to be formally recognized by the town administration. By doing that, they asked the administration to outlaw other brokerages.
- 44 As many of the younger people working as brokers were marginalized, they started to organize themselves and established Chernet General Brokerage Plt. Most (55%) of the members of this organization are aged between 20 and 30 years while the corresponding figure for Hibret is under 10%. There still are many people, particularly young and poor males, who would like to be brokers, but the conditions set by the municipality to get licenses for brokerage are beyond the reach of many.
- 45 In addition to meeting livelihood objectives, the brokers of both associations are playing crucial roles. The first is the provision of shelter to the migrants. For many of the migrants, this is important. Second, brokers networking and communications are helpful in speeding the process of employment. They provide information on wage rates. Third, having self-organized people is important to ensure security and to guarantee contract conditions for both the employees and the employers, including the security of children in the town.

Livelihood Sector	Payment Scale (in Birrs)	Additional Benefits	Gender (dominant)		Waiting days	Comments
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				Gender (to some extent)		
Domestic Servant (child care, clothes washing, house cleaning, cooking)	150	Food, hygiene, material lodging	Female		15-30	More waiting days for mothers with children
Domestic Servant (child care, clothes washing, house cleaning, cooking)	150	Food, hygiene, material lodging	Female		15-30	More waiting days for mothers with children
Common Cook	200-1000		Female and Male		7-15	High skills required
Baking	300-600		Female	Male	15-30	Skills required
Barista (operating tea/coffee machines)	150-200		Male		15-30	
Cooking Assistant	150-200		Female and Male		15-30	
Washing Glasses	80-100		Female and Male			
Baker (abkui)	100-150		Female and Male		20-60	Rare job
Waitress	100-150		Female and Male		15-30	
Barman	200		Male	Female	Up to 60	Rare job
Meat Chopper	150-200		Male		15-30	
Slaughter	170-200		Male			Rare Job
Meat Seller	300-350		Male			Rare job
Hotel/ Restaurant Chef	400-600		Male			Rare job
Beers/Drinks Deliverer	100-200		Male			Rare job
Bar-Lady (given by the employer)	30-50					
	Lodging room and potential					

	additional incomes with prostitution					
	Female		Maximum 7			
Disc Jockey	200-400		Male			Rare job
Hotel Room Caretaker	120-150		Female and Male			Rare job
Guard	120-150		Male			Rare job
Bilijardo Manager	150-200		Male		15-30	
Farmer (plough)	80		Male		3-7	Seasonal

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Re-negotiating notions of place: Tigrayan migration to Addis Ababa

Markus Breines

p. 129-141

- 1 Music in praise of God is playing nonstop. When the woman covered in a white shawl sitting next to me offers me roasted grains, the circumstances of the journey fade into the background of my consciousness. She asks me in Amharic if I have tasted *qollo* before, and when I pass this poorly-hidden language test, she starts to question me about my origin and purpose for being in Ethiopia. Answering to the best of my ability, I soon find myself engaged in a conversation about the challenges many Ethiopians face and how they respond to these in creative ways. Other passengers overhear our dialogue, and after a while, some of them join our conversation. I come to learn that the passengers have different reasons for being on this bus: a man is on his way to set up a stationary store; a young woman is stopping over in the capital only for a few days before starting her studies at Jimma University, while the woman who initiated the conversation is returning to her job as a domestic worker in Saudi Arabia. Looking at the priest, the man chewing *khat*, and a child sleeping on its mother's lap, it becomes clear to me that this bus journey is a small excerpt of life in Ethiopia.
- 2 This paper discusses migrants' subjectivity and intersubjectivity to explore the ways in which individuals are entangled in political structures and contribute to their consolidation. I address these issues by researching how urban-urban migrants conceptualise place and how these notions develop through migration. I focus on Ethiopian migration between the provincial city of Adigrat and the capital Addis Ababa as a case to explore how notions of place develop. Migration is commonly considered to be a movement from a place of origin to a destination (COLLYER 2007), but I am approaching migration as a process that develops over time and include numerous places (SCHUSTER 2005). Through an exploration of how places are conceptualised I emphasise how people experience different aspects of political structures and what role they play in people's notions of place. I also look at how people's migration and experiences of place play a role in the process of renegotiating power centres.

- 3 The contributions of this paper can be divided into two main points. Firstly, I aim to contribute to the knowledge of urban-urban migration and its importance in political dynamics. There is a dominant focus on rural-urban migration that tends to marginalise other forms of migration and does not fully reflect the full extent of South-South migration (HAAN 1999). For example, studies of migration in Ethiopia has often emphasised economically and politically marginalised groups through a predominant focus on migration in rural-urban and rural-rural contexts.¹ Migration from Adigrat in the northern part of the country to Addis Ababa is a particularly relevant case of urban-urban migration to study, as the people who travel this route mainly belong to the politically dominant Tigrayan ethnic group. By looking at the mobility of those who are sometimes associated with relative political advantage (while not excluding migrants with other ethnic backgrounds), I aim to highlight the interrelation between urban-urban and political power in the context of daily life in Ethiopia. In this way, I seek to contribute to a more integrated view of Ethiopian migration and a more nuanced understanding of the complexity of migration in the Horn of Africa.
- 4 Secondly, I am exploring the often-overlooked context of migratory journeys. It has been a topic of some interest in anthropology (ALVAREZ 1995, KEARNEY 1986), but in general, it has received little academic attention (COLLYER 2007). By conducting research on three-day long journeys on the *Selam Bus* between the two cities, I am bringing analytical attention to subjective and intersubjective experiences of migratory journeys and their importance within people's lives. However, by also tracing the development over time my analysis questions the linearity of migratory journeys and to what extent they lead from a place of origin to a destination.² By approaching the migratory journey as a form of mobility that is not limited to the movement from one place to another, but rather as a process that can extend over long periods of time and include a variety of places, I explore trajectories of migratory journeys in relation to conceptualisations of place. I am exploring the ways in which migrants' experiences of place affect their mobility, while also examining how this is interrelated to political conditions.
- 5 Ethiopian migration has historically been, and continues to be, significant. In relation to the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and the civil war that followed until 1991, Bariagaber (1997: 30) calls Ethiopia "one of the most important refugee-generating countries of the world for the past 20 years [1972-1992]". Another example of large-scale migration is the 'villagisation' programmes introduced by the *Derg* regime to increase access to education and agricultural production (BAKER 1995); between 1985 and 1988 around 12 million people in rural areas were coerced to move to new villages (LORGEN 2000). Yet other factors of importance for migration are drought and famines (MARKOS EZRA and GEBRE-EGZIABHER KIROS 2001), and over the past 30 years there have been four major food security disasters (LITTLE *et al.* 2006). These movements, and other forms of migration such as long traditions of pilgrimage and mobility in relation to poverty, constitute the background for migration in and out of Ethiopia³.
- 6 Currently, Ethiopian migration takes a variety of forms that include both internal and international migration.⁴ Despite the large numbers of people on the move and the variety of studies on migration, migrants' trajectories of migration have in the Ethiopian context been given little attention, and consequently, notions of place has neither been a focus of research, with the notable exception of Hammond (2004a, 2004b). In her research on migration among Ethiopian refugees who return from

Sudan, she demonstrates the complexity of the notion of 'home' and argues that it "need not be a single place of primary importance to the subject" (HAMMOND 2004b:51). To explore place in the Ethiopian context, I will be drawing on such empirical work, but also on a wider range of insights relating to the concept of 'place',⁵ as well as to data from my own current fieldwork.

- 7 I use the word 'migrant' to clarify who I consider to be the subjects of my research. To differentiate migrants from other people I rely on King's (2012) point that the 'mobilities paradigm' (URRY 2000, 2007) emphasises constant movement, but migrants are not constantly on the move. Rather, "what defines them as migrants is that they are [...] looking for a place to stop and settle down, at least for a while" (KING 2012: 136). Hence, I use the term 'migrant' to focus on people who are moving between Adigrat and Addis Ababa with the intention of staying in the capital for some time.
- 8 My methodological approach follows anthropological traditions of ground-level ethnographic fieldwork. I have chosen participant observation, focus group discussions and unstructured and in-depth life history interviews as my core research methods, whereas my secondary method is semi-structured interviews. Through these methods, I intend to build an in-depth understanding of migrants' backgrounds, present situation and the Ethiopian context. This multi-sited research is being conducted on three-day long journeys on the *Selam Bus* and on minibuses between Addis Ababa and Adigrat. The two cities together with the bus journeys serve as field sites. The *Selam Bus* is a form of transport that Tigrayan migrants of the 'middle class' are inclined to choose, as it is a faster, safer and more comfortable option than the other buses that are available. In order not to limit my study and to build a broad understanding of migrants' experiences, I am also travelling with other forms of transport. The main part of the 12 month-long-fieldwork is being conducted during equal periods in the two cities, and on interspersed bus journeys between them.

Constructions of place

- 9 I will begin this section by discussing the ways in which people construct place, as place is often merely seen as a "stage upon which social activity is carried out" (TURTON 2005: 275). Secondly, I will provide an overview of how anthropological studies historically have considered migration and place, which has been problematic in the sense that place has commonly not been considered from the subjects' perspectives (RODMAN 2003). This is followed by a discussion on the complexity of place in Ethiopia.
- 10 Adigrat and Addis Ababa are not only field sites where I am conducting my research, but are also places that different migrants experience and construct differently. Even though the complexity of 'space' is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that for some scholars place is seen as space that has been given meaning.⁶ Places come to exist through the meanings people attribute to them, but also in relation to their physical aspects, and, consequently, a place "is both 'internal' and 'external' to the human subject, a personally embedded centre of meanings and a physical locus for action" (TILLEY 1994:18). Place therefore seems to exist in the intersection between person and physical environment. According to Harvey (1993:17), the construction of place can be understood as a "dialectical interplay between experience, perception and imagination". But Harvey also finds that "the relations between distanciation

(presence/absence and spatial scale), appropriation, domination and production of places” must be considered to understand place (HARVEY 1993:17). Hence, places are not static. Rather, they are human constructions that are “constantly shifting, emerging or receding, being accentuated or veiled” (KAHN 1996:168).

- 11 Among migrants who go between Adigrat and Addis Ababa, I am finding that migrants are constructing and reconstructing place in the process of migration and mobility. Tigrayans in Addis Ababa make the city feel like a home in various ways, while often relying on familiar objects and established patterns of behaviour to do so. This can be observed in various forms, such as through narratives about the place a person is currently in, or about another place; style of clothes for holidays; hairstyle; and in the places people spend time in (for example bars that play almost exclusively Tigrinya music). These are ways of engaging with place in a familiar way while simultaneously undergoing a process of adjustment to the circumstances. As people continue some of their practices in new places while also adapting and developing new ways of relating to place, the continuity and flux of place develops. The continuous movement and interrelations between people do not seem to be taken into consideration by the Ethiopian system of ethnic federalism, as it takes on a somewhat essentialistic approach to ethnicity, belonging and place. However, it would be too simple to ‘blame’ policies for not recognising the complexity of place and the ways it transforms over time. Also anthropological approaches to people and place have been, and continue to be, somewhat problematic.
- 12 People and ‘cultures’ have for a long time been associated with specific places or areas (GUPTA and FERGUSON 1997). Anthropology has engaged with migration mainly after the era of structural-functionalism, in which anthropologists viewed “‘societies’ or even ‘cultures’ as more or less isolated, static and homogenous units” (ERIKSEN 2002:10). Brettell (2003) claims that early anthropologists often chose not to write about migration even if it took place right in front of them, mainly because it did not fit with the idea of culture as timeless and bounded. However, the ‘Manchester School’ questioned the stability and coherence of tribes: “The anthropologist may want to study a particular group, or a set of relationships, or domain of activities, which is only part of a larger or more complex social field. How far is it possible to isolate these areas of the field for significant study?” (DEVONS and GLUCKMAN 1964:15). Partly in response to these conceptual developments there grew a focus on process and social change, especially in African cities.⁷ Through these and other studies it has become increasingly clear that people and cultures are not ‘given’, but rather, that “associations of place, people, and culture are social and historical creations to be explained” (GUPTA and FERGUSON 1997:4). And, hence, the ideas of homogenous territorialised units have been increasingly rejected in anthropological theory (BRETTELL 2008).
- 13 Even though the ‘natural’ associations between place and people have been shown to be somewhat misleading, it is only fairly recently that migrants’ conceptualisations of place have become prevalent in anthropological studies. Wolf (1982) and Mintz (1986) show that the interconnections of the world are not new, and hence, the novelty of ‘globalisation’ lies in the increased intensity of the flows of goods, information, capital and people (APPADURAI 1997, ONG 1999). Consequently, social processes crossing geographic, political and cultural borders have become a central feature of anthropological studies (ERIKSEN 2003). These often transnational studies inherently relate to place in new ways, and the ways in which migrants experience and construct

place have recently become more prevalent within anthropological research on migration.⁸

- 14 Hence, I cannot portray different Ethiopians as belonging to specific places or describing what happens in particular places as “the essence of an area” or as the “truth of a place” (MASSEY 1994: 120). For example, the population of Addis Ababa is very diverse and is constantly transforming. An example of this is that there are now large numbers of boys (and even some girls) from the Wolayta zone shining shoes in the capital, but until recently this has often been conducted by boys from the Gurage area. With increased mobility and migration places are becoming more diverse, and it becomes increasingly difficult to define places and describe their populations in specific ways. Thus, my exploration of Tigrayans’ notion of place and interrelation with political structures is not limited to people who can somehow be classified as Tigrayans or to the specific places of Adigrat and Addis Ababa. I have to take into account how people with different backgrounds in different places intersubjectively experience and construct places. While Addis Ababa is probably the most diverse city in Ethiopia, also Adigrat is changing. The new university in Adigrat and the movement of people from other regions contribute to a flow of people to this town. Places, then, are reconstructed, both through people’s conceptualisations and physically in new and unexpected ways as a result of individuals’ experiences and creativity, while simultaneously being influenced by political forces and policies.
- 15 Nevertheless, place continues to be “a problem in contemporary anthropological theory” because “the meaning of place too often seems to go without saying” (RODMAN 2003:204). Even though the spatial dimensions of anthropological studies are taken into consideration to a greater extent than previously (KAHN 1996, LOW and LAWRENCE-ZUNIGA 2003), place have often been considered merely a matter of setting “where things happened” (RODMAN 1992: 640). By acknowledging that different individuals relate to place differently and that conceptualisations of place are fluid, my exploration of the dynamics of migration in Ethiopia investigates how people’s relationships to places evolve over time and space. In the following, I focus on migrants’ perspectives in order to understand how conceptualisations of place develop through movement.

Subjective and intersubjective experiences of migration and place

- 16 Now I will, firstly, clarify how I understand subjectivity and intersubjectivity in relation to migration and place as this will make it possible to see how the different contexts are interpreted by migrants (MALKKI 1995). Migrants are particularly interesting as their movements can inform their knowledge and notions of place in ways that differ from people who are more ‘stationary’. Through my focus on migrants’ subjective and intersubjective experiences of migration I am highlighting the ways in which relationships to place are transformed during migration, and emphasise the importance of the Tigrayan dominance in Ethiopian politics over the last two decades to explore senses of place in everyday life.
- 17 The ways in which people experience migration and place need to be addressed through the concepts of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘intersubjectivity’. Luhrmann asserts that subjectivity “is a term loosely used by anthropologists to refer to the shared inner life

of the subject, to the way subjects feel, respond, experience” (LUHRMANN 2006: 345). And similarly, Das and Kleinman (2000: 1) explain that subjectivity is “the felt interior experience of the person that includes his or her position in a field of relational power”. Hence, subjectivity seems to emphasise how shifting contexts are experienced by the subject and subjectivity is therefore relevant for a study of migration, particularly as the contexts are more often shifting than in stationary circumstances. However, a person’s subjectivity is not separate from the environment, but is rather part of the intersubjectivity of one’s existence (JACKSON 1998, 2002, 2004, 2007). Intersubjectivity goes beyond the dialectic between individuals, and can be seen as a form of interaction “between persons and a world of ideas, attributes, and things that are held in common without any one person having complete control over them or the last word on their meaning” (JACKSON 1998: 7).

- 18 Migrants’ subjective experiences, as also constructed intersubjectively through interaction with others and the environment, is a key factor for people’s construction of place. By exploring how Adigrat and Addis Ababa are conceptualised by migrants at different points, I am examining how the importance of place transforms and alters in relation to migrants’ subjective and intersubjective experiences of different contexts. To explore subjectivity (and inherently also intersubjectivity) in relation to mobility, Conradson and McKay (2007) build on Appadurai’s (1995) notion of ‘translocality’. A translocality, in addition to being a “place whose social architecture and relational topologies have been refigured”, is a term that recognises that “localities continue to be important sources of meaning and identity for mobile subjects (CONRADSON and MCKAY 2007: 168).
- 19 To demonstrate the intersubjectivity of translocalities I will briefly outline some aspects of the life of ‘Genet’ and her descriptions of Addis Ababa and Adigrat. Genet has been working in Addis Ababa in a low paid job for several years now. As the Mesqel celebration was drawing closer she was getting increasingly eager to go visit her family in Adigrat. Before she left for Adigrat she talked a lot about how much she enjoys being there and staying with her family. She said that the *Mesqel* celebration is particularly nice in Adigrat, and if she can, she goes there every year for this celebration. Nevertheless, she is continuing to live in Addis Ababa, even if Adigrat is presented as a place that is much more desirable to be in than Addis Ababa. She lives in an area of Addis Ababa where there are lots of Tigrayans, and the neighbours in her building are from the same area as her. Genet’s notions of place are not merely individual constructions, but are both intersubjectively experienced and constructed. Her desire to visit Adigrat can be seen as a need to see her family, but also as a means to strengthen her identity as a Tigrayan and her belonging to the northern part of Ethiopia. Similarly, her long-term stay in Addis Ababa is of importance for her presentation of herself when she is in Adigrat. Thus, the translocalities of both Addis Ababa and Adigrat are continuously reconfigured by Genet, and are being important in different ways in different places. The ways the importance of translocalities are renegotiated by individuals can be seen in light of the political circumstances.
- 20 In my encounters with different people from Tigray I often find a sense of pride of being Tigrayan. This can partly be seen in relation to the TPLF’s success in ousting the *Derg* and maintaining political control of Ethiopia through the Tigrayan dominated EPRDF. This sense of pride seemed to grow even stronger after the death and before and after the funeral of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, as his background,

achievements and intellect are admired by many (while he was disliked by others). Through a sense of affiliation with this icon of the struggle and of political power, Tigrayans can build an identity they can rely on both while in Tigray and outside of that region. Thus, the association with political power can lead to subjective and intersubjective experiences of belonging to place. Tigrayans can use the sense of pride of being Tigrayan, and even sometimes of superiority to other Ethiopians, to generate feelings of rightfully being in Addis Ababa. I will now go on to look at how the experience of place plays a role in migrants' movements.

The importance of place and home for migrants' movements

- 21 People move for various reasons, but their plans can change when places turn out to be different from what they were imagined to be. This brings me back to the anecdote that this paper started with. The woman going to Jimma may find that living in this part of Ethiopia proves too different from what she has known before. Will she try to go somewhere else when she hears about the opportunities that exist there? Will the man setting up a stationary store succeed? If he does, will he encourage his closest family to join him in the capital?
- 22 One of the factors that may be of importance for how migration unfolds is the political situation. However, as I have tried to clarify, migration in Ethiopia is not only a phenomenon that concerns those who are politically and economically marginalised, but occurs also among those who are associated with the dominant political group. People's intentions for migration, and the way they change or not, can be seen in light of people's relationships to place, as the possibilities and constraints that exist in places are in various ways related to political structures. Tigrayans' experiences of migration can be seen in relation to the political situation, and, consequently, so can their conceptualisations of place and trajectories of migration. Thus, my exploration of how places are conceptualised takes into account not only individual experiences of places, but also the political structures that condition how both social constructions and the physical aspects of place influence individuals' experiences. Experiences are, nevertheless, not determined by such factors, and it is therefore necessary to take into account also other factors that are of importance for how and why people conceptualise places similarly and/or differently.
- 23 Often, migration is not a process where a migrant follows a specific plan (COLLYER 2010). Migration involves movement from a place of origin to a (temporary) destination, but Tesfaye Tafesse (2007: 22) finds that migration is a process that takes long time to materialise, and the point in which a person reaches the decision to move "differs from individual to individual due to variations in migration behaviours, coping capacities and social networks." Once the movement has started it does not always progress straightforwardly. For example, focusing on undocumented migrants in North Africa, Collyer (2007, 2010) identifies the fragmentation of journeys and that it is common for migrants to be stranded in different places for extended periods of time, which indicates that journeys are complex, unpredictable undertakings, and that the lines of journeys are far from straight. Coutin (2005) develops the non-linearity of journeys further by demonstrating how migrants' illegality continues to pervade their lives as they never fully arrive to destinations because of their prohibited presence.

- 24 Migrants move in response to how places are conceptualised and what they seem to offer in comparison to other places.⁹ Benson and O'Reilly find that as “expectation meets reality, migrants come face to face with the limits of their knowledge of the local setting and way of life” (2009:8). An example of Ethiopian migrants encountering unexpected realities is provided by Yitna Getachew (2006) who shows how Ethiopian migrants stranded in Bossasso, Somalia, have to develop strategies to cope with arrests, violence, and harsh circumstances. Because of these hardships some of the migrants decide to cross the Gulf of Aden and continue the journey towards Saudi Arabia, whereas others prefer to go back home to an even more impoverished life – as many borrowed money for paying the costs of migration (YITNA GETACHEW 2006).
- 25 Hence, I am approaching trajectories of migration as more complex than physical movements from a place of origin to a destination. By conducting research along three field sites (Adigrat, Addis Ababa and on the *Selam Bus*), I am exploring if migrants' conceptualisations of place can lead them to reconsider their options and possibilities for staying in a place, returning 'home' or for onward migration. 'Melake' and two of his sisters can be used as an example of how plans change over time. Melake went from Adigrat to study in Jimma, but did not complete his bachelor degree and went to Addis Ababa for work. He stayed in Addis Ababa for a couple of years working in different jobs, before he returned to Adigrat again. He has stayed in Adigrat and does not find it appealing to go anywhere else. One of his sisters, on the other hand, has settled down in Addis Ababa and opened a restaurant close to Mercato. Another of his sisters went to study in Harar, but only stayed for a while before she, to her family's surprise, went to Saudi Arabia to work as a domestic worker. These examples from a single family's (unpredictable) movements demonstrate that people engage with place and experience the possibilities and constraints differently, and thereby choose different ways for coping with the environments. Hence, when migrants from Adigrat reach Addis Ababa, they have not necessarily come to the end of their migration. Migrants' perspectives on having reached a destination can be seen in light of how they conceptualise place and home.
- 26 Migrants come with histories that affect their constructions of new places. Home, as Chu points out, however, “has been overemphasised as “imaginary places simply of longing and belonging” (CHU 2006: 397). During migration home does not only remain a nostalgic memory of the past during migration, and in his research on Mexican migrants, Striffler finds that these migrants “understand home in contradictory ways that are shaped by migration and life in the United States” (STRIFFLER 2007: 678). The complexity of the notion of 'home' has been described by Hammond in her research on Ethiopian returnees. She points out that there is not only one home, but rather, “there may be many different types of homes, and [...] people may be willing and able to adapt when necessary to create a new home” (HAMMOND 2004b: 51). Migrants' notions of home, then, is of importance for how conceptualisations of place develop during migration, and a migrants may reach a destination (but not necessarily the end of a migration trajectory) when a place that has the potential for becoming a home has been found.

Conclusion

- 27 Tigrayan migration in Ethiopia can be seen as movements in search of places where better opportunities exist and where one can settle down, at least for a while. Tigrayans might not benefit more than others under the current regime, but opportunities are to some extent part and parcel of the political climate. Among Tigrayans there seem to be a strong support for a government dominated by Tigrayans and particularly to the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. This association with the dominant political power has implications for people's sense of belonging, security and feeling of being at home even when outside of their 'home region'.
 - 28 By expanding and developing senses of home to places outside of Tigray these movements can be seen as a factor that contributes to the consolidation of the power centre as Tigrayans are participating at various level of society in different places, and thereby becoming increasingly influential beyond their region in the north. Thus, people's migration is not only an individual matter, but is related to the political situation and can be understood as a factor in the consolidation (but also contestation) of political power.
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FOOTNOTES

1. See e.g. BERHANU and WHITE 2000, MARKOS EZRA and EGZIABHER KIROS 2001, GRAY and MUELLER 2012.
2. See e.g. COUTIN 2005.
3. See e.g. HELDMAN 1995, LITTLE *et al.* 2006.
4. See e.g. GRAY and MUELLER 2012, DE REGT 2010, ERULKAR *et al.* 2006, BYASS *et al.* 2003.
5. See e.g. HARVEY 1993, LOW and LAWRENCE-ZUNIGA 2003.
6. See e.g. BASSO 1996, CARTER *et al.* 1993, TUAN 1977.
7. See MEILLASSOUX 1968, MITCHELL 1969.
8. See e.g. CHU 2006, HAMMOND 2004b, ENGLUND 2002, PERSSON 2007, STRIFFLER 2007.
9. See e.g. SCHUSTER 2005.

AUTHOR

Markus Breines

Multilingualism and identity in intercultural couples: The case of Ethio-French couples living in Addis Ababa

Véronique Miguel Addisu

p. 143-154

- 1 Urban sociology reveals that one of the effects of globalization is diversity, or the change from ethnic identities to socio-cultural identities (COOPER et al. 1976; BLOMMAERT 2010). But until now, we have very few studies about how this plays out in African cities, making it very difficult to understand the impact of multilingualism such an evolution (EDGAR, 2004). In Addis Ababa, Amharic is the *lingua franca*, while other languages may be used for vernacular purposes, including foreign languages (TAMRU 2007; FICQUET et al. 2007). Social diversity is traditionally recognized as one of the main characteristics of this capital city. Partition between private and public territories can be seen spatially and linguistically: houses are hidden behind walls, and individuals are likely to choose different languages according to this guiding principle: “Do we want to be understood or do we accept not being understood? (TAKKELE TADESSE 2004). Thus, walls cannot be taken down, but everybody can switch from one language to another for the purpose of including or excluding “others”. In that way, language is a very strong piece of evidence for social movement: how does it help to accommodate individual identity as well as group membership? The perception speakers have on the status of a specific language does not depend only on the general use in society, nor on their degree of bilingualism. It is also related to the way they perceive the cultural value of those languages at the individual level (HAMERS & BLANC 2000). I do not consider here cultures as universal attributes but as discursive constructions made by the participants themselves (MYERS SCOTTON 2006; PILLER 2007).
- 2 In order to understand how people categorize their language practices and the main factors they select to do so, I undertook a qualitative inquiry with several intercultural

couples living in Addis Ababa for more than 10 years. I will present here some results of a more international research currently being conducted on five different countries.¹

- 3 The category which I employ here —“intercultural couple”— does not have a clear and objective definition. According to the different definitions, it may depend on factors such as, but not limited to, the nationality/ethnicity, the languages spoken, and the social or religious origins of the couples (VARRO, 2003). In the literature, we may find terms like: “interracial couples”, “intercultural couples”, “Multicultural or mixed couples”, “interlingual families”, or even “cross-border couples” (DERVIN 2011b). Independent of these different categories, all researchers recognize that the category is constructed by crossing two subjective perceptions: the one of the couple itself and the one of the social group they live in (PILLER 2002). So couples here not only feel “mixed”, but are also recognized officially as such by others. In an attempt to consider all pertinent aspects of a couple’s identity in a comprehensive way, sociologic and sociolinguistic Francophone researchers in this field use mainly the expression “mixed couples” (DERVIN 2011a). Although this expression might sound a bit strange for Anglophone readers, I will use it because it is employed both in French and in Amharic, and it makes sense to all people I observed or interviewed.
- 4 All the couples who were studied in the “Mixclasis” project have been included in this corpus because of their different nationalities, and their different mother tongues. But beyond those characteristics, all couples have a common factor with “non-mixed couples”: the expression of identity. Thus, their bilingualism is strongly related to their identity within the context in which they live. This is the case for the three Ethio-French couples I will present here.
- 5 First, I will introduce the sociolinguistic framework of multilingualism in Addis Ababa and the variables of the interactions for those couples. These elements will provide the context necessary to understand their respective linguistic backgrounds before they met. In a second part, I will analyze their discourses collected through interviews to see how they make coherence out of the tensions between the various languages they employ in each relationship. I will then present how they communicate in French after ten years of marriage. When they met, they considered communication as a private understanding and used English. After ten years their social frame of interactions has become much larger, as they have developed multilingual skills and sociolinguistics strategies. These strategies reveal creative ways of crossing and redefining language boundaries. Finally, I will discuss the emergence of what can be called a “multilingual stance” as a modern cultural categorization.

Urban multilingual context for a qualitative enquiry

Language in Addis Ababa: vernacular and vehicular functions

- 6 In Addis Ababa, according to the last census of 2007, 70 % of the population declares Amharic as their mother tongue, while only 47 % declare to be Amhara. This result is similar to the 1994 census.
- 7 As we can see on the table below (annex 1), some ethnic groups declare being from one ethnic group while their mother tongue is not the language of the group. This tendency

could increase from 1994 to 2007 for a large group (Tigrigna: -11.56% declaring this language as a mother tongue) and for smaller groups (-14.74%).

- 8 This evolution is not attested for all groups neither related to their size; it depends on areas, cultural behaviors and socioeconomic interests (MIGUEL ADDISU 2014); thus, some national languages seem to be more transmitted than others. It is also true for foreign languages used as mother tongues: more people declared a foreign language as a mother tongue in 2007 than in 1994 (from 0.2% to 0.5%) but the data does not allow us to distinguish foreign languages here.
- 9 These trends are obviously related to the national linguistic policy as well as the ethno-federal organization of the country. Since they are quite different from other Ethiopian areas, here it shows the impact of migration and urbanization, noticed also in other multilingual contexts such as Nairobi² or towns in Mayotte Island for example.
- 10 Urban social dynamics develop a lingua franca (here, Amharic) and also more diversified language practices (variation into the same language, more languages declared also). In our case, this focalization on plurality as a sign of expressing one's identities seems to be neither favourable to the international languages nor to the languages spoken by a large ethnic group.
- 11 Addis Ababa is also a place where many foreigners coming from non-East African countries live for professional reasons. Most of them work for international structures. They need an international language at work and Amharic from time to time. Within these communities, international languages are maintained for vernacular purposes. Then languages have different functions according to the practices of the communities. The data collected suggests that the more multilingual the society is, the more a unique language is used for different functions. The multilingual couples we have observed give us a clear example of this phenomenon at a micro-level.

Toward a dynamic scheme of sociolinguistics functions

- 12 The practice of diglossia goes with modernity when we talk about couples made of an Ethiopian and a foreigner. In fact, modernity is associated with “the idea of the world as open to transformation, by human intervention, a complex of economic institutions, a certain range of political institutions. Largely as a result of these characteristics, modernity is vastly more dynamic than any previous type of social order. It is a society—more technically, a complex of institutions—which, unlike any preceding culture, lives in the future, rather than the past” (GIDDENS 1998: 84).
- 13 Since mixed couples have to manage their identity at three levels to assure their future (the individual, the couple, the social group), they are open to transformations and they develop dynamic social postures—providing hints to the question of modernity, especially in Ethiopia.
- 14 The figure in annex 2 highlights the plurality of interactions in different linguistic contexts: everyone implied in such relationships constantly has to use different languages and different types of sociolinguistic rules and norms. How do they do this?
- 15 The social and sociolinguistic factors identified in previous researches about language practices of mixed couples are:
- 16 **At macro level:** a. Linguistic ideologies in both contexts (of the two countries involved here). b. Socio-economic status

- 17 **At meso level:** Linguistic proficiency due to previous use and current use of languages (including mother tongue)
- 18 **At micro level:** a. Couples' perceptions of their family and social networks. b. Value and projects for the future (especially about children). c. Perception of culture and individual identity
- 19 Those factors are important to clarify because previous studies on bilingual practices showed that locutors have linguistic choice within a macro-context made of linguistic ideologies present in the living context but also in the context of the first socialization (France and Addis Ababa here) (VARRO 2003). Those factors are neither totally external nor totally dependent on personal choice. For example, language proficiency depends on the exposure to the language and on the investment in learning. The representation both partners have of their couple depends on their relations in private but also on the image they get from their respective communities. From this perspective, social actors refer to a "cultural behaviour" according to the "cultural attributes" recognized in the social context in which they live.
- 20 *Corpus for a qualitative methodology*
- 21 Through semi-directive interviews focused on linguistic biographies, each partner has explained how he/she communicates in the family and how he/she mixes with the group speaking the language of the other spouse's community. The guide below shows that a diachronic point of view was privileged to focus on the actual practices. Each interviewee answered to the following questions:

Previous life

- 22 Where did you grow up? Using which languages?
- 23 How did you meet your spouse? What language did you use? How did you understand each other?
- 24 How did you pass from this language to the current one?
- 25 Did you learn the language of your spouse? How? When? Why?

Today

- 26 Today, what language do you speak, how and when?
- 27 How do you communicate with your family-in-law? (yesterday and today)
- 28 How did/does your spouse communicate with your family? (yesterday and today)
- 29 What type of discourse do you mainly use with your spouse? And your spouse with you?
- 30 What language do you use when you quarrel with each other?
- 31 How did you choose the names of your children?

Understanding of the research

- 32 What is a "mixed couple" for you? Do you consider yourself as mixed couple?
- 33 Was this interview interesting for you? Why?
- 34 Would you like to add some more information seem to be important for you?

- 35 The data examined and presented here are related to three couples who share the same sociologic and sociolinguistic profile: all couples are composed of an Ethiopian wife and a French husband. They have good income, due to the professional status of the husband. All have already one child or more. All the Ethiopian wives grew up in Addis Ababa, they spoke several languages at home but mainly Amharic. None of them are Amhara. They all learned English at school but they do not use it often to communicate. Since they are around 20 years old, they all grew up in a place where multilingualism has a positive value at the national level. None of them had contact with the French language until they met their partner. All work, occasionally or regularly.
- 36 All men grew up in a monolingual environment (in France there is no doubt about French as the only national language for inhabitants). They all came to Addis for professional reasons and they have continued to use French at work. They have learned English at school but they do not speak it well; they did not know anything about the Amharic language before they came to Ethiopia, 15 years ago.
- 37 The names of the first couple are Gregoire and Guenet; the names of the second couple are Hubert and Bezawit; and the third couple's names are Quentin and Nahome.
- 38 The interviews show different ways of managing similar communicative situations. A significant evolution could be noticed in all the linguistic biographies. In this perspective, we will first present the initial contexts of the "love stories". We will then show how and why spouses have switched from one language to another. Finally, we will discuss the influence of the "communities of practices" on their communicative strategies. I will show how they construct a unique identity in relation to a plurality of multilingual and multicultural situations.

Identifying "others": individual and couple-hood issues

Falling in love: a private story with international tools

- 39 When they met, they started to communicate in English as the lingua franca. Even if their communication "skills" in English could be quite different from one person to another, all of them remember the simplicity and the ease of their understanding: "I could understand easily," "It was not difficult," "I don't remember any problems," etc. They all remember that they could understand each other, whatever the subject and no matter how they were able to express it linguistically. Their low proficiency in English did not prevent them from meeting. It even made it more "special" and "interesting": since most of them associated this recollection with positive feelings, as if language contact was not a barrier between them but actually helped them to be more thoughtful to each other.
- 40 Some remember that they mixed languages. But it has been noted in other research about bilingualism, that the categorization of language use could be quite different from one person to another (BAKER 1992; HELLER 2006). Thus, Bezawit mentions that they would create a "Ketena language" with Hubert, mixing French, English and Amharic together. She is proud of it even if this designation comes from her Ethiopian friends in a pejorative way: they were not able to understand them at all. In his point of view, Hubert remembers that they used to talk in English and it was fine for communication,

but more difficult when it came to cultural habits (being on time to appointments, for example).

- 41 So what could be considered as a handicap or even impossibility to communicate for some people (especially for monolingual persons), became, in this case, a creative way of building a common identity. For them, it seems that using a lingua franca was a way to develop a unique couple's identity through a specific means. Such statements can be associated with what BAKER (1992) called "bilingual creativity".
- 42 After this first phase, the interviewed couples declared they did not communicate in this way for a long time. Today, most of them have switched to French, the mother tongue of the foreign spouse, even if Amharic is also used from time to time. While they declare they use one main language, code-switching is nonetheless often used. It has a prestigious value for each partner. It is still a creative way to develop a common identity for the couple. But the organization of the languages is much more complex today because of social interactions with other people. This variable was not that important at the beginning of their "love story". Before analyzing how these social interactions, we have to understand how they switched from English to French for their private interactions.

Making sense of tension: languages and roles in groups

Wives: active mediators

- 43 In each couple, it is the wife who has decided to learn French. All wives mention different reasons: it could be related to the attraction of the beauty of the language itself, or for its international status, it could also correspond to a personal challenge. One wanted to discover the literature, another one to be able to communicate with French people in France. It could even be a curiosity for a new language in general. Beyond the diversity of reasons, all of them said they knew it was very important for the sake of the couple. Nahome mentioned also her children: she was afraid of losing her children by not being able to communicate easily with them; she knew that they would go to the French-Ethiopian Lycée. All mention as well that at the beginning of their relationship, when they had to mix with the French community, they felt "transparent", "stupid", or even like a "vegetable", and they did not accept this role. All of them clearly expressed a paradox: it was their personal decision to learn French but, at the same time, they did not have the choice since the whole family would benefit from it. So, family is highly valued for them and they have to find their own individual position to make the family stronger.

Husbands: insecure participants

- 44 Today verbal interactions are still mixed but more than 90% of them are in French. So what about the husbands? At home, husbands speak Amharic only when it is about simple things, related to daily life and they recognize it is not enough. They regret it. At the same time, they are all proud to say that they use the Amharic language in France in front of "strangers", showing here their difference.

- 45 In their interviews, all husbands remember the progress of their wives with pride. They are touched and they judge themselves badly: they said they are not “good” at learning languages, not able to learn since their wives “absorb” languages, they are like “sponges”. They all say their wives have a good level in French. All of them mention the same example, with regard to their mother living in France: the first year they had to be translator and they did not like it. The second year, the wives and mothers-in-law could speak together without their help. So, in a mixed couple, the role of “translator” is important. We shall develop this point in more detail later.
- 46 All husbands mention a few common reasons: French is their work language, they are not good learners, and they are tired when they go back home, so it is difficult to speak another language. It is stated by all of them, even by Gregoire, who had taken many courses, including at university. He can write and read and interact with strangers in Amharic. Quentin is handicapped by the writing system, Hubert stresses that he intended to take an academic course but finally he did not and now his children laugh at him because of his “French Amharic style”. Two of them have lived for many years with their Ethiopian family at home; all of them have French speaking and Amharic speaking friends, so they are exposed to both languages on a daily basis.
- 47 When the subject of the interview shifted to the Amharic language use, discourses turned out to be really different within the husbands’ group, but also between partners. They all have created different types of sociolinguistic accommodation. All husbands recognize they do not participate enough, and they provide different reasons for that. Quentin relates it to “gender” difference: conversations between women are not interesting for him. And he respects also his wife’s privacy. Hubert insists on the fact that he needs translation and translation does not allow him to follow the conversation “in time”, so he prefers not to be involved unless he leads the conversation. Gregoire notices that he could follow them a few years ago but now he is a bit “lazy” and he does not know why. This expression of “linguistic insecurity” is recurrent although they mention that they can follow up to 80% of the exchange when the conversation turns to subjects they are familiar with.

Wives and husbands: common accommodations to the group

- 48 Their wives express their regrets but at different levels; and they have developed different strategies to accommodate to this.
- 49 Guenet, Gregoire’s wife, is proud of his knowledge of Amharic. She first translates and then she directly talks to him in Amharic in front of people so that he can answer. But if it works at the beginning, after a while Gregoire stays quiet, and listens without participating. Sometimes, he participates in French, asking her to translate. For this couple, the main criterion is the integration of individuals into the conversational group.
- 50 Bezawit, Hubert’s wife, translates what he says according to the importance of the subject, so it can be few words here and there. She summarizes or even finally goes into the conversation without translating. Sometimes she changes the meaning of the sentences when she thinks it could be too difficult for Hubert to understand the cultural part of the situation. But on other occasions, she speaks in French with him in front of everybody when she knows that what she says will not be misjudged by the

group. In that case, other people are not included. For this couple, the cultural part of verbal interaction is the first criterion used.

- 51 Nahome has developed her personal social life, with her group of female friends; she does not try to include him. But she tries to be present and to participate in French when French friends are with them. When they visit her family, Quentin comes with a French friend so he does not feel lonely: communication cannot be established with the entire group but, at least, there are verbal interactions. This strategy was chosen by both of them. For this couple, the main landmark for intercultural communication is to occupy or not the “communication land”, to be present, whatever the language is.
- 52 To sum up, all of them are accustomed to consider communication in group as a great challenge. But women and men do not react the same way in such situations. Men expect their wives to help them (by translating, by learning or even avoiding the exolingual situations). Women are more “active”: they decide to talk, or to translate, or even to develop the “exolingual identity” of the group within which they are supposed to interact.
- 53 For both spouses in each couple, the reasons of these kinds of sociolinguistic accommodations are facework, undertaken at individual, couple, and social levels together (GUMPERZ 1982). In order to communicate, each social actor has to challenge linguistic insecurity and identity. In this way, each couple creates its own way of making a sociolinguistic dynamic out of different languages. Skill proficiency, then, appears as the stable part of the framework but it is not the factor that will initiate / give the impulse to factor for the dynamic of the communications.

Mixed couples: multilingual stance and identity

- 54 The six interviewees recognize themselves as members of “mixed couples” but do not know exactly what this kind of couple is supposed to be. They insist on the fact that they feel mixed because of the way they are seen by “others”, be they French, Ethiopian, or from other nationalities. At the same time, they insist on being an “ordinary” couple in their daily life, like any other couple.
- 55 It is clear that their exposure to different languages obliges them to deal with different types of communication, wherever they are, in France or in Ethiopia. So it makes them more aware of the socio-cultural consequences of their verbal interactions. Furthermore, it impels them to give an explicit priority to the sociolinguistic framework of the verbal interaction in general, more than on the linguistic contents and forms. Thus, their conversational collaboration always involves a process of negotiation, in whichever language. That is what I call the “multilingual stance”: this posture reveals an integrative communication, based more on social effects than on linguistic effects.
- 56 Understanding is considered as efficient only if sociolinguistic insecurity is recognized by the other as a base of the communication frame. Since sociolinguistic insecurity differs according to the cultural background and the social integration of each person, it is always evolving and the only way to deal with it is to accept that linguistic norms are subject to change according to social norms. We can see that this is the case, even if tensions may sometimes provoke a break up between the “community” formed by the couple and the social community, or even between the two spouses. Of course, this

posture is developed only if each person involved perceives the other as totally different and completely identical at the same time. This is called “alterity” or “otherness” (KRISTEVA 1991; RICOEUR 1992). And when it comes to couples, I can also call it “love”.

Personal identity, couple-hood and socialization: a complex system

- 57 In a synchronic perspective, this study suggests that there is not only one language for one function. Linguistic proficiency is one of the characteristics of the challenge but it does not change the ground rules by itself.
- 58 In multilingual situations, languages seem not to be the most pertinent categories to describe sociolinguistic practices. At macro, meso, and micro levels, diglossia could be seen in a dynamic perspective, since the same language could be used with different functions.
- 59 For example, according to Guenet:
- 60 The language to express individuality is **Amharic**
- 61 The language to express differences between the couple and the group is **French**
- 62 The language to express links with a family group is mainly **French with some Amharic**
- 63 The language to express links with a public group as a family' member is **French**
- 64 The language to express links with a public group as a group' member is **Amharic**
- 65 Language choices are different from one person to another. But those social functions are the same for everyone living in the same context.
- 66 Looking for a “multilingual stance” could then help understand dynamics of verbal interactions in situations of language and cultural contacts. It helps identify how people become active participants of their socialization, including languages they do not master. The issues at stake are related to the expression of identity as a member of national group, family group, and social group together.
- 67 When values differ from one person to another, or from the couple to the group, “cultural differences” are declared as “alibis” for misunderstanding (HELLER & LEVY, 1991). When both partners attribute the same value to the sociolinguistic interactions, accommodations created seem to function efficiently. Thus, dynamics and movements are enhanced at the level of the couple and at the level of the community.
- 68 At the micro-level, this research suggests that sociolinguistic accommodations are realized differently according to the gender, the sociolinguistic background, and the life projects. However, a qualitative approach does not enable us to know which factor could be more influential than another. With references to those couples, the main variable seems to be love, or what we can call a common life project, in which the intention of “making community” is much more important than any other factors.
- 69 At the macro-level, multilingual stances could be noticed in an empirical way in a multilingual environment, especially in cities like Addis Ababa. It is much more difficult to identify those dynamics in a monolingual context. The effects of this complex system probably depend on the linguistic ideologies and the impact of

globalization. That is, then, a great challenge, since any theoretical framework is developed in a specific scientific field.


- 70 In this way, developing sociolinguistic research on bilingualism in Ethiopia could teach us a lot about language practices in different contexts. It also gives us some hypotheses concerning the change of sociolinguistic practices in Ethiopia.

Annex

Annex 1: Table: Mother Tongue and Ethnicity in Addis Abeba
(Source: CSA, 1994 and 2007)

First language declared in Addis Ababa (%)			Inhabitants declaring an ethnic identity (%)			First Language / Ethnicity	
	1994	2007		1994	2007	1994	2007
Main L1 declared by 90 000 locutors or more.	93,13	93,69	Ethnic groups (90 000 people or more)	89,89	89,08	103,60	105,18
Amharic	73,06	71	Amhara	48,92	47,05	149,35	150,90
Oromiffa	10,01	10,72	Oromo	19,5	19,51	51,33	54,95
Guraguegna	5,11	8,37	Gurague	13,72	16,34	37,24	51,22
Tigrigna	5,41	3,6	Tigray	7,75	6,18	69,81	58,25
Other ethiopian L1 declared (less than 90 000 people)	6,85	5,81	Ethnic groups (less than 90 000 people)	10,11	10,92	67,95	53,21
Foreign languages	0,2	0,5	Foreigners (data missing)				
Total	100	100	Total	100	100		

Annex 2: Figure: Social Groups and Verbal Interactions (Intercultural Couples)



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FOOTNOTES

1. Project “Mixclasis”, University of Rouen – France (EA 4701) Since “mixed couples” is a sociologic category very ambiguous and often related to language practices as relevant factors, a team of 12 French researchers on linguistics has chosen a qualitative approach to understand impact of language practices on communication of couples recognizing themselves as “mixed”. This qualitative methodology explores discourses and practices of couples living, in Egypt, in Ethiopia, in France, in Germany, in Tunisia.
2. World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision, ONU (DESA), 2009.

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English Language in Ethiopia: A Disruption Point in the Chains of Education for Development

Moges Gebremariam

p. 155-169

- 1 The tragic flaw of Ethiopia's underdevelopment resides in its attempt to modernize itself through the introduction of modern education which, as MESSAY (2008) points out, was/is Eurocentric in orientation and effective in producing alienated, culturally dislocated and radical intellectuals. Messay also argues as this was the deep cause of our wrong fight for the revolution than a reformation, and recommends as modern education in Ethiopia needs to be decolonized to bring about environmentally sound development. Such kind of development is, however, ensured only when we are capable of regaining our harmony with our voices and perspectives in our socio-linguistic realities—which are reduced to the status of backwardness as a relegated tradition to the extent of standing in a hierarchical opposition with those voices and perspectives imported from the west as a shadow of modernity. Hence, the birth of an Ethiopian dilemma of the traditional-modern connection that needs to be deconstructed. Examining the issue broadly, Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2009) shows the need to decolonize modernity in the African context, as it is a budding on the decay of a colonial trace. The scheme of decolonization should also target the education sector in Africa as it is still cherishing the colonial instructional media and content. Brock-utne (2006) also capitalizes on this issue when she says that education seems to congratulate students on their success in identifying with the cultural perspectives that the foreign languages they are taught with carry at the expense of their socio-linguistic reality in the post-colonial Africa.
- 2 Ethiopia, without colonial history, exhibits such an aftermath of colonialism. This paradox of Ethiopia counts on the introduction of western education through the English language. This confusion about the English language has been, over decades, nurtured to the extent of causing the foundation of some private schools, which are determined to humiliate their own students for speaking native tongues instead of

English. Such a retributive manifestation of the use of English as a medium of instruction in Ethiopia reminds us of the context of colonial education in Kenya as Ngugi wa Thiong'o (1987) recounts. Of course, it is a rehash of an old speech to say: Ethiopia is known to have been the bastion of African independence; but it has fallen easy prey to what it fought at Adowa to be independent of. Through public education it has borrowed from the West the intention of modernizing itself.¹ And education has empowered us to live up to what we were fighting against.

- 3 Hence, modernization in Ethiopia is the result of colonization through education, which needs to be decolonized like other African nations. This shows that the true voices and perspectives of the Ethiopian polity have been decentred and re-schematized in such a way that they are not meaningful any longer; or if they are meaningful, it is only in terms of connoting a state of "backwardness". The development of such a perspective has been, however, facilitated by the miscalculated intention of modernizing Ethiopia's traditions, which embrace its voices and perspectives, in line with that of the West. This has happened to create an outlandish system of mannerism that attracts the impressionable children of Ethiopia from their traditional way of doing things. And at the expense of the true sense of Ethiopia's modernization, alienated and culturally dislocated citizens have been produced with a launching pad borrowed from the West for modernization. This has also brought about the conception, on the part of the majority of Ethiopians, of development as any act of getting out of one's tradition for that of the West. This xenocentric mentality is a self-defeating perspective that has been fostered with a parallel relegation and suffocation of the Ethiopian voices and perspectives.
- 4 Thus, here come the questions: how can we become cognizant of the articulations of our tradition and modernity at the same time unless we are suffering from living in between, with the grammar of western modernity being determinant of how our traditional values and practices are selected and combined to make up for the structure of our modernity? How can we become aware of the features of our modernity ahead of time unless we have undergone through a dismembering process that has a bearing and a trickle-down effect on how we perceive ourselves in relation to our society?
- 5 And the relationship we have to our past and present consists in our languages which mark different voices and perspectives with an in-built articulation of cultures. Hence, we have the socio-linguistic diversity, which in Ethiopia as elsewhere particularizes human existence differently in a non-gradable manner. This is what one understands only when he/she is content with his/her own socio-linguistic reality there by living in deference to its premises. And the people of each socio-linguistic entity in Ethiopia can evolve into a status of an inclusive and interpretive community that should be declared from below by the economic integration of the productive forces of the different entities there by fostering a language of integration and production as a super structure. But, being dislocated and dismembered by western education, we feel strange to our socio-linguistic realities and hesitate to recognize what it is in its own terms. Rather, we tend to feel out-wardness to the extent of referring to it with *that* which shows distance and detachment. Hence, the separation of *what* and *that* in Ethiopia has come into existence. And the educated class, as a self-anointed modernizer, has introduced a system of perceiving oneself in a hierarchical connection with the patrimony of western cultures—which causes the dethronement of ours to go haywire and decentred. This ushers in a disruption of the continuity of childhood

socialization at home, and it fails to determine adulthood intellectual and moral order, as it is fettered to a contradicting secondary socialization at school. The socialization at school was/is not in communication and complementarity with what was/is at home. Thus, the students have been conditioned by double socializations by virtue of which they have remained part of neither of the socializations, but in between. They have, hence, begun to feel the suffocation of their own culture, witnessing as they stand outside of it, and to prescribe western culture for Ethiopians in different socio-linguistic entities as an act of modernization.

- 6 Furthermore, the motivation to achieve such kind of modernization does not depend on inspiration from within oneself, but on externally induced and appealing value system for imitation. Subsequently, the values and practices in the different socio-linguistic entities have been left to their fate of decadence and a stagnation-led-discontinuity of integration thereby emerging powerless to resist the arbitrary interpretation of the radicalized educated class that has come to hold the missionary position of modernizing and developing the entities from above in line with Euro-centric prescriptions. This reminds us of what the European missionaries did in terms of inculcating the myth of the “white man” in the souls of their colonies in Africa (MESSAY 2004: 4). And the question “what is this?” is no more answered from within itself, but in a manner of responding to “what is that” from the educationally induced metaphysical reason of existence in the west.
- 7 And I contend that the educated class, exercising “power as tutorship” (MESSAY 2004: 170) in Ethiopia, has formed a cyst among the social body promoting the newfangled conception of achievement as something that comes out of the hierarchical opposition of tradition and modernity. This is, however, perilous to an Ethiopian mind as it evolves into a self-conflicting entity as a result of hosting perspectives in contradiction—the dominant one being from the West and declared from above, and the other being from the socio-linguistic base of which the mind itself is a construct and resisting from below. This flawed process of modernization has brought about a mentality that is neither Ethiopian nor any other kind, but that which can, in a centre-less mood, imitate some social role in vogue beyond the horizon. This global mentality objectifies one’s subjectivity to conjure up fragmented and self-oppressing collectivity. This, in turn, leads us to accept the terms of globalization without critical examination—which empowers our movement from the frying pan into the fire. Thus, I argue that one of the main causes for the development of underdevelopment in Ethiopia is western education in English language.
- 8 This paper, then, wants to show that English language disrupts the chains of education for development in the Ethiopian context as many educated Ethiopians fall trapped culturally between the search for effective knowledge building in English language and applying their knowledge to develop different and well-established cultural structures embodied in their native tongues. It also demonstrates how English language can be an antidote to our essence of creativity for development by serving us more as a tool of imitation than inspiration, in a way that reflects on how we ought to use English as a foreign language.
- 9 The paper would also be significant for strengthening the pre-existing arguments on education for self-reliance and development by restoring the cultural base of modernity through education in native tongues (repositories of native contents), but in a context of changed norms and methods of reviving the continuity of the integration

of the stagnated socio-linguistic entities which are now tied to the repression of western socio-linguistic perspectives.

- 10 As for the methodology, the paper appropriates scholarly discussions on the relations of language of education and development by analyzing the retributive manifestations of the use of English for knowledge transference in Ethiopia. Hence, the following discussion on the missing link between education and development in Ethiopia.

Context, choice and chains of education: a narration of social change in Ethiopia

- 11 It is known that Menilik II's Ethiopia emerged victorious over the would-be destructive colonial culture at Adowa. This marks the modernity of Ethiopia's traditions for insuring survival² and a revival of a pre-existing supra-socio-linguistic consciousness as the patriots defending Ethiopia were from the different socio-linguistic entities. Then, it was the task of the then traditional ruling elites to lay the foundation for the continuity of such a promising social base to launch development and modernization of its own. In doing so, what they went for as a choice was education. The choice was also made on the basis of the political decision of the ruling elites to produce Ethiopians who would be on the guard of the hard-won independence, which was prone to the engulfing colonial powers. And Menilik II School was almost a language academy with the mission of teaching Ethiopians to converse in foreign languages, which they thought was the means to insure the continuity of independence.³ But the strength and survival of a government emanates from a system of empowering the peoples with knowledge to deal with their environment and to be economically self-reliant. This would be a cause for the people's self-empowerment in their own terms and perspectives from within themselves, and development along a continuum which they have reason to value, justify and understand.⁴ This couldn't, I think, cross the feudalistic mentality of the traditional ruling elites who dared to manipulate the peoples to their own interests and it was uncharacteristic of them to work for their peoples' wellbeing and empowerment. Hence, they prescribed out-wardness to the first form of Ethiopia's public education to preserve Ethiopia's existence. This posed an outlandish element which was prescribed by a preceding context of existence for choice to determine the choice of what would come next by way of making a chain of choices as in a linguistic structure. For example, beginning to construct a sentence with the pronoun "he" is not selective of "am" as an element to come next along the chain of combination. This holds to be true to the case of the chains of education in Ethiopia: the primary inclination to the education of foreign languages ushers in the inception of the relevance of western education for the modernization of Ethiopia in the reins of Haile Selassie I. This shows that the original mistake caused a decaying spot that has been appealing and eating into the Ethiopian social body. The 1974 revolution in Ethiopia was also in disguise foretold and *written* in the early twentieth century intellectuals' claiming of a revolution from above the liquidation of feudalism and the development of capitalism through the agency of the modern state (MESSAY 1999: 269). Hence, they have unconsciously locked the Ethiopian social body in a western box of capitalist modernity to suffocate, decay, stagnate and burst out. Comparing the mistake with what the Italian colonial spirit would have done us indicates as Ethiopia has

unconsciously succumbed into what it was in fear of lack of respect and subjugation to an alien power.

- 12 Then, we can say that colonialism would have done nothing less than what Ethiopia has been doing for itself by educating her children about western contents and languages. It is also known that western powers attempted to colonize Ethiopia not to be part of the causes for her development in its own perspective thereby helping the Ethiopian personality transform across generation, but to reduce the Ethiopian personality to something that can be recreated as modern in terms of fitting to the prescriptions of western personality thereby making the Ethiopian personality exist in a hierarchical bondage to that of the west. This task has also been carried out by the so called “modern education” in Ethiopia. And one of the basic elements of the relationship between oppressor and oppressed is prescription as every prescription represents the imposition of one man’s choice upon another-thus, the behavior of the oppressed is a prescribed one, following as it does the guidelines of the oppressor (FREIRE 1972: 23). Hence, the Ethiopian personality has suffered from living in between itself and otherselves, as western education enforces the enactment of “living in the duality where *to be is to be like, and to be like is to be like the oppressor*” (FREIRE 1972: 25). The domesticating effect of living in the duality has also deprived us of our own choices for development since a western choice of social development was prescribed to function over ours as an upper limit of achievement. Thus, education in Ethiopia seems to have been in the service of empowering the students’ imitation capacity that has tarnished the originality and creativity of the traditional base. Here, quoting Messay would make the point clear:

“All that is not unique, original is deficient because it owes its existence to a reduced ability. When creativity takes the lead, the model loses its normative stand and becomes an inspiration. The great difference between inspiration and imitation is that imitation makes a person passive, subordinate; it is lowering and debilitating. Not so with inspiration, which is an appeal to rise to the same standard, if not to go higher. Inspiration is stimulating and emboldening while imitation inculcates self-lowering and dependency.” (MESSAY 2004: 210).

- 13 But, we have gone out for the gross imitation of the western techniques, values and knowledge at the expense of ours, so that we are no more with our truly Ethiopian sensibilities and means of survival which, in turn, leads us to depend on imitating western models in every walk of life. And our relation to modernization is external and imitative to the extent that we lack inwardness (MAIMIRE 2010: 95). This was what Japan had managed to avert by borrowing techniques from the west to empower its values and creativity with Japanese sensibilities and language (MESSAY 2010). What was wrong with our case was the trend of getting educated about western values, knowledge and cultural practices in English language which can’t be expressive of ours and a vehicle for transforming in our terms. This was, however, meant for modernization that didn’t actually bring about the instalment of an emancipatory process of social transformation as it contradicts with the socio-political context of feudalism in Ethiopia. Feudalism and modernization are also by their very nature incongruous and can’t live side by side without creating fissures in the body-politic as the former presupposes hierarchical class connection and loyalty to the monarch by traditional conventions, and the later the creation of institutions for facilitating participatory decision making process and loyalty to the nation-state (PAULOSE 2010: 51). The

deconstructive interference between these social forces came to be visible on the Ethiopian social body in the 1960's, which

“was a time that saw the collapse of conventions and conscious wisdom among the rising Ethiopian elites. Consequently, the elite were questing for new galvanizing ethos to remap their lives and organize their experience along new lines. The period represented that phase of in-betweens, in the ebbing of traditional values and the surfacing of new sensibilities.” (TIBEBE 2010: 99)

- 14 This marked that “the modest steps toward modernity that Ethiopia has taken have already kindled a smouldering conflict between generations, perhaps for the first time in Ethiopian history,” (LEVINE 1972: 118) which ended up with the 1974 revolution and has made its way to the present as a post-revolution disillusionment. And the students who caused the revolution soon began to take the missionary position of civilizing the Ethiopian societies against their civilization. As Germa recounts their act in the campaign of development through cooperation (which seems to have ignored the time taking dynamism of social development from below and gone for prescribing social development from above):

“Many went to the countryside believing that they had all the answers to the people's problems. Over-enthusiastic to see rapid change and confident of their actions, some campaigners aggressively attacked deeply rooted values and beliefs of the local population. They denounced practices like polygamy, idol worship and witchcraft; they destroyed sacred shrines in some animist communities and aggressively challenged all forms of religion as reactionary forces standing in the way of progress. Angered by the students' arrogance and radical posture ... in some areas offended residents set students' camps on fire as a result of which many lost their lives.” (GERMA 2006: 103)

- 15 Here, the subtle transcendence of the original sin of choosing out-wardness for modernization reached a stage where it can induce a self-conflicting situation as it was illustrated above. The students' perception of those values and beliefs of the local population seemed to have been influenced by their conception of the western social theories. Hence, they failed to respond to what the local ethos promises to be perceived. This was so as those subjects dealing with the human and social sciences were not responsive to the history and culture of Ethiopia (TEKESTE 2010: 12). This was also the possible aftermath of the absence of a quest for the aspects of education relevant for Ethiopia's progress, in the beginning. Hence, education in Ethiopia has been moving without ideological foundation thereby lacking a philosophy of its own (MESSAY 2008: 53). Thus, education has missed its social purpose and has been reduced to be something important for the economic gain of the individual. This has virtually become real as the students have got culturally dislocated from their social body by education for alienation. Thus, they were no more on the same ideological position of responding to the local ethos as the residents were; this was due to the difference in the nature of relation to the ethos-to which the students were related outwardly and the residents inwardly. The residents had also reason to value the ethos unlike the students who were detached from them through education and tempted to objectify and organize them with the prescriptions of western social realities. This has dramatized cultural discontinuity and social instability with a palpable communication gap between generations.
- 16 Thus, the Ethiopian socio-linguistic entities can be said to have been divided against themselves, because educated individuals considered as “modern personalities” became the de facto representatives of their respective entity. But, what the illiterate

parents felt about themselves couldn't be felt by the literate sons and daughters; the illiterate and the literate exhibited different roles and behaviours in relation to their ethos. This shows that they couldn't make up for a unified community which Dan-Cohen defines as a collectivity whose roles don't allow their holders to maintain a distance from those roles, or as a *social union of non-detached roles* (DAN-COHEN 2002: 2). And as "modern education" deprived the literate of the opportunity to make the crucial transition from the unhistorical consciousness of childhood to the historical consciousness of adulthood, they maintained an inappropriate distance from their childhood socialization of their social ethos which their illiterate parents' existence was co-extensive to and non-detached from. Thus, the parents (the residents) had the unconscious motive of self-defence against alien culture and the literate children the unconscious motive of self-denial. Alien education had repressed the root of their motive of self-defence to give way to the consciousness which they were domesticated to identify with in their adulthood behaviour. As repression doesn't mean deletion, it seemed to have caused a sense of self-betrayal to wax and wane in their consciousness which is a painful stimulus to the senses. Recognizing the stimulus to recreate one's wholeness in the parents' terms for the revival of cultural continuity wasn't as easy as the denial of self-betrayal as a defence mechanism was-which seemed to have been taken for the sake of the individual's psychological equilibrium at the expense of the true path of social development. Thus, the students have unconsciously worked for the implementation of such a self-deceiving mechanism by prescribing the ready-made western values and practices to rule over their social body.

- 17 Hence, attempting to change the social ethos from above entails domination and oppression which call resistance from below, the social base. This is what the post-revolution crises reveal in Ethiopia. And the educated class represents the visible end point of a society divided as "traditional" and "modern" as the child is dislocated from the traditional base to imitate a western adulthood personality traits at school. This breaks the bad news of the impossibility of an educated Ethiopian with a truly Ethiopian adulthood personality traits. Hence, Freud's stipulation of "the child is the father of the man", with the assumption that childhood experience is creative of adulthood personality, is correct only when the aim is to colonize Ethiopia by producing self-denying citizens. And it is, to use MAZRUI'S expression, "a socio-linguistic impossibility"⁵ to find an educated and/or urbanized Ethiopian who is not also westernized; because, education and urbanization in Ethiopia are stylized after the west. Then, we can say that our education produces doctors with wounded souls and that we have been making patterns of life after other's choice against our context of existence. Thus, we need to look for an education system that can enable our childhood experience to transform into being a base for our adulthood traits thereby breaking the good news of individual wholeness that can understand modernity as something to be achieved from within one's tradition. Hence, a socio-linguistically sound education system ought to be looked for. To this end, I want to reflect upon the trend of language of education and language education in Ethiopia with emphasis given to English, by way of forwarding a prospective commitment for discussion.

The English language and the educated class: The case of communication for production

- 18 Memory resides in language and is classified by language (NGUGI 2009: 113). Thus, words of a language are concepts that determine how we perceive ourselves in relation to others and the environment. They are also the abstract forms of the process of conceptualizing the feelings and perceptions that man encounters in his relation to nature and others-(production relation) -to insure existence; and this creates language of real life as culture that presents the abstractions of the fathers' means of survival to the children as a spring board for advanced production and creativity. Hence, "production is co-operation, is communication, is language, is expression of a relation between human beings" (NGUGI 1987: 13), and the association of the child's sensibility is with this language of real life (ibid.).
- 19 Here, education is one of the variables needed in a society for the advancement of production with a correspondent renewal of the expressions of human relations and forms of communication. To this end, the contents and language of education should be in complementarity with the child's sensibility so that the child will creatively protect his society's means of survival and self-definition in relation to others. In such a society, there is broad harmony of a child with the three aspects of language as communication-life experience, spoken and written signs. This helps the education system to organically link to the society concerned and to change in tandem with the changes taking place at the level of economy and society.
- 20 To illustrate the issue, we can look into the context that in absence conditions the automatic reception of advertisements that show a portrait of a girl bearing a figure of poverty with the sympathy-seeking caption of "To educate a girl is to educate a society". Here, what is present in absence is the tendency and normalization that education is important for the progression of individual life in a context of impoverished society. But, education should be meant for producing individuals who, instead of increasing the burden on the labour force by being salaried citizens for self-fulfilment, can also contribute to the wellbeing and development of the society that sponsored their cost of education. Hence, there should be some sort of proportional relationship between the number of individuals to be sponsored for education and the economic growth of the society concerned. And anybody who appears poor in a society shouldn't be referred for education; the case should be seen in relation to the self-made economic capacity of the society to sponsor the cost of education. This would enable the society to have an education system for self-reliance. Unless, if a society veers in to sponsoring everybody at all costs at the same time, it will go for accepting alien education system-a system for dependency-which the donors present as a recipe for loan. This exasperates the already flawed education system in Ethiopia; we are not able to decide on the contents and languages of education to be in line with our social realities; we have taken it normal to pass through school system for self-fulfilment having the impoverished society as a context. This, I think, needs to be rethought.
- 21 Thus, education, ever since its introduction, has gone through changes with a parallel stagnation of the poverty landscape in Ethiopia (TEKESTE 2006), which shows the missing link between the chains of the education system and the choices and contexts of the Ethiopian societies. This is mainly due to the use of English as a medium of instruction

which disrupts and dissociates the child's sensibility from his natural and social environment to associate with the values and sensibilities of otherness which English has for him. And we are feeling colonized while we were victorious over colonialism, because:

"The program of learning developed for students in the erstwhile British colonies was adopted in the Ethiopian primary and secondary schools. For example, the flora and fauna of the British Isles and the history of western civilization formed the core of the social sciences, while the story of the Knights of the Round Table and the works of Shakespeare constituted the subject matter of literature" (BEKELE 2010: 60).

- 22 This was the conspiracy of colonial education which was destined to create an African middle class for future partnership by dividing Africans against themselves (NGUGI 2009). This was what we adopted as education and consequently to deny our Knights for deferring to those of others, to speak in native tongues at home and to write in English at school, to appreciate otherness which is alien to our real life situation. This has brought about post-revolution disillusionment in Ethiopia which has replaced the feudalist hierarchical class relations with a west-centred traditional-modern hierarchy. And the educated class seems to be caught young to take the middle ground which Achebe shows as what the education of a British-protected child reveals when he says: "the middle ground is neither the origin of things nor the last things; it is aware of a future to head in to and a past to fall back on; it is the home of doubt and indecision, of suspension of disbelief, of make-believe, of playfulness, of the unpredictable, of irony." (ACHEBE 2009: 6) That is why we have come to understand ourselves as traditional and modern simultaneously. This conception of ours has also caused the reduction of the different socio-linguistic entities to a stagnated aggregate of peoples who are caught to be ready for modernization after the west through imitation. As the peoples' memory of integration is no more recognized by their literate children, the unity of the dead, the living and the unborn is broken and there is no wholeness; only a dislocation of the national psyche, for in not remembering the past, there are no inherited ideals by which to measure the excesses of the present (NGUGI 2009: 61). Hence, we have lost our tools of self-definition, which reside in native tongues, as we have preferred English as a language of conceptualization, knowledge accumulation and transference. How can we try to solve the problems of the natives which have their own language of conceptualization and socialization while we are trying to conceptualize and socialize against our socio-linguistic environment? Unless we declare without justification that our knowledge in English should have been what the natives are practicing in their real life thereby attempting to salvage them from the life they know to join the middle ground in between their own tradition and western modernity. The middle ground, as was indicated above, contextualizes a sense of denial of loss, which, however, creates a collective trauma of repression that can be passed on trans-generationally as the unfinished business of a previous generation to haunt the future (NGUGI 2009: 58). That is why we are regretting and talking back as we feel lost and devoid of the centre of defining our future in our terms. What should be done? And as to me, I would like to forward the following points for discussion.
- 23 The child should attend the first few classes of primary education in his mother tongue; because, literacy becomes a particular problem when children do not know the language used to teach reading and writing. Hence, young children know but the language of conceptualization at home-their mother tongue. Applying this to the Ethiopian sociolinguistic diversity is important to get a child in harmony with his

natural and social environment. But, these children of different harmony need to integrate by way of reviving the lost integration. Hence, after learning the corresponding concepts in their first language, they should be taught the de facto national language Amharic as a second language at a subject level with the intention of replacing English as a medium of instruction at secondary and tertiary level. This can be illustrated with contemporary experiences in Ethiopia as follows.

- 24 Ethiopia is known to have been a nation of socio-linguistic diversity. Thus, Ethiopia has been conceptualized and realized in different life styles and linguistic expressions. And the idea that the same language can be realized in the form of dialects with a spacio-temporal limit shows the possibility that a certain socio-linguistic group can gradually fall apart with no sense of intelligibility among its parts which it would be reduced into. For example, the Gojjam, Wollo, Gonder and Shewa dialects of the Amharic language show the absence of economic intercourse among the people to evolve into an efficient and interpretive community. And if they continue to exist in such a quasi-self-bounded and self-sufficient mood, they will evolve into diversities with no sense of intelligibility among them. The same holds to be true among the different socio-linguistic entities to which Ethiopia seems to have been reduced into. And diversity in Ethiopia seems to have conjured up an absence of economic intercourse and communication among the labour forces of each socio-linguistic group. Every socio-linguistic group seems to live on the natural blessings of its respective habitat with the subsequent outcome of satiety at one corner and utter starvation at the other corner of the country. Hence, the possible remedy to be taken to avert such a problem is facilitating the coming into being of labour specialization among the different labour forces to create communication as a necessary condition among them for exchanging their products. This gives way to the integration of the different socio-linguistic entities in their own terms from below, and they become part of the creative process of the language of integration that appears as a superstructure. This language of integration will also be a medium witnessing the projection and exorcism of unity from the diversity as an Ethiopian and supra-socio-linguistic consciousness. As it shall also be declared from below, the nature and features of this language can't be known ahead of time. But, let's see the case in relation to Amharic.
- 25 I am not simply prescribing Amharic to be the medium of instruction for the socio-linguistic diversities in Ethiopia; but I want to reflect up on the unfolding reality in relation to the language in Ethiopia: it is a socio-linguistic impossibility to find an educated Ethiopian who can't speak Amharic. This is mainly due to the location of most of the learning institutions in urban centres which embody a social context for learning the language at least as a second language. Universities also contribute a lot to this end, as they contextualize a setting in which socialization is highly possible through Amharic. And if such a reality is untenable and self-propelling in the contemporary context of Ethiopia's existence, we should meet it half way by teaching the child Amharic after it acquires the corresponding concepts in its mother tongue. So that when it learns Amharic, it will simply transfer the content from the linguistic form in its mother tongue to the one in the Amharic. Hence, Amharic can't disrupt the child's socialization at home and schematization in its mother tongue; it only gives the child a system of double signification thereby facilitating for the child a language to learn in as of higher level of elementary education. This can also ensure the continuity of the child's education as it is made to learn in a language which it was taught at the lower level as a subject for mastering. And the children of the different socio-linguistic

groups will form an interpretative community having its own language of conceptualization, knowledge production and dissemination as a means of doing for the common good. And this is what we are seriously lacking in Ethiopia as the child is made to pursue its education in English language as of the higher level of elementary school, which amounts to deny the child's previous conceptualization.

- 26 Here, the fate of the child is but to restart learning new concepts and foreign linguistic forms which fail to compliment with the child's socio-linguistic environment. Hence, the child misses its social context and fall into the lure of western modernity which has been brought to school for imitation by English language. And it is impossible to think and create in a foreign language like English in the Ethiopian context as there is no social context outside of the school system to practice socialization in the language. But we seem to act against such a reality, and the child tends to gratify the aspiration of being a speaker of English language with a native-language-cum-English speech. We can also see the tragic experience of the child in relation to English language at some private elementary schools as the child is prohibited to freely and creatively socialize in the language it can find at home and/or its social environment-the child is forced to consciously repeat those English words which it acquires in the school compound with the attitude of practicing communication in English. Here, the child is forced to speak a language against man's will for communication; that is, a person speaks to fulfil some sort of desire emanating from his socio-linguistic reality. By the same token, the child's desire for communication emanates from its socio-linguistic reality. Thus, the child dares to express its desire by the language used in its social context. But, the child's desire remains suffocated in its mother tongue as it is forced to speak in English which hardly describes its desire and social reality. Consequently, the child gets in the habit of consciously looking for contexts in which it can attempt to describe its own social reality in English with the attendant attitude that anything which can't be described in English is backward and traditional.
- 27 This shows how the child is gradually dissociated from its true desires and sensibilities which are relegated as backward and traditional social-realities. The different linguistic expressions that embrace the voices and perspectives of such realities also exist in deference to the voices and perspectives of the English language. Then, how can we expect such a child to solve the problems of its society which it is dissociated from through the flawed process of acquiring the English language? So we need to rethink our attachment to the English language. And English shall be taught as a foreign language as of elementary school after the child conceptualizes its social context in its mother tongue. To this end, we badly need school of English that can produce teachers with a very good command of the language at all levels of education. And this should be done with the intention of getting experts who can systematically adapt technical know-hows from the west as it is found accumulated mainly in English. But, Amharic shall replace English as of higher level of elementary education to make the way towards what was discussed before. So that, the different socio-linguistic entities live in deference to a language of integration with a dialectical relationship to evolve into a unified and syncretic community declared from below. But, existing in deference to a foreign socio-linguistic reality will gradually entail the irrelevance of existing in diversity with an aftermath of getting things fall apart.

Conclusion

- 28 The attachment and relation of the primary form of Ethiopian schooling system to the completely other and westerly signified one has brought in to play the crossing-out of Ethiopian mode of survival—which has remained with traces of its origin under the erasure of the differently deferring consciousness of the tragic flaw of public education for modernization in Ethiopia. The traces are, thus, signs of the missing presence, of the culture whose relation to the people concerned with a linguistic schema was disconnected by the power of the meaning-forming-through-erasing centre of this flawed and modern education-born structure of consciousness. The meaning-forming-centre has also such an educationally familiarized and taken-for-granted machinery of traditional-modern hierarchized opposition, which issues an anachronistic and arbitrary interpretation of our traditional means of survival—a base for our modernity. To this end, English language has been a major accomplice in terms of disrupting the child's chain of education for self-centred development. Hence, the educated child runs the machinery of the traditional-modern hierarchized opposition with the effect being the existence of the different socio-linguistic entities stagnated and in deference to the English language world view.
- 29 To avoid such a problem, Amharic shall be used as a medium of instruction as of the higher level of elementary education in Ethiopia to facilitate the possible integration of the socio-linguistic diversity. The nature and feature of the language of Amharic that would be the language of integration witnessing a supra-socio-linguistic consciousness—as a kind of exorcising from the syncretism of the diversity—shall also be declared from below by the economic integration of the labour force in the different socio-linguistic groups. How can we communicate for national production, otherwise?

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FOOTNOTES

1. MESSAY 1999, 2004 and 2008, TEKESTE 1990, 2006, PAULOSE and MESSAY 2010 among others.
2. See MESSAY'S (1999) philosophical discourse on the relation of survival and modernization with respect to Ethiopia's enigmatic present
3. See TEKESTE (1990), the first chapter
4. See GEBREHIWOT'S (2010) classical discourse on a political-economic theory of development pertinent to Ethiopia "Government and public administration"
5. MAZRUI (2003:143) argues that "an African who has a good command of a European language has probably assimilated other aspects of western culture as well. This is because the process of acquiring a European language in Africa has tended to be overwhelmingly through a formal system of western-style education. It is because of this that the concept of an African physicist who is not also westernized is for the time being a *sociolinguistic impossibility*". (Emphasis mine).

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Oral Storytelling in Ethiopia and the Links to Children's Literacy

Helen Papworth

p. 171-180

- 1 Movement can mean progression as well as a physical passage to another place. Improving literacy among children enables them to progress educationally and, as a consequence, to travel outside their own community and possibly beyond their region or even country. Access to learning can be difficult for many children in Ethiopia especially those having little family support, living in an illiterate community,¹ and having other obligations such as helping the family on the farm and living a long distance from the school. However, oral storytelling may provide a link. Ethiopia has a long history of storytelling, which continues to this day in some regions and cultures whilst it has almost disappeared from others. The collation and documentation of many of these stories has ensured that several can be made available in books and other publications and through different media. This paper attempts to identify what positive links such literature, both in the written and the traditional oral format, can have on children's literacy in Ethiopia. It will hopefully explain why and how the local oral traditions may help students develop reading skills, which will be their first step to education.
- 2 One negative outcome of modernisation, globalisation and technological development is that relatively few children are exposed to stories passed on to them by an elder person in the way that their ancestors experienced storytelling. Benjamin acknowledged this fact in Europe many years ago when he wrote: "familiar though his name may be to us, the storyteller in his living immediacy is by no means a present force. He has already become something remote from us and something that is getting even more distant" (BENJAMIN 1968: 83). He went on to explain that stories had to be assimilated and remembered, and how the activities associated with boredom, were already extinct in the cities and were declining in the country, causing the loss of the ability to listen: "for storytelling is always the art of repeating stories, and this art is lost when the stories are no longer retained. It is lost because there is no more weaving and spinning to go on while they are being listened to" (BENJAMIN 1968: 91).

- 3 In the Ethiopian countryside today observers will frequently see individuals or small groups of adults and children tending the family herds for hours on end. The tasks of ploughing, reaping, winnowing and grinding are still done manually in many parts of the country and children are also involved in these repetitive tasks. One could assume that such a lifestyle maintains this opportunity for stories to be remembered and developed. Or one could also ask whether increased communication and the access to technology and education has already impacted and led to a decline in storytelling even in the most rural parts of Ethiopia.²

History of storytelling in Ethiopia

- 4 Stories and folklore cover a number of formats such as the fairy tale, myth, legend, fable, song, riddle and the proverb. Their history goes back in time to days before people developed the ability to read and write. Krappe believed that the Animal Tales are: "...the oldest that are known to-day" (KRAPPE 1962: 60).³ It is possible that such tales were told in Ethiopia though whether early examples could be proved to be the source of *Aesop's Fables* cannot be verified.
- 5 It is thought by some that this most famous among story tellers, Aesop, who lived in the 5th Century BC, was taken to Greece as a slave from Ethiopia -the connection being the similarity of his name and the country, Aethop. The similarity of many of his fables to those told today in Ethiopia leads one to question whether such stories emerged in Africa, or further east where similar tales developed and influenced the writings of story tellers. It is interesting to note the likenesses between the Ethiopian story, *The Greedy Dog*, reproduced in Bachrach's compilation for Ethiopian schoolchildren (BACHRACH 1967: 15), and Aesop's fable, *The Dog and the Shadow*, in the use of reflections to fool the greedy character. Regardless of whether Aesop did come from Ethiopia, or if such a slave was responsible for telling these tales, in relation to storytelling in Africa they share the same characters, usually animals and birds, often with universal characteristics, and each story has a message that is relevant in different communities across the world and is just as significant for today's population as it was centuries ago.
- 6 While the context of storytelling may differ considerably in different parts of the world, particularly Africa, the content of the narratives compares more closely to the myths, fables and stories found in other parts of the world and may use common features and characters such as animals, mythical creatures as well as humans including the stepmother who is often as wicked as her Western counterpart in *Hansel and Gretel*. Ethiopian examples include *Mamo the Fool*,⁴ the *Story of Jahiti and her Sister* from the Shinasha, in the Benishangul region and *The Wicked Stepmother*, an Arsi story from Oromia. In countries where death may still take mothers at an early age and polygamy (DFID 2010: 34) and divorce are not uncommon, children may relate to such tales.
- 7 Many stories use animals that are common to or known about in the country where they are told. Although lions are rare sights now they are widely used to depict strength, sometimes cruelty and even stupidity. According to Knappert, in many African religions lions are "revered as a god" and they are assumed to be so potent that 'even one hair from the eyebrows of a lion is believed (in the Horn of Africa) to give a

woman power over her husband so that she can have children from him by catching his mind” (KNAPPERT 1995: 141).⁵

Fig. 1: The late Michael Daniel Ambatchew telling stories to children (Photo: H. Papworth)





Fig. 2: Example of book of Ethiopian folktales at an event in Addis Ababa, May 2009



- 8 In 1982 Seifu Metaferia, in a paper based on his study of oral literature in Ethiopia, also explained the characters in the tales told in Ethiopia, for example, the *gabaree*, ‘farmer’

in Amharic language, was hard working but was mistreated or deceived by his wife against whom he used a stick. The donkey was often 'hyena prey' and therefore an unfortunate character while the goat symbolized profanity and the baboon was foolish and paid for his folly. He noted that the oral telling of tales was often done during daytime when the cattle were being herded and children would sit under a tree.

- 9 Oral literature has a number of functions for different audiences, including entertainment and teaching. Often they offer an explanation and sometimes education in the form of epics and also in proverbs. Finnegan wrote: "[s]tories, for instance, are told to educate and socialize children, or, by drawing a moral, to warn people not to break the norms of the society" (FINNEGAN 1976: 330). This important function ensures such stories are included in school textbooks to teach Civics and Ethical Education and other subjects.⁶
- 10 Explanations of why things are as they are and the search for meaning appear in many stories. Some relate to the creation myth. In Ethiopia Laird's retelling of the tale of *When the World Began* the focus is on why man became the master of cattle and the buffalo. When Courlander and Leslau collected stories in Ethiopia during the 1950s, they attributed the wealth of literature to the Christian and Muslim influences overlying older traditions and the European invasions. They were able to identify regional differences with stories told in Muslim areas (such as Somalia and Harar) tending: "towards the episodic and heroic" while the characteristics of stories from strong Christian communities were: 'sharp and often poignant" (CURLANDER and LESLAU 1950/1995: 121).
- 11 Across Ethiopia there is evidence of the oral storytelling tradition among the different ethnic groups. In the Omo Valley region, part of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Region (SNNPR), there are agriculturalists such as the Basketo group which has a tale of the *Lion King*, *Hyena and Clever Monkey*, pastoralists such as the Banna people, highland agriculturalists including the Yem people who tell the tale of the *Selfish Baboon and the Clever Monkey* and Gamo people who tell a tale about the *Verdict of a Serpent*. These stories all use fantasy to offer hope and justice as well as fostering self-confidence, growth and development. "The characters of the tales are everyday people or animals using minds, skills or cleverness to achieve objectives – success does not come from supernatural actions, or unexplained events, but from the wise use of reason and common sense".⁷ Wild animals are portrayed but there is no reference to religion or money. The stories are timeless and children of any culture can enjoy them and learn from the messages they give.
- 12 Seifu presumed that oral literature was: 'between a state of agedness and that of rejuvenation' and stated that: "the popularizer will attempt to take every oral literacy piece he collects, in this case, tales, stories etc. to freely work on, so as to make them appealing reading material to kids" (SEIFU METAFERIA 1982: 15-16). That task continues in Ethiopia with the purpose of making literature relevant to the young people of and from a nation, preserving the rich legacy of oral resources from the different regions and cultures and creating a vast library of fascinating tales that will continue to enthrall young and old from across the world for generations to come. In textbooks and in a range of supplementary readers, these stories are being used to teach moral concepts as well as reading.

- 13 Ethiopia is a country with a long history of writing and copies of the stories told centuries ago appear in the literature which still survives. Some of the oldest stories told in Ethiopia are located in the *Kebrä Nagast*, ('The Glory of (Ethiopian) Kings') and one of the well-known myths is that of the Queen of Sheba and Solomon.⁸ Oral storytelling ensured that this story was recognized and accepted by many Ethiopians as part of their Orthodox Christian culture. Even though literacy is still far from universal, storytelling remains important in many parts of the country.
- 14 To preserve the oral storytelling tradition may appear to be a lost cause in a world where technology and education have moved people away from such a culture. What seems more important now is to fully appreciate this art form while protecting as many as possible of the stories, rhymes, riddles and proverbs in a retrievable format and sharing them.⁹ Laird and Sargent were involved in a project to gather many Ethiopian folktales and make them available digitally in English and Amharic (DIGGLE 2011). In Ethiopia, as in other parts of Africa, the media is also playing its part in preserving this tradition through television and the internet.

Children's literacy in Ethiopia

- 15 Current reading skills for many children in Ethiopia are a cause for concern according to the EGRA research.¹⁰ As part of this research students were asked to read a simple passage at a Grade 2 level but it was discovered that, "many regions had more than 30% of Grade 2 and 20% of Grade 3 unable to do so successfully".¹¹ One recommendation of the research was for a range of reading materials to be developed and used by learners and incorporated into lessons. While these children may have experience of oral storytelling they often lack the literacy skills needed in today's society.
- 16 In collaboration with the Ethiopian Ministry of Education and USAID/Ethiopia, AIR launched the Teach English for Life Learning (TELL) program in December 2008... TELL teacher training was designed to empower teachers to utilize active-learning English textbooks created specifically for this program by Alabama A&M University, with funding from USAID's Africa Education Initiative.¹²
- 17 This initiative also included the publication of anthologies¹³ of Ethiopian folktales gathered from different regions and levelled for different abilities of readers. Other organisations that have played an important role in gathering stories and publishing books to be used as supplementary readers include CODE Ethiopia,¹⁴ which has existed for over fifty years, and the British Council which appointed Elizabeth Laird to gather stories which were then published in local English media materials and later formed into bilingual anthologies by EBCEF.¹⁵
- 18 Functional literacy is the acquisition and use of reading and writing skills to gain knowledge and skills useful for life. The failure of the Derg adult literacy initiative was partly due to the fact that not only was the language inappropriate but the content of the learning materials and the delivery. Janes, in her research, stated that:
- "Quite possibly, a major cause of failure of these literacy projects is that they were not relevant to locally identified concerns, needs and goals. Specifically, few previous campaigns used the local language, Tigrinya, as a vehicle for literacy" (JANES 1999).

- 19 In an effort to improve functional literacy skills and educational attainment for adults,¹⁶ and children not attending formal schooling, Alternative Basic Education opportunities exist in Ethiopia. A report by Save the Children Norway and Save the Children Denmark in 2008 stated that: “[t]he large majority of parents of the students were found to be illiterate. Children get very little support from parents in terms of meal, reducing child labour and study. Thus, it is important to conduct adult functional literacy hand in hand with enhanced ABE for children” (SCNE 2007).
- 20 A number of non-government organisations are working with education providers in Ethiopia to address these issues. In 2011, Save the Children Norway (SCNE) advertised for a consultant to identify the: “level of Amharic alphabet identification and words reading skills of age 4 -6 years children; ... teachers/facilitators attitude towards reading/ reading books; level of availability of books and extent of the reading books in stimulating reading skill”.¹⁷ At the same time SCNE put out a tender for a contract to provide a range of supplementary readers for Amhara Regional Education Bureau using stories gathered from elders and children in the Gondar area. By 2012 a set of full colour illustrated Amharic story books had been published and were available for the children to read.¹⁸

The value of oral traditions for children's literacy

- 21 In this day and age literacy is not just desirable for Ethiopian children, it is essential. “And in general, the more literacy one has or can control, the more power one can exercise...” (ROBINSON 1988: 244). Traditional methods of teaching reading include the rote learning methods employed in church schools and in many classrooms where teacher pupil ratios cannot afford the luxury of every child reading to a teacher each day. Language textbooks are still largely functional although ‘supplementary readers’ do provide stories. Although the emphasis is now on mother tongue literacy in the early primary years, there are relatively few books to encourage children to develop a culture of reading as Bloch noted:

“The oral tradition, with its great potential to impart knowledge and to function as a bridge to literacy has been sorely neglected in primary education systems, presumably to a significant extent as a consequence of the low status of African languages and the corresponding loss in perceived value to traditional social and cultural practices that were communicated through these languages” (BLOCH 2007: 49).

- 22 The benefits of informal learning are well documented in, for example, Fanta-Vagenshtein's paper which states that, “[t]he essential difference is that informal learning is primarily inductive (generalizing from the particular); while in the school setting the child first learns rules and then connects them with their real-life manifestations” (FANTA-VAGENSHEIN 2008: 30). Fanta-Vagenshtein identified the role of narrative with its links between the oral and the written:

“Narrative is the counterpart of text in written cultures (BEN EZER 2002). Bruner (1985) sees narrative as the basis for learning and knowing about the world. Narrative refers to the structure, knowledge and skills needed in order to construct a story (SHKEDI 2003). Narrative is a source of broad, long-term, logical and stable knowledge that makes repetition possible. It is, in effect, a story or part of a story that was told, written or imagined through the eyes of one of the participants or observers (and probably fictional)” (FANTA-VAGENSHEIN 2008: 33-34).

- 23 Fanta-Vagenshtein concluded that the illiterate Ethiopians in her study could continue to learn without gaining literacy. But can oral storytelling transfer into the skills of reading and, eventually, writing? Using storytelling in the classroom has some benefits as noted by Craig et al., in their research, which stated that:

“Storytelling is a powerful tool for teaching reading and writing (Honeyghan, 2000; Strickland & Morrow, 1989). A growing body of literature emphasizes the value of storytelling as a means of helping children understand classroom discourse and sense of story (Greene, 1996; Peck, 1989; Trousdale, 1990; Williams, 1991). Oral stories help children acquire the context of literacy” (CRAIG *et al.* 2001: 46-51).

Conclusion

- 24 There is strong evidence of the value of oral traditions to help learners from different cultures. Miller and Pennycuff, described a study conducted by Cliatt and Shaw (1988) where: “The researchers reported that storytelling not only helped participants enhance the language and logic skills of the children but also resulted in the development of positive attitudes development in children and storytelling was well established” (MILLER and PENNYCUFF 2008: 38). They also identified the power of the narrative in teaching reading skills observing that “having a sense of story is critical for students to make sense of text and derive meaning from a story” (*Ibid*). In their studies of literacy in Canadian Aboriginal cultures McKeough et al identified the barriers to literacy learning as well as some solutions involving community engagement including using members of that community as storytellers which: “not only offers children a model of how stories should be structured and told; it also signals to them that, within their very communities there are stories to tell” (MCKEOUGH *et al.* 2008: 149). A recommendation of this project was to provide language and literacy instruction by trained Aboriginal teachers with culturally appropriate materials. The findings of Ottmann, Abel, Flynn and Bird, 2007, provided them with evidence that: “stories play a critical role for Aboriginal students in learning to read and write and traditional oral forms of knowledge transmission can and should be used to support literacy development” (MCKEOUGH *et al.* 2008: 150).
- 25 Taking into account these studies over the past decades and the similar issues facing Ethiopian children, there seems sufficient evidence to justify the wider use of traditional stories as supplementary reading materials but also to consider how traditional storytelling practices can be preserved and used within communities and schools to underpin reading and writing strategies and skill development.

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FOOTNOTES

1. "The large majority of parents of the students were found to be illiterate. Children get very little support from parents in terms of meal, reducing child labour and study" (SCNE 2007).
2. Yet BERGER and QUINNEY (2005: 8) refute this writing: "... since the last quarter of the twentieth century, we seem to have undergone a storytelling revival. The writing and reading of autobiography and biography are more popular than ever".
3. He adds: "The animal tale in its most primitive form is essentially an aetiological story, i.e. a tale purporting to explain a cause... From the very childhood of the race Man may be presumed to have shown considerable interest in the animal world around him, for reasons of pure self-interest, if not from intellectual curiosity. But even the savage is a keen observer and is struck by the zoological peculiarities of each animal form" (KRAPPE 1962: 60). Krappe was sceptical as to the African origin of certain folklore (fairy tales): "It may be seriously questioned whether either Ethiopians or American Indians are at all capable of the sustained interest required by the ordinary fairy tale with its string of various adventures" (KRAPPE 1962: 3). While his language borders on naïve racism, his apparently prejudicial attitude towards African mythology compares to that of FINNEGAN (1976) quoted in OKPEWHO (1983: ix): "myths in any strict sense do not seem, on the evidence we have, to be a characteristic African form at all". This thesis does not, however, claim to prove the origin of the stories, myths and other tales that claim to be Ethiopian.
4. The format of this fairy tale fits with identified criteria e.g., there is a good deal of humour also in the types centring the adventures of a 'fool', often enough likewise a 'widow's son'. According to KRAPPE (1962: 25), "the innumerable fairy tales in which the hero is at first depicted as a simpleton..."

5. The moral of this story, as Michael Daniel Ambatchew explained, is that if a woman is wise and careful enough to tame a lion to pluck a hair from its eyebrow, she would easily be able to do the same with her husband.
6. The author was involved in the publication of Civics and Ethical Education textbooks and teacher guides with the Ministry of Education in 2008-9 and observed references to such folktales.
7. Copied from a caption in the Museum of Ethnographical Studies, Addis Ababa.
8. Finnegan cites Bascom's description of myths as "often associated with theology [...] set in an earlier world" (FINNEGAN 1976: 362-363), which she notes are not common in African oral literature.
9. "The stories were originally collected in order to provide material for the production of simplified English language readers, so that schoolchildren in each part of Ethiopia could read stories from their region's particular cultural heritage while practicing their English. In all, eight such readers were produced. This web-site has been set up to allow the rich and varied folk stories collected during the project to be available to a wider audience. It's a treasure trove of the tales which Ethiopians have told to each other since time immemorial, many of which had never before been written down or translated into English" (ETHIOPIAN FOLKTALES 2010).
10. An early grade reading assessment (EGRA) performed in eight regions in Ethiopia in May – June 2010 (RTI INTERNATIONAL 2010: ES8).
11. *Ibid.* According to this EGRE: "In Sidama the percentage of nonreaders was 69.2%, and in Oromiya it was 41.2%. Only Harari (17.9%) and Addis Ababa (10.1%) have percentages of zero scores less than 20%, with the largest regions (SNNP, Oromiya, Tigray, and Amhara) all having Grade 2 zero scores above 25%. Even in Grade 3, significant percentages of children remained nonreaders. For Somali (21.4%), Amhara (17.0%), Sidama (54.0%), and Oromiya (20.6), it is striking that after 3 years of school, such large proportions of children remained completely illiterate in their mother tongue. Interestingly, it appears that large decreases in the percentage of nonreaders occur between Grade 2 and 3 for Oromiya, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Tigray. However, for those children who were just beginning to learn to read at the end of Grade 3, it was likely too little and too late. These children are likely candidates for dropout or repetition, and they certainly run the risk of not being prepared for the end-of-primary examinations. ... In each of the 8 regions, at least 80% of children—and in the case of Sidama, 100%—were not reading at the expected oral reading fluency rate" (RTI INTERNATIONAL 2019: ES3-4).
12. 'Teachers were trained in literacy instruction, including strategies for improving students' listening, speaking, reading, and writing skills. ... The program was then extended to train 52,300 grade 1-4 teachers over the course of two years. Over the program's three and a half year performance period, TELL trained 71,129 grade 1-4 and 6-8 English teachers through a cascading model that has reached teachers throughout the country in a limited amount of time and in a cost effective manner... In December 2010, the TELL program was tasked with the administration of an English language Early Grade Reading Assessment (EGRA), receiving an extension through March 2012 in order to administer the assessment, analyze the data, and support the MOE with understanding and disseminating the results" (AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH 2012).
13. Dr Mary Spor, the organiser, emailed the author with details of this initiative in August 2012.
14. <http://www.codeethiopia.org.et/code/>
15. <http://www.janekurtz.com/ethiopiareads/ebcef.html>
16. Literacy rates among adults still hover around 30%.
17. <http://www.2merkato.com/latest-ethiopian-tenders/2011/09/19/18663> (Date of access 6/8/2012)
18. The books were published by Fitsame Teferra at Habte Books (<http://www.habtebooks.com>).

AUTHOR

Helen Papworth

Women Living with HIV as Agents of Social Change

Carolina De Rosis

p. 181-196

I would like to thank the CFEE (French Centre of Ethiopian Studies) that funded the first fieldwork (November 2007-Mai 2008) and facilitated the third phase of ethnographic surveys (September-November 2010) in the frame of my PhD research in Social Anthropology at the EHES-IMAF (School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences-Institute of African Worlds) in Paris.

- 1 What G. Prunier remarked on in his introduction to the collection of essays entitled *L’Ethiopie contemporaine* quoted above perfectly reflects the special place that Ethiopia has occupied in the field of African Studies (TESHALE 1995: xiii-xvi; GASCON 1999: 433-434). It also accounts for the ways in which the country “has historically captured the imagination of outside observers, who have been fascinated by its enigmatic aura” (KELLER 1988: ix). In fact, despite progressive developments in research on social, political, cultural, and religious realities since the 1980s years, in contrast with the image of a mythic and mystic Ethiopia, few scholars have dealt with issues such as HIV/AIDS, gender and social inequalities.¹
- 2 What links are there between Ethiopia and the rest of Africa that might highlight research on these issues, except for the country’s inclusion within this “vast, complicated, heterogeneous region of the planet” which “has come to occupy a place-in-the world called *Africa*” that has usually been “synonymous of failure and poverty” (FERGUSON 2006:5)? What aspects of the Ethiopian history would these researches be able to reveal in order to gain a better understanding of the “real country Ethiopia is today” (PRUNIER 2007:5, translated from French by the author)?
- 3 This paper deals with the social and political side of HIV/AIDS in Ethiopia, and more specifically with forms of participation by affected women in the struggle against the epidemic. The study is therefore orientated towards that part of the “truth” that is hidden by the way Ethiopia is projected in the production of encyclopaedic erudite knowledge. In particular, we explore the opportunities available to individuals located on the margins of society and the State for “producing history” (GRAMSCI 1977), the

chances they have to “speak” (SPIVAK 1988). Far from viewing these opportunities as forms of disobedience or dissidence on the part of socially-marginalized women *vis-à-vis* the established powers, we analyse them here through the lens of the ambivalently dependent relationship these women have with the “discourses”² on gender that have historically been produced in the context of the relations between Ethiopia and the “rest of the world” (BAYARD 2000). Specifically, I will offer a detailed analysis of gender identity in and around the analytical category of “gender and class relations”³. This analytical approach will allow us to highlight the composite and varying nature of the “female condition”: in other words, the multiplicity of positions and experiences regarding what it means to be a “woman” in society.

- 4 Male and female identities are not simply produced by means of a discursive practice that organizes and orders reality and follows an arbitrary binary logic (BUTLER 1999; SCOTT 1988): they are also individually embodied and shaped by the social extraction of individuals and their paths of life. The division of labour by gender in terms of productive, reproductive, and community activities, which has been heavily criticized since the 1970s in French feminist circles, has become more and more clearly framed by social inequalities. The increasing introduction of gendered tasks – such as nursing and care-based activities and other household chores – into the labour market is a reflection of the ways in which economic and social inequalities shape different female identities.
- 5 In this presentation, I argue that the “female embodied subject”, as shaped in terms of sexuality and gender relations in HIV/AIDS policies, is a state-approved good, whose various forms of social and political availability for protecting the social fabric against the impact of the epidemic are determined by embodied social and health inequalities.
- 6 In the first place, I will seek to place the introduction of gender issues in HIV/AIDS policies in Ethiopia within the wider historical framework of the evolution of political and social actions on gender from the 1950s up to the time of the establishment of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). Secondly, based on fieldwork conducted in Gondar on the implementation of care and support strategies for socially marginalized HIV-positive individuals, I will reveal the dynamics surrounding the emergence of two associations of people living with HIV/AIDS. Along with health and social inequalities, I will point out how their social make-up reproduces the same over-representation of HIV-affected women as that which affects the social struggle against the epidemic in general. Finally, I will attempt to demonstrate the potential and limitations of this new social space for creating innovative forms of participation and integration for socially marginalized women.

Gender issues in the HIV/AIDS situation: politics of action and legitimization

- 7 The evolution of HIV/AIDS into a generalized epidemic and its progressive feminization,⁴ which is particularly evident in Sub-Saharan Africa, have served to invalidate the explanatory models of its spread in terms of risk groups and risk behaviours. In the second half of the 1990s, “female vulnerability” – which had been theorized by international organizations such as the WHO (World Health Organization) and UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS) – was the dominant paradigm

for explaining the dynamics of the spread of HIV/AIDS in terms of structural factors, and inspired new intervention strategies. Within the sexually active female population, the risk group of sex-workers was then progressively banished into the shadows by the emergence of two target categories: pregnant women and mothers with children. These new forms of visibility of HIV-positive women have been analysed in various ethnographic contexts (BILA 2011, MSELLATI & MEYER 2011, VIDAL 2000, MAKHLOUF, OBERMEYER *et al.* 2011, LE COEUR *et al.* 2011), and explain the subsequent different analytical approaches. Here, I will attempt to single out the main contiguities among them, together with the principles that underlie the formulation of the 1993 Ethiopian gender policy and the subsequent action plans.

- 8 The issue of gender entered the policy agenda of the Ethiopian State earlier than it did in other sub-Saharan African countries. The right of women to vote and be elected to Parliament was approved by the General Assembly and promulgated by Emperor Haile Selassie on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of his coronation in November 1955 (HENZE 2000: 254). After the 1950s, organized activities for women were mainly encouraged and run by non-governmental bodies such as the Ethiopian Women's Welfare Association, the Ethiopian Officers' Wives Association and the Ethiopian Female Students Association. Nevertheless, as it has been noted in the National Policy on Ethiopian Women (1993), "these associations were, however, limited in scope, and only concentrated in cities. Consequently they had little or no impact on government policies, laws, regulations and development programmes" (TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA 1993: 8).
- 9 What seems to define this political reformism and all these social initiatives is the particular place occupied by Ethiopia in the international system and its special relationship with the West. Ethiopia was one of the fifty countries that met in San Francisco to create the United Nations (UN) on June 26, 1945. Owing to the importance of women's rights, as recognized by the UN, it was involved in the first conventions on women promulgated by the UN from 1949 on, and was thereafter involved in various national and international forums on women. In addition, the international feminist movement seems to have influenced policies on the promotion of civil rights and the social emancipation of Ethiopian women; the *Ethiopia Observer*, which was founded in 1956 by Sylvia Pankhurst, the English campaigner for the suffragist movement, may be considered to be an example of this.
- 10 These initial social and political reforms mainly impacted well-off, educated women. As Tsehai Berhane-Selassie observes in her essay "*Ethiopian Rural Women and the State*":

"When educated female vice-ministers, diplomats, and higher administrative staff appeared in the state structures in the '50s and '60s, they owed their positions more to their relationships to powerful men -mainly the Emperor Haile Selassie but also some fathers. [...] Like the laws and institutions, these experiences did not translate into benefits for women in general, and major changes are continuing to take place without women's involvement" (TSEHAI BERHANE-SELASSIE 1997: 186).
- 11 The creation by the *Därg* in 1980 of the Revolutionary Women's Association (REWA) to be a nationwide organization grounded in a socialist ideology, with the aim of promoting women's emancipation, operated – as Helena Pankhurst puts it – "only at the level of rhetoric because, like the youth association, it lacked real power. [...] REWA acted as a magnet for all issues regarding gender, thus removing them from the central political domain" (PANKHURST 1992: 30).

- 12 The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, which was established in 1995 and had been preceded by a transitional government following the fall of the *Därg* (1991), is a signatory of the major treaties on women. In 1993, the transitional government expressed its commitment to gender equality and equity by issuing a National Policy on Ethiopian Women. However, since the last years of the socialist regime, the government along with development and UN agencies took several initiatives focused on women. As Tsehai Berhane-Selassie writes:
- “Development agencies working in Ethiopia, including branches of the UN, have therefore produced interesting research and evaluative papers from women’s perspectives. Similarly, the women’s bureaux of the various ministries and commissions that were set up by the government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia have held workshops and discussions which have resulted in writings on women” (TSEHAI BERHANE-SELASSIE 1991: 133).
- 13 What actually brought the gender issue to the heart of UN policy agendas after the mid-1980s was the inscription of gender equality and women’s rights into the “participatory development” policies⁵ of Southern countries. The assumption that these countries’ economic growth, although it was perceived as unachievable, could not be a factor of human and social development alone led to the introduction of alternative strategies. The fight against poverty thus began by reinforcing participation by the poor themselves. The actions taken by international organizations such as the World Bank and UNICEF pointed to the potential inherent in participation and community organization among marginalized groups, in which women were especially present.
- 14 In addition, the aim of securing a fall in infant mortality and morbidity rates led to global organizations and agencies focusing on mothers’ health. In 1985, during the conference that marked the end of the UN Decade for Women,⁶ the negative balance sheet for women’s health was worsened by an announcement from the WHO that half a million women in developing countries were dying from obstetric complications each year. In 1987, a conference in Nairobi sponsored by the World Bank, the WHO, and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) prepared the first global programme, known as “Safe Motherhood”. Investing in maternal health meant preserving not only the health of new-borns and children, but also the well-being of the family, and thus of entire societies. An official document on this initiative written twenty years after its launch reveals the utilitarian principles underlying the attention on women’s health and their roles in the society. It reads:
- “About 30–40% of neonatal and infant deaths result from poor maternal health and inadequate care during pregnancy, delivery, and the critical immediate postpartum period. [...] In addition to the impact on infants and children, a woman’s death affects her family’s well-being and society as a whole. After a woman dies, her family is less able to care for itself, and forfeits any paid/unpaid wages she contributed to the household” (FAMILY CARE INTERNATIONAL 2007:6).
- 15 In the 1980s years, the GAD (Gender and Development), a model for the participation of women in development, emphasized the importance of women’s reproductive activities in economic and social life, which corroborated their visibility as procreators and as mothers. In 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women, which was held in Beijing, introduced the operative concept of “empowerment” aiming to enhance the women’s power of action and their autonomy (Beijing Declaration 1995). However, advocating

gender equality and the promotion of women's rights have mostly fallen within the utilitarian consideration of the social role of women essentially as procreators.

- 16 The introduction to the *National Action Plan on Gender Equality (NAP-GE) 2006-2010* by the Ethiopian Ministry of Women's Affairs, which was inspired by similar principles, states:

"Countries will not be able to combat poverty, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and ensure sustained development without a deliberate attempt to overcome gender inequality. [...] It has also been realized that the attainment of equal rights between the two sexes and improved women's status benefits men as well. An educated woman is more likely to delay marriage, practice family planning resulting in a smaller family size, more available food for the family, and resources to educate the children. Investing in girls' education therefore has high social and economic returns and is instrumental in achieving sustainable development and economic growth" (MOWA 2006:1).
- 17 When interviewed⁷ in November 2010, the head of the Women's Affairs Office in *qäbäle* 16 in Gondar stated that:

"Social policies focus on women because we know that teaching a mother means teaching her family, and giving her a loan means helping all the family."
- 18 This statement, in which the words "women" and "mother" are used interchangeably, perfectly reflects the orientations of women's policies, their pivotal links with the fight against poverty, and the promotion of human and economic development. Our analysis of the empirical process behind the formation of the two associations of people living with HIV in the city of Gondar will make the point that the organization of the fight against HIV/AIDS has built on the progressive implementation of strategies informed by the principles of the participatory development model. We will show that socially marginalized affected women have participated in these fighting strategies against HIV/AIDS as both beneficiaries and actors. Although their contrasting social profiles, their visibility has been mediated by their role as mothers.

Women living with HIV and association projects in the city of Gondar

- 19 According to the *Single Point HIV Prevalence Estimate* published in June 2007, adult occurrences of HIV in the Amhara Region between 2004 and 2010 were estimated to be between 10.2% and 9.8% in the urban area making up the city of Gondar. More precisely, HIV in the male population has fluctuated between 8.2% and 7.9%, while in the female population, it has fluctuated between 12.2% and 11.8% (FMOH and FHAPCO 2007: 18). A glance at the numbers of HIV-positive people benefiting from the main mass-treatment HIV programmes implemented in the city shows a marked pre-eminence in the numbers of women that goes well beyond the difference in the HIV rate between the female and male population.
- 20 The beneficiaries of the OSSA (Organization for Social Service for AIDS) registered in March 2010 consisted of 2,891 orphans and vulnerable children born to HIV-positive parents and 481 individuals living with HIV, of whom 351 were women and 130 men. All the members have at least one child. The beneficiaries of the *Home-and community-based palliative care for PLWHIV* (People living with HIV) programme run by FHI (Family Health International) and local mutual help associations (*əddər*, *sānbāte*, and *ām'əya*)

amounted to 177 PLWHIV under the age of 18, and 817 HIV-positive women and 299 HIV-positive men over the age of 18.

- 21 According to a statement by the project manager of *Mahbär Hiwot*, a local NGO that provides care and support to HIV-positive people, women made up about 75% of all beneficiaries of the organization. Almost all were mothers of at least one child. In addition, infected pregnant women benefit from care from PMTCT (Prevention Mother-to-Child Transmission) in hospital, and based on their social conditions, they can also benefit from specific material support programmes. In November 2010, the *Fərehəywāt Mahbär* association of people living with HIV had 550 members, of whom 364 were women and 186 men. The total number of members of *Wəgagān*, an association of women living with HIV established in the city in 2007, was 213.
- 22 Except for *Mahbär Hiwot* and *Wəgagān*, all the organizations and associations mentioned above became operative in Gondar between 2003 and 2004 to coincide with the launch of the first pilot programme for access to antiretroviral treatment (ART) (MOH 2005). Since February 2004, Ethiopia has become one of PEPFAR's (the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief's) fifteen focus countries, and a beneficiary of support from the Global Fund (HAPCO 2007:5). It has thus obtained general access to treatment free of charge, which has simultaneously promoted the implementation of secondary and tertiary prevention strategies⁸ focusing on care and support for people affected by the disease. Furthermore, since 2004 the Ethiopian national response to HIV/AIDS has been integrated within the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). The *Multisectoral Plan of Action for Universal Access to HIV Prevention, Treatment, Care and Support in Ethiopia (2007-2010)* reads:

"The Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia fully recognizes the impact of AIDS on the overall development of the country and gives particular attention to fighting the epidemic within the broader development plan of the country. Accordingly, the response to HIV and AIDS is one of the eight development interventions of the Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP)" (HAPCO 2007: 4).
- 23 Moreover, since 2006 food security has become a specific issue of global HIV intervention (HUNSMANN 2010:63-64). In fact, people affected by HIV have higher energy needs than uninfected people. In addition, the virus modifies their metabolism and prevents them from fully assimilating nutrients (HUNSMANN 2010:70). As it has been observed in the article untitled "Effect of nutritional factors on adherence to antiretroviral therapy among HIV-infected adults: a case control study in Northern Ethiopia": "Malnutrition, inability to get enough and/or quality food and consumption pattern which is less than three meals per day were significantly associated with non-adherence to ART. Therefore, the capacity to effectively manage the food and nutrition implications of ART adherence is a critical factor in the success of antiretroviral therapy in resource limited settings" (NEGASSIE *et al.* 2013: 1).
- 24 Ethiopia is among the countries that since 2006 have been benefiting from a food aid programme coordinated by USAID Office of Food for Peace (FFP) together with PEPFAR. A programmatic document on the subject published in September 2007 reads: "While PEPFAR remains focused on supporting food and nutrition interventions in limited, priority circumstances, its strategy also strongly promotes and fosters linkages to food security and livelihood assistance activities. These include, for example, improved agricultural practices, and skills training and microcredit programs supported by other

donors and USG (United States Government) entities, including FFP, to avoid dependency and address chronic individual and family food needs"⁹.

- 25 In accordance with the principles of the “participatory development” model, marginalized affected people have thus become the main actors of the strategies implemented in these programmes, which have essentially aimed both at integrating and increasing nutritional supplementation for HIV-positive patients and their social and economic (re)-integration. The organizations involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS in Gondar, mentioned above, provide people living with HIV with micro-credits, or loans of smaller amounts of money that are known as the Income Generating Activity (IGA). They also assist affected people with specific material support consisting in providing them with oil, rice, and flour for periods of no longer than 6 months and giving orphans and vulnerable children born to HIV-positive parents, who are enrolled at school, notebooks, pens, and whatever they needed to attend classes. More particularly, members of *Fərehəywät Mahbär* are involved in USAID/Urban Garden Project, which is a programme of farm production.
- 26 As emerges from interviews with operators and project managers, more women than men are eligible to benefit from these programmes due to their nursing and care activities in families. Although they have a wider range of actions and goals, the two associations of people living with HIV/AIDS also provide their members with care and socio-psychologist support. Their social composition points up the serious degree of precariousness and marginality of the majority of HIV-positive people. With regard to *Fərehəywät Mahbär*, only 17 out of 364 women had completed compulsory education, and of the 186 men, two were teachers and only 13 had completed compulsory education. 139 women declared that they were *yä-qän särratāñña* -that is, agricultural labourers – who were currently willing to take any type of job, from bleaching linen to assisting masons with building projects; 63 declared that they were unemployed; and 66 reported that they were housewives. There were 2 drivers, 1 carpenter, 4 civil servants, 3 cleaners, 1 caregiver, 1 ART promoter, 1 tailor, 4 gardeners, 1 students, 1 nun¹⁰, 1 sex worker, and 2 pensioners.¹¹ The remaining 74 stated that they held jobs in retail, spinning cotton, bleaching linen, and producing and selling local drinks in their homes (where they create small bars). 95 men declared that they were *yeqän särratāñña* (willing to take any type of job, from assisting masons with building projects to cultivation). 14 stated that they were unemployed, 5 were retired, 2 were bricklayers, 2 were mechanics, 4 were carpenters, 6 were construction workers, 5 were drivers, 5 were farmers, 8 were gardeners, 11 were merchants, and 11 made no declaration. With regard to their civil status,¹² 46 women and 24 men were separated; 90 women declared they had never been married, 99 were widows, and 128 registered as being married. 17 men registered as widowers, 39 as never having been married and 106 as married. There were 193 single women (widows, separated, or never married) with dependent children, and 62 single men (widowers, separated, or never married) with dependent children. In the case of *Wəgagän*, out of 213 members, except for one woman who did not declare her civil status or how many children she had, only 34 women had no children. 71 were widows, of whom 12 had no children; 66 were separated, of whom 11 had no children; 60 were married, of whom 11 had no children; and 15 had never been married and had dependent children. With regard to employment, except in the case of 1 woman who did not declare her employment, 72 declared that they were *yä-qän*

särratännä; 4 were gardeners; 2 were cotton spinners; 29 were housewives; 76 were unemployed; 25 were traders; 3 were students; and 1 was a pensioner.

- 27 Members of the associations have been also involved in activities such as home-based care and “public testimony” (*məsəkkər*). After having first been used in Northern countries, “public testimony” was promoted as a global strategy for fighting the epidemic. It consists in HIV-positive people telling their personal story of their experience with the disease, and its aim is to inform and sensitize society about HIV/AIDS and the ways it can be transmitted and prevented. In fact, since the 1990s years, international agencies sorrowed over social denial of the epidemic in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, and focused on “putting a face” to HIV/AIDS by promoting the “coming out” of affected people (NGUYEN 2002; 2010; Seidel 1993). In 1994, the World Summit on AIDS held in Paris ratified the initiative to involve people living with HIV in the fight against AIDS (Greater Involvement of People with AIDS, or GIPA).
- 28 *Fərehəywät Mahbär* was established in 2003 by an initial group of 25 HIV-positive people -7 men and 18 women -to facilitate access to antiretroviral treatment and to promote HIV testing. Its members were recruited by social workers and the HAPCO (HIV/AIDS Prevention Control Office) of the city of Gondar from among beneficiaries of OSSA and the Ethiopian Red Cross.
- 29 Since 2004, the Ethiopian Strategic Plan for Intensifying Multi-Sectoral HIV/AIDS Response (2004-2008) has been promoting the creation of associations of people living with HIV/AIDS throughout Ethiopia. It reads:

“People living with HIV/AIDS have a tremendous power and influence to teach about HIV/AIDS from their personal and social experience. They can also be trained to provide care and support. The involvement of PLWHA¹³ in the fight against HIV/AIDS has been quite encouraging and has contributed a great deal towards openness, and to a reduction in stigma, denial and discrimination. The continued involvement of PLWHA as a guiding principle should significantly contribute to the reduction of the spread of HIV/AIDS and improvement in the quality of people living with the virus” (FMOH & FHAPCO 2004:6).
- 30 When interviewed in December 2007, the chairman of the association, whom I shall call Kebede,¹⁴ explained its formation in these terms:

“It was to advocate human rights. At first we were trained by CVM¹⁵ for seven days on positive living¹⁶ and witnesses. Afterwards, we began teaching people, and we are still telling them about our *background*.¹⁷ In the beginning, we announced that people living with HIV were going to talk to them about the disease, but the reaction was negative. People used to respond that *it was better to kill them to stop AIDS*. Later, they understood what the disease is exactly. They felt ashamed about what they had said. Thanks to our testimonies and teaching, they have recognized that it is possible to live with HIV by taking the drugs.”
- 31 Later in the interview he adds:

“When we established the association, there were twenty-five of us, seven men and eighteen women. We guaranteed home-based care for other HIV-positive people; we took care of their hygiene; we were provided with soap, bleach, and gloves; we took care of HIV-positive children and AIDS orphans. At present, the association counts sixty-two HIV-positive children. The home-based caregivers were trained by a physician who works in the North Gondar University Hospital. We also fought stigma and discrimination.”
- 32 *Wəgagān* was created in November 2007 as a local response to the national initiative launched by the *National Association of Positive Ethiopian Women* with the aim of

constituting a national network of HIV-positive women. The founders – thirteen women who were already members of *Fərehəywät Mahiber*, were supported by the HAPCO (HIV/AIDS Prevention Control Office) of the city of Gondar, CVM/APA – and NGO – and Christian Aid. As the President told me during an interview in April 2009:

“A woman from the *Finot Amhara Women’s Association*¹⁸ initiated the establishment of our association. We got various kinds of help from CVM and the national network of associations. We got the computer, the chairs and some furniture from Christian Aid. She came from Bahr Dar and informed us that it was necessary to establish an association in Gondar.”

- 33 As a member of the National Network of Positive Women Ethiopians (NNPWE), *Wəgagān* builds on a mission that falls within the category of promoting gender equity. The Strategic Plan (2007-09) Working for Positive Change of National Network of Positive Women Ethiopians states:

“Association of HIV-positive women raise issues pertaining to global access to care, treatment and support, for women and girls, gender equity and a full role of HIV-positive women and girls in all decisions that affect their lives. In Ethiopia too, HIV-positive women have been actively involved in the PLWHA associations since the first group of people decided to go public and form their own associations called Dawn of Hope and Mekdim.¹⁹ For instance, six of the eleven people who founded the Dawn of Hope association were women” (NNPWE 2007:4).

- 34 From focus groups with the members of *Wəgagān*, ways of advocating gender equity emerged that were somewhat influenced by rhetorical discourse on women’s conditions. A widow of 26 with a dependent child, who participated in a focus group held in May 2009, explained the reasons of their membership in *Wəgagān* in these terms:

“The main reason why we went to the association is that all of us are women, and so we can talk freely about the disease. The fact that we are women doesn’t mean we aren’t able to work and we are obliged to spend the time at home. Here we can meet each other and make sure that each of us takes the drugs properly. We used to think we were inferior to men in many areas. But it is not true: we are equal in rights and everything with them. We want to be independent and earn our own livings.”

- 35 What emerges from the social composition of the two associations is the involvement of women in a varied range of activities, and their wide-scale presence in the informal sector rather than being locked into the domestic sphere. However, our interviews with members raised the issue that their participation in the association in fact meant both their integration in an innovative space of solidarity and the opportunity to gain some form of social life and public visibility. The single women with dependent children stressed their material need for support in their interviews. They had joined the associations in the hope of obtaining loans to start or improve informal activities. For others, whose paths of life were characterized by particular forms of precariousness that were often exacerbated by geographical mobility, HIV represented a way to facilitate their social and economic insertion (DE ROSIS 2012; 2014). More particularly, for some of them the different manifestations and consequences of the disease including opportunistic diseases and loss of partners and children first led to extreme material and existential insecurity, and then stabilized their lives.
- 36 Thanks to the innovative support strategies, the illness ended up by representing a means by which they might become socially and economically integrated. From a focus group held in *Fərehəywät Mahbär* and interviews with women born in rural areas who

had settled in Gondar after following various paths of internal migration, it emerged that care and support for their HIV-positive status coincided with their initial access to “vital rights” (ROSE 2006: 134) such as employment, food, shelter, information, and various forms of child support.

Conclusion

- 37 The spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic has highlighted various forms of social and gender inequality, and has drawn attention to the needs of disadvantaged and marginalized people, especially women, who had otherwise been excluded from social networks of solidarity.
- 38 The over-representation of HIV-positive women in mass treatment programmes is due to a combination of factors. Women are more exposed to precariousness and social marginalization than men. In addition, because of their reproductive role, they benefit from specific care and support strategies aimed at protecting the fabric of society from the impact of the epidemic. These strategies have contributed towards bringing them into new social spaces, and have led them to participate actively in improving their conditions of life and those of their children. Although these women have been transformed from “passive victims” of social and sexual oppression into “agents of social change”, they nevertheless lack the kind of visibility that takes the complexity of their situation into consideration. The well-consolidated discourse on gender equality has focused mostly on gender separation between the public and private sphere, and does not adequately stress the introduction of gendered activities into the market and the various forms of exploitation of which women who live in poor conditions are victims. Furthermore, those strategies used in the struggle against HIV/AIDS that build on the economic and social utility of the gendered functions of nursing and care obfuscate the most composite reality of female sexuality, the interrelations of various forms of oppression, and the structural factors that are responsible for sexual exploitation and abuse.

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FOOTNOTES

1. BELETE BIZUNESH (2001: 8) remarks on this regard: "Although some work has come out that deals with Ethiopian social structures and the lives of ordinary sections of the population since then, in comparison with other African countries the gap remains significant... Out of a total of 494 papers published in the *Proceeding of the International Conference of Ethiopian Studies* (vols. 1-9 and 11) only 12 articles appeared in the index under "women". The bibliography of articles published in the *Journal of Ethiopian Studies*, the premier scholarly journal in Ethiopia that features works on anthropology, archeology, history, linguistics, and literature, lists 311 entries, only three of which concerned women".
2. I use this term following the *foucauldien* conceptualisation of "discourse". For M. Foucault, "discourse" is not a linguistic concept. As Stuart Hall notes, "By 'discourse' Foucault meant a group of statements which provide a language of talking about -a way of representing the knowledge about - a particular topic in a particular historical moment... Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. But... since all social practices entail *meaning*, and meanings shape and influence what we do -our conduct - all practices have a discursive aspect" (HALL 1992: 291).
3. The development of the concept of "gender and class relations" relies on a critical examination of the key concepts of work and production. It was progressively introduced by feminist criticism (DELPHY 1998; GUILLAMIN 1972) of the sexual division of labour in the 1970s, which elaborated the definition of domestic activities as productive. In those years, the emergent *black feminism* (BHAVNANI 1999) denounced the implicit racism in the analysis of the sexist domination by the feminist movement, which was dominated by white middle-class women. More recently, sociological researches employ the analytical approach of race, sex and class relations on the effect of the transformation of local, national and international labour market to analyse the internationalization and the feminization of the introduction of activities of care in the productive economic sector (FALQUET & RABAUD 2006, MOUJOU & FALQUET 2010). For a detailed history of all theoretical perspectives of the notion see HIRATA *et al.* 2004, PFEFFERKORN 2012).

4. Four years after the 9th International Conference on AIDS, held in Berlin in 1993, in which the major topic discussed was the rapid spread of HIV among women, the report by UNAIDS entitled *Women and AIDS* (UNAIDS 1997: 2) highlighted the fact that the risk of contracting HIV was increasing for women all over the world. WHO report on women and health states that “HIV is the leading cause of death and disease in women of reproductive age. Of the 30.8 million adults living with HIV in 2007, a 15.5 million were women. The prevalence of HIV infection in women has increased since the early 1990s and is most marked in sub-Saharan Africa” (WHO 2009: 43).
5. Originating in the 1970s in the context of research that was deeply critical of a development model based on economic growth (FREIRE 1970, CHAMBERS 1983), this paradigm was gradually appropriated by organizations such as the World Bank, UNFPA (the United Nations Populations Fund) and UNICEF (the United Nations Children’s Fund), which have been arguing in favour of basic needs, women-centred approaches and targeting marginalized groups since the 1980s.
6. At the first conference on women held in Mexico City in 1975, in an effort to raise international attention to the health, rights, and development priorities of women, the United Nations declared the period between 1976 and 1985 the “UN Decade for Women”.
7. All interviews quoted in this article were conducted by the author with the support of an interpreter, and recorded with the permission of the interviewees. All passages quoted here were transcribed and translated in English.
8. Preventive medicine strategies are typically described as taking place at the primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary prevention levels. Secondary prevention strategies attempt to diagnose and treat an existing disease in its early stages before it results in significant morbidity. Tertiary prevention strategies focus on helping people manage complicated, long-term health problems. The goals include preventing further health complications and maximizing the quality of life.
9. <http://www.pepfar.gov/reports/guidance/93184.htm> (consulted in December 2013)
10. This was an 80-year-old widow in 2010, following tradition by living as a nun after the death of her husband. She was enrolled in the association because she was caring for her grandchild, who was HIV-positive.
11. They receive a pension for their husbands, who had been soldiers and had passed away.
12. One woman did not declare her civil status.
13. People Living With HIV/AIDS
14. In accordance with ethical protocol for research on HIV/AIDS, all names of HIV-positive people mentioned in this article are fictitious.
15. CVM/APA (Community of volunteers for the world and AIDS partnership with Africa) is a humanitarian, non-governmental organization that works in HIV/AIDS.
16. Kebede refers to the global sensitization campaign, *Living Positively with HIV and AIDS*. This campaign is based on the concept of HIV as a long-term, potentially fatal disease. It is aimed at developing hope and acceptance and reducing stigma and discrimination in affected people. (see http://www.searo.who.int/EN/Section10/Section18/Section356/Section428_5500.htm, consulted in July 2013).
17. Kebede uses this English word “background” while speaking in Amharic.
18. She is also the coordinator of the National Network of Positive Women Ethiopians (NNPWE).
19. *Täsfa go* and *Mäqdām* were the two first Ethiopian associations of people living with HIV/AIDS, established in Addis Ababa in the end of the 1990s.

AUTHOR

Carolina De Rosís

Mapping Decision-Making: The Case of Tigrayan Women's Contraceptive Use

Thera Mjaaland

p. 197-210

- 1 Two reoccurring development presumptions found in international as well as national policies on gender and education formed the starting point for my doctoral research project in north-western Tigray, Ethiopia (MJAALAND 2013). The first assumes a causal link between education and women's empowerment (as in the case of Millennium Development Goal 3). The second is based on the frequently quoted argument that educated women will have fewer children and, therefore, that educating girls will cause fertility rates to decrease; in short, girls' education = contraception. These presumptions, if they are based on an understanding of causality as linear, are questionable. As the discussion in this paper will show, gendered processes of change intersect with power dynamics in complex ways.
- 2 In a review of the empowerment literature, Anju Malhorta, Sidney Ruth Schuler and Carol Boender suggest that:

[a]ny given context, at any given point in time can be seen as having behavioural and normative 'frontiers' that need to be crossed for women to be empowered along a specific dimension [defined as economic, socio-cultural, familial/interpersonal, legal, political or psychological], within a specific arena [or spheres of life]. (MALHORTA et al. 2002: 18).
- 3 However, when including women's perceptions of contraceptive use in my ethnographic study in north-western Tigray,¹ behavioural and normative 'frontiers' were also operative along a spiritual/religious dimension. In this particular area, where the Ethiopian Orthodox Church is dominant,² the frequent reference to God's will and 'idil'³ (fate/chance) in peoples' reasoning about their own plans and actions, successes and failures in all strands of life – ranging from education to child births – suggests that God constitutes a decisive agentive power in their lives. One question is, therefore, how this spiritual/religious dimension links up with the most commonly used parameters

for women's empowerment that Malhorta and colleagues identify, and which in addition to 'options', 'control' and 'power', focus mainly on 'choice'? Or more specifically, to what extent do women's perceptions of power and control vis-à-vis God and the authority of the Orthodox Church, pre-determine their reproductive choices when the Ethiopian government provide them with alternative options through free family planning services now available also in remote rural areas of Tigray?

Gendered aspects of religiosity

- 4 The tendency for women to observe religious practice more meticulously than men is not only mentioned by other authors on Ethiopia (WRIGHT 2002: 51; BISESWAR 2008: 142) but is also at issue in writings on women's religiosity in other cultural contexts on other continents (MILLER & HOFFMANN 1995; IANNACCONE 1998). While the number of men and women going to church were more equal in the rural than in the semi-urban area of my study, women seemed to comply with religious prescriptions – by going to church on the many holy days (*be'al*) in addition to Sundays, and observing the days and extended periods of fasting (only exempted following childbirth) – more conscientiously than men in both contexts. When I asked a successful businesswoman and female head of a household in her late forties, why more women than men go to church in this semi-urban town, she explained:

– Yes, this is based on men's own [considerations]; it's about them. Now if you look at this market town, it's mostly the women who worship at the church, that's it. When it comes to the men, they are not that many; meaning it's according to their own [conviction]. Otherwise, according to religion it's the same, but in our place men do not worship at the church that much. Women, however, they worship, they fast, now we even stay fasting till after the mass in the afternoon, but men, there is only some, that's it; you will only find some elders, the rest they don't focus much on the church. Otherwise, the religion is the same for all of us; it presents itself to us in the same way.

– Yes?

– Ehe, yes, I think it's habitual that men are not that many.

– *Maybe women have more fear about life, about giving birth, about illness and the like. Meaning, is that so?*

– Yes. Women that means, yes, since there are problems, we will pray, we will worship... meaning you know... it's we that receive the problems, like the many problems in relation to giving birth. It means, you say "forgive me", and beg God for everything. Since women have a lot of problems, they beg God and worship at the church. For a man, however, if he worships or doesn't worship it doesn't matter that much; he's "careless" (in English), that's it. Once in a while ... when there is a big holy day that means; like now when Gabriel [celebration for the arch-angel Gabriel] is coming up, that's it, both men and women worship. At some holy days there are a lot of men worshipping. Now on Gabriel's day, except that you happened not to go, you could have seen it, on the 19th [E.C.]; that's it, men, children and the old worship en masse. However, this is based on ones' own belief, that's it, meaning it's personal.

- 5 This businesswoman supported my assertion that the problems women encounter in relation to their reproductive role might result in differences in religious practice between women and men. While some holy days carry more weight than others, she also emphasised that personal conviction plays a role. Another woman in her mid-thirties, who since her second divorce has lived with her three children in her mother's

household in the same semi-urban town, with the main income coming from brewing *siwa* (local millet beer), noted:

– Generally, when it comes to worshipping at the church there's no one worshipping like women. Men don't match that here in town, you don't see that. (...) They have no reason to, so they become careless; they're careless. It's not that many [men]. In this place there are more women [who go to church]. There're lots of women, there aren't that many [men]. They know about [drinking] *siwa*, they [only know about] *siwa* (laughs). (...) Women, yes, now for the sins they have committed, they say, "forgive me, I'm sorry". But the men say nothing. Since they are superior he says, "what do I have [to ask forgiveness for]". But women ... they go [to church] and say "release me from my wrongdoings" ... she will say, "if I have sinned forgive me". If she wants to give birth, they will go and pray. They're like that. (...). I would also ask what [problems] do men have? The sin is in us [women].

- 6 Following up on the notion of men's carelessness in religious matters mentioned by the businesswoman earlier, what caught my attention in this woman's account was her mention of that women carry more sin (*hat'iyat*) than men. This is confirmed by an orthodox priest in his seventies, when he relates women's responsibility for human misery to Hiwan's (Eve's) eating of the forbidden fruit (*itse-beles*) in the Garden of Eden:

– It was the eating of the forbidden fruit that above all made women inferior; the sin that was committed then was grave; you couldn't say it was minor. It was this which caused death; it was precisely that [sin]. Eh? It was this that brought us all into trouble.

- 7 This gendered burden of sin, which could explain differences in women's and men's religiosity, links up with Alan S. Miller and John P. Hoffmann's attempt to explain gender difference in religiosity by way of 'risk preferences' (MILLER & HOFFMANN 1995). This means interpreting religious practice as risk-averse behaviour and, conversely, that rejecting religious belief is risk-taking behaviour. These authors note that gender differences in risk-taking have commonly been based on biological strength and differences in gendered socialisation into risk-taking behaviour, including as well the structural location of risk as it relates to gendered divisions of labour (which would include reproductive labour). Gender differences in religiosity in their study from the US are, however, found to correlate with risk preferences only *in part* (*ibid.*: 73). In my study area in north-western Tigray, a general economic as well as ecological insecurity makes life risky for both women and men. Women's position in relation to pregnancy, child birth and their pivotal role in child care – together with the general instability of conjugal relationships – does suggest gendered aspects of insecurity that, from the perspective of risk preferences, might increase their religiosity relative to men. Women are also considered more vulnerable to spirit attacks,⁴ evil doings of the *deftera* (sorcerer)⁵ and the evil eye of *buda*⁶ during pregnancy, the first twelve days after childbirth when it is risky even to step outside the house, and up to the christening of her child when she again can enter church (which is after 40 days for a boy and 80 for a girl). As women seem to accept the burden following from Eve's sin in line with clerical sentiments, this might increase their commitment in religious matters compared to men's. It does not by necessity follow that religious exegesis and practice will not be subject to individual deliberations. This is evident in the businesswoman's account, when I asked:

– But what does *'idil* mean; is it by God or incidental (*agat'ami*) that means?

– *'Idil* is incidental (*agat'ami'yu*). It's both incidental and by God (*bi'amlak*). It's by God and if... God commands something for you... if God wants it, now look, it's said that God decides it for me or you... the level you will reach, as you can see, you are

educated in your country and came here, have started a good job, you have a volition, receive a good income; you have got a good *'idil* that means. How was that possible? By God, that is what it means. Now, I didn't get the *'idil* I wanted. However, in between I didn't do that badly. Meaning, even if I thought it was a problem for me from the start, it wasn't. That's because of my own labour, my own work and not because of other people, that's it; I had no special support from people whatsoever. I'm telling you, I didn't have anything like the *'idil* other people have. Independently, by selling my labour cheap as to not lack work and have trouble, and since I think about the children I have, I'm working hard (literally 'run working'), and we have survived up till now without problems that means. I don't have that much profit, however. Nevertheless, I have brought up my [four] children [and fostered one child] all this time. Even taking care of your children, to bring up your children in your own place and in your own home; it's in itself quite an *'idil*. Yes! How many of my friends aren't there who have to live far below [my standards], meaning who are in trouble, who have problems, who have no house of their own. This is because of *'idil*. Your *'idil* ... if God decides that you get it, you get it, if he keeps quiet [you get nothing]; everything is by God that means. Even *'idil* comes if it has been commanded by God. Otherwise, if He keeps quiet *'idil* doesn't come just like that.

Having started her first business, as she expressed it, "with a packet of tea leaves and one kilo of sugar", this woman sees herself as fairly successful as a result of her labour, despite what she understands as her initially unfavourable *'idil*. While asserting it was incidental she got that particular *'idil*, the fluctuating transition between God, *'idil* and her own initiatives constitutes a space where divine power and her own control can be negotiated, and where her own initiative has a chance to make a difference. The way *'idil* is commonly talked about in this area in north-western Tigray does not simply imply 'fate' in a fatalistic sense but points to 'chances' beyond the inevitable where a person's agency still matters in seizing that chance. In fact, what Messay Kebede sees as the fleeting nature of the concept of *'idil* and the volatile nature of fate (MESSAY KEBEDE 1999: 208-9) allows for the projection of individual ambitions beyond the inevitable. Laurence R. Iannaccone also notes the uncertainties connected to religiosity itself, since the effect of religious practice is itself unpredictable (IANNACCONI 1998). Of concern here are the negotiations these uncertainties open up for over authority in the relationship between God and the person, the Orthodox Church and the government and the women themselves on the issue of contraceptive use.

Spaces for agency in between religious sentiments and new government policies

When addressing reproductive choice, it is important to bear in mind that having children is imperative, not only in the Tigrayan context but in Ethiopia in general. A woman who does not give birth will most likely be divorced, regardless of whether it is her "fault" or not (See also FIKIR ASEFFA 2011). Orthodox Christian women's reverence of the holy day for Mariyam (Saint Mary) the 21st day [E.C.] every month, attests to the fact that women perceive themselves as needing divine protection in reproductive matters – in addition to available health care. Praying to Mariyam constituted the main preventive measure resorted to, together with prolonged breastfeeding, before modern reproductive technologies were introduced. In fact, many of the women, who, in my study, did not want to use contraceptives, emphasised that it is Mariyam who has authority in these matters. However, contrary to what might have been expected as a result of women's sincere religiosity in this area of Tigray, their answers to my question on family planning and contraceptive use were not unanimous. In fact, answers fell into three categories for women's reproductive strategies: (1) those who would not use contraceptives and explained this with a reference to religious sentiments and/or that the church did not allow it, (2) those who interpreted the church' current silence on the issue in public to mean that it is now allowed by the church and that they were free to use it if they wanted, and (3) those who believed that the church

was still against contraceptive use but who would use it anyway. It is this last category that is at the base of my discussion here because of the contestations of authority implied and the spaces for agency these contestations generated.

Since the church's stand on contraceptive use was interpreted in different directions, I also brought up the issue when interviewing the elderly orthodox priest referred to above. People that were present in the room (referred to in parentheses) commented on our conversation and started asking the priest questions as well. This points to the fact that they were not sure about the Orthodox Church's stand on the issue of contraceptive use either:

– *Yes, now the government allows birth control, but is it allowed now according to religion?*

– This has nothing to do with religion.

– *Contraceptive use that means?*

It might be mentioned, but this is not our concern. She can say she will give birth, or she can say I will leave it, and leave it (laughs). About birth, what is it called again ... [contraceptives]; we [the priests] have no say. If she claims that she will not be able to raise them, that she doesn't have the means; how can we interfere? Eh? If she says, "oh my, I want to have many children"; to have a child is her decision.

(A man: – What is underlying the question is ...)

(A woman: – Is it a sin?)

– *Is it sin, or?*

(A man: – Is it a sin (...) to control birth?)

– Oh! We cannot say this or that about birth control.

(A man: – Is it allowed by religion?)

– We cannot say this or that about this, but in the past He told us to multiply, and if that is what He says, that is what happens (laughs).

(A man: – Is there a law in the Bible about contraceptives?)

– Hah! We never say anything ... about stopping to give birth; we do not teach them [about that]. Do we say stop giving birth? We don't teach them to do so. ... If they stop giving birth, if they give birth, they give birth, if they stop, they stop; I would say it's up to them.

(People are discussing)

– *But now, does it mean it's a sin if a woman uses contraceptives; is it a sin?*

– Hah! We never say; we never say that. Even in the Bible ... we found nothing in the Bible about giving or not giving birth. (...) But one thing that I told you earlier, the Bible says (quotation in Ge'ez), "multiply", and as to not multiplying as He said, the government says that we have already multiplied past what is required; that's what they say, hah! We don't interfere if that's what it [the government] wants. We never tell her to leave it, we never tell her to stop, to stop giving birth, nor do we tell her to give birth; she will act according to her capacity. (...) According to us, according to the Bible, this book doesn't say this or that, it doesn't differentiate. It doesn't differentiate about not giving birth or giving birth. [Contraceptive] medicines that weren't used before can therefore be introduced now.

(A woman: – It's a sin if she has an abortion after getting pregnant)

– That is indeed a sin.

– *Ehe, is that so, yes, is that how it is?*

– Getting pregnant, and when pregnant doing an abortion?

– *Ehe?*

– That's a sin. First, who told her to get pregnant in the first place? What has it [the foetus] done to not [be allowed] to grow up? This is obvious. So if she aborts she is a murderer; she is killing a person that means.

– *Ehe, yes?*

– That is a big sin.

- 8 When asking whether there is a conflict between the government and the church on the issue of contraceptive use, I was told at the *wereda* health bureau in my study area in north-western Tigray:

- The priests might be against family planning and contraceptive use, but they don't express their opinion openly anymore. They don't raise the question or express their resistance at the church. They don't express support for it either. They simply keep quiet about it.⁷
- 9 Women would, however, also keep quiet about what they do in the case of family planning. One elderly divorcee in her seventies in the semi-urban area of my study, noted:
- What about it; it's good to give birth, but if you don't want to, you can prevent it. The priests don't have knowledge about this; it's the doctors who know. Who will tell them [the priests] about it?
- 10 In her early thirties and with four years of education, one rural woman having moved to town asserted:
- It's right [to use contraceptives]. But my opinion and the priests' opinion are different. They say it's a sin; that it's not allowed. From the point of view of science it's allowed, I think.
- 11 Furthermore, a non-literate peasant woman in her mid-forties said:
- About [if it's a] sin; we don't ask the priests. Who will ask them [permission] anyway?
- 12 Another non-literate peasant woman in her mid-thirties with seven children claimed:
- I will take it from now on, I have enough children now. It's said it's a sin, but who will tell them [the priests]?
- 13 In her late thirties, another non-literate and landless female head of a rural household proclaimed:
- I don't know if it's allowed or not. We [women] will allow it ourselves!
- 14 In fact, these non-literate women (except for one) do not feel obliged to tell the priests what they do when it comes to their reproductive choices. Rather, the above statements indicate a relegation of authority on the issue of contraceptive use from the religious domain of the Orthodox Church to the government domain of science. The existence of contradictions between authorities also allows women to lay claims to their own authority on the matter as women, despite the risk of committing a sin. Regardless of being more vulnerable than men as a consequence of their reproductive roles and Hiwan's (Eve's) sin, these women were involved in subjective deliberations about whether to comply, or not with what they considered the Orthodox Church's stand. While interpreting religious practice as risk-averse behaviour cannot explain why women's reproductive strategies would go against religious prescriptions, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky's understanding of risks, as ranked according to the dangers worthy of attention (DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY 1982), makes sense in a context where real risks to women's lives and health in relation to pregnancies and childbirths might be ranked above the risk of committing a sin. Of significance here is also the role of silence in these negotiations of authority in reproductive matters.

Negotiating reproductive choice in silence

- 15 While women might prefer to be in agreement with their husbands on the issue of family planning, it was emphasised at the wereda health bureau in my study area that a woman does not need her husband's consent, as it is her right to decide on contraceptive use and abortion. The *wereda* health bureau and the health extension

workers in the rural area also confirmed that family planning services could be provided in secrecy to avoid husbands denying their wives this right. Of concern was also that neighbours and others could come to know about it and, hence, to protect women from gossip, as a certain stigma of promiscuity is still connected to women's contraceptive use. Family planning services can also be provided on house-to-house visits by local health extension workers or during vaccination campaigns, when, commonly, it is the mothers who come with their children. The perception that the Orthodox Church is against contraceptive use and that it is a sin to use it does, however, prevail. When I asked a young peasant woman in her early twenties with four years of education, and mother of two, if contraceptives are allowed by the church, she said:

– No! It's bad; it's said it's not allowed, but what about it? It's said it's a sin, but they [women] use it [contraceptives], meaning some of those who use it are wives of the priests. Anyway, that's what is said. But the wives of the priests are making use of it, meaning, for three years, for two years. Afterwards, I will also do that. Now, I'm fine (laughs), but later I will do that too.

– But do the clergy say it's a big sin?

– They say, yes! Ehe, they say that, yes. That's what they say, but what about it? (...) Hah! About my life from now on that means, I wish (yīmīne; 'hope') to give birth to two [more children]. But after those two, after [that] I can't give birth [anymore]. Meaning, there is illness, there is old age and, since it's so [difficult] to cope, I cannot give birth anymore. About afterwards, God knows. Anyway, I think I will start using contraceptives. I think it's better to make use of contraceptives and bring up the children I have born, so they can live up. I wish that; that's what I wish. What my husband will say, I don't know, I'm yet to hear (laughs). Whether he says, "give birth", whether he says "don't give birth", we are to hear later. If he refuses [the use of contraceptives], I will do it secretly that means. I will do it myself, but if he will be angry, let him be angry, meaning that is what I think. That's what I wish that means, I will give birth to up to four [children], then I will stop, I think. This is what I wish.

- 16 Again, this young woman's answer shows the willingness to stand up against what is *perceived* as the Orthodox Church stand against contraceptive use. She is also willing to go against her husband on the matter if necessary in silence, and do what she considers best for herself. The issue of silence also surfaced in the account of one educated married housewife in her late twenties with one son, living in the semi-urban town:

– (...) If I want to give birth, if I want it, I will stop it [taking contraceptives]. (...) I don't tell them [the priests that I use it] ... the priests, that's it, they tell [us to do] this, this, and that. Then we say "okay", and listen to them. But in practice it's not done, it's not done in practice, it means. ... If we follow what they say it might not be good for our lives. That's it, we tell God [what we did] and say, Lord forgive us, and do what we want (laughs).

- 17 This young woman, who also believed that contraceptive use is prohibited by the clergy, questions the clergy's authority on the matter; she even doubts if what they say is good for women. As with many women, her strategy is to keep quiet; to not tell the priests. She admits it before God, however, and asks forgiveness. This perception that God is forgiving is important when women act counter to what is perceived as the Orthodox Church's stand against contraceptive use. The 40-year-old non-literate peasant woman below also gives one example of how this resistance plays out in the dialogue with the priests when I asked her:

– But what do the clergy say about contraceptive use? Is it allowed?

– Hm! It's not allowed, it's not allowed by the priests; they don't allow it. They say

why [do you use it] and get angry. You keep quiet and don't tell them; you keep quiet and take the [contraceptive] injection. "Why are you late [why don't you give birth again]?" they ask you, and I keep quiet. "Hah! Have you taken the injection?" [they say, and you say], "no, I didn't take the injection". Otherwise, they become angry.

– Are you supposed to give birth to all, is that what they say that means?

– Yes, ehe, ehe. They say all people should give birth. How can the priests open up [for the idea of not giving birth]? They say it's a sin; taking the [contraceptive] injection is a sin. They say you commit a sin. (...). Yes. Yes, it's a sin ... meaning, if you take the injection, the priests say it's bad according to religion. "Don't take the injection simply give birth", or, "if you take the injection it's a sin", the priests say. What can you do? You make your own decision; you take the injection and say, "I haven't taken it." ... If he asks, "did you take the injection", you say, "I didn't do it". [You] keep quiet. "So why don't you give birth?" "That time has passed" (laughs), you tell the priest, "time has passed".

- 18 This peasant woman's account points to the fact that, while the clergy downplay their opinions on contraceptive use in public teachings, their concern might still be part of the advice given on the household level as spiritual fathers (*abo nefsi*). This woman's strategy is, nevertheless, to keep quiet and make her own decisions in spite of believing that the church is against it. Even she is willing to lie which, in this case, might be ranked as a lesser sin.
- 19 Entailed in the accounts of these Tigrayan women, who believed that the church is against contraceptive use but who would use it anyway if they wanted/needed to, is, firstly, that moving contraceptive use away from the authority of the Orthodox Church and the religious domain to the authority of the government and the domain of science constitutes a space for agency that, potentially, can avoid challenging their religious faith. Secondly, authorities are commonly challenged in a non-confrontational manner. In fact, women can guard themselves against the interference of any authorities (including husbands) on the issue of reproductive choice, by keeping quiet. In fact, women's own strategies when going against the authority of the church or their husbands, the church's strategy when downplaying their opposition to contraceptive use publicly, and the health institutions' practice of providing family planning services to women in secrecy if needed, are *all* based on the use of silence as a strategy. This is in accordance with the socio-cultural dynamics of layering communication in the predominantly vertical power structure of highland Ethiopia, where challenges to authority can be put forward, as Maimire Mennasemay (2010: 76) expresses it, by being "active silently". It is therefore important to have in mind here that, if the pressure on family planning from the current government exceeds their interests, this strategy of keeping quiet would also allow women the possibility to refrain from using contraceptives if that is what they want.

Family planning; links to education and development

- 20 The focus in my study on women's contraceptive use related to the presumed impact of girls' education on fertility rates in international and national educational policies and discourses. For example, the Education Sector Development Programs in Ethiopia from 1997 onwards make references to international research when stating that "a person with at least 4 or 5 years of primary education is more responsive to attitudinal changes in nutrition, health, family planning, etc." (e.g. FDRE-MOE 2000: 28; FDRE-MOE

2005: 31-2). The formulation used in the Introduction to the National Action Plan for Gender Equality is similar:

An educated woman is more likely to delay marriage, practice family planning resulting in a smaller family size, more available food for the family, and resources to educate the children. Investing in girls' education therefore has high social and economic returns and is instrumental in achieving sustainable development and economic growth. (FDRE-MOWA 2006: 1)

- 21 The Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) also stated:

Increased education levels have been shown worldwide to be a major determinant of fertility and family size. Women's education in particular contributes to lower fertility levels. Slowing the rate of population growth will also dramatically reduce the amounts that need to be spent each year in the future on providing education; and will allow better quality education, by reducing overcrowding and class sizes, and allowing more resources per student in the form of textbooks and teaching time. (FDRE-MOFED 2006: 169)

- 22 It is, however, important to take note of here that the National Population Policy of Ethiopia does not only emphasise (1) the incorporation of population and family life education topics as integral parts of formal education curricula at relevant levels of education but also (2) the incorporation of population-related topics in the package of information carried to the rural population by agricultural extension workers, informal community leaders, and other community level development practitioners. (TGE 1993: 35-6) Population and Family Life Education is also to be incorporated as a component in both teachers' education and in education in general in the Education Sector Development Program IV (FDRE-MOE 2010). This governmental strategy means that the issue of family planning is addressed explicitly on many levels and, hence, is not assumed simply as an outcome of education by implication.

- 23 Women in both the semi-urban and rural area of my study in north-western Tigray use economy in terms of livelihood as a rationale for contraceptive use, well in line with Ethiopian population and development policies (E.g. TGE 1993; FDRE-MOFED 2010). In her early thirties with four years of formal education, a divorced woman with one child, having lived half her life in urban areas, says:

- If you don't have enough means to raise many children, it's the right thing to do.

- 24 One non-literate peasant woman, also in her thirties, but having given birth to seven children, says:

- We want to give our children a good upbringing. If they are too many how can we manage?

- 25 Another non-literate peasant woman in her late fifties, who has given birth to eleven children (whereof three had died), touches on the same economic livelihood aspect from the opposite angle when she says:

- Since we were rich [then] there was no reason to reduce the births. Since it was not a problem for me, I didn't use it [contraception].

- 26 The young peasant woman in her early twenties with four years of formal education, referred to above, says when pregnant with her third child:

- It will be a problem if we become too many in the family. (...) There is not enough land now; what shall we eat [if we have too many children]?

- 27 Hence, these women's reasons for being positive about contraceptive use circled, implicitly or explicitly, around current development issues in Ethiopia; escaping poverty and improving living conditions for themselves and their children.
- 28 While some mothers seemed to think that their daughters should be able to cope, as they had, with frequent childbirths, the reason many older women were positive about family planning was based precisely on their experience of hardships, since neither education nor modern contraceptives had been available in their time. While the level of education in the semi-urban area of my study is generally higher than in the rural area – and the younger women have more education than the older ones – women's justifications for using contraceptives did not correlate with levels of formal education. Rather, the fact that there is no significant difference in *perceptions* of contraceptive use between educated and non-literate women and between rural and urban areas of my study, gives reason to assume that the multilevel information strategy that includes community learning and a progressive health programme that provides access to family planning services and contraceptives for free also in rural areas have, started to override these commonly expected differences. This process of change in contraceptive use must, in my opinion, also be seen in relation to the ecological degradation, which is worsened by climate change, together with the scarcity of land in this area of Tigray. The younger generation is, therefore, increasingly pushed to urban areas in search for alternatives to the harsh lives their parents have lived – especially through the pull of education which according to prevailing rhetoric in Ethiopia carries the promise of development. In this context where children no longer are simply wealth but constitute a cost, priorities are in the process of shifting from educating only a few of one's (most clever) offspring to thinking that giving birth to fewer children might enable parents to educate all of them. In this environmental context of increasing livelihood insecurity, having fewer children can be interpreted, from the perspective of risk preferences, as risk-averse behaviour.

Concluding remarks

- 29 Encompassing the issues of control, power and options, the findings of this ethnographic study in north-western Tigray, suggests that when the issue of religion is included, a more multi-faceted understanding of choice than the empowerment literature implies, is needed. The fluctuating transition between God, '*idil* (fate/chance) and a woman's own initiatives, constituted in this study a space where religious exegesis and government policies (in terms of available family planning services), could be negotiated. Hence, women's reproductive choices were not simply predestined by their religious belief. Furthermore, the Tigrayan women's redefinition of who holds authority on the issue of contraceptive use, and which in this study cross-cut educated/non-literate as well as urban/rural divides, indicates that change in women's reproduction practice depends on more than education only. Rather, the prevailing presumptions of linear causality between education and women's empowerment, and girls' education and fertility decline might miss out on the complexity at stake and the need to work on multiple levels when addressing gender issues in development. This includes providing women with alternative options to choose from.

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FOOTNOTES

1. I have known this north-western zone of Tigray since I first arrived there as a photographer in 1993. Since 2001-02 I have carried out several anthropological fieldworks in one semi-urban town and one rural community in Asgede Tsimbla Wereda (see also MJAALAND 2004).
2. According to the the 2007 Census, 95.6 percent are Orthodox Christians, and 4 percent are Muslims in the close to ethnically homogenous region of Tigray (FDRE-PCC 2008).
3. Other common transliterations from Amharic are *idil* or *edil* (*eddil*). Transliterated from Tigrīña it is *idil* when following the Simplified Ethiosemitic Translation System
4. In addition to God and a host of benign entities like angels and saints, malign entities like *Shetan* /the Devil, *jinni* and *aganinti* /evil spirits that can take possession of people are encompassed within this spiritual/religious universe, as are other demanding spirits like *zar* (in my study area most often referred to as *buda - zar*) and *qolle* / *weqabi*, the latter possessing women in particular (see also PANKHURST 1992; ASPEN 2001).
5. MAIMIRE MENNAEMAY (2010) defines the *debtera* (in Tigrīña *deftera*) as an intellectual within the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The local understanding of the *deftera* in my study area in north-western Tigray is as a sorcerer who can both heal and harm, even cause death, with his knowledge. There is generally a lot of anxiety, even fright, related to potential malevolent doings of the *deftera*, who can act on behalf of other people.
6. *Buda* is a male or female witch taking bodily possession of other people through his or her evil eye. *Buda - zar* unites the qualities of *buda* (evil eye) and *zar* since, when possessing someone, they both ‘eat’ that person from within, causing illness, even death.
7. These discussions have been with Maternal and Child Health Service expert Desta Abate at the Asgede Tsimbla Health Bureau in the north-western zone of Tigray.

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The Ambiguous Role of Women in Ethiopia: Female Role Change in Social and in Self-Perception

Angela M. Müller

p. 211-221

- 1 The position of women in Ethiopian society is changing. There are different female role models emerging and more room for exploration. When it comes to the notion of women in Ethiopian society, there are visible cultural changes made by political decision-makers. These decisions influence cultural ideals of femininity. Besides, there has been a noticeable increase in women exploring and re-defining existing norms and thus their position in society (ALMAZ ESHETE 1991).
- 2 The question can be raised, however, whether this cultural change, namely the shifting in position of women as well as their empowerment, is actually substantial. Is this cultural change reflected in social and self-perception of female role-models and female body representations – which are the most substantial and intimate part of femininity? (JORASCHKY, LOEW, RÖHRICHT 2009; BRÄHLER 1986) Or is it just a superficial change on an educational and administrative level of society?
- 3 This presentation shall explore and question theoretical approaches to this topic and show possibilities for advancement in the Ethiopian context.
- 4 Gender studies, anthropology and sociology have developed different theories on gender representation and the female body in its social and self-perception. Some of these theories designed by Western scholarship for Western societies have been transferred to the African context. Many African voices, however, have argued against this unquestioned transfer and developed their own theories on gender and body.
- 5 Still for the peculiar Ethiopian situation a unique theory on gender and body perception is much needed. Possibilities to develop it, and sources for the collection of empirical data to back it up, shall be discussed.

Gender studies in Europe and the USA

- 6 Gender studies in Europe and the US developed out of political movements, such as the women's rights movement, feminism and later the more diverse movements of gay, lesbian and queer people (LLOYD 2008). Given the different aims and foci behind these political groups, the theory behind gender studies shows diverse features as well (SALTZMAN CHAFETZ 2006; ALEXANDER, MOHANTY 1997; FRANKLIN 1996).
- 7 Some of the more widely accepted assumptions shall be highlighted here, as they are important for our further discussion:
 1. "Gender" is not biologically defined, but socially. There is nevertheless a biologically defined difference between men and women, which is called "sex". Gender-roles are perpetuated by society through early-childhood education (Caplan 1996; Davidson' Gordon 1979; Rosaldo 1974).
 2. Traditionally, by socio-cultural standards, women were tied to the domestic sphere and femininity was mainly defined by motherhood. Being a woman meant becoming a wife and a mother (Glenn' Chang' Forcey 1994; Chodorow 1978).
 3. Feminist suggested two points to break this linkage of woman-to motherhood: shared parenthood, which resulted in new role-models for children as well as the steady increase of women's emancipation; and women taking positions in the public sphere (*Ibid.*).
 4. Later in the discourse the aspect of gender as a relational and performative category was added: Gender-roles and gendered behaviour is always negotiated and performed in the actual situation between the persons present (Butler 1993; 1990).
- 8 These assumptions were also transferred to the African cultural context, as they were seen as universally shared facts in all human societies (ROSALDO, LAMPHERE 1974). They even formed the basis for development programs and development aims for African women (in general), which were modelled after political programs for gender mainstreaming in Europe and the US (MIERS 2011; FREY 2003).

Excursus

- 9 Gender studies had an immense influence on studies about the body: its social impact, performative qualities and expressions, the social perception and the self-perception of gendered (female and male) bodies etc. There has also been an influence, however, by other disciplines: such as psychiatry, psychology, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, history, literary studies and art history; each of which has used a different approach to the topic (ABRAHAM, MÜLLER 2010; FRASER, GRECO 2007; ATKINSON 2005).
- 10 The academic discourse on social and self-perception of female bodies therefore moves on the fine line between differing viewpoints. It often combines aspects of gender-roles with aspects of bodily expression and performance (PAULI 2009), including dress (ENTWISTLE, WILSON 2001) and body ornamentation (MÜLLER 2014; KLEMM 2009; 2002), as well as body image in performing and fine arts (WALLACE-SANDERS 2009; THOMSON 2008), imaginary literature, daily life and ritualistic contexts.

- 11 For example the gender-role “virgin” is bodily expressed by a slender figure, a child-like face, big eyes, long hair, no or little body-hair, slim legs, a slim pelvis and nearly no belly or breasts. The virgin’s dress-colour is white and shows the amount of skin that is culturally acceptable. The “virgin” is frequently visualized in performing arts, in fine arts and in literature. She shows clear features and represents a well-known image (perhaps she even shares some universal features worldwide). The “virgin”-bodily expression is still highly favoured in European and US-American societies, as can be seen in the model industry, which prefers girls and women that resemble “virgins” (EICHER 2001).

Gender studies in Africa

- 12 Gender studies in Africa was mainly developed by Black American academics and later African academics educated in the US or Europe, who researched gender issues in their own African cultures or their ancestral cultures (EMENYONU 2004; ARNDT 2002; 2000; KAPLAN 1997).
- 13 Some main points of their argument were:
1. The scholarly and academic theory of gender was developed in a Western context, coined by European and North American history and did not consider the linkage between race, class and gender (BARNARD, SPENCER 2008; FREY 2003). Womanhood and female role models of African women, however, can only be understood in the historical and cultural context of their own societies (CORNWALL 2005; OYEWUMI 1997; NASTA 1991).
 2. When gender theories are transferred to African contexts, indications of colonialism, racism and imperialism can still be found in the way they are imposed on African realities (mostly without considering the very differing cultural contexts of various African societies) (CORNWALL 2005; NNAMEKA 2005; ALEXANDER, MOHANTY 1997; NFAH-ABBENYI 1997).
 3. In some West African societies, as for example the Yoruba (OYEWUMI 1997) and the Igbo (AMADIUME 1987), the predefinition of gender and gender-roles (before colonialism) was not as rigid as in European and North American societies. Gender-roles could be changed easily and were adjustable throughout a human lifetime; they were more situational and relational than static (BORIS 2007). Some scholars even challenged the biological determination of sex as non-existent, as biology and the theory of a biological human nature is also grounded in Western academic history (OGUNDIPE-LESLIE, LEWIS 2002; FAUSTO-STERLING 2000; KAPLAN 1997; OYEWUMI 1997).
 4. Other social determinants, especially lineage-affiliations influence a person’s life in Africa much stronger than gender. For example women in patrilineal societies have a weaker position – as they are the outsiders in the husband’s family after marriage – than women in matrilineal societies, in which the husbands are the outsiders in the wives’ families.
 5. For African women motherhood is not a way of oppression, but of empowerment. Being a wife under the control of a husband, especially if living in his lineage, can be oppressive for a woman, but being a mother usually is not (GLENN, CHANG, FORCEY 1994).¹ As motherhood is highly valued in African societies, and children are not

excluded from daily life, having children does not exclude women from the public sphere, but instead adds to their public standing (CORNWALL 2005; OGUNDIPE-LESLIE, LEWIS 2002; NFAH-ABBENYI 1997).

- 14 It must be noted that African gender theory is of great value to gender studies as a whole, as it adds some important aspects to the theory left out by European or US-American scholars.² A very important aspect added by African Gender Studies is the situational and relational display of gender-roles and gendered behaviour, which implies that gender-roles are not as static as they seem to be in Europe (BUTLER 1993; 1990). Furthermore, the great value and freedom, ascribed to motherhood in African societies, shows that the dilemma of women as “second sex” is not due to being a mother, a wife or a woman, but to social ascriptions to these roles (BORIS 2007). The way out of this dilemma is therefore not to drop some female role-models and change society’s reality, but alter society’s way of thinking, its mental representations and its values.

Excursus

- 15 Setting up a broader gender-theory considering all these aspects, we can compose a list of theoretical levels, which should be observed while working on womanhood and female body-expression:
1. Biological aspects of woman-and manhood: sex
 2. Social and educational aspects of woman-and manhood: gender and gender-roles
 3. Performative, situational and relation-based aspects of woman-and manhood: execution of gender-roles in concrete situations in relation to other members of society
 4. Qualitative aspects of woman-and manhood: energetic, emotional and mental qualities considered female or male
- 16 Bodily self-expression is situated between the second and the third point and encompasses both.

Gender studies in Ethiopia

- 17 Gender studies in Ethiopia was mainly concerned with development issues and the equalization of women on a political and social level (GAESING 2004; FREY 2003; ALMAZ ESHETE 1991). The academic literature on gender is informed by discourses on harmful traditional practices, such as early marriage (GUDAY EMIRIE 2005, TSEHAI BERHANE-SELASSIE 1993), childhood and adult prostitution (YEMATAW WONDIE 2009) as well as gender-role definitions by society. As Ethiopia is affected by patriarchal religions and society structures, and womanhood is strongly defined by ideals emanating from the two monotheistic religions Islam (GIBB 1996) and Christianity, the oppression of women has been the prevalent focus of Ethiopian gender studies.
- 18 The objection against Western theorizing, concluding in the critique of the biological and social determination of sex and gender by African scholars, cannot be transferred in the same way to the Ethiopian context. In my opinion every of the above mentioned

four categories has to be considered and none can be excluded in the research on female role-models and bodily expression.

- 19 My research area – Gondar region – is strongly affected by Christianity. In this context a purely situational approach to gender cannot be taken. In Christian Amhara society one assumes that womanhood is biologically determined (*bätäfäṭro*). In this worldview gender-roles should be socially and educationally constructed and reconstructed after a positive Christian role-model leaving relatively little space for trial and error or the exploration of differing role-models (MOLVAER 1995).
- 20 So far the theory – Gondarean reality, however, looks different. Diving deeper into day-to-day life and social reality, a big gap between the Christian ideal and the aforementioned topics, as well as the secretly lived realities, becomes obvious. Performative, situational and relational aspects of gendered behaviour become visible; while publicly scolded role-models are secretly lived by a big part of society as well (MOLVAER 2007).
- 21 Therefore to analyse gendered attributions, female role-models and bodily representations in the Ethiopian context, each one of the four above mentioned analytical categories has to be considered. Some examples for concrete situations:
 1. Sex: The biological sex of a new-born baby determines if it is baptized after 40 or after 80 days. Girls' baptism is later. Often the sex of a boy or a girl is marked and thus reflected by different hairstyles after the first year of their lives (Fritsch, Zanetti 2003).
 2. Gender and gender-roles: Appropriate gender behaviour is instilled quite early in childhood. In the first three years children are not expected to know themselves. Later on, girls are expected to learn from their mothers, older siblings and peers on how girls and women are supposed to behave, and the household tasks girls should be able to perform (Molvaer 1995). Christian ideals of virginity and motherhood are instilled and enforced by teaching, gossip and reprehension. This part of gender representation – the ideal and the repressed – can easily be researched by analysing fine arts, imaginary and dramatic literature, theatre performances, movies, song texts and video clips, as well as Christian literature, such as the praise songs for Mary (Marcus 2002) (i.e. “Mälkə’a Maryam” or “Mälkə’a Sə’əl”) or hagiographies (Selamawit Mecca 2006). In addition field research, participant observation, the analysis of rituals (i.e. body representations and dress codes) (Klemm 2009; 2002), dances, and personal interviews (i.e. life histories and subject-centred interviews) (Hannig 2014) can help deepen the understanding even more³. Furthermore, the historical dimension should not be neglected – to document the social change taking place slowly but steadily (Belete Bizuneh 2001; Pankhurst, R. 1990; Pankhurst, S. 1957).
 3. Performative, situational and relation-based aspects: There are many performative, situational and relational aspects of gender in Amhara society. To give only two examples: A woman as household-head in her family tells all her adult-children and everyone else around what to do. She speaks out loudly in public neighbourhood meetings and raises her deep voice to calm down fighting drunken men. She performs just like a man in her everyday life, but can change her role, when she goes to Sunday mass, where she takes on the role of a shy, quiet and deeply respectful person, even ashamed of her very being on earth (as a

woman). On the other hand the oldest brother in a family, who is respected by his siblings and neighbours as a brave young man and the one who supports his family financially, can be called *anči* (you for females) by his best friends. Sometimes his friends can even call him the wife of his best friend, especially if they are living together or the other one is financially better off and therefore supporting him. In both examples the situational roles are not taking on the form of an identity construction. They are seen as a result of living conditions by society and are supposed to change again in other circumstances.⁴ This part of gender representation can only be captured in field research by participant observation, group discussions as well as personal discussions and interviews (i.e. thematic interviews posing direct questions). In this regard imaginary literature and theatre performances (especially comedy) can only give some hints, but cannot be used as main sources.

4. Qualitative aspects: Female and male qualitative aspects are given special attention and value in the Amhara worldview. Female or male qualities have nothing to do with the sex of a child or an adult, and female qualities can be exhibited by both women and men. The education of gender-roles, however, tends to train girls in female qualities and boys in male qualities.
- 22 To give only two common examples: A female quality is to be talkative. Thus, if a baby is not yet speaking, but makes noises constantly, it is considered a girl. And if a boy should be talkative or cry easily (another female quality), he will be called *set* (woman) by peers, siblings and even parents. Vice versa a brave and strong girl exhibiting male qualities will be called *wänd* (man) or even *anbässa* (lion) – a praise-name for strong men – by others. This can be a situational ascription or become a permanent one, depending on the individual and the circumstances.⁵
- 23 For this part of research on gender representation the same methods (as listed under point three) can be applied, especially combined with linguistic research using questionnaires, as these mental, qualitative representations are reflected in language.

Excursus

- 24 The question if cultural change in women's positions and female empowerment is really substantial, and reflected in social and self-perception of female role-models and female body representations will be addressed by a newly emerging female role-model (reflected in bodily expression): the independent woman.⁶
- 25 More and more Christian Ethiopian women in the Gondar region are single female household heads, self-reliant, self-sufficient and independent (YIGREMEW ADAL 2001). Some women are unmarried, some are divorced, some highly, some less educated, some are mothers, some are not, some have several relationships with different men and some stay single.
- 26 For them, their newly emerging role-model is inspired by Western ideals and representations on TV and magazines. With the help of this role-model an independent life is created.
- 27 From a historical point of view, some of the already existing, contrasting role-models could also serve as examples for an independent life: The virgin nun – an example for a self-reliant woman, striving for education and independence from marriage, supported

by the community of female nuns and relatively free from family (and lineage) restrictions, social norms and worldly desires. These women are less bound to female gender-norms, such as motherhood and marriage, and strive to become male, which is considered purer and more spiritual. This transition to becoming male even results in bodily changes, such as the ebbing of menstruation (WRIGHT 2002).

- 28 The prostitute – an example of a free, endangered woman, who chooses her sexual partners by herself, supports herself financially and stands outside society and its social norms regarding marriage, family and sexual restrictions. She, however, is frowned upon as well.⁷
- 29 The big mother of the lineage supports herself and her family financially and therefore has the last word in family-matters. She is supported and surrounded by her clan and able to count on her progeny in old age. As the role-model of the “mother” is respected by society, these women have the chance to be given a voice in the neighbourhood and become leading figures in female associations (i.e. mahbär) (DESSALEGN RAHMATO 1991).

Conclusion

- 30 As has been shown, US-American, European and African gender theories as well as debates on gender and body have highlighted different aspects, which should be considered while researching on gender and body in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian context still remains unique (as every regional context is) and requires a closer look. Its peculiarities should be considered in the research process, while applying the hitherto developed theoretical foundations and adding newly emerging aspects to theory.
- 31 I attempted to demonstrate how a thick theoretical background could look – taking the four categories (biological sex; social gender; performative, situational, relational gender; gendered qualities) into consideration – and which methods could be applied while researching the subject.
- 32 In the process of researching questions about social change and emerging new role-models as well as deeper, more persistent layers of womanhood and body representation are arising and have to be taken into consideration. Thus a multi-dimensional and multifaceted approach has to be applied, without neglecting the historical dimension.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Note, that in the Afro-American context (as well as the African context) shared parenthood, even with the extended family, is normal and mothers are usually not restricted to the home.
2. The critique was either reflected in the Western discourse or developed in that context as well: LANCASTER, DI LEONARDO 1997; ORTNER, WHITEHEAD 1981.
3. See the latest anthropological studies on Southern Ethiopia: LA TOSKY 2013; THUBAUVILLE 2010; EPPLÉ 2003.
4. I have not been able to find any literature on the here depicted performative and relational aspects of gender-relations in the Ethiopian context so far.
5. There is literature on praise-names, but as far as I know none on the qualitative gender aspect.
6. Compare to the Nigerian situation: EMENYONU 2004.
7. Compare to the Tanzanian situation: HARAM 2006; PANKHURST, R.

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Gender and Election in the Newspapers' Narratives. The Case of the Fourth Ethiopian National Election of 2010

Agaredech Jemaneh

p. 223-233

- 1 This paper is a follow up of my PhD dissertation on the representations of gender in Ethiopian newspaper narratives, as observed through the coverage of the election of the year 2000 (AGAREDECH 2013). By examining on how two major Ethiopian newspapers covered the fourth national election in 2010, the purpose of this article is to see whether the media have shown any sign of progress regarding gender empowerment after ten years. This analysis will be completed by an interview conducted in November 2012 with a political woman who was elected as Regional president in the year 2000.

Data collection, sampling and analysis

- 2 *Addis Zemen* and *Addis Admass* are two major Ethiopian newspapers, which have the highest circulation rates in the country (Ethiopian Broadcast Corporation, September 2012; Mesfin, 2005). For instance, *Addis Zemen* has an average of 11,860 copies per day (Ethiopian Broadcast Corporation, 2012). On the other hand, 20,000 to 25,000 copies of *Addis Admass* are printed weekly (personal communication with Ato Mengistu Abebe, Deputy Editor of *Addis Admass*).
- 3 The present research focuses on the editions of both newspapers from April to June 2010. During these three months, *Addis Zemen* published 90 daily editions while the weekly *Addis Admass* (on Saturdays) released 14 editions (including one special edition on 25 May 2010, Tuesday). The topic of the election was treated by the two newspapers before April and after June 2010, but the time scope had to be limited in order to come up with specific and manageable data.

- 4 Through a key word strategy, headlines and pictures relevant to the topic of election were collected from the front pages. These news items mainly deal with the candidates engaged in the electoral campaign, on the one hand, and the process of voting, on the other. Accordingly, in *Addis Zemen* 46 items were found in April, 52 in May, and 20 in June making a total number of 118. On the other hand, 13 items were published in *Addis Admass* in April, 15 in May, and 6 in June, totally 36 items. In both newspapers, there are fewer post-election materials than in the pre-election period.
- 5 From this data collection, four sample narratives -two from each newspaper -were then singled out and examined in depth through a critical discourse analysis. This selection consists in two interviews (one with a female candidate and another one with male candidate), one caption story, and one gathering of interviews conducted with six voters are selected. The analysis does not rely on texts only, but also on the pictures that illustrate the news items. These pictures are about candidates, and voters. The majority are male candidates. When pictures of voters are examined, the majority are females.

Analysis of four samples

Case 1: Ballot box: a challenge for mom

- 6 The figure n° 1 was published by *Addis Admas* on the May 17, 2010. It shows an elderly woman, dressed in the traditional *šamma* cloth and wearing eyeglasses. Her hands are busy. With her right hand, she holds her voter card, and with the other, she tries to open the narrow slot of the ballot-box, made of canvas. The caption tries to display the problem she faced during the event.
- 7 Normally, a ballot-box (*koräḷḷo*, in Amharic) is a container in which people insert their voting cards through the narrow slot left at the top of the box. Ballot-box can be made of glass or plastic according to *Addis Admass*. The caption raises a question: “When will this canvas-made ballot-box be changed into glass or plastic box?” The question is presented in a bold and relatively large font size. The word “when” has two implications. On the one hand, it emphasizes that the ballot box which is being used is not convenient. The picture showing the elderly woman struggling to slot in her voting card is self-explaining. On the other hand, the canvas ballot-box is liable for change, as it poses three kinds of problems: 1. It is not transparent; 2. it cannot stand as a solid material. It has either to be hanged up or tied up from four directions using ropes or other string materials; 3. its narrow slot is non convenient, particularly for old people, to insert the ballots easily
- 8 The literature tells us that ballot-boxes can be made of different materials, such as wood, cardboard, etc. However, all the pictures collected in the newspapers show that the ballot-boxes are made of canvas. There may be four possible reasons why a canvas-made *koräḷḷo* is chosen in the Ethiopian context. The first reason could be canvas is portable, so it can be folded into small size. Second, it is waterproof, so the ballots inside may not be damaged. Compared to this canvas box, what would happen to boxes made of wood or metal? Both materials may take more space and may be too heavy to transport. Compared to these situations, canvas made ballot box is more convenient. Third, canvas made ballot box can contain more cards than ballot box made of glass, metal or wood. Fourth, canvas made box is not fragile.

Fig. 1: The old woman and the ballot-box



Fig. 2: The self-assertive candidate



Fig. 3: The young female candidate



Fig. 4: Voters' voices



- 9 So, what is the issue about the canvas ballot-box? It is not transparent and therefore, it is not possible to see what it contains. If it was glassy or transparent, at least the number of ballots could be visible.

Case 2: the self-assertive candidate

- 10 The term ballot box is repeated in this article in a different context. “Unless the ballot box is emptied, I will be the winner” (*Addis Zemen*, April 3, 2002, p.1, 11, 24). The narrative is presented into two parts. On the front page, the spot news quotes the confident statement of the interviewee, a member of one opposition party, to win the election. The story is continued in the politics page on page 11. The interview covers the entire page and ends on page 24. The size of this interview shows how much space is given to the topic. The story has two different titles. On the front page, the headlines quote the subject’s self-confidence in the competition. In the inside page, the headline is drawn from a statement made by the interviewee: “Beyene Prime minister, Siye Defense minister, Merera Foreign minister.... how would charge these people?”¹
- 11 The interviewee campaigns to be elected for the House of Representatives. He talks on behalf of himself saying “I”. The interviewee represents three institutions Hibret Party that he is member of, an opposition party, known as Medrek, of which is an executive member. Hibret is composed of four different parties (Oromo People’s Congress, Tigrayan opposition party, Arena, and Medrek) and the parliament. This list shows the norm of the society, in which a man can play roles in various institutional structures.

Case 3: Candidate 2, the young female candidate

- 12 The next case is the story of a young female candidate, published by *Addis Admass* on April 30, 2010. On the front page only her portrait photo accompanied by headline entitled “Neither Blind Opposition nor Support Take Us Nowhere”. The full interview is given on page 3, with the same picture, and its end is printed on page 11.
- 13 The political views of the candidate are blended with biographical information, like her birthplace, age and her work experience. According to her narration, she involved into politics because she wanted to fight against the bureaucratic red tape of the country. She campaigns to be elected by the community of a *qäbälé* of the capital city.
- 14 Her main message is that the opposition party she represents is much better than the others. The implication of the headline message is that people have developed negative attitudes towards political parties, other than the ruling coalition. Their negative attitude might not have logical ground because as they blindly support the parties in power they blindly oppose the new ones. Therefore, the candidate tells that even though there are challenges, one has to join the political movement by joining the existing political parties.

Case 4: voters’ voices

- 15 The fourth case is an interview with six different voters published by *Addis Zemen* on April 22, 2010), presenting the views of three women followed by three men. The headline emphasizes that it is the responsibility of all parties to accept whatever the result of the election is. The tone of the content of this interview story is somehow similar to what is reflected in the above case. The difference is that the interviewees who express their concerns are voters, not candidates.
- 16 The picture inserted in the article represents an old man casting his vote into the ballot box. He uses one of his hands to insert his card into the slot. There are obvious similarities and differences with figure 1. Both voters are relatively above the middle age and both are putting their voter cards in the same kind of canvas ballot box, but the two pictorial narratives, the observer can easily notice to what extent gendered the process of election is. In the first place, the man shows no difficulty in using the voting material. The ballot box is placed properly so that people can put in their cards easily. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the man on the picture seems not to be related to the text for he is mentioned neither by his name, nor by his role as interviewee. Since the story was published on April 30, 2010, before the election took place in May 2010, it is understood that the picture was taken from the archive.
- 17 In the paper itself, the first interviewee is a woman voter from Addis Ababa. She starts to point out the importance of being given training or information on the newly introduced Code of Ethics of Election. Then, she is a bit critical of the flaws of the government, by saying that the state has to stop throwing citizens to prisons for “trivial” reasons. Therefore, she concludes on the need for tolerance amongst all parties.
- 18 The second interviewee, again a woman, tells that this time the public has understood how to elect their representatives properly. So the public is perceived as a decision maker. Her intention is to tell that whoever loses the election, as a result of the

expressed votes, should accept the defeat. The third interviewed woman shares the same idea with the other two, and she warns that the parties should make their argument in a modest and wise way. Therefore, these interviews suggest that the public has similar view regarding the election process. The first and the third woman are from the same district while the area of residence of the second woman is not given.

- 19 Having presented the views of the three women, next come the opinions of other three men. The addresses of the three men are not revealed. Their views revolve around the improvement of democratic argument, and the parties should focus on the introduction of their policies, which the researcher thinks is a point worth buying.
- 20 The recurring themes are that parties should present their policies to the public; they should stop exchanging offensive expressions. The other theme revealed is that the public has to use its cards to make the right decision regarding casting their votes for the right persons. Finally, all parties should be ready to accept the result and should act responsibly and show civility.

Structural description

- 21 Narratives can be presented in different ways: by describing the writer's observation, or by giving background information, or by directly presenting the dialogue between the interviewer and the interviewee. This approach seems to indicate that election needs more of opinionated approach than presenting the five WHs facts only. On the other hand, this approach may reflect the biases or partiality of the newspaper from a certain group (MESFIN, 2005). Accordingly, the above samples reflect views of people from different directions: the writer's views, the public's views and the candidates' views. There could be the fourth view that is the view of the National Election Board (NEB). How are the narratives presented?
- 22 Traditionally, front-page items are known or classified to be news items. News items are again traditionally structured in an inverted pyramid structure. However, with regard to *Addis Zemen*, most of election stories on front page are presented in feature style. This is a new trend introduced by the newspaper compared to the style which was common in the year 2000. Here we read more feature stories presented as lead or opening stories. This implies that the newspaper is giving more space to subjective descriptions and detailed information with regard to election as timely issue. On the other hand, *Addis Admas*' style has also changed to some extent. In the year 2000, most of the time, it was common to see featurized news items on its front page. In the year 2010, however, the medium adhered to traditional news writing format for its front page items.

Topics covered

- 23 The points recurrently addressed by the newspapers can be categorized into three. The first category is that of the public's concern regarding the importance of conducting peaceful election processes. This by itself shows how the election is accompanied by conflicts, suspicions, contradictions and open conflicts. The narratives' reference to this is the country's previous election experience, which took place in 2005. In 2005 election, there were clashes and conflicts that led a number of citizens to prison and to

loss of lives, as reflected in the narratives. So, people were emphatically telling that they do not want to see that kind of turmoil.

- 24 The other point, which has been already mentioned earlier, is the importance of tolerance. The interviewees reflect that the different opposition parties and the ruling party should tolerate each other. They should restrain themselves from exchanging offensive words when they present their agendas and views to the public. The interviewees mostly state that offensive and aggressive expressions should not be used to address the opposition in front of the public audiences. It is commented that insult will not be helpful in getting the public's attention. This implies that newspapers carry offending expressions and insults.
- 25 The third major topic or theme addressed by the two newspapers is the ratification of the election Code of conduct. The code of conduct of election was signed on 30 October 2009, and it was the main topic journalists wrote about (TRONVOLL 2011). This code of conduct was proclaimed so that it could help to manage unethical and unprocedural practices in the process of the election. In other words, the past experiences of election gave lessons to the government and led it to design the code of conduct to run the election processes smoothly. In relation to this point, from the discussions made in the narratives, it is understandable that there are conditions that should be respected by candidates.

Seasonality and repetition

- 26 Since 1995, national parliamentary election has been a periodical event taking place every five years in Ethiopia. Periodical activities are known and are expected by the readers and the media. One of the common practice of the media is, therefore, to use from past files or documents to substantiate current information. Using pictures of voters from the archives reminds us what Conboy (2007:157) stated. He wrote:

“Consonance has relevance to the national narrative at the heart of news worthiness. It refers to the predictability of events. Within a national context, some stories become news because they fit with what an audience expects at particular times of the year. To this end media diaries are drawn up well in advance of events which will have a nationally public importance.”
- 27 The above idea is certainly reflected in the newspapers here. The focus of the writers here is to give color or attractive structure to the text placed on the pages, not the actors.
- 28 The pictures brought to the current situations could be those taken during the first election held in 1995, or the second election held in 2000, or from the third election which took place in 2005. This matter is not mentioned in the captions, but only sources are stated. During the study period, *Addis Zemen* published 12 pictures showing people putting their cards in the narrow slots of ballot boxes. Out of these twelve pictures, eight voters are women and four are men. Two women are portrayed with their kids, while the others are without kids. During the 2000 election, more women participated as voters. This is repeated in the 2010 election.
- 29 The two newspapers characterized female political candidates as having no major differences between their views. For instance, there is a female candidate whose story is covered by both newspapers on their front page narratives. This female candidate is interviewed and her story published by *Addis Admass* on May 7, 2010 and by *Addis Zemen*

on May 15, 2010. Therefore, repetitive presentation is one of the media approach. What makes her important to be interviewed by the two newspapers? That young candidate reflected that she was much loved by the public for she was young and had serious and important political agenda. This is what is reflected in the year 2010, paying heed to other young female candidates who represent the views of the opposition parties.

Gender and gender relations in the electoral process: critical discourse analysis

- 30 Discourse analysis is chosen here for its ability to examine how gender and gender relations are conceived through words or pictures. This short presentation investigates how women, men, and their discursive practices are reflected in the sample analysis in relation to their political spheres. As Bell and Garrett (2007:45) state:

“Meanings are, however, expressed in various ‘forms’ or ‘surface structures’, that is, in concrete lexical items, clause and sentence structure, syntactic categories, word order, discourse intonation, graphical structures, and the organization of macrostructures in canonical schemata, such as those of narration, argumentation or news reporting.”

- 31 Accordingly, gender and gender relations during the 2010 election were examined by taking four narratives, two from each newspaper. Quoting Hinchman and Hinchman (1997), Richardson (2007:241) defined narrative as “discourses with a clear sequential order that connects events in a meaningful way for a definite audience and thus offer insights about the world and/or people’s experiences of it”.

Women give election an emotional touch

- 32 In the context of this short study, voters, candidates (female, male and parties) and the writers of the election stories are negotiating in translating their interests through the newspapers. The newspapers have their own discursive practices in presenting these negotiations.
- 33 Women are portrayed as players of commonly known roles. The young female candidate, for instance, is described how she was active in organizing fashions, traditional food festivals and the like before she came to the political arena. She came to politics because she observed how the bureaucracy was hustling when she was trying to facilitate and hold the above-mentioned events.
- 34 As perceived from over viewing of the entire data, there are women voters who fetched their children to the election stations. One would appreciate this practice for it shows women’s determinations to use their political rights.
- 35 On the other hand, no man is depicted with his kid. Why do women bring their children with them? Where are the fathers? The newspapers do not answer these questions. But it is implicitly understood that this is the manifestation of the traditional belief that assigns women to taking care of children. What does this exclusion of men from this process of socialization tell us? Presenting women with their kids on the Election Day gives emotional attributes to the occasion there by revealing how election is very much important in the lives of people, as stated earlier.

Power relation of the interviewer and interviewee

- 36 Writing in the media is characterized by a kind of power struggle between the source of information and the information gatherer. While the former may resist providing the required information, the latter keeps on probing more to squeeze out the materials needed for the purpose of writing.
- 37 As observed from the interview with the male candidate (case 2), he is asked whether the party he runs for intends to join the coalition party or not. The interviewee tells the journalist that he should take his view as personal view instead of presenting it him as representative of the party's view, even though he is a member of it. The journalist insists on this point because on the sub headline the interviewee described himself as a representative of the party he's running for. At this particular point, the two are confronting. The male interviewee tries to avoid the question that comes from the interviewer. Then the latter raises another question without getting his question answered. This implies that sometimes the interviewee seems to wield more power than the interviewer does.
- 38 Similar situation is reflected in the story of the young female candidate (case 3). The interviewer asks her if there is anyone she appreciates either from the opposition parties or from the ruling party. She evades the question by giving an irrelevant answer. Unlike the above male candidate, she tells the writer the point she wants to say. She answers that the leader of the party she joined is the best person. In this dialogue, the interviewee does not say to the interviewer that the question is not appropriate, but she tells what she wants to convey. Neither the journalist asked her to address the question she is asked directly nor the dialogue ended there. This is the media discourse.
- 39 When the two interviews are compared, the female candidate sometimes speaks on behalf of her party, by promoting the positive sides of this party led by a male leader. On the other hand the male candidate tells only about himself, trying to bring himself to the public's attention.

The gendered ballot box

- 40 There are times when writers of newspapers narratives and their subjects may intersect at certain points. In the two newspapers, ballot box is presented as a hot issue. The nature of the kit is presented as if it is difficult for voters to cast their votes in.
- 41 The slot left for card insertion is so narrow that people have difficulty to insert the card into it. This difficulty is more serious especially to mothers, as per the description given below the picture (case 1). What does that word "mother" imply here? It suggests aged women. The journalist used mothers here to substantiate the argument that women always face difficulties in coping with the public sphere. Therefore, the writer is gendering the election procedures and routines, by presenting women as illiterates and incapable of accomplishing tasks similar to those of men. Implicitly, however the reporter addresses the highly secretive nature of the kit.
- 42 The ballot box is problematized for various reasons. One of them is the point suggested in the second interview saying that the kit is vulnerable to sabotage and cheating for

nothing can be seen inside it. This idea is compared to the point reflected in the caption of figure 1, which tells about the difficulty of canvas made ballot box.

True life experience: lamb as metaphor of leadership

- 43 This last section, deals with a former female political leader and member of the Harari Regional Council, *Wäyzäro Nuria*. An interview of her was published by *Addis Zemen* (vol. 60, n°25) in the first week of October 2000. This was one of the sample narratives I had analyzed in my dissertation to see how gender and gender relation are perceived by the media (AGAREDECH, 2013: 249). Twelve years later, I met this woman for a short interview at the Harrari Cultural Centre on November 1, 2012, in order to ask some questions that were not raised in the published interview, particularly on three points: 1) her memories of the year 2000 election, 2) her conception of a woman's role in her society, and 3) how she relates her private (domestic sphere) life with her public (sphere) life.
- 44 A widow now, the sixty-year old, *Wäyzäro Nuria* used to be engaged in various social and political commitments. She is the chairperson of the Regional Women Association and the vice chairperson of Women's Coalition. She has been the chairperson of the *Ġäma* for more than 37 years. *Ġäma* is the oldest social institution in the society. She is advisor of the Harrari Cultural centre. She is Deputy Chairperson of the Council of Ethiopian Women Lawyers' Association. She is also the Chairperson of the Council of the Coalition of 15 *Ġämas*. They are governed by principles even though they do not have written laws. Below *Ġäma*, there are other social institution called *Afoča* aimed at resolving conflicts between husbands and wives. All the above mentioned responsibilities show the multi dimensional roles of a woman like her in her community.
- 45 She recalls the year 2000 for different reasons. She did not expect to be appointed president of the regional council. She was completely engaged in the political instability that existed in the Council during that time. She did not read the interview, but she knew that her story was published is from an old friend who congratulated her from Addis Ababa. The reason she gave was that
- 46 The number one question in this regard was whether she was nominated for full term or not. According to her, she was elected for the full term. However, her personal interest is to empower women at the grassroots level. Every time she asks herself, why women are not coming to politics? While she worked as the chairperson of Harrari League, she could not address the women of the common people. She explains the situation as follows:
- Let me focus on the 2000. Some people were against my power. Some were supportive. Of course, I know how to lead people. I want to use the metaphor of Lamp here. It doesn't give light to its bottom but to the top ones only. Similarly, I couldn't reach the majority women directly. My reason was this actually. On the other side, some individuals opposed, because they couldn't accept a woman as their leader. So I refused the position however, I was spokesperson of the council. For the first year, I was Deputy Spokesperson, after that for the rests of four years I worked as main spokesperson.
- 47 The other reason she attributed to is that she is not educated at the higher level. She stopped going to school after she finished grade eight. She wants to see her Region to

be lead by a person who educated at the higher level. She suggests that leaders should be elites or educated ones who went through modern educational system.

- 48 The other question the researcher was curious to know about was how *Wäyzäro* Nuria managed to be active in the public sphere while she was a mother and a house wife during the year 2000. The subject reveals interesting realities of the majority of housewives, which is not disclosed in her published interview. Her answer now shows that her life was not as simple as what is told in public.

We were not economically well to do. My children were small kids. I did not have house cleaner. So, I used to make handcrafts and sell them to earn money to provide my family with the necessities. I never missed any single meeting in committees. I got married when I was 14 years. My mother died a month before my wedding. My brothers were not self sufficient. So, life was challenging. However, I managed to lead my life. At the same time, I used to listen to radio and I was empowered by the information I get through the media. I was member of EPRP. During that time, there was no women's association. It was not common to have that. Nevertheless, I gathered women and organized a cell (women's association) for EPRP in our region. In all the five doors (Harrari, has five main gates that separates it from the outside Harrar region, and these gates are one of the tourist attractive heritages of the region). I was chairperson for them all. But finally, our association was dismantled. All the members were women. It is not fruitful to mix with men before equality is ensured. I saw all the circumstances what we encountered. During the Derg regime, we were asked to prepare food for the Bazaar. I confronted that we were striving to come out of the influence of kitchen work.

- 49 This long quotation tells different realities. Her domestic responsibilities and her public life witness her strengths. She got married to her deceased husband at a very young age, 14. She has to assist the family economically for her husband couldn't afford to provide the family with all the necessities. She was active to bring political change in her community.
- 50 Her experiences show that, for a woman to come to the public sphere, she has to fulfill all the duties that are attributed to her at the domestic level. *Wäyzäro* Nuria believes that women can work what men are entitled to. The only obstacle that hinders women from coming out is the traditional impositions. As per her life story, personal challenges led her to be strong and invisible. Her loss of her mother and poverty toughened her to come out as winner in all the challenges. The other important element that contributes for her empowerment is the media. The information she obtained through radio served her as important input.

Concluding remarks: inter-textual meanings

- 51 Newspapers are one of the instruments supposed to facilitate the process of election by providing readers with reliable information. Two different newspapers examined here display similar approaches and content coverage in terms of gender representation. Both show men as strong and competent, while women are weak and incompetent. Not only the newspapers narratives but also the perception of the "assertive" woman's belief herself results that leadership should be left for men. However, this dominant representation is challenged by women who engage in politics. In the case of the young female candidate indicated in figure 3 above. She runs her political campaigns not for the higher position but for a *qäbälé* administration. This illustrate the fact that women

mostly run for the lower level positions. This is visible through the participation of women in the lower administrative levels. This reveals the fact that women leaders participate in politics to bring about change in the society at the grassroots levels. For instance, *Wäyzäro* Nuria, who used to occupy high political positions, believes if she sits on the top of the ladder, the women of the common people may not be addressed and their problems may not be resolved. All these lead us to conclude that there may be various improvements in gender and gender relations, but these improvements have not gone far enough beyond the traditional benchmark.

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FOOTNOTES

1. By this, the interviewee means the provisions of the electoral code against insulting statements are applicable only to the opposition parties, not the governing party.

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Kara Women in Motion: Putting into Action an Association for More Development, Power and Security

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p. 235-246

- 1 Terms like “Empowerment of Women” and “Engendering Development” are central in debates about the fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals for 2015. The aim is to support men and women in their ability and possibility to operate and participate freely and under equal conditions, to become active and productive, to use their potential and resources for the well-being of their family, society and their own. These global premises should be guaranteed for all people and thus they meet different challenges in the realization due to diverse structures of different societies.
- 2 Five years ago the *Korcho Meena Maberno* project was established in Korcho, one of the three main villages of Kara, to implement an institution that provides a saving and micro-credit-service for women run by a women’s cooperative. The basic concept is that every member saves money into a common pot from which individual members can borrow an amount when required. Several women have been selected to form a management board and participate in training courses held in different administrative towns. Money for investment comes mainly from tourists visiting Kara area and paying for photos. For the community, tourism is a new source of income that requires methods to administer it strategically. At the beginning the money tourists had to pay for the village entry was administered by an association to which only men belonged and that spent it according to the demands of the community. Now the *Korcho Meena Maberno* project is able to give this chance also to women to invest individually earned money that the tourists pay to take photographs. Money is mostly required for financing transport to health centres in the more distant market towns, as well as treatment, medicine and accommodation in hospital. Furthermore to counter temporary shortages of food and to support extra demands in distant towns, as there is no market in Kara. The cooperative should empower women to pursue their own

interests and to build up an independent insurance system for themselves and their families.

- 3 This access to and control of finances should also provide a higher measure in co-determination and decisive power for them. As a newly defined area of influence it affects gender roles and shifts responsibilities, as it allows women to invest in projects that are important for themselves without having to depend on financial support from their men. My study shows how Kara women in Korcho deal with the new cooperative, and how it is integrated, developed and talked about in their community. It is a driving force for change in the life of the women and the society at large, developing new kinds of knowledge and networks, and affecting authority structures. Old ways are changing as women use new strategies and participate directly in public life. There's recognition of new values, a building up of self-confidence and a modification of traditional role models. In practice, women face new expectations, problems and challenges as well. For example, it is difficult for Kara women to combine regular meetings of the cooperative with their full timetable of agricultural, household and family jobs. The study is based on fieldwork undertaken over several months in Korcho where I investigated the impact of the association. It shows how Kara women creatively modify and adapt this externally initiated model of financial security to make it fit in with local institutions and conventions and becomes thereby a socially accepted movement of women.

Background

- 4 This study refers once more to the discourse about the position of women in pastoral societies. This discourse is mostly characterized by words like 'disadvantage', 'passiveness' and 'marginalization' of women under their men. "Western" graduations and valuations are often decisive in the construction of development projects and efforts to change this situation. The understanding for local knowledge, methods and gender roles seems to be secondary to the realization of externally targeted goals. Dichotomies that ascribe the political/public area to the men and the private/domestic one to the women, nevertheless, reach in the society of the Kara just as little as in most other pastoral societies. The control of these decisive areas is often connected, men and women operating together in everyday life (SAGAWA 2006: 63).
- 5 This begs the question, how Kara themselves deal with externally initiated actions based on assumptions like this? How do they integrate a saving-credit-project with local forms of organization?
- 6 The *Korcho Meena Maberno* project could be a steppingstone for individual women to get further education, attain new consciousness about organization and management, models of behaviour and the rights of women. It raises awareness of the human rights of women by encouraging them to stand up and work for it, to get access to rights like property, school education, skills, information and development. And it is one movement against the obstacles of the "subalterns to speak" (SPIVAK 1988), not only in the domain of promoting gender equality, but also in strengthening competences of Kara society at all, to be supported and perceived as equal members of the Ethiopian State. The interaction of different needs in development projects, culture and gender systems provokes power games and requires elaborate strategies, sensitive approaches and negotiation to have a balanced output. Everybody involved in its implementation has to reflect upon, as it is no automatic working process and no routinized practice.

It's a project that unites women, regardless of relational, neighbourly or amicable ties and without limits of age or social position. It absolutely excludes men and by this creates a new action area reserved for women.

- 7 The Kara live in the Ethiopian lowlands on the southern shores of the Omo River. They live primarily from subsistence economy in the form of flood-retreat cultivation and small-stock pastoralism. Partilineal principles are the basis of their segmentary social structure. The often polygamous households show a social and economic unity where the roles and responsibilities are distributed after age and gender. Every household exhibits one or several women-centred households (Ekejiuba 1995). The husband has to provide each of his women a house, small stock and farming land of whose harvest she disposes and for which she has the responsibility. For pastoral works, with the exception of milking, men are responsible while women care for the main household work and both share the workload of cultivating the fields. A woman can get a certain amount of money, by serving as a photo-model for tourists. This money she can use for her own purposes, it is mostly invested in food and medicinal care. Neighbours and related women often meet to discuss recent subjects and to maintain reciprocal barter-partnerships. Visits of women in other Kara villages or settlements of surrounding ethnic groups are frequent and consolidate a good network among the women. Such gatherings of women are important processes to make decisions in everyday life, the well-being of the family and society; they contribute considerably to the continuance of society, but are mostly not perceived as significant to increase performances (MASENO/KILONZO 2011).
- 8 Responsibilities in the household, food distribution and upbringing of children are important domains too, where women can exert influence. But these areas of competence have low prestige in public awareness, are mostly concealed and not present in the general perception (cf. LYDALL 2005). Existing standardizations and expectations shape the possibilities and borders of women within the social organization. However everything is open to variation. Traditional norms and obligations of gender roles are challenged particularly by external influences over and over again. Both sexes get stimulated to discourses and comparisons, even if through superficial contact with tourists, development aid workers, missionaries or anthropologists. Representation of alternative forms of femininity and womanhood, may it be just by the presence of foreign women with different dress, behaviour and possibilities, has influence on knowledge and practice of Kara women. Own restrictions of autonomous action, subjective wishes and possibilities of Kara women are reconsidered, compared and negotiated anew.

The Women Association Korcho Meena Maberno

- 9 The women's association *Korcho Meena Maberno* was based in 2007 in Korcho on the advice of EPARDA (Ethiopian Pastoralists Research & Development Association) and PACT Ethiopia. EPARDA is an indigenous non-governmental organization and is actively engaged in the interests of pastoral groups in Ethiopia and PACT Ethiopia is an organization engaged in the improvement of health, livelihood and natural resource management. One main focus of both lies in the support of women, particularly by strengthening their participation and scope of action. The *Korcho Meena Maberno* association should provide an extra possibility for the women to protect themselves

financially, to benefit from their capital, have better access rights and control of their life. At the beginning the organization was supported in its ideals and financially by these organizations; they supported the implementation of the cooperative in the form of a civil society organization and processes of decision-making. Also the owner of the *Murulle Camp Side*, a nearby tourism-lodge, gave every now and then financial help or brought guests in the village to which he introduced the project and asked for donations. Aldi Bodo, one of the chair-members of the association, explains the importance of the support by the Greek owner of the *Murulle Camp Side* as follows:

“Why we ask this Greek man to help us? Because he is better than us, sometimes he brings guests to us, they can see our association and give something. Or when he himself comes here and gives some money for the association. This is important because we are very weak, before there was no such association in this area, this is a new idea, which is created by the government to support the women. And we are voluntary to collect our money and to make our association. And this is how we want to come up and change our life slowly” (Interview with A. BODO 2010).

- 10 Individual women take leadership positions in the association, regardless of age or relationship rules, but depending on their readiness to be involved and to take over responsibility for the cooperative. Some of them received training courses in financial management and maternal health care in Turmi and Arba Minch.
- 11 It forms the counter pole to the cooperative of men that originated over the course of a tourism project in Korcho and administers the money that is taken from tourists. The women gain individual income from tourism when the visitors pay them for taking a photo and they don't receive anything from the entry toll to the village. But even with this limitation they earn good money and the association was founded for the better usage and management of it. From now on they use their money on the one hand to satisfy the needs of everyday life, to buy coffee or salt etc. and on the other hand, to save it in the association for long-term investments. Originally the association should function after a Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (RoSCAs)-System. In a local support-network, the members save money by paying regular contributions into a common pool and pay a part or all of it back to single members when required (ARDENER/BURMANN 1996).
- 12 All members are obliged to deposit regularly an agreed amount to have access to the financial reserves. To get money out of the pool the member has to raise a request, then the association decides together about who gets credit and how high it should be. The members gather every few weeks to speak about recent problems and to make decisions to whom a certain amount is paid, who has got in delay with payments or must be admonished for missing meetings. Participation in the association was generally high at the beginning. One of the reasons was the trust base between the participants, when one lives and works close by, and is familiar with the conditions of the other. Respect and solidarity raises pressure to take part in the enlargement of the pool and to strengthen the common project for the purposes of collective consciousness and shared experience. It is a commitment in the interest of the community and in the own. ROSCAs could be a strong relief in times of crisis, like Ardener Aredo reported about the first ROSCAs in Ethiopia that developed after the Italian Occupation for reconstruction and are still active today (AREDO 1991). In principle, this kind of organization should be based on local structures of social protection given for example in support from relatives and confidants. However, in

addition, it should create a more formal base and lend stability to the irregular incomes of the inhabitants.

The development and structural change of the association

- 13 In this perspective, does the organization in Korcho actually deliver what it promises? Is it offering chances and advantages for the Kara women?
- 14 The original idea for the association was to set up meetings every three or four weeks and to collect 20 Birr from every participant. At the beginning around 40 members attended the association. After three years the organizations stopped their support and involvement and the *Korcho Meena Maberno* had to depend on its own resources. Starting from this the association changed its mechanism. First of all it was difficult for the members to distribute their financial part at every meeting due to the lack of individual capital, more and more women failed to attend the meetings regularly and so the association stopped collecting money from the members. They decided to live from the capital they had already collected in the last three years. They also stopped having regular meetings, due to the full timetable of their regular workloads during agricultural seasons, in the household and so on. They changed their way of acting and started, in times of shortage, to buy stuff like sorghum, maize, Uso, oil and biscuits in the market-towns and sold it back in Korcho to the villagers. By this their capital remains stable and they are able to buy again new things and provide necessary products for the community.
- 15 They get active just when the need to provide products for the community is high and a transport to the market-towns is given. In the past such endeavours would have been unthinkable due to the lack of transportation. But since 2012 a truck to Turmi is provided every Monday by a company working in the Kara area. This is an essential factor to organize and to realize the projects of the women association. During my fieldwork in 2012, I experienced this essential respect. There has been an alarming lack of sorghum and maize in the village, the basic foods in Kara. So the women decided to take half of their capital to buy this product for the community in Turmi, the next market-town. After three long meetings and discussions in five days some persons were selected to go and to leave behind their work on the fields and in the homes. The truck started early in the morning and reached Turmi after one hour. The women bought fifteen sacks of sorghum and six sacks of maize and gave it to the grinding mill in Turmi. In the afternoon they arrived back in Korcho and stored the products in different houses to distribute it later on.
- 16 This process works very well, but there are some problems the women's association is facing. First of all is the small amount of capital, due to the limited possibility of income gathering, as the only income is the payment of tourist for photos. And the prices in town increased dramatically, for some products it increased threefold in the last three years. Another problem is the lack of accountability and transparency of the association. None of the women can read or write and so it is difficult for them to manage the financial expenses. They depend on men to do the bookkeeping for them, but recently they decided to stop this. So now the women count the money, buy products, sell it and count their money again and keep it in mind. This gives rise to

room for mismanagement. There are no receipts, no formal financial management to reflect upon the losses and gains, to compare the expenses. So every time, it is just a situational check-up. Also there is no access to further training or information and for three years there was no meeting with other women associations from surrounding ethnic groups or villages.

- 17 Before such kind of meetings and exchanges of experience has been organized by PACT Ethiopia and EPaRDA. Now workshops or evaluations from outside partners or organization are not given anymore. Another factor is that the men's organization has much more capital than the women's association, because they control the entry of the village that is much more than the payment for individual photos. But the men's association is not managing this money not properly and rarely spends it for benefit of the community. Sometimes even the men's association calls on the women's association in times of crisis. They got to know that the women use their capital effectively in solving problems and so they deliver the responsibility to them, without even adding capital. Another problem for the women is that they have no house for the work of the association, where they can meet, store and sell the products. And there are complains, especially from the head-members, that only a few members are really active and engaged in discussions and realization of projects and they tried to animate the others to participate more actively. But the chance is limited due to the workload of normal household and fieldwork activities.
- 18 We have to look at the good sides of it, as an own support-network it has first of all the positive precondition to perceive the capacity of women and to promote their participating and self-help in situations where local protection mechanisms are not enough. It is a tool that is offering voice and choice and that cares about long-term advancement. In the past innovations and developing models concerned mostly the men in Kara, they conducted final decisions and control. Sometimes women were also included in the implementation of the projects, but at last the responsibility and conversion was taken over by men. Money could be a resource which provides new self-esteem for women, which is perceived as a common standard for both sexes without gendered distribution restrictions and it offers therefore the feeling of autonomy (CLARK 1980:358).
- 19 Own capital is important for Kara women, as they spend it for example on cow's milk, butter, oil and cow skins from Hamar, but also with increasing regularity for imported alcohol. So the association is also an institution that prevents misuse because the women decide together for whom the pool gets opened and whether it is really needed or maybe just taken for short-term enjoyment. For many members it is important to have extra capital for self-finance management, capital on which they can decide according to interests and problem situations. Often the husband is using their money for things he feels to be right, like weapons, cows for bride-wealth, bullets or alcohol. For the family it is better to save it, instead of having to borrow the money if necessary. Saving is voluntary, offers flexibility to react on unexpected problems and by this reduces vulnerability. And the stowing away of the money diminishes the susceptibility of in-kind shortages, where money gets taken, stolen or eaten by insects, where the animals get ill and grain goes bad, where a lot of people see what you have and claim a share.
- 20 Positive main features of the association are trust and respect, aspects that an external institution could not offer. This results from the social ties which are anchored in the

village and form the existing social space. The organization thereby has a very private character and takes place in the immediate life surroundings. The direct contact strengthens the consolidation of the project. Even if the members are not able to attend official meetings, nevertheless, the association is always a subject at private meetings of women and very present in the common awareness. The women themselves evaluate the process, accompany the association by its heights and depths; invest time, interest and capital. And by this it also becomes the project of every single member. All members use their strengths and capabilities, get a feeling of security and above all an alternative and voice to influence their being positively.

- 21 They get knowledge and skills to improve and consolidate the association. Their chance for participating and using the agency is strengthened, while they have a cover for unexpected household expenses like illness or widowhood. Another effect of the association is that the children grow up with this women's association. Children are always present at the meetings: they play and run around between the women. For them this formal women's organization has become part of everyday life and normality. The children experience the influence of their mother, see their mothers obtain something and get the knowledge and trust to do likewise. This association becomes a part of the socialization, the local practice and knowledge. Also individual freedom is stimulated, because women take positions by which they gain other competences. Many women actively engaged in the association are widows, who have houses and lands and hold their destiny in their own hands.
- 22 To have continuance it is important for such projects to be integrated in the everyday life of the respective societies. The amount of work to sustain the domestic life lies largely on the shoulders of the women. Their time is filled with tasks like cooking and serving food, milking, bringing water and firewood to the homes, the care of the children and the grinding of flour. After these time-intensive works in the household, the cultivation of the fields is next on the plan. Or, the women provide the accommodation (coffee and food) of the men who are working on the fields. They carry all utensils (meal stones, water canisters, calabashes...) needed for carrying the field workers to their working places and serve them with drinks and foods. It's not common to have spare time, a fact visible for example at meetings of the association when the women mostly bring their grindstones and the time is used to grind millet.
- 23 Also it's normal to bring their children along and to care for them during discussions. In particular during the cultivation and harvest times it's hard for the Kara women to keep the association alive. For months they find no time to meet and the project lies flat. The chairpersons complain about the situation and try to change it. The problem is that every single member stays away during the day on their respective fields and comes back to the village late in the evening, when there is no energy and time for meetings. Meetings during the day are possible only with field neighbours. The saving deliveries are especially difficult for many during this time, because the rainy season that is well for the harvest is at the same time bad for tourism. Due to the impassable roads no tourist makes his way to the village and therefore the money the organization is dependent on, is missed. Moreover, the women have to spend their day in the fields, only a few remain around in the village to supervise the children. So, they cannot afford to wait in the village for the few tourists coming to Korcho. This is only possible for some young people, while they shorten the waiting period with games or pearl works.

- 24 It's often difficult for women to avoid spending the money they save in the association. They have to resist demands from relatives, children and friends asking for support. The money they save in the association stimulates above all their husbands to raise a claim on it. But the members take care that given pay-offs are concentrated upon emergencies. Even it happens that husbands do not contribute their part in times of need any more and rely on their wives and their saved finances to bear the expenses. From this point of view the question arises whether the association in the long run affects moral principles anchored in the social system. For example the general assumption that women are secured now by their group could lead to the reduction of mutual help and reciprocity. Money increases the independence, scope and individuality of the women; but maybe it promotes in the same way the distance of social relations, the loss of reciprocity and socially rooted insurance networks.
- 25 To some extent the organization carries conflict potential by questioning some basic principles of social organization. When it comes to misappropriation of money or positions, for example when a pay-off of the association fund isn't used as stated before but transferred in different products like alcohol. Such happenings can lead to the loss of confidence of individual members by the association and finally to an exclusion. Especially for women with a high social position and respect through age- and relationship-rules in the Kara social system this exclusion from the organization could encroach negatively on the respect this person earns in the village at all. Difficulties like this provoked loud discussions already and released accusations and disapprovals of single women. Ardener refers to this problem:
- "The overriding priority given to meeting ROSCAs obligations, and the consequent comparative rarity of default, is a notable feature of these associations. The disgrace and humiliation which can fall on a defaulter is much feared" (ARDENER & BURMANN 1996: 4).
- 26 This new area of cooperation and influence the association calls for puts demographic rights over gerontocracy principles and thereby collides with implemented rules of the social system. No doubt the association provides new possibilities for women to participate in and to have a vote on important topics shaping their lives, but to be productive on a fundamental state the association acts extremely isolated from other institutions of the community. Actually, cooperation with the association of the men could be beneficial. It seems that the concept of the association is too women-centred and could convey the impression that the only projects that work are those that exclude men. A promising aim could be to supervise such projects together in the family. But gender roles are still absolutely fixed in Kara society and the realization of such projects take time and should not be implemented with participation.
- 27 The women need some time to prove their ability to manage the association and to do this successfully, to lay the foundation stones and to set a good and respected example. And the men need time to pay attention to this success and to trust in the worth of this project. This certainly challenges quite a lot of gender-stereotyped images and extends the accepted sphere of activity for Kara women. The women are very proud and active in this new sphere of influence which touches the gender roles so far as the women depend in case of emergencies not only on financial support of the men but are able to react on it out of their own initiative. Until today the men tolerate the organization because they also experience the advantages of it especially when they are not solely responsible for financial rescue in times of crisis.

Discussion

- 28 The reflection of societies in many development projects seems to focus mainly on the problems and neglects to mention the strengths and the advantages of peoples, their lives and culture. This can create a mentality of discontent and a reproach of injustice and suppression. Such externally created projects have always the danger to transfer western imaginations of a 'good society' on all societies. One standard is taken as universally valid and against this standard also the Kara women have been compared. The local reflection of such comparisons can lead to the imagination that problems are real that have not even been perceived as problems before. This could create uncertainty and conflicts, because women should be shielded from the (often presumed) suppression by men. The female members of this association will reflect upon the process and changes and they will figure out the assets and drawbacks of it over time.
- 29 The *Korcho Meena Maberno* is first of all a voluntary network and self-help cooperative to improve the living conditions of the women. It exists beside other networks of exchange partners, friendship and kinship ties that served as social insurance systems for a long time and are established after local birth, age, sex, territorial or kin reasons. In need of additional workers on the field, for example, work parties will be convoked and the women pay their assistants with catering them coffee, food or alcoholic drinks. These work parties are based on the reciprocity principle and combine communal work with sociable gathering. It is easier to share the workload of cultivation or, especially for women, to build a house collectively. Also everyday work is done mostly in groups of female co-residents, co-wives and relational groups.
- 30 Among women an expectation of reciprocity exists. In case of illness mutual help to do the everyday tasks is normal. The essential advantage, nevertheless, that makes the *Korcho Meena Maberno* association interesting and important for Kara women is the possibility to have funds available for cases of medical emergencies and hunger crisis. All other needs are widely based mostly on subsistence economy and exchange and, hence, do not urgently need cash. The Kara women have to take care that they don't neglect their subsistence economy and socio-cultural insurance mechanisms by the apparent ease of buying everything on the market and making themselves dependent on external products.
- 31 With the loss of the weekly transport possibility for example the whole concept could break down. But the women are aware of this and will find a way. When the inputs from development orientated organizations gave a start to the women association and local circumstances made it impossible for the women to run their association in the way it was meant to be, they have been the ones who improved it. After the support from the outside organization stopped the women changed the character of the association in a way they can deal with. They developed their own organizational structure based on their knowledge background.
- 32 The capital of the women association is small in comparison with that of the men's, but the women organize themselves in an effective way and by this they earn respect from the men. They run projects for the well-being of the whole community and it becomes an accepted movement in the society at large. It becomes one sign against the perception of "passive women" in pastoral societies. Even if all management is based on

oral proceedings the association is effective, especially because it is invigorated by mutual trust and respect between the members. The saving pot symbolizes a community of innovative women thinking and planning in the long term and thus creating an insurance system through cooperation with each other. The saving union is no innovation in the sense that gender roles would be revolutionized, but is mostly rather considered by men like the everyday barter between women.

- 33 The assumption that pastoral women are always excluded from public life and have to respect totally decisions of men is not real in Kara. In a partnership a dynamic system of mutual influencing and complementary tasks exists. The women have the possibility to express their opinions at work parties, daily coffee meetings, ceremonies and actively make or influence decisions. In the competition for the payments from tourists taking photos, they have an equal position like men and have the right to keep the money earned. However, much too often they are shaped by needs of everyday life and spend all the money for the well-being of the family. The association promises them a better way to manage their money. It makes them active in a field that promotes access to resources and decisive power. To decide about a big amount of money without asking their husbands is a possibility for action that oversteps some familiar borders and rules.
- 34 The officially sanctioned character of the association lends a political relevance to it. And if the men do not yet take the association too seriously, the greater number of female members does this the more and argue with a lot of engagement against criticism. They try to learn from setbacks, think about changes for better compatibility and identify themselves with the success of the association. Every member helps to increase the pool and is therefore important and gets treated in that way. Positive results strengthen the confidence in this system and there are some cases when a paid amount made it possible for a member to visit the hospital and get treated. Ordinarily, this is mostly an unaffordable endeavour. Especially for this the association is of benefit to the whole society and in the case of medical care the association fulfils its claims to offer more security.
- 35 It guarantees a quicker possibility to reach a bigger amount of money and to improve with it the fall-back position of the members. For the Kara women theories about a general suppression of the woman in patriarchal societies are not decisive to get active in the association, but existential problems of everyday life that have to be improved and the certainty to be involved in this improvement. As a thinkable side effect the saved capital could also be used to contradict the husband or even to leave him. This situation shows how resource access can be converted into negotiation or decisive power. Certainly the association makes the competencies of women obvious in a new manner and for all villagers, promotes the respect for the attained and belongs to strategies used by women to maximize their benefits in society. But at the same time it refers to practices of a society residing in the periphery of the Ethiopian state, that uses development impulses in combination with own experiences to reshape and improve the local situation.

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Schooling for Agro-Pastoralist Communities in the Sala-Mago District, South Omo Zone: Vignettes from the First Generation of Mursi Schoolgirls

Shauna LaTosky and Jana Zehle

p. 247-260

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- ¹ In the 1970s, when anthropologist David Turton embarked on fieldwork among the Mursi, he did not speculate about what the consequence of formal education would be. This is because at that time there was no formal schooling or alternative basic education (ABE) in Mursiland. In fact, it only within the last decade that the Mursi have come to see themselves as living on the periphery of the Ethiopian State, rather than at its center (TURTON 2005). Now, nearly 40 years later, formal (and informal) education has slowly become a shaping force among the Mursi to the extent that schoolchildren have no choice but to move to urban centers in order to go to school. In Ethiopia, after 1994, efforts were made to implement educational strategies that support pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. Today, these strategies fall within the framework of the Second Millennium Development Goal, which seeks to “achieve universal primary education”. Based on the “Education for All” concept, which has been endorsed by the Ministry of Education and externally directed education programs, the Mursi have been included within the “Education for All” framework, although it was not until 2006 that the first public school was built (with funding from USAID/PACT) in Maganto (northern Mursiland). In 2008, SIM missionaries from the U.S. and Australia formally established the Orachaga (Mission) School in Mako (with funding from the Japanese Embassy), and, by 2009, the first generation of Mursi students were enrolled in several boarding schools throughout SNNPR. Because the education policy for pastoralists only began in 1994, and the history of Mursi formal and informal education in 2006, the effects of the strategies adopted to shape the schooling situation are still unknown and the mixed

responses to and experiences of these strategies have so far received little attention by education experts, policy makers, and anthropologists.

- 2 Based on preliminary fieldwork in SNNPR in January 2012, we argue that education is still beyond the reach of the Mursi (and many other agro-pastoralists in SNNPR). More specifically, we show the incompleteness and unevenness of what has so far been achieved for the Mursi by sharing the stories and experiences of schoolgirls as they move between informal and formal education and traditional ways of learning. Through their stories we hope to demonstrate the ways in which schooling beyond Mursiland is contributing to new forms of subjectivities that in some cases provide a simple reading of resistance to formal education and, on the other hand, suggest ways in which formal and informal education also offer certain possibilities to those on the margins. This study has implications for the analysis of education and for the relationships among the state, its ambitions, and agro-pastoralist citizens in southern Ethiopia. More specifically, it forces us to ask whether the goals of education for agro-pastoralists in the Sala-Mago *woreda* are being realized, or whether they are a major impediment for students and the communities from which they come. In this paper, we begin by describing the education policy in Ethiopia since the 1990s. Then, we summarize our fieldwork experience in SNNPR in 2012, and, finally, we compare the vignettes of five Mursi girls.

Strategies for education in pastoralist communities in SNNPR

- 3 Until recent years, the provision of formal and informal education among pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in Ethiopia was almost non-existent. This is confirmed by an expert from the Office of Pastoral Affairs for SNNPR: “*Pastoralists were totally ignored under the former regime [Military regime, Derg], oppressed and had no access to school education at all*” (Interview 5 May 2012). The New Education and Training Policy (1994) articulates the commitment of the EPRDF government to offer special support to the marginalized areas that were deprived of education services in the past. It emphasizes the strengthening of female education and stresses, in line with the 1995 Constitution, mother tongue education:

Amharic is the language of the Federal government but each regional state can choose its official language (Constitution 1995, Article 5).

1. All Ethiopian languages shall enjoy equal state recognition.

2. Amharic shall be the working language of the Federal Government. (Art.5)

- 4 According to the Education and Training Policy, ethno-linguistic groups have the right to learn their mother tongue: Amharic for national communication, and English for international communication. Primary education can be taught in the mother tongue, and if it is not Amharic, the latter should be learned as a subject in order to facilitate national communication. When Amharic is taken as the medium of instruction, the mother tongue can be taught as a subject.

“To recognize the rights of nations/nationalities to learn in their language, while at the same time providing one language for national and another one for international communication” (1994, 2.2.12).

- 5 Within all ‘Education Sector Development Programmes’ education for pastoralists has been a topic addressed differently. The first ESDP (ESDP I, 1997/98-2001/02) mentioned

boarding schools as the best solution for pastoralists, meaning that the mobility issue was acknowledged but not the economic and cultural dimensions of indigenous education (young people's participation in pastoral production, and enculturation within the community). The ESDP (ESDP II, 2002/03-2004/05) marked this policy turn, as it was the first policy document to emphasize the role of non-formal education and other arrangements for pastoralists:

“Special arrangements shall be made for children in the pastoralist areas. Holistic and sector-wide integrated methodologies would be applied in the pastoralist areas which include sensitization of the population, curriculum revision, training of teachers, provision of textbooks, establishment of alternative non-formal schools, mobile learning centers, boarding schools, construction of hostels and introducing and expanding school feeding programs” (Ministry of Education, 2002:35).

- 6 The ESDP II also advocated for possible measures to accelerate the expansion of formal and non-formal schools at a minimal cost: low-cost buildings, single-room schools and multi-grade classrooms. From that time, the provision of education in pastoral areas diversified progressively, along with the building of more formal primary schools. The ESDP III (2005/06-2009/10) devoted, for the first time, a full section on the issues of primary education for pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, reaffirming the need for alternative approaches and strategies: localization of curriculum for more relevance, employment and training of local facilitators selected by their community, development of community-based boarding schools, hostels, permanent village schools and mobile schools. In the current ESDP IV (2010/11-2014/15) it is stated that,

“Notwithstanding the significant progress in access and the improvements in some equity indicators (e.g. gender parity index in primary education), participation levels at primary remain much lower in some of the emerging regions and among pastoralist and semi-pastoralist groups. Overall, about three million primary school age children are out-of-school in the country. (...) ESDP IV addresses the need to design specific strategies to reach the millions of out of school children in the pastoralist regions and disadvantaged communities. Under ESDP IV, specific programs will be developed to improve the participation of the groups which are the most difficult to reach. Where and when necessary, Alternative Basic Education Centers (ABECs) will be opened and, where possible, existing centers will be transformed into formal schools...” (Ministry of Education 2011:11-12).

- 7 Despite efforts undertaken by the government to promote primary and secondary education in pastoralist areas, the General Enrolment Rate (GER) in primary schools still remains low in the areas where pastoralists are highly represented, e.g. Afar and Somali region. In SNNPR there is a high GER of 102.6 % in primary schools (MoE 2011:76). However, this figure does not provide any detailed information about the percentages of school enrolment within the regional state for students from pastoralist and non-pastoralist communities.
- 8 Initially implemented and promoted by international organizations, Alternative Basic Education (ABE) was adopted and scaled-up by the Ethiopian government following a study in 2000 on “Alternative Routes to Basic Primary Education”, as a key strategy to increase enrolment by reaching out-of-school children, notably in rural areas. ABE can be delivered by governmental and non-governmental providers, and is characterized by low-cost construction (to expand rapidly the school network and reduce the distance between communities and schools), community participation, local ABE facilitators using local vernacular as the medium of instruction, and flexibility (class hours, calendar, etc.) to allow working children to participate in school education.

Alternative Basic Education Centers (ABECs) should be structured in 3 levels, with 50 students and three teachers per level. Besides ABECs, further educational models and approaches for pastoralists – besides formal education – are explored in a study conducted by USAID and PACT Ethiopia. These approaches include studying under shade trees, that is, mobile education (though this is not yet widely explored in SNNPR), distance learning (e.g. through radio education programs), and boarding school facilities, which have become the most popular strategy for children attending second cycle primary and secondary school. Boarding within a family is another approach (USAID/PACT 2008, ZEHLE 2012).

- 9 According to the Office of Pastoralist Affairs, there are 162 Alternative Basic Education Centers in South Omo: Salamago (14), Maale (25), Tsemay (23), Hamar (37), Daasanetch (30), Nyangatom (24). This information is contrary to our field experiences. The Sala Mago district includes the Mursi, Bodi, Kwegu, Dime and newly resettled Konso. In Mursi we visited the only 5 ABECs that existed, but were not fully functioning in Mako, Moizo und Meganto. In Bodi there are at least 6 ABECs in Gura, Ge'a, Arbujo, Chademisony, Boboy, Nyollu, but during visits to them by anthropologist Lucie Buffavand between 2010 and 2012, there was little or no activity at any of them since teachers could not come regularly (pers. comm. Lucie Buffavand, August 14th, 2013). It remains unclear as to where the remaining 3 ABECs are situated. With regard to Mursi pastoralists and other neighbouring ethnic groups like the Bodi, Kwegu, Dime and Konso – a detailed ethnographic study of education in South Omo does not yet exist. Here we limit ourselves to education in Mursi, but hope to expand this study to include other groups in the future.
- 10 In 2006, the first USAID-funded school in Meganto (northern Mursiland) was inaugurated (see Photo 1). This school, as well as two smaller 'Teaching Learning Centres' were part of a 5-year bilateral PACT/USAID "Transforming Education for Adults and Children in the Hinterlands" (TEACH) program (Teshome 2005:4 quoted in LaTosky 2010:237). One Mursi elder who was interviewed on the day of the Meganto school inauguration claimed that the school was doomed to fail since the Mursi had not been properly consulted. "If the government had consulted with the *bara* (elders)," he claimed "they would not have agreed [to hire] an Aari school teacher who only speaks Amharic to the children!" (2010:236). Less than six years later the prophecy of that Mursi elder proved to be true. When we arrived in Meganto what we found was a rundown building, three men from the nearby village, one police officer and a herd of goats that represented the leftover school population (see Photo 2).

Photo 1. Mursi children in the first school in Maganto, northern Mursiland (funded by USAID)



Photo: LaTosky, 2006.

Photo 2. The school in Maganto in 2012 (funded by USAID)



Photo: LaTosky, 2012.

- 11 When the school was inaugurated (by the former American Ambassador to Ethiopia and Chief Administrator of the South Omo Zone) the number of students was roughly 120. The students and their families move from this place on a seasonal basis due to water shortages, and, at the time of our study, had abandoned the settlements for this reason. There is no water pump in Meganto, thus people must walk one and a half hours to fetch water from the nearby river. The three Mursi men that we met there and interviewed had a generally positive attitude towards school and formal education. They confirmed:

“We want more schools ... we want our students to learn to read; it is bad if you cannot read if you are uneducated you cannot communicate with the government

or with foreigners, we cannot even read this letter” (my authorization letter from zonal education office).

- 12 They also stated that it was senseless to construct a school at a location where there is no water. We also asked them about the language of instruction and they confirmed that the language of instruction was Amharic. When we finished our interview with the three men, one of the former Mursi schoolgirls entered the classroom. She told us that a donkey had been bought to fetch water, but that it could not possibly keep up with the demands of the students. Meganto was one out of seven school settings we visited on our study trip to SNNPR. We visited both boarding schools and Alternative Basic Education Centers (ABEC) located in Hawassa, Arba Minch, Jinka, Hana and Mursi. We held interviews with 20 Mursi schoolgirls and further interviewed Mursi girls in their villages. These interviews gave us fresh insights into the creative ways in which Mursi girls are coping with their new social and academic environments while trying to maintain their sense of dignity, self-respect and cultural identity.

Moving from the Margins to the Centre

- 13 In the second half of our paper, we examine the stories of Mursi girls as they move from the sorghum fields of their mothers and cattle compounds of their fathers to schools in Makki, Jinka and Arba Minch (see Photo 3).
- 14 We begin with an excerpt from LaTosky’s fieldnotes, which is from a conversation with the first Mursi schoolgirl to reach grade 10:

“We drove to Arba Minch with the missionaries. They brought us here [to Arba Minch]. Our parents also came to see where we were going. The first time we left the school compound and walked to the market the people yelled and called us names. They yelled ‘Look, look at her ears! Is that a baboon or what?’” Another girl sitting next to her on the bottom bunk in the hostel replied, “Yeah, we still feel uncomfortable when we walk into town, but we have let our hair grow and no longer wear our ear-plates. They still point at us, but not like before” (Conversation with Lalobo, author’s field notes, November 29, 2011).

Photo 3. Mursi schoolchildren doing homework at home




Photo: LaTosky, 2008.

- ¹⁵ Local experiences of and responses to formal education vary widely in Mursi (cf. LATOSKY 2010: 240-241). As the opening passage indicates, Mursi girls find it especially challenging to fit in when they move to boarding schools outside of Mursiland. This is largely because people in urban areas such as Arba Minch are not used to their appearance, which is characterized mainly by their shaved heads and stretched earlobes. Thus girls are especially vulnerable to pressures to transform their physical appearance by letting their hair grow and by abandoning their traditional bodily adornment (e.g. brass bracelets, ear-plates, and lip-plates, though seldom do schoolgirls today pierce their bottom lips).¹ Drawing on fieldwork conducted mainly in 2012, but also using examples from LaTosky's doctoral research, we explore both the sense of pride that comes with being included in formal education, on the one hand, and the sense of disappointment and even anger that comes with feeling excluded on the other hand. In other words, whereas some Mursi schoolgirls see formal schooling as way of securing belonging to a larger Ethiopian society, others see it as a way of alienating them from their culture and identity. Drawing on the narratives of Mursi girls, I argue that their experiences within formal education are transforming conceptions of self and "Mursiness". The following accounts of five girls—Mabirroiyn, Ngonta, Ngadhole, Ngarora and Lalobo—suggest that we need to be attentive to girls' experiences of formal education from a wide range of subject positions if we are to assess the effectiveness of strategies for Mursi education.
- ¹⁶ *Mabirroiyn Oliholi and Ngonta Biochaga*² are age-mates and were inseparable when the author (here: LaTosky) first met them as young girls during field research in 2004. In 2008 when she met them again, this time as mature girls, they were spending less and less time together. Mabirroiyn was attending the Orachaga Mission School, while Ngonta spent most of her time at her mother's homestead grinding sorghum and

fetching water. During our meeting in 2008, the difference in their appearance was striking. When Mabirroiyn was asked why she no longer dressed like her age-mate Ngonta, she explained that she was now a schoolgirl, but that once she finished her schooling, she would go back to wearing Mursi-style dress.

“You asked me if I have an animal skin (*sai*). I don’t have a skin. I will tell you why. I don’t want one. Skins are bad, skins smell terrible! I am a highlander; I am a student. As long as I am a student I will wear this [blanket and cloth skirt]. I will keep on studying and eventually I will go to Arba Minch. There are girls in Arba Minch. If I go there I have to wear clothing. If you go wearing a skin it will smell and people will tease you. Like in Jinka, the people say skins are bad. If you wash your clothing it doesn’t smell bad. It’s good to be a student. Later I want to work on cars (...) or work with my fingers (*deshi tirtir*)—[typing on a] computer. If my mother doesn’t want me to go, or my father tells me to stay here, I will stay. If they want me to go, that’s up to them. If they say that it’s good then I will go to school [in Arba Minch]. Once I am back in my place, if there are no skins, I will wear cloth. If there are skins, I will wear skins, like Ngonta” (Interview with Mabirroiyn Oliholi, Jinka, unpub. fieldnotes, September 25, 2008).

- 17 Mabirroiyn’s appearance and identity were a way to convince others in Mursi of her new role as a student and ‘highlander’. Although her appearance is tolerated, this is not the ideal way in which Mursi girls should look and behave. The ideal style, as one elderly woman reminded us, “...is like Ngonta’s”. Even though girls’ styles are changing, especially schoolgirls who are choosing not to shave their hair, wear animal skins, pierce their lips; or adorn themselves with ear-and/or lip-plates, the Mursi-style dress is nonetheless still widely used to articulate girls’ styles and what it means to be a young Mursi girl (*nyawalalnai*), or a mature girl (*ngodhinyaroi*). This is reflected in Ngonta’s explanation of why she chose not to attend school:

“I don’t want to give up my skin-cape and lip-plate just to go to school. This is not what I want. I don’t want to look like those girls. They look like highlanders. I want to look like a Mursi girl. I will stay with my mother and be a ‘big girl’ (*haidai*) for as long as possible. Without my lip-plate, I would be very ugly. This is not the Mursi way”.

- 18 *Ngarora Olikoro*, one of the most confident Mursi girls from all of the girls we interviewed, struggled to find her place in formal education for similar reasons. After she moved to Jinka, to continue her education, she began to equate formal schooling with the erasure of ideal expressions of Mursi female beauty and “Mursiness”. LaTosky first met Ngarora in 2004, during a critical time of year. The birds were eating her father’s brother’s wife’s crop (who was also LaTosky’s host sister) and both were given the task of protecting her sorghum from the birds. We spent seven days together on top of a bird-scaring platform. LaTosky was most impressed by her strength and her candid stories of beating off boys and defending herself and age-mates during *koma kodha* (a ritual whipping of girls by the elders). Like her father, she had the ‘gift of the gab’ and could talk her way out of almost any problem. When we met in Jinka again in 2009, she still had a playful fighting spirit, and proudly showed me the new scarifications she had on her chest and shoulders. By 2011, she had stretched her lip to fit a pottery lip-plate and decided to continue her education in Jinka. However, by this time, it was more evident that she was feeling the pressure of assimilation. This was most apparent in the many visits that she made to the South Omo Research Center, where LaTosky worked as Director, and would share stories about how she had been harassed once again by people on the streets of Jinka for having a stretched bottom lip. One day, when visiting the school she was planning to attend, a teacher offered to pay

her money to go to the hospital to have her lip sewn back. A few days later, a policeman jokingly gestured that he would gladly cut off her dangling lip. As she recalled these incidences, she became angry and shouted:

“They can kill me before I lose my long lip! What [Mursi] man would find me attractive with a crooked lip and big bulging scar! I would be laughed at in Mursi. If I could continue my schooling there I would, but it’s not possible [the mission school only goes to grade 4]. I will go to school here, but not if I have to change who I am. I am a Mursi!”

- 19 When I asked her what she saw as the best alternative, she told me that Mursi girls would benefit more from a system of educational mobility in Mursi. This was hardly surprising since she was living with her relative, Olisarali Olibui, who was a strong advocate of mother-tongue learning and mobile schools for pastoralists. In fact, it was Olisarali who had developed the curriculum for the Orachaga School, and had established an NGO, with the hope of developing a mobile school program in Mursi.

- 20 *Ngadhole Dhedhep* studied elementary education until grade four at the mission school and continued to grade 6 in Arba Minch:

“I am proud to have gone to school in Arba Minch. This is where I learned how to speak Amharic and where I learned mathematics. I didn’t learn English though as I had hoped. I had many non-Mursi friends but we only spoke Amharic. I could not remain because my children are in Mursi and my mother is not always able to take care of them.”

- 21 My acquaintance with *Ngadhole* began in 2004 when I began my doctoral fieldwork. Within her age-grade, she was infamous for her height and for having one of the largest lip-plates in northern Mursiland. When I met her again in 2009 she was thinking about attending the Adult Boarding School in Arba Minch, however, she was reluctant to do so without first sewing back her stretched bottom lip. She was well aware that she would be taunted and teased by others if she didn’t and wanted to avoid being the centre of attention. In 2011, she explained:

“I saved the 400 ETB that I needed to sew back my lip. A foreign doctor did it here in Jinka.” *Ngadhole* was one of the first Mursi girls to perform this procedure. The school director of the boarding school that she attended in Arba Minch later explained to us during our visit in 2012 that “At our school we discourage the Mursi from piercing their ears and lips, since this is an easy way to get HIV”.

- 22 *Ngadhole* left school by 2011, after her aging mother had convinced her to return to Mursi to be with her two children. She shared with me a photo album typical of most teenaged schoolgirls, in which her and her friends posed wearing different cultural garb made available at local photo studios. As we looked at her photos, she lamented that she had to give up opportunities for education and a more town-based life out of a sense of responsibility to family obligations. She asked if I could train her at the Museum in Jinka to become a businesswoman in order to market Mursi products to sell to tourists, especially women’s baskets, lip-plates and girls’ leather pouches. Without a school in Mursi (that went beyond grade 4), the only possibility for her to continue her education was to move her children to Jinka. She attempted the move, first without her children, renting a house next to the Museum. However, once her children joined her, she realized that the financial challenges were too great and everyone returned to Mursi. As she explained:

“I am not used to having to pay for food, firewood and water. In Mursi, my children are always taken care of by someone, but here we are alone”.

23 She decided that her children were better off in Mursi, though she did not give up on the idea of saving her money in order to finish her education. Ngadhole's depiction of the benefits of the boarding school, on the one hand, and the hardship of living without family, on the other hand, reflects one version of reality for Mursi girls.

24 When we met *Lolabo*, who only wanted to include her first name, she was a student at the Adult Boarding School in Arba Minch, where she was completing grade 10. She was found sitting in her room on a crumbling sponge that served as a mattress in the all-girls hostel. Next to her bed was another bunk with a Mursi style 'house' built to protect her personal belongings and as protection against mosquitoes. Lolabo had missed class that day and complained of the food and severe fatigue. "Here we only get two pieces of bread in the morning and two kinds watery chickpea sauce (*shiro*) with injera for lunch and dinner. We never get milk. We get meat maybe once a year. It would be good if we could have our own Mursi food [porridge]. If we had money of our own, we would buy greens (*kinnoi*) and flour for porridge. We are not used to eating injera every day and always feel sick to our stomachs". It was clear that the school diet had taken its toll on her health, as she focused a lot on her inability to concentrate in class due to constant fatigue and the feeling of never being satiated. The other Mursi girls who later joined her, and with whom she shared the dorm room also complained about the food and basic amenities that were lacking, including soap, proper mosquito nets, blankets, etc., but not like Lolabo. She later confided in me that she was 6 months pregnant and asked if there was still a possibility to terminate the pregnancy. As the first girl to reach grade 10 in Mursi, and to speak fluent Amharic, she had gained social standing among her peers and was afraid that she would not be able to finish her schooling once the baby arrived. When I met her again one month before she delivered, she talked about renting a house in Arba Minch and bringing a female relative to take care of the baby while she finished school:

"Of course I would prefer to go with my baby back to Mursi, but how can I? There is no school there. I must finish here. I don't know yet how we will pay for everything. The father is also a student in Hawassa. Once I am finished school and the bridewealth has been paid, then I can go back, otherwise I will have problems with the elders".

25 Lolabo made it clear that she would return with her baby to her agro-pastoral lifestyle following her schooling. She also made it clear that her children would not be raised in the same way that she was raised:

"If it's a girl she will not have a lip-plate or stretched ears; I will only pierce her ears and put gold [earrings] in them. I don't want her to go through the same thing. Now there are more of us here in Arba Minch, but when I first arrived it was bad. At the market they would say: 'What are you doing here? Look at that girl with the ears, look at her ears! Why are you here?' Even at school they tell us: 'God gave you a body that you must keep pure and not alter like this. Why do you do this? You must stop to pierce your ears and lips and to pull out your lower teeth.' When I go back to Mako, I will teach our children to stop these customs. I want to work in the clinic and help our people to become strong again".

Realities and challenges of schooling beyond Mursiland

- 26 What all of these stories from Mursi schoolgirls share in common is that they are about movement, inclusion and exclusion, change and identity transformation. They all speak of either a sense of belonging as citizens of the state or a sense of belonging as Mursi. In contrast to Ngadhole and Lolabo's accounts of gaining certain skills (e.g. Amharic, mathematics, etc.) and social standing through the education system, most girls felt disappointed with the poor quality of education they had received.
- 27 Like Ngadhole, they all had high hopes of learning English, yet after years of schooling not one of them could carry on a simple conversation in English. In fact, all of the girls at the Adult Arba Minch Boarding School said that they would return to Mursi in a heartbeat if there was the possibility to continue their education beyond grade four. This was especially the case for girls who had children or became pregnant while at school. Having families while attending boarding schools far from Mursiland made it almost impossible to complete their education. Another major challenge that Mursi girls face has to do with outside pressures to change their striking appearance.
- 28 While most girls in Arba Minch were reluctant to discuss repression and forced assimilation, Lolabo, who acted as a kind of spokesperson for the girls, openly expressed the challenges that she faced when she first arrived in Arba Minch. As a result, she decided that she would relinquish as many Mursi identity markers as possible and would ensure that her own children would not face the same kind of harassment that she did.
- 29 Maibirroiyn's account suggests that one must only temporarily relinquish the Mursi-style dress in order to create possibilities for new life trajectories. In her case, she hoped to someday return to Mursi to work either with cars or computers and did not think twice about returning to her traditional way of dressing. As we saw in the accounts of Ngonta and Ngarora, both emphasized more resistance to the idea of giving up their Mursi appearance in order to attend school. Ngarora suggested that one way in which Mursi girls (and boys) could keep their sense of self (i.e. "Mursiness") would be through educational mobility in Mursi.

Concluding remarks

- 30 Despite the Ministry of Education's "Strategies for promoting primary and secondary education in pastoralist areas," which includes an evolutionary narrative featuring "backward" peoples who would benefit from formal education (MoE 2008:5-6), mother-tongue learning has so far been neglected (with the exception of the Orachaga School run by the SIM mission). Similarly, access to education within Mursiland beyond grade four does not exist. This means that students must move far away from their natal homes to get a basic education. Agro-pastoralists in southern Ethiopia, like the Mursi, are in a sense 'icons' of state efforts to transform society.
- 31 Mursi girls and women in particular represent the "backwardness" that the Ethiopian state seeks to "civilize". This first generation of Mursi schoolgirls that we interviewed are "at the centre" of such historic social transformations. Drawing on their narratives Mursi girls' provides (and could continue in the future to provide) a fresh perspective

on their nuanced experiences while attending boarding school and fosters discussion about the nature of the agro-pastoralist peoples' access to formal schooling without homogenizing their experience.

- 32 At the time of writing, there was only one Mursi girl attending school in Addis Ababa, the USAID-funded school in Maganto was not in operation, and only one female student was attending a boarding school in Hana, together with Bodi students. In Jinka and Arba Minch there are over a dozen girls were attending school. When asked if they would want to return to Mursiland if there were opportunities to study in their homeland in their language, all of them said "yes". Like Ngarora, most girls were in favour of the recent attempt undertaken by Olisarali Olibui, a Mursi educator and filmmaker, to develop 'The Mursi Pastoralist Mobile School Organization'.
- 33 This is directly in line with Ibrahim Ogachi, who in his study *Transforming Education and Development Policies for Pastoralist Communities in Kenya through the Integration of Indigenous Knowledge Systems* writes that:
"While some of these initiatives [for pastoralists] have attempted to provide a measure of relevance and flexibility, they are nevertheless, mostly adaptations of formal schooling for pastoralists by non-pastoralists with little knowledge of the physical, social and cultural realities of pastoralists' diverse lifestyles (see also Woldemichael 1995) (2011:7). ... What is needed to redress this situation is an alternative model that takes into account the broader context of economic and social change (Dyer and Choksi 1997 and of pastoralists' adaptation to changing circumstances (Frantz 1990)" (OGACHI 2011: 7, 11).
- 34 Without future support for such alternatives within Mursiland, Mursi language rights and educational development will remain under-realised.

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APPENDIX

Acronyms

- ABEC: Alternative Basic Education Centers
- ESDP: Education Sector Development Program
- MoE: Ministry of Education
- SIM: Serving in Mission

FOOTNOTES

1. The only time that people let their hair grow and remove all of their adornment is if they are mourning the death of a relative (LATOSKY 2010: 199).
2. Excerpts from Mabirroiyn and Ngonta's stories are taken from my doctoral research (LATOSKY 2010:189-190).

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Marriage, Residential Movement and Cultural Innovation of Women in the Hamar-Banna-Bashada Cluster

Jean Lydall

p. 261-269

Shada Alma:

“What hunt does a girl have? A girl’s hunt is
when she marries. (laugh)

Otherwise does she go hunting? She just stays at
home with her mother.”

(Two girls go hunting, LYDALL and HEAD 1991)

Duka Aike: “A girl’s hunt is when she marries.
That’s when I’ll go hunting.”

(The women who smile, LYDALL and HEAD 1990)

Introduction: marriage and the movement of women

- 1 The idea for this paper arose from a seemingly simple fact: as in most patrilineal societies, it is the women in the Hamar-Banna-Bashada cluster who move upon marriage, while men stay put with their parents (i.e. there is patrilocal residence upon marriage). Seen another way, parents keep their sons with them, and send their daughters away. In the Hamar-Banna-Bashada cluster, parents prefer to keep their sons with them because, as one young father put it:

“The reason I want many boys is the goats and the cattle. One can go after the cattle, another after the goats, one to the field, and another to the beehives. Boys set a person up within one day. Girls, growing up, eventually join their husbands.”
(Sago in *Duka’s Dilemma*, LYDALL and STRECKER 2001)

- 2 Parents can control the marriages of their sons by determining when they can be initiated, and by negotiating whom they can marry.
- 3 In Hamar, for example, where herding livestock is very important, parents often delay a son's marriage until he is well into his thirties, thus forcing him to remain dependent on them, and making him available to herd their livestock in the distant grazing areas (see LYDALL 2005). But, if parents keep their sons with them, then they have to let their daughters move away in marriage. When a girl is born she is called a 'guest' because, it is said, her rightful home is that of the man who will eventually marry her. After growing up in her parents' home she moves to her parents-in-law's place, where, even if her husband dies, she will establish a new home, building a house, collecting goats and cattle, making a field and bearing children. Upon marriage a woman joins another family with its own specific clan traditions. She also moves to a residential area that is in most cases new to her, and quite often far away from her natal home. The new residential area has its own distinctive environment and climate, and its own particular local community composition.

Residential movement and women as agents of cultural innovation

- 4 If marriage in the Hamar-Banna-Bashada cluster entails residential movement for women, does this not mean that women take the ideas, knowledge and skills they have gained in childhood, and adapt them to those they learn in their adult home? Could the movement of women upon marriage, therefore, turn women into agents of cultural innovation and channels of cultural diffusion?
- 5 Let me explore these questions by considering the cases of several women I have come to know well, and whose lives I have followed over the past 42 years.
- 6 Aikenda, who grew up in Banna, was married to Abara, son of Berimba, a great Hamar spokesman who, by the time Aikenda moved as a bride to his homestead in Kadja, in the Hamar Mountains, had accumulated so many cattle, goats and donkeys, that his wives and daughters-in-law didn't have to cultivate fields of sorghum, but could simply acquire grain and flour from bond friends, or in exchange for livestock. In her new home Aikenda had only to put down green fodder, sweep up the dung of the animals, and smoke the milk containers. These were tasks Aikenda rarely had to do in her natal home, an area of Banna where the land was not suitable for goats, but was excellent for agriculture. The high bank of dung and earth around Berimba's cattle enclosure, which remains a distinctive feature in Kadja today, is attributed to Aikenda's great effort. But after Berimba died, the family moved down to Dambaiti where Aikenda's agricultural knowledge and skill, and her expertise in brewing beer, were much sought-after and came into their own. No one else in the family had so much knowledge and skill. Ginonda, for example, who was married to Berimba's eldest son, had grown up herding cattle and goats, and had no idea how to make a field, let alone to brew beer. Aikenda was able to give Ginonda guidance, which she also passed on to her daughters and nieces, and many years later to Birinda.
- 7 Like Ginonda, Birinda grew up in the south of Hamar where there was no land suitable for cultivation, just vast grazing areas ideal for livestock. Birinda moved to Dambaiti bringing great proficiency in cattle and goat herding, but having no idea about

agriculture. Birinda's husband died before she became a bride, and then Birinda was brought in as a widow-bride by Aikenda, who introduced her to cultivating a field and brewing beer. To this day, Birinda's agricultural efforts are very improvised in comparison to Aikenda's, but her management of livestock far excels that of Aikenda.

- 8 Duka is the daughter of Aike, another son of Berimba. After being born in Dambaiti, Duka moved with her mother, aunts and grandmother up to Kadja in the Hamar Mountains. Here the women made fields like they had begun to do in Dambaiti, and Duka learnt to chase away birds and weed the sorghum. Duka's uncle Baali spent much of his youth at his mother's brother's homestead in an area close to Buska, up in the highest part of the Hamar Mountains. There he saw how settlers from northern Ethiopian were using oxen to plough their fields. In the rest of the Hamar-Banna-Bashada cluster people cultivated their fields using hoes and digging sticks, and planted the seeds using long poles to dig the holes. Back at his mother's place Baali carved a yoke and plough, and trained oxen to pull the plough. As a teenager, Duka gave her uncle a helping hand and learnt how to drive the oxen. After her mother died in 1979, Duka moved to Dambaiti with her unmarried brothers and sisters, her step-mother and her father. After a while her father sent his second wife back to Kadja to look after his aging mother. Duka then became mistress of the house and a field that she helped her brother plough.
- 9 Ten years later, by the time she was brought to her husband's home in Bashada, Duka was accomplished in ploughing as well as all aspects of cultivating, harvesting and storing sorghum, preparing food and drink, entertaining guests, helping the neighbours, and generally running a household. She brought all these skills and knowledge to her new home in Bashada, and being one of the first women to learn to plough in Hamar, she became the first woman ever to plough in Bashada. Could one not say that Duka acted as an agent of cultural change (women ploughing with oxen had never been practiced in the Hamar-Banna-Bashada cluster before) and a channel for cultural diffusion (by bringing her newly acquired skill with her to her husband's home area)? Duka's husband, Sago, claims to have introduced ploughing to Bashada, having learnt it from his cousins in Dambaiti, who in turn learnt it from Duka's uncles and brother. Sago also acquired plough oxen from Duka's father as a marriage gift. In this respect, Duka could be seen as a channel for cultural diffusion.
- 10 When upon marriage a woman moves to a different ecological area, does she not facilitate the movement of scarce assets between the homes of her parents and her parents-in-law? For example, if a girl moves from an area where sorghum cultivation is the main source of subsistence, to one where animal husbandry is most important, could she act as a conduit for bringing sorghum to her husband's home, and livestock to her parents' home? Let us listen to the advice that Sagonda gave to her niece, Gaadi, on the eve of her being brought to her husband's home:

"If your mother-in-law beats you do not run back to your father's homestead. If your husband beats you, do not come back. Just sweep up the goat droppings, just put down the green fodder, and work well. Fetch water, and stay in the house. The Hamar are not sorghum cultivators, do you understand, so just smoke the milk containers and hang them up early at the fence. Milk is their sorghum, and when they drink milk they will not ask for sorghum food. But should they ask for sorghum food, then come here to Alma's (Gaadi's father's) home, and you will find a granary which is full, and you can scoop out sorghum and load it onto donkeys, and bring it to their house. Do not cultivate a field. If it's said, "cultivate a field", answer: "I will not cultivate. I will not cultivate". Then, taking a whipping wand and

a milking pot, put on sandals and herd the goats. Go and herd the cattle. Only if your husband says: "I haven't eaten any sorghum food. Bring me sorghum food to eat," then, coming early next day to your father's homestead, you will be able to load two, three donkeys with sorghum. Then there's my field. I, the niece of Sula! If Alma sends you up to me, I will throw plenty of sorghum in front of you. You won't have to go further afield. I will be there. That's all". (Recorded for *Two girls go hunting*, LYDALL and HEAD 1991).

Residential movement and the preservation of traditions

- 11 The above cases show that residential movement upon marriage can lead women to be agents of cultural change and diffusion, and to act as channels for the movement of assets. But isn't the opposite also true? Doesn't residential movement have the effect of forcing women to conform to the standards and customs of the new home and local community? Aren't women constrained by traditions that quash their innovative spirit?
- 12 The movement of a woman to a new home poses questions of authority and control. In her parents' home a girl grows up under the loving care and authority of her parents, whom she normally respects and obeys. There are no ritual restrictions on an unmarried girl. Once her marriage has been sealed, however, she has to start observing ritual restrictions such as not milking cows, and other taboos that are specific to her husband's clan. In her new home her parents-in-law, especially her mother-in-law, may assert their authority over her by enforcing or manipulating ritual prohibitions and prescriptions. The bride is obliged to observe these ritual restrictions if she wishes to bear legitimate children. The movement of a woman to her marital home, therefore, subjects her to ritual constraints. In time, when she in turn becomes a mother-in-law, she too will assert and impose ritual constraints on her own daughters-in-law (see LYDALL 2005).
- 13 When a bride reaches her new home, she is completely dependent on the new family and has to accept their habits and fit in to their ways, whatever they might be. This is well known to the senior women who have already been through the same experience themselves, and who then give advice to a girl when she departs to her marital home. When, for example, Ginonda gave advice to her niece, Duka, she told her to make the best of whatever comes:

"I have given you. Having brought you up, now go and when you reach that place, if the homestead is slovenly, or if it is haughty, if they make you put your hand on your eyes (i.e. make you cry), or if they push you aside, you should say: "I have eyes, I have ears, I have feet. I'll take on any bitter task." Here you learnt how to serve food. Here you learnt how to put things away. Whether your mother-in-law will dominate, or your sisters-in-law will dominate, I don't know. But let me hear only good things said about you" (Ginonda in *Two girls go hunting*, LYDALL and HEAD 1991).
- 14 Movement upon marriage also means that a bride has to get to know and relate to all sorts of new people: her husband's brothers and sisters, the age-mates and friends of her husband and those of her father-in-law, the female friends and neighbours of her mother-in-law, and the distant kinsmen and bond friends who come to visit the family. Sagonda, giving advice to her niece, Gaadi, recommended self control and dissociation

as ways of accepting the demands of her in-laws and their friends, and establishing good relations with them:

“The one who runs away to her father’s home is bad. The one who runs away when her husband beats her is bad. The one who insults her father-in-law and runs away is bad. Staying put, control your feelings. Do you understand? Control yourself and sweep up the goat droppings, put down the green fodder for the kids, the fodder for the calves, and take the sandals of the age-mates. If your husband’s age-mates come to whip you, say: “I am the daughter of spokesman Alma, I will not run away from the age-mates.” And closing your eyes you will go and take their guns, and take their sandals, and carry them to the house. If you place the things in the house, and put on coffee, then the age-mates will tease and laugh with you, and when they come again tomorrow they won’t whip you. They will call you ‘age-mate’, and call you ‘hunting friend’. They will not whip you if you work well. If your father-in-law’s age-mates come and you say, “Who are those people?” they will be cross with you, saying, “My son’s wife will not look at me and address me well. She doesn’t put on coffee for me.” They will be angry. What you should say is: “*Āke* (polite address for senior man),” and they will answer: “Yes.” Lay out the cowhides for them, put on coffee for them, give them tobacco. When they come you should take their sandals and their guns, and you should laugh and not get upset and hang your head. You are the child of a successful man. You should look upwards. Don’t look down like this. A person who looks like that is a dog. The child of someone who hasn’t collected cattle, who hasn’t collected goats, who hasn’t put up beehives, looks down at the ground. The child of someone who has collected cattle, who has collected goats, who has put up beehives, looks upwards like this, and looking up will take the guns, and when they whip you with whipping wands you should say: “Where did that whip crack? Did it crack on my skin? Where did it crack?” When you say this, the beating will be as if you are drinking the milk of your father’s cattle, as if you are eating honey. So take their things and put them in the house, and put on coffee. Don’t let the age-mates curse you. Don’t let your father-in-law’s age-mates curse you. If your father-in-law’s age-mates bless you, saying: “Abundance, abundance, abundance! and if your husband’s age-mates bless you, then you will give birth to children” (See *Two girls go hunting*, LYDALL and HEAD 1991).

Residential movement and the challenge to create a great homestead

“Girls are like castor-oil seeds (*aati* -*Ricinus communis*), which, when cast from the ripened pod, establish new plants wherever they land”. (A Hamar saying)

- 15 Although movement upon marriage constrains a woman, doesn’t it also offer her an opportunity to prove her worth, and, even in the face of all odds, to build up a homestead, filling it with children and livestock? Doesn’t the move free her from her relationship to her parents as a dependant child, and allow her to become a mother of her own children and mistress of her own home? Doesn’t residential movement upon marriage also involve a moving up in status? Before the move she was a dependant child with no rights to bear children, collect livestock or found a home. After the move she is a married woman with these rights. The moving up in status continues as she gives birth to children and later becomes a mother-in-law and finally a grandmother. To begin with, of course, her mother-in-law tries to assert her authority over her and constrain her through rituals, but when she begins to collect her own livestock, to bear her own children and to build her own house, a woman progressively gains independence and authority, and becomes more and more mistress of her own destiny.

- 16 A typical theme in the advice given to brides before they leave their parents' home is that they should work hard and build up a fine and flourishing homestead, filling it up with livestock and children. Let's consider the advice Baldambe told me his son would give his sister Duka on the day of her departure:

"Duka, here am I, the one who brought you up. I wonder if you will cause insult to your father? I wonder if you will cause insult to me, becoming a hyena (i.e. being mean), becoming a feeble baboon (i.e. doing no work). I have brought you up. You have hands. You know how to clean the milk containers. You know how to sweep up the goat droppings. You know how to cultivate the fields. You know how to serve the bowl to the guests. Having served your younger brothers and sisters, having milked the cows, haven't you served your father? Having cultivated the field, haven't you fed me? Haven't you gone to the initiation rites singing your song? Now, in the same way, go to the home of Ditto's son, and heat up the homestead there. Here is your mother-in-law. Don't say your mother-in-law is bad. Don't say of your mother-in-law that she is feeble. Don't say of your husband, that he is no good. Compliment him, rather, and help him. How about Duka, the mother of Omalle, wife of the old man Kolmo. Now was it he who made the goat enclosure? No, it was Duka who did it. It was Duka who raised the embankment of the cattle kraal. It was Duka who made the name of the homestead famous. Now what has Kolmo ever done? She had the misfortune to marry him, but she got up and said: "I will make Kolmo great". In the same way, you should make your homestead great" (Recorded for *Two girls go hunting*, LYDALL and HEAD 1991).

- 17 When Baldambe gave his own advice to Duka, he didn't urge her to work hard, but simply gave her a blessing, saying that good fortune should go with her:

"May the goat droppings, which you swept up, go with you (i.e. may your good fortune go with you). Now your mother-in-law is the child of a person (as opposed to an enemy). The other day it was your mother's brother and your uncle who gave you (agreed to your marriage), they are the ones who gave you. May the rains go with you, may the fortune of your father's goats go with you, may the fortune of your father's cattle go with you. Fill up the cattle pond (*dalba* the lower end of the cattle enclosure where rain water collects and cow dung accumulates, and which symbolizes good fortune) and the crevices (i.e. collect cattle and bear children). May bad things go beyond Mount Saka. You are a *barjo* baboon (i.e. like a baboon, you will prosper and reproduce without difficulty)".

Residential movement after marriage

- 18 Marriage is not the only reason for residential movement in the Hamar-Banna-Bashada cluster. The vicissitudes of life may drive a family to move residence. For example, my friend Banda moved away from Dambaiti when one of her daughters died there. She hoped the new place would bring her better fortune. Another woman moved away after people started accusing her of having the evil eye. Bokonda moved away in fear when Galeba (Daasanach) came to Dambaiti and killed her sister's son and co-wife – she moved close to the town of Dimeka where she thought the police would provide some protection. Galte moved when her field grew exhausted and she needed to find another place to make a new field. All these women were widows. Women with living husbands may also move residence, as did Hailanda who moved with her husband Alma to Dambaiti. Alma undertook the move primarily because a good friend of his had settled in Dambaiti, and via him he had access to land for cultivation.
- 19 When a woman, whether with a living husband or as a widow, moves to a new area and community, does she not face similar problems and challenges as a woman who moves

for the first time to her husband's home? A woman needs to be accepted by the new community, and to achieve this she has to fit in. The new community may try to control her through imposing ritual constraints, and she will use all her creative energy to find ways of making herself attractive and indispensable to the new community.

- 20 In memory of Duka's mother-in-law, Sagonda, who unfortunately died earlier on in 2012, I would like to retell a story Sagonda once told me about her husband's grandmother, Kaddi's widow, who fled from Banna to Bashada in order to save her only son. It is a story that was told to Sagonda by her father-in-law, and which she surely embellished in her own way for her own ends, and which I now reproduce and summarise for my purposes.
- 21 Sagonda's story began with Kaddi, her husband's grandfather. Kaddi was found as a small child in the bush where his parents had died of hunger. That was in the wake of the Ethiopian conquest when there was a great famine, and most people in Banna had fled to Galeba (Dassanech), Kara or Aari in order to survive. Kaddi's parents had been collecting wild fruits and gum in the bush and feeding their little son, who was about 7 or 8 years old at the time.
- 22 In Sagonda's words:
- "Then a woman called Ubanda, saying to herself: 'I will feed my children with *kaddi* leaves. Going into the bush, let me collect *kaddi* leaves which I will wash and bring to them'. So putting a sling over her shoulder she went into the bush. When she came, he was eating gum: 'Fellow! – Yes. – Please come here'. And he came to her. 'Whose son are you? What's your father's name? – My father's name is Gino. – Gino's father, who was he? – Gato. – Eh, where are your mother and father? – My father and mother, falling asleep, have stopped getting up. They wouldn't get up so I went through the bush eating gum. They are over there in the bush, lying on their backs. The hyenas have eaten them. – What's your name? – My name is Garsho. – Eh, let's go'. She cut *kaddi* leaves and put them in her sling, and she led him to her homestead. She cooked the *kaddi* leaves and gave him some to eat. Early next morning she shaved his head. 'Children, elders, I have collected a child. When I asked his father's name he said Gino. – What is your grandfather's name – Gato'. He is one of us, a Banne. 'What is your father's clan? – Gasi, he said. Breaking *kaddi* leaves I collected him, so now call him Kaddi. Abandoning the name his mother and father gave him, call him Kaddi'. So everyone called out 'Kaddi! – Yes'. She called, 'Kaddiyo, the one I collected in the bush. Kaddiyo, Atcha (Fallen Leaf) – Yes'.
- 23 Ubanda brought up the boy, who herded the cattle and goats for her husband. When he was old enough they initiated him, Ubanda having grown sorghum and brewed beer. They had to find kinsmen for him. In Banna it is the mother's brother who gives the *boqo* stick, without which a youth cannot start preparing for his initiation. They found distant patrilineal relatives of Kaddi's mother, who agreed to give him the *boqo*. The family of Ubanda's husband declared that Kaddi belonged to their clan, and that they would sew on the *banzi* (phallus) and draw out the *garo* calf for him, and a girl of theirs would provide the goatskin cape. Kaddi was then married to a Banna girl, and together they established a homestead in the south of Banna, collecting animals and bearing two sons and two daughters. One daughter died, the other ran off with a *Gal* (highland Ethiopian). Eventually Kaddi died. At that time, the ritual leader of the Banna, *Bitta Dore*, was taking children and selling them to the *Gal* (northern Ethiopians). Kaddi's younger son was taken away on the pretext was that the boy's upper teeth had come through before the lower ones. Fearing for her remaining son, Ditto, Kaddi's widow decided to flee to Bashada.

24 In Sagonda's words:

"On the way an Aari man, fleeing from the north, met her and became her lover. In Bashada she cultivated a field, and the sorghum ripened. Being a Banna child, she brewed beer. At that time Bashada women didn't know how to brew beer! By now my father-in-law was grown up, He fetched honey for his mother; set traps and killed wild animals for his mother. She, a married woman, was like a man. "Hey, we will chase that Aari man away! She has moved to our country. Chasing the Aari man away, let a man from here marry her (i.e. be her lover), we will find a partner for her in this country". So the people talked and talked, and then they beat her Aari lover. "We will not kill you, go to your country". Then Yärangole, Haila, was given to her: "She is an accomplished woman. She brews beer and cultivates fields!"

25 Kaddi's widow then initiated her son Ditto, brewing beer and sending him to her family in Banna to get the *boqo* stick. Once he was initiated, Ditto was married to Ailo, the daughter of a Bashada spokesman called Gurdo. It was Haila, his mother's Bashada lover, who bore the staffs to negotiate the marriage. Ditto's first wife gave birth to six children before dying after having an abortion. The eldest son was Bargar, who eventually married Sagonda. When Ditto finally died, Bargar brought him back to Banna to bury him. But before he himself died, Bargar asked to be buried in Bashada, the place where his after-birth had been buried, and where he had become *pe edi* – a countryman, a person who belongs to the place.

26 Kaddi's widow, whose name Sagonda never mentions, simply referring to her as *aka* (my grandmother), moved to Bashada and gained acceptance there by proving herself a competent farmer and brewer of beer. Sagonda says that at that time no one in Bashada knew how to brew beer. This was probably an exaggeration, and what she meant was that Kaddi's widow excelled at brewing beer, not unlike Sagonda herself. Wasn't growing sorghum and brewing beer her way of getting herself accepted in the new community? Then she grew sorghum and brewed beer again in order to initiate her son. Necessity had made her move to Bashada, but once she was there she needed to be accepted by the new community. Furthermore she was driven by her own desire to create a prosperous home for her son and her descendants. Could it not be that such needs and desires, which are part and parcel of movement, gave her the strength to excel in the cultivation of sorghum and the brewing of beer? And wasn't it due to her efforts that her son was able to marry a local girl, and her grandson, Bargar, was subsequently fully accepted as a Bashada man?

Conclusion

27 In this essay, I posed several questions arising from the fact that women in the Hamar-Banna-Bashada cluster move, upon marriage, to a new home. I looked at several cases to show how, due to this movement, women bring new knowledge and skills to their marital home, act as agents of cultural innovation, as channels of cultural diffusion, as well as conduits for the movement of assets. In contrast to these creative aspects, I then drew attention to how movement upon marriage also puts constraints on women, who are obliged to obey their in-laws and conform to local expectations. Turning back to the positive side, I noted that movement upon marriage involves a moving up in status, and provides impetus for women to prove themselves and become mistresses of their own destiny. Finally, I considered the movement of women subsequent to marriage, looking in particular at the case of Kaddi's widow who fled with her son to Bashada, and by

excelling in sorghum cultivation and beer brewing gained acceptance from the local residents, and married her son to the daughter of a local spokesman.

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AUTHOR

Jean Lydall

Patriarchy Upside Down: Land and Love Calculations in Hadiya

Valentina Peveri

p. 271-282

*When the great lord passes,
the wise peasant bows deeply and silently farts.*
(Ethiopian proverb quoted in SCOTT 1990)

The parable of oppression

- 1 The purely rhetorical speculation about women's groups, which flourishes outside the physically experienced contexts, regains pragmatic life if tempered by an ethnographic approach. In this article I will focus on the relationship, sometimes of peaceful coexistence, more often discrepant, between academic models and the situations directly observed by ethnographers.
- 2 The goal is to highlight the usefulness of the ethnographic method in rethinking the conceptual toolbox that the researcher has set up through years of study, and afterwards is led to take for granted, and therefore idly reemploy, every time (s)he embarks on interpreting reality. Specifically, I will focus on the term *patriarchy*, which is used by journalists, doctors, human rights activists and even anthropologists as a term to indicate the generic subordination of women (CARNINO 2011: 58). This mode of representation, ingrained in common sense and in certain branches of academia, will be put into dialogue with the data I collected during research in the District of Lemu, Hadiya zone (SNNPR), between 2004 and 2009, having maintained a privileged relationship with fifteen women of a village community.¹ I will analyze the mismatch of different moral systems: on the one hand, how emotive the concept of patriarchy is, always unleashing strong collective participation; on the other, the politically neutral analysis of women who do not have a feminist vocabulary, and who provide anti-heroic and minimal answers to the issues of power and subordination. The ethnographic work leads to narratives of women who challenge a number of ideas overworked in feminist writings: for example, the firm belief in the existence of a universal category called

“woman”; which, through time and in many places, is always somehow marked by subordination; and which dovetails by antithesis another, equally static category, having an oppressive function – the so-called “man”.² If it is true that feminist movements in the West have widely deconstructed these gender stereotypes (DEMARIA 2003: 25–66), why then are women of other places and cultures always defined through the less sophisticated version of such theories?

- 3 In several feminist epistemologies – as well as in the eyes of occasional observers, voluntary workers, compassionate tourists and NGO’s –gender issues are often dealt with in accordance with ideals of development (ALMAZ ESHETE 1997). The public policies on literacy and modernization aim at promoting individual initiatives to the detriment of family bonds. In this paper I will reinstate the ordinary voices of female agents in relation to crucial aspects of marriage and gender relationships. We must apply caution when using words and concepts drawn from a particular, that is, a western, way of creating the sense of difference in other cultures, whilst the majority of recent accounts rely on a generalizing definition of “patriarchy” (GOLDBERG 1993; LERNER 1986; WALBY 1997).
- 4 According to enlightened activists, women’s reaction against their oppressors should be triggered starting from inside the local communities, and not fueled by foreigners – albeit well-intentioned. Nevertheless they remain stuck to the idea that women will be able to change when they become less economically dependent on men, and therefore less willing to satisfy their husbands; on the assumption that women have little to gain and much to lose if they remain totally dependent. The most frequently offered solution is to improve their opportunities in terms of education and employment as a fast entry point to political and economic power. In this way, and preferably from the point of view of humanitarian workers, marriage and pregnancy would cease to be the primary source of women’s self-confidence (SARGENT 1991: 25). Such a rescue logic aims at promoting the rights of the oppressed without the latter actively taking part in the definition of her/his own interests (HOWARD 1995; ŽIŽEK 2005).
- 5 In the introduction to *Theorizing Patriarchy* (1990), Walby argues that scholars cannot help but use patriarchal terminology whenever they analyze gender inequality. Before even mentioning the pivotal concept, she suggests a string of disconsolate qualifications to characterize the women’s lives: “disadvantaged”, “restricting”, “subordination” and “oppression”. This portrayal leaves the reader out of breath. Later the author recognizes in passing that this political paraphernalia is more relevant to contemporary western societies, and especially to the United Kingdom, than elsewhere (ivi:2). In the following we will perform the experiment of abandoning gender paradigms which have been refined in books and, in contrast, we expose ourselves to cultures not authorized, or muffled, by our tradition of thought. We will now move, over the next few pages, into a community of rural Ethiopia.

Transfers

- 6 In the Hadiya zone, the bride moves into the compound of the groom according to a virilocal system. Women are always on the move, especially because they are destined to follow their husbands after marriage. In a sense the new brides lose their chronological age and enter into the man’s lineage as newborns and foreigners. When new brides enter the husbands’ families, they are at the very beginning of a journey

toward prestige and social recognition. It is a geographical and existential instability which characterizes many cultures in south-central Ethiopia (FREEMAN 1997: 348-349). The wedding ritual does not occur as a single act but is punctuated by a series of legitimising transactions. In the traditional procedure, payments were in kind, including cattle and land products; most recently they have been replaced by a demand for cash. Sometimes, even today, observers are led by common-sense to judge this exchange as a purchase agreement. On the contrary, it is an indirect increase in value of the female person, for which anthropologists have coined the term “bridewealth”. It has the effect of social levelling, redistributing goods and prestige. The woman enters in an indirect but active way into the game of exerting pressure on payments (LYDALL 1994: 479).

- 7 Whilst some scholars read women’s actions in terms of manipulative skills (OYEWUMI 1997), others are inclined to discern in this circulation, in which women and wealth run the other way round, a sexual-economic exchange (TABET 2004) or a “harmful traditional practice” (HIRUT TEREFE 1997). According to the latter point of view, female subjects are conceived to be gradually assimilated into a pre-existing system, such as marriage, which reduces their independence and authority (WATSON 1997: 146). Only men therefore would acquire identities which vary over time and age, over which they have full control, gaining status in the eyes of society. In contrast, women are frozen from a social point of view, their existence is conceived as being entirely trapped in relationships with no possibility of individuality (BUSONI 2000: 36).
- 8 Defining female trajectories as being “depersonalized” endorses the idea of an underlying passivity during the process of incorporation into the man’s family through marriage, and into mothering through childbirth. In fact this seeming depersonalization appears to be actively orchestrated by women, albeit from social positions which might indeed be unfavourable. Blaming women for a lack of individuality – especially if we refer to non-western societies, still considered somehow “exotic” –relaunches old stereotypes about African “sisters”. These representations, found in certain literature, result in the polarization of these women into victim or heroine. On the one hand, women are depicted as being powerless, and hence calling for intervention to help them; on the other, as being exceptional, assertive and self-sufficient individuals, and hence as a mirage for emancipation. Western feminist fairy tales abound of gender myths that justify rescue packages with no memory of who created the very evil they now want to cure (CORNWALL 2005: 1-2).
- 9 Nevertheless autonomy is not an essential element of the western self only (SPIRO 1993). To prove this, I will analyse the construction of the “ideal” woman in a southern Ethiopian village, within, and by virtue of, the constraints placed upon women themselves. In order to understand what “becoming a woman” in Hadiya society means, we must proceed from the central theme of land, asking the following question: is the status of women connected to access to land, property rights and inheritance?

Status and property

- 10 Economic dependence is one of the factors which women ascribe to their social immobility. Management of scarce material resources often turns into a weapon of dispute in domestic settings. The new bride is perceived as a potential source of the

dispersion of wealth and property. She is welcomed in environments which are described, from an indigenous point of view, as intimidating and hostile, especially if there are children from the man's previous marriages. Women gravitate around male wealth in a seemingly unfavourable position: although the property belongs nominally to the man, the bride may however slip into the sharing game as long as she can give birth to male children, who in turn inherit from their fathers.

- 11 Animals do not enter into the exchange, but in the aftermath of marriage those animals belonging to the man become common property. Oxen are basic ingredients of conjugal love, as a sign of a provisional merging of capital. Only children will put the final seal on it. No children, no land. No land, and social rooting becomes complicated and leads to disgrace.
- 12 Bridewealth has been curtailed in the last thirty years, particularly in connection with the erosion of land, which can only be inherited from the family and not bought. Always looking for guarantees, women adapt themselves to "get attached" to male worlds, and to squeeze as much from them as they are able, to the extent of fighting with others to gain some of the resources at stake. In reference to the female condition in the Amhara region, northern Ethiopia, it has been argued that it is not the woman's prerogative to choose the place of residence; she belongs to the place of her husband, or better, her husband is her land (YESHI HAILE MARIAM 1995:37). Women are perceived, mostly by men, in contradictory terms: on the one hand they are guardian angels of home and family values, but on the other they are also untrustworthy individuals whose loyalty and altruism have to be tested. That is why the ideal wife should be docile, cold, submissive, and ignorant (*ivi*: 37-38).
- 13 Women travel across boundaries between groups and communities. Precisely because of their sporadic ties with land, and therefore by reason of their mobility, they can be considered as one of the most migrant social elements in the Ethiopian landscape. The accumulation of wealth and prestige requires patience, and in fact it is often planned beforehand and monitored. Brides migrate toward houses run by the fathers of their husbands and strive to get socialized in new environments, in an attempt to take root in a stable position. What is the element capable of closing the fluidity of female geographies? How do they take root in marriage and land? Through legitimate offspring.
- 14 Ethiopia shows a deep-rooted pronatalist attitude. Extended family is the rule, and fertility appears to be the most appreciated womanly attribute. Such an inclination toward motherhood does not include only natural vocations or sentimental choices. The seeming naturalness of the mother-child dyad becomes more complicated if we introduce the idea of tactics: women, like men, have goals and strive to achieve them. If we take into account the context, we realize that children are for the Hadiya women not only metaphorically, but also literally, goods and property. Beyond undeniable emotional contents that it is not our task to investigate here, children are pawns moved on the chessboard of women's pressing interests in terms of identity; as one of my informants used to say: "for a woman children are the home, the land, all things. Without children a woman has no glory".

Love Calculations

- 15 Marriage careers, along with reproductive and social misfortunes which could break them down, provide a useful point of view to focus on the relationship between person and society, and the tactics performed by women to assert their own individuality within hierarchies of genders and generations. In a high density area, where property tends to be eaten away, and especially from a female perspective since residence is virilocal, a central role in defining what is socially valued rests upon material wealth, circulation of goods, and land rights. According to native theories, the nature of love cannot help but be conjugal. These solid grounds, through which peculiar forms of humanity and family are created, demystify the western view of romantic love without rules (LAMPHERE 2005; LUHMANN 1982).
- 16 Life stories collected in northern Ethiopia (PANKHURST 1992) and in the Hadiya zone show that women perceive marriage in economic terms. Women actually do not inherit land, they conquer it: only by interpreting with audacity their marriage chances do they gain access to goods and rights. A woman who wants to seize land must follow an ideal, normative procedure. A good marriage has to be crowned by births of children, after which she has acquired assets and a social status which cannot be revoked: “for a man it is less important to have children, for a woman they are all she has. If my husband were to die, I would not remarry because I have children and I do not need anything else. For me, in my condition, children are gold”. Adultery, although widespread, is a phenomenon which must be kept under control: the birth of children from extramarital affairs would lead to a repudiation -no man takes care of the children of another man, or is keen to transfer to them pieces of property. Casual relationships provide no economic benefits: “a lover is of no point, he does not buy clothes or earrings”.
- 17 Younger women allude to love, but translated in terms which are inconsistent with the dogma of western romance. In fact they speak of the necessity of getting pregnant within a year after the wedding: “a man and a woman cannot love each other unless they have got children. The main purpose of marriage is having children”. After marriage a woman is considered part of the husband’s ethnic group; being rooted in land goes far beyond a metaphor: “we do not come back; I had children, I take part in good and bad ceremonies, when I die they will bury me here in the land of my husband”. Children reveal the obligations of the husband toward the wife, the mother of his children, and the woman’s rights over the man’s movable and immovable goods: “only if she gives birth he begins to believe her; otherwise he will be hesitant, and will continue to repeat ‘she can go away at any moment and take some of my money’. Uncertainty decreases when children are born”. In case of widowhood, children are the ones who legitimise the presence of a woman in a family setting which is not that of her origin: “from a legal point of view, the woman may inherit land, but from the point of view of socialization she would not claim it because she is surrounded by relatives of her husband. But if she has children, she feels as if she is protected”.
- 18 In contrast, the inability to have children leads to a tragic situation of perpetual mobility and economic poverty, or being forced to return to the parental home. Equally disadvantageous is the condition of women who are for several reasons depreciated on the marriage market (that is divorced women, mothers of illegitimate children, and the repudiated), and then forced to marry older, widowed or divorced men: “nobody wants

the children of another man, they do not allow for the retention of property". These children are pawns left in position by previous women, and as a result they symbolize the identity of another family.

- 19 In order to assert the rights she has acquired, the woman can appeal to various strategies, not least the legal one: if during the *Derg* land ownership was recognized as only being a male right, the current government (EPRDF) has established that through marriage land belongs in common to the couple. In cases of separation, property is divided. The presence or absence of children is the element on which costs and benefits are calculated. If the woman has no children, oxen as well as objects are divided in equal numbers; the house and the land go back to the man. If a woman has children, animals and objects are distributed equitably, the house goes to the woman as well as half of the land. It is therefore clear that the identification of children with land has not only metaphorical value. Quite rare is the case in which the man decides to leave: anyway, why should he do that, abandoning the land of his father and any other goods along with the markers of his social identity? Conversely, women utilise divorce as a strategy to acquire pieces of land according to the number of male children from different husbands. My informants were emphatic about the fundamental importance of offspring as compared to the evanescence of conjugal ties. Divorce rates and accumulation of goods are dependent variables: to put it brutally, marriage is less important and more unstable when men and women mainly inherit land (MAHER 1989: 116).

The Story of B.

- 20 I will now discuss an exemplary story -the case of B., who employs divorce and widowhood to her benefit -in order to highlight the local theories on the necessarily conjugal, that is economic, nature of love. This narrative reveals the power beyond the apparent passivity mentioned earlier. It introduces fluidity into the models of womanhood, conjugality and ownership in the community under consideration. A woman who has been whispered about in the village -widow, divorcee, libertine, midwife -shows us rules and obligations along with the creative resources inside the normative system. The training process of B. reminds us, obviously without her knowledge, of the definition of culture as toolbox – therefore more a repertoire than a coherent set of values, habits and skills -from which the individual draws on audaciously for solving different orders of problems, according to changing social configurations (SWIDLER 1986).
- 21 Let us observe the career of an actress who could be described as an opportunist. The story has several main characters, as in the morphology of the folk tale (Propp 2000): B., the *heroine*; a female *antagonist*; a young girl as *false heroine*. Children are the *mandator*. Land (as material and symbolic reward) is the *princess*. A local activist sponsored by FARM-Africa is the magical *helper*. Many *rulers*, the elders in the village and the legal-administrative system, watch over conflicts of interest. It cannot pass unnoticed that the male figure is in this narrative more background than character.
- 22 B. gets married for the first time, but her husband dies leaving her alone with five children. The second chosen man lives nearby, he comes to visit her from time to time, then the cohabitation levels off and two children are born; finally a separation occurs. The interests of her own family, and the loyalty of B. to her relatives, emerge: "my

father and my brothers, after the death of my first husband, suggested I should have tried to have more children. Therefore I remarried, and after I have got two children I sent him away". Somebody says he drank like a fish, somebody else suggests B. had already picked the best fruits from that relationship. The most likely version is that children of the first marriage stepped in, triggering conflicts over the division of property, which could not, at that point, be avoided. Then the two partners stipulate an informal contract, according to which the man commits himself to retain part of the land for the children he had with her.

- 23 The second husband of B. is already married; each wife resides in her own house. It seems as if he had approached B. because his first wife could not have children. Even when he stops to take care of their children, B. keeps cool and lets things ride, because she is aware she has already earned a piece of land. The antagonist, i.e. the first wife, at this point, realizes she is in a slippery position, since she has no children in opposition to those of B.; and in reply to the attack which the heroine launched on the property, she decides to fight back: three years after the end of the relationship between her husband and B., she invites a young female relative to come and live with them and strives to convince the man to marry this girl.
- 24 From the beginning the antagonist had actively pursued her intention: since she had no children, she had been keen to throw her husband into B.'s arms; such agreement had preserved her from the threat of repudiation, and had satisfied the man in search of offspring. The calculation was based on the fact that B., as widow, already had house and land, which she had inherited from her dead husband, to be distributed to the children of the first marriage and possibly to succeeding ones. But this plan did not take into consideration the heroine's determination to increase her status by setting her sights on the rival's property: "when the first wife was insulting me on the street, I replied by saying: do not talk to me; the two children I got from him, they will take your house". When the first wife realized that B. would not give up the rights she had acquired, she retaliated by co-opting her cousin with the aim of bringing property back into the family.
- 25 They enter a guerrilla war using the children as weapons. The situation of B. becomes complicated when the village people, in true soap opera fashion, discover that the young girl is in the sixth month of pregnancy; another piece of land goes away, this time toward the antagonist's family: "I asked him what will happen to my children; he had given to me a part of the land for them, now he took it back [...] if the third woman gives birth, her children will take the whole land; and they will refuse to grant me the part my children are entitled to".
- 26 B. expresses her deep anger by the calm tactics of a counter-move. She begins to accuse the man and resorts to several levels of law, both customary and institutional. Land is scarce, and the number of claimants increases. The objective of B. is clarified in a material sense, with no room for jealousy: "I do not want to restart a relationship with him, I just want the property". The strategy of the first wife breaks through the unexpected resilience of the heroine: "the first wife did all this by thinking: B. is weak, poor, uneducated; she will never press charges against us, she has no power".
- 27 B. decides instead, on a move that catches the other characters unprepared, to pull out all the stops. Her performance demonstrates how the woman's power does not express itself overtly, but by controlling the context: that is power as resource control, or as "tactics" (WOLF 2000: 268). The charges against the man are of various kinds: he has

failed to support her and her children; he beat her; and finally he married a third woman. First B. tries to negotiate with the man's family, calling upon the assistance of the elders. They meet six times. From the point of view of B., they seek to pump money out of her and wear her down through inconclusive sessions. They advise her to drop her plan: "you have enough land, stay there and do not ask". Their resolution leaves her unsatisfied. She suspects the elders might have been corrupted by her husband, who is indeed a relative of some of them, and therefore they could have penalized her: "the woman is a relative by marriage, the man by blood: that is why they have come to his defence".

- 28 Later she employs the second-level threat, that is, the law court, to readjust the composition of the community council: "the second time only two elders were the same, the others had been replaced. I was the one to call for that, by saying: I do not want them here again; if the same are coming, I will proceed with my lawsuit". In order to increase her chances of success, she decides to use a helper, unwanted by the council of elders. It is then the turn of Shita: an uncommon character, shaped by a local NGO which selects and puts women through legal training, with the purpose of letting them act as a bridge between the community and the wider administrative structures. Shita accompanies her to the court; she knows the civil code, and assists her in drafting letters. When negotiations with the family of the man fail, B. formally blows the whistle on him. Offices for B., illiterate and inexperienced, transform into labyrinths: documents which are considered incorrect have to be filled out over and over again; ushers fail to appear; and typists fail to attend appointments. B. sits patiently on a chair, day after day, waiting to appear in court. Once the process has been started, from the nearby town requests of testimony reach the man. He refuses to turn up for the trial. Someone in the village brings him summonses as well as wise advice: "if B. keeps on this road, you risk a lot; you will lose everything, and you will have to pay legal fees; do what you want, but do it now; otherwise you will go to jail, and your life will be ruined".
- 29 Up against the stubbornness of B., and the forms of support that she has been capable of weaving in four months around her case, the man begins to be afraid. He calls together the elders for a session that lasts three days and which takes place in the garden of B., in the presence of all the characters. They promise to B. that they will solve the problem, and beg her not to go to court in the future. In the final resolution it is stated that the man has taken home his third wife and let her live on the land that was destined for B. and her children; it is recognized that his financial support of her was inadequate; and it is established that he must return the land to her and pay the legal costs. The man, on his first wife's suggestion, gives consent: "we will never take the land of B."
- 30 The community has observed the evolution of B.'s story with suspicion. The elders felt offended by the impertinent way in which she brought a representative of the women's association into the heart of tradition, where only men of the most prominent families are in charge of conflict resolution. The heroine, drawing on different options without establishing a preferential way, cast a shadow on the transparency of customary methods as well as on the inertia of the state legal system.

Rephrasing patriarchy?

- 31 The tortuous performance of B. becomes an index of women's power and dissatisfaction. In southern Ethiopia land is scarce and population grows ceaselessly. Women take an active role in this short-circuiting of resources and competitors, being rightly perceived as agents of fragmentation. The life story of B. offers a somewhat cynical, yet very human, perspective of social reciprocity: nothing is for nothing, and female manoeuvres often replace protocols which men formally establish and should, but do not, uphold. According to SCHLEGEL (1972), women are masters in manipulating emotions, and in circumventing husbands and sons. Ethnographic observation gives evidence of frequent cases of aging male patriarchs who gently lose power to their wives (KANDIYOTI 1988: 278-281). Women become skilled in the art of optimising their personal opportunities. This perspective, often dismissed as "female conservatism", is conceived here, on the contrary, as an intelligent political conduct which the oppressed move not in front of, but behind the back of, their oppressors. The infrapolitics of the weak deploys itself by means of secret forms of insubordination, sprouted in settings off the beaten track -woods, glades, fairs, markets -and then disguised in the face of the powerful (SCOTT 1990: 176).
- 32 One of the most ambivalent ties is the one which binds women to children and, through children, to husbands.³ It is through children that the bride gets rooted in her husband's land and family, thereby protecting herself from repudiation and gaining the right of living forever in the marital home: "if the woman is fighting for her rights, only her children and no one else in the world can support her in this battle; if she has no children, since she is living in an unfamiliar place, she is forced to abandon everything". If she becomes a widow, most often she agrees to marry a relative of her husband in order to avoid the fragmentation of the estate. Several scholars have illustrated how the sense of belonging and identification in women goes far beyond the axis wife-husband which is, if anything, load-bearing only in the Euro-American nuclear family (LAMPHERE 2005; OGUNDIPE-LESLIE 1994; OYEWUMI 2000; SUDARKASA 1986). This distortion in reading the female priorities through the coital and conjugal lens has been imported from outside, filtered by the prism of development; while indigenous women, from their own point of view, show a deliberate preference for blood rather than conjugal ties.⁴
- 33 The Hadiya women's narratives reveal the practical benefits of motherhood. Women perceive themselves in a delicate social position, which can be revoked at any time. It is precisely by virtue of constraints, by collecting success in their careers as wives and mothers, that they finalize the transfer process. As suggested by one of my informants, women do not resort to witchcraft or poisoning to get rid of the annoying male presence, but to sophisticated skills in the art of manipulation. They sometimes despise their husbands, but they would never like being alone. Each individual moves in the public or domestic sphere in an attempt to gain control over limited resources -be they men or women, reproductive capacities, animals, or relationships that matter.
- 34 If the exclusion from public life is for some women a disgrace, for others it becomes a much-sought after and cherished target. When scholars argue that women pander to men's interests in securing social relations of a patriarchal nature, they forget to ask themselves the logically following question: is it a sign of passivity or the plain expression of a genuine desire? The dependence implies subordination (or better,

rituals in which the weaker is required to show off deference, paying lip service to the master) but also substantial rewards: that is the protection by those who have taken upon themselves such responsibility, along with its burden of rights and duties; and the privilege to be located at a certain distance from the official power and its inherent perils.

- 35 In the story of B. a role game predominates where those who are formally dependent in fact exert a soft and inflexible power over the patriarch, enjoying benefits which remain invisible to most people. The clever tricks of B. represent an alternative form of what we call “emancipation”, in contrast to the outmoded perspectives offered in the past of African womanhood as being dark and pre-modern. Female worlds are permeated by a strategic dimension: that is appropriate adaptations, masquerades and disguises which equally characterize actions inside and outside the so-called patriarchal family. These performances of power, seen on the basis of ethnographic and not ideological data, profoundly weaken the possibility of speaking of mute or oppressed women. B. and the others effectively defuse the logic of development, and reaffirm the full dignity of societies different from our own, a sign and strength of the variety of human experience.

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FOOTNOTES

1. The Hadiya people are nowadays mainly settled along the Ethiopian Rift Valley, between the Gibe and the northern part of the Omo. At the end of the nineteenth century, after being conquered by Emperor Menelik II, the Hadiya people, herdsmen and breeders, formally semi-nomadic warmongers, were forced to adopt agriculture. Their society is characterised by a predominant commitment to agricultural activities, especially the growing of *ensete ventricosum*, as well as the breeding of domestic animals, which have both a material and symbolic purpose in marriage transactions.
2. A few voices stand out of the crowd and provide a quite skeptical version of these governmental feminist politics: “The importance of the Women’s Decade has to do with the way it unequivocally put women as a victimized category on the world’s agenda. Womanhood has been pathologized, at a global level, and the concerns of the feminist international have underlined this globalization of what was once a local Western preoccupation. Germaine Greer, the Australian feminist, was right when she declared in 1975: The decision to have a women’s year was simply a belated recognition of the fashionableness of feminism in the West, whose lifestyles dominate the UN self-image.... International Women’s Year is a single extension of Madison Avenue feminism: the agricultural laborers of Asia and Africa might as well lay down their hoes and light up a Virginia Slim” (OYEWUMI 1997: 177).
3. When OYEWUMI pointed out to an elderly woman that in the West polygamy was considered detrimental to the dignity of women, this was the answer: “You learned people (alluding to my Western credentials), there you go again! The other day you were all advocating the merits of having joint finances with one’s *oko* [husband]. Were you born together? (that is, are conjugal partners consanguineal relations?) So long as an *obinrin* [wife] fulfills her need for children and he fulfills his obligations, what else? *Oko* is not salt that you have to have in your food on a daily basis. What is this desire to lock oneself in a suffocating embrace?” (1997: 55).
4. “Men as husbands or lovers are largely absent in much of women’s everyday lives and interactions in Ado; and, as many of my women acquaintances and friends assured me, men are often the least of their problems. The phrase ‘facing my children and my work’ is one I heard used often when women talked about their intimate relationships with their husbands, years into a marriage. The feeling was less that these men were actively misusing or otherwise oppressing them, than they were vaguely useless, and not really giving them much of anything – be it love or money” (CORNWALL 2007: 160-161).

AUTHOR

Valentina Peveri

The Challenges of Child Labour Migration, Voluntary Repatriation, Family Tracing and Reunification: The Case of Ethiopian Minors Repatriated from Yemen in 2011

Zelalem Teferra

p. 283-299

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- 1 This paper explores the nascent problem of independent child labour migration from rural Ethiopia to the Middle East putting the issue within the broader migration discourse. While discussing the process of repatriating Ethiopian minors stranded in Yemen on their way to Saudi Arabia, the paper puts emphasis on the experiences: challenges faced and lessons learned in the process of providing emergency interim care, family tracing, reunification of minors repatriated from Yemen in 2011 under the auspices of the IOM and the UNICEF with the assistance of Global Development PLC, a research and consultancy wing of the New Generation University College.
 - 2 Drawing on empirical observation and personal participation of the author in the process of providing emergency interim care, family tracing, and reunification of the returnee minors as a social work supervisor from March 31 – July 31, 2011, the paper describes in detail the practice, and the challenges faced with a view to drawing lessons for future actions. The necessary data for the study were generated through participant observation, in-depth interview, focus group discussion, and critical review of secondary sources.
 - 3 The finding of the study attests that the provision of emergency interim care both in Yemen at the IOM temporary camp and upon repatriation to Ethiopia in the UNICEF-New Generation University college temporary shelter was crucial in physically and psychologically rehabilitating the returnee minors who have experienced untold difficulties and traumas in the process migration. Yet, the absence of well thought out

and planned reintegration schemes after reunification of returnees with their families hampers the prospect of sustainably solving the problem of child labour migration.

General overview of population migration in twentieth century Ethiopia

Internal migration

- 4 Despite the risk of generalization, existing studies related to internal population migration in 20th century Ethiopia discern four general patterns with contextual variations: the migration of soldier-settlers from northern Ethiopia to the south and south west following Emperor Menelik's conquest of the south and consolidation of the nation building process; the emergence of the so-called railway towns as attraction centres and the rise of rural-to-urban migration; the expansion of large scale farms during the 1950s and the ascendancy of labour migration; the relative decline and stagnation of migration processes during the Derg period and the resurgence of population migration fuelled by relatively better policy environment, economic growth and urban expansion in post -1991 period (AKALU 1967; DONHAM 1986; MCCAN 1988; PANKHURST and PIGUET 2004; PANKHURST *et al.* 2013). For the sake of clarity, let me reflect upon each of the discerned patterns.
- 5 After the conquest of the south by successive campaigns of Emperor Menelik during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, intensification of north to south (rural-rural) migration took shape spearheaded by soldiers in the Emperor's army. The soldiers who participated in the campaigns and settled in various garrison centres of the south and south western Ethiopia ultimately became landlords exacting tribute from local tenants.¹ This encouraged the migration of followers who became settlers attracted by the prospect of available land (DONHAM 1986; MCCANN 1988; cited in PANKHURST *et. al* 2013: 224). The north-south migratory process injected by soldier-settlers of the Menelik era continued unabated throughout the imperial period bringing hundreds of thousands of northern settlers to the south thereby reconfiguring the social and ethnic composition of the region. According to PANKHURST *et. al* (2013), the push factors precipitating the migration process included shortage of land, low agricultural productivity, high population density and recurrent drought in the north. The pull factors included opportunities of gaining control of more fertile land, tribute and labour in the frontiers of the empire. The exploitation of the peasantry of the north by feudal lords and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church as well as dispossession of lands were seen as additional causes for migration of the rural peasants from the north towards the south and south west.
- 6 The above mentioned exclusively rural-rural migration of the early period was followed by nascent rural-to-urban migration following the expansion of Addis Ababa as a major nodal centre, and the proliferation of towns along the Ethio-Djibouti railway line in the early twentieth century (Mojo, Debre-Zeit, Nazareth and etc.). Urban growth provided new impetus for migrant labourers, increasing urban-rural linkages and population movement (AKALU 1967, BAHRU 1991). The expansion of urban centres and infrastructure development during the brief period of Italian occupation (1935-1941) has also had a bearing on population migration pattern, particularly encouraging non-agricultural 'specialists' from rural areas such as artisans, traders, bar and restaurant

owners, shop-keepers and construction workers (BJEREN 1985 cited in PANKHURST *et al.* 2013). The expansion of urban centres has altered not only the motives of migration, but also the direction of migration and the social segment involved. In terms of motive, the earlier period driven by territorial expansion and conquest, shifted to economic motives of earning a better living through engagement either in urban service provision or the labour market. The direction of migration, which was predominantly rural-to-rural in the early phase also shifted to rural-to-urban (this, however, does not mean that rural-rural migration ceased to function. It is simply to say that apart from the traditional rural-rural migration, a new trend emerged). In terms of the social category that joined the rural-urban migration too, there emerged at least in part, a shift from a predominantly agricultural population to non-agriculturalists such as artisans and traders.

- 7 The 1950s witnessed another trend in the pattern of population migration in the country. The development of commercial agriculture in various parts of the country, particularly in the Awash valley and the rest of Ethiopia's Rift valley, the Setit-Humera lowlands in the north west and the plains of Jigiga in the east led to further migration of labour into these areas. This trend not only encouraged labour migration, but also spurred urban growth. For instance, the expansion of urban centres in the Rift valley such as Shashamane and Nazareth (Adama) is by and large associated with this development. Likewise, in the South-west, the development of coffee production attracted seasonal and permanent labour, and contributed to the development of towns such as Agaro, Jimma, Metu and Gore (PANKHURST *et al.* 2013). Apart from the particular localities indicated above, seasonal labour migration to the coffee growing areas of the south-west covered western Wollega, especially Gimbi and Dembi-Dollo areas. These coffee-belts, as they are dubbed by the locals, attracted seasonal labourers from Amhara region, particularly Gojjam, Gonder and Wallo as well as from Tigray.
- 8 The multi-faceted migration trend spurred by nascent development initiatives and urban growth during the imperial period come to a standstill during the seventeen years of the Derg rule largely due to the notorious and inhibitive measures undertaken by the military regime: confiscation of rural and urban private lands, closure of private mechanized farms, de-prioritization of urban development, introduction of measures that limited individual movements and free choice of place of residence such as introduction of official registration in urban areas including the introduction of official pass letters to go to towns, the 'encadrement' of peasants through rural cooperatives and villagization as well as introduction of checkpoints along the major roads (BAKER 1996, CLAPHAM 2002, PANKHURST *et al.* 2013). This period, however, witnessed massive cross boarder migration precipitated by internal political conflict, repression, economic crisis, recurrent drought and famine. Tens of thousands of migrants fleeing the civil war and the red terror found themselves seeking asylum in the neighbouring countries, particularly the Sudan, Kenya and beyond.
- 9 The demise of the military regime in 1991 and the aftermath ushered a new era of migration resurgence. The permissive policy climate and the banning of the Derg period restrictive measures by the EPRDF government injected a sense of freedom including freedom of movement and settlement. Moreover, economic growth and urban development substantially altered the migration trend. As aptly indicated by PANKHURST, A, *et al.* (2013), in recent years, the expansion of the construction industry and the burgeoning service sector have attracted considerable migration to urban

areas, also leading to the beginning of commuting from peri-urban areas. Rural-rural migration has also been stimulated by the promotion of state and private commercial farms particularly in the lowlands, producing sugar, cotton, peanuts and sesame. Recently, not only permanent labour migration has hiked, but also seasonal migration at harvest time and for coffee picking in the southwest have increased significantly. Yet, the current pattern of internal migration bears an intra-regional character as compared to the inter-regional feature of the previous periods. This is largely attributed to the regionalization policy adopted by the EPRDF government since 1991 and the subsequent adoption of ethnic federalism in 1995. Despite the presence of continuing spontaneous migration of the northern population particularly from Amhara region to Oromiya and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR), the northern migrants are no longer the desired guests in these parts of Ethiopia.

- 10 As could be seen from the above discussion, while there is relatively robust scholarship about the general pattern of population migration under successive governments of twentieth century Ethiopia, far less parallel scholarship exists concerning the proportion of youth and child migration across the country. Concerning the migration of this segment of society, the information presented here is obtained from the results of the National Labour Force Survey (NLFS) of 1999 cited in PANKHURST *et al.* (2013). According to this source, 63 percent of the total migrants in the country were under the age of 30. The largest group (26 percent) of migrants fall in the age category of 15-19, followed by the age category of 20-24 (21 percent) and 25-29 years old (16 percent). This shows that migration in the country is heavily concentrated among the younger people aged 15-30 years. In terms of literacy rate, the same source revealed that whereas majority of temporary rural-rural and rural -urban migrants are illiterate, urban-to-urban migrants have higher levels of education. As we will see later in the contextual analysis part, in terms of age, most of the returnees repatriated from Yemen during the period under discussion are by far younger. Their age falls between 11 and 18 year. In terms of literacy, about 38 percent of these returnees are illiterate.
- 11 An increasing trend of adolescents and children joining the migration process has been documented recently by KIFLE (2002) and WOLDIE ASFAW *et al.* (2010). In rural Ethiopia, despite the prevalence of child labour beginning from earlier ages (both at home and in the field), traditionally the scope of their work was limited to the local environment as herders (males) or helping mothers in domestic chores (females). Recently, however, sending children to towns to work as domestic servants has become commonplace. Studies conducted in Amhara region by WOLDIE ASFAW *et al.* (2010) corroborate this trend. Accordingly, whereas in the past students in the traditional Orthodox Church education system who were planning to become deacons migrated begging on their way, recently school children are found to be migrating during summer vacation to earn money to cover educational expenses. Despite the absence of similar studies in other areas, the fact that children are now migrating to places far from their home villages has become public knowledge requiring no justification. What could be considered a new phenomenon is the independent international child labour migration, which is the primary concern of this paper.

International labour migration from Ethiopia

- 12 As could be seen from the foregoing discussion, for most of the country's history, labour migration in Ethiopia has been a domestic affair confined to national boundaries.
- 13 International migrations from Ethiopia began to peak starting from the late 1960s and early 1970s (FRANSEN and KUSCHMINDER, 2009; BERHANU NEGA et al. 2004). Since then, international migration from Ethiopia is steadily increasing. Towards the early 1990s, Ethiopia became one of the largest producers of migrants in Africa (BARIAGABER 1999). An overview of refugee flows in the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia presented by Sonja FRANSEN and Katie KUSCHMINDER (2009:11) shows that the number of refugees from Ethiopia increased from 55,000 in 1972 to over a million in 1992. Most of these migrants were adult refugees, escaping political conflict, famine, and persecution (BARIAGABER 1997), often from their own governments (DE WAAL, 1991). The refugees from Ethiopia are depicted as "[...] a mass of fleeing individuals primarily interested in safely and quickly reaching neighbouring countries" (BARIAGABER, 1997: 27).
- 14 During this period, only a few adherents of Islamic faith used pilgrimage to major holy places of the Middle East such as Mecca as a cover for labour migration. Following the demise of the military regime (1991) and the subsequent liberalization of population movement across the national boundary, however, thousands of youth, mainly young girls started to flock to the Middle East in search of better opportunities (largely as domestic workers). Recently, male minors started to join the migration venture *en mass*. Besides poverty at home, these child migrants are often deceived by brokers and human traffickers to migrate to distant lands in search of a better life. In most cases, however, it was peer pressure and the ease with which modern information flows across the national frontiers imparting knowledge about the existing opportunities and demand for unskilled labour that tempt the minors to migrate.
- 15 Most contemporary Ethiopian child labour migrants tend to migrate either to the neighbouring Sudan or to Yemen on account of obtaining better earnings. Sudan attracts Ethiopian child labour migrants because of its recently discovered oil wealth, whereas Yemen mainly serves as a getaway to the Middle East because of its proximity to Saudi Arabia & other rich Gulf States, which are the preferred destinations of the migrants. However, despite their attempts to migrate to rich countries on the Arabian Peninsula including Saudi Arabia, not all migrants succeed in attaining their objectives. Most of them end up stranded in a transit country, particularly Yemen, facing multiple hardships: deportation, physical and sexual abuse, arbitrary arrests, robberies, and human trafficking. As indicated earlier, this paper, therefore, explores the case of Ethiopian minor labour migrants voluntarily repatriated from Yemen by the joint effort of IOM and UNICEF in 2011.
- 16 The objective is to draw the attention of scholars and policy makers to the nascent problem of independent child migration from rural Ethiopia to the Middle East in general and the plight of the young migrants in the process of migration and in the host country in particular. Above all, however, it aims at describing in detail the process, the challenges and prospects of repatriation, interim care, family tracing and reintegration with a view to drawing lessons for future actions. The necessary data for

the study were generated through participant observation, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and critical review of secondary sources.

Conceptual framework

- 17 In dealing with issues of voluntary repatriation and reunification of child labour migrants, a lot of equivocal concepts and terms are used complicating easy understanding. Thus, with a view to reducing conceptual puzzles and ambiguities that hamper easy understanding and engender miscommunications, below I will endeavour to provide definition of key terms and concepts used in this paper: voluntary repatriation, emergency interim care, family tracing, reunification and reintegration.

Voluntary repatriation

- 18 In most cases, the concept “voluntary repatriation” is used in relation to refugees. Though the concept is not new; its practice has nonetheless gained popularity since 1980s among governmental organizations, NGOs and UN agencies as an ultimate solution to the problem of refugees and failed asylum seekers. Since then, as a practice, voluntary repatriation has been given priority compared to settlement and integration of refugees in the countries in which they had sought asylum (See Ghanem 2003). In general, this concept refers to returning of migrants to their country of origin. The returnees in this sense are perceived as the reverse condition of refugees. Though highly contested and problematic, while refugees are seen as uprooted and displaced, returnees are often considered to be naturally ‘re-rooted’ and placed back in the right order of things.
- 19 In this paper, the term voluntary repatriation refers to the returning of Ethiopian child labour migrants (under the age of 18) stranded in Yemen on their way to Saudi Arabia on a voluntary basis. It doesn’t include the return of refugees or failed asylum seekers.

Emergency interim care

- 20 It refers to care and protection given to voluntary returnees in IOM and partners’ facilities including provision of food, shelter, medical assistance, psycho-social help and other necessary and relevant services geared towards physical and mental rehabilitation of minors who have gone through traumatic experiences in the course of their migration and in the host country. Yet, the practice of providing emergency interim care in this paper is contextually defined as it was implemented in 2011 by UNICEF-New Generation University college project under the auspices of IOM whereby 481 Ethiopian minors repatriated from Yemen were given appropriate care and service in an emergency situation.

Family tracing

- 21 As utilized by many aid and humanitarian agencies like Save the Children, the term “family tracing” refers to the whole gamut of activities that include identification, documentation, tracing and reunification programs often used in an acronym IDTR (see BONNERJEA 1994). Conceptually, the term “family tracing” refers to the search for

parents and relatives to return the children to and the search for long-term living situation for children, if family reunification proves impossible. In relation to Ethiopian minors repatriated from Yemen under the joint effort of IOM and UNICEF in 2011, the format utilized for family tracing included a number of interrelated activities. First, registration of the returnees for simple statistical purposes has been carried out. Next, the returnee bio-data has been gathered by interviewing the minors about themselves, their families, and the circumstances in which they migrated, which generally fall under the rubric of documenting children. Then, the actual family tracing activity which included among others, searching for families and assessing whether the returnee minors could be reunified with them has been done. After these preparatory works, both the returnees and the parents-cum-families have been prepared for final reunification.

Reunification

- 22 It refers to returning children to their parents or guardians as the case may be. Yet, it should be noted that reunifying a child with a family may connote many things: the direct return to the same family members; return to live with all new relations; or return to new places. It also includes setting up monitoring system to ensure that reunification is satisfactory. The simplest form of reunification is the direct return of a child to the members of the family he/she was living with before migration. This also presupposes the return of a child to the same place of habitation before migration. One should, however, note that this “sameness” of family and place of domicile is illusory. Because, the returnee minors have experienced a lot of change in the course of their migration and can never be the same upon return, as is the case of the family. The physical and mental traumas sustained by returnees make difficult the process of reunification. Thus, reunification as aptly indicated by (BONNERJEA 1994: 73), is not a return to the same situation that was before, but rebuilding, recreating a family, with new experiences, which the family needs to come to terms with. It means assessing whether the reunification should take place and if it should, trying to build safeguards into a reunification, to help it become a successful one.
- 23 The complex form of reunification involves returning children to different people and different places the returnee may hardly know. Such children may have conflicting feelings about family obligations and struggle to support themselves. Social and economic pressures may be pushing in different directions, with the child being caught in the middle. Things and conditions might also be new, while the kinship it is based on is not. This kind of reunification requires some kind of assessment to ensure safety and desirability, and then safeguards to be built in, to help the placement to be a successful one.
- 24 In reunifying Ethiopian minors repatriated from Yemen, no such complex process has happened, for the simple reason that the returnees stayed in Yemen not for more than a year, and had fresh memories of their parents-cum-guardians and original places of domicile.

Reintegration

- 25 In broad terms, reintegration is “equated with the achievement of a sustainable return, i.e., the ability of returnees to secure the political, economic, [legal] and social conditions needed to maintain life, livelihood and dignity” (UNHCR 2004:3).
- 26 Discussion about reintegration pivots around the perennial debate about the provision of individual assistance to returnee minors versus broader community based reintegration. Arguments in support of each side of the debate will be presented later. For now, it will suffice to underline the fact that the “end state” of reintegration is the universal enjoyment of full political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights. Reintegration of child labour migrants, therefore, is a collective responsibility under government leadership; some actors (e.g. UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF and other humanitarian agencies) play a lead role in the earlier stages, while other actors (e.g. development agencies) play a greater role later in the reintegration process. According to current thinking amongst humanitarian practitioners, sustainable reintegration requires a coordinated transition from targeted individual based assistance to long-term development that benefits not only returnees but also other community members in return areas. Having said this much about key concepts let me now move on to the detailed description of the case under study.

Descriptive analysis of repatriation of Ethiopian minors from Yemen in 2011

- 27 Voluntary repatriation is often taken as the ultimate and most enduring solution in ameliorating the condition of refugees, failed asylum seekers and stranded labour migrants. However, activities accompanying voluntary repatriation and methods used to effectively address the problems of returnees are given less attention. This section is devoted to description of the process of repatriation; and challenges of providing emergency interim care, family tracing, reunification and reintegration of child labour migrants with a view to drawing useful lessons. It presents a case whereby 481 Ethiopian minors (between 11 and 18 years of age) were voluntarily repatriated by the joint effort of IOM and UNICEF.

The process of repatriation

- 28 Information obtained from IOM Ethiopia, country office indicates that, since 2010 this organization has been engaged in voluntary repatriation of Ethiopian child labour migrants stranded in transit countries, especially Yemen, and failed asylum seekers from Djibouti, Somaliland, Tanzania, and Libya. Until mid 2012, 12,109 individuals have been repatriated from these countries by IOM on voluntary basis. Of this number, 10,535 are male and 1574 are female returnees. Among these returnees the number of minors below 18 years of age was 1843, and the elderly constitute 66 individuals. Among the minors, 1095 were unaccompanied youth who left their country in search of better opportunities independently (see table 1).

Table 1. No. of Ethiopian migrants voluntarily repatriated by IOM from 2010-2012

Year	No of returnees	Gender		Age group		
		M	F	Adult	Minor	Elderly
2012	299	277	22	220	79	9
2011	7395	6551	844	5830	1565	57
2010	4415	3707	708	4216	199	-
G. Total	12,109	10,535	1,574	10,266	1,843	66

Source: IOM Ethiopia country Office

- 29 There are three migration routes identified by IOM concerning Ethiopian labour migrants. These are: 1. The northern route, which passes through Egypt and Libya. The ultimate destination of migrants pursuing this route is Israel and Europe respectively. 2. The southern route, which goes through Kenya-Tanzania and further south, the ultimate destination being South Africa. 3. The eastern route that goes through Djibouti or Somaliland, and Yemen. The ultimate destination of migrants preferring this route is obviously Saudi Arabia and other rich Gulf countries. Even though the exact number of Ethiopians currently stranded in each of these transit countries is unknown, data obtained from IOM indicates that the eastern route is the most popular and Yemen stands as number one transit country attracting Ethiopian migrants because of its proximity to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States (see table 2).

Table 2. Transit countries and No. of Ethiopian migrants voluntarily repatriated by IOM in 2011 and 2012

Year	Country	Nbr. of returnees	Gender		Age group		
			M	F	Adult	Minor	Elderly
2012	Yemen	286	267	19	212	74	9
	Djibouti	10	10	-	8	2	-
	Somaliland	3	3	-	-	3	-
Total		299	280	19	220	79	9
2011	Yemen	5290	5107	183	4267	1023	40
	Tanzania	909	909	-	904	5	-
	Somaliland	1005	437	568	492	513	17
	Libya	191	98	93	167	24	-

Total	7395	6551	844	5830	1565	57
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Source: IOM Ethiopia country Office.

- 30 The number of mixed migrants flocking to the Middle East from the Horn of Africa through Yemen is very huge and increases from time to time despite the political instability in Yemen. According to an IOM report, a total of 103,154 new arrivals were registered in 2011, double the figure of the previous year. In February alone, IOM registered some 12,454 new arrivals, of whom 10,496 were from Ethiopia (SOUCY 2011). Yemen as a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention generously grants *prima facie* refugee status to all Somalis landing on its shores. However, the majority of Ethiopians are classified by the international community – and the Yemeni government – as economic migrants and they are detained and deported if caught by authorities (SOUCY 2011). On top of that the outbreak of unrest in Yemen and the fact that Saudi Arabia closed its border with Yemen in 2011 because of security reasons exposed thousands of Ethiopian migrants trying to enter Saudi Arabia through a border town of Haradh, to more severe hardship. Unable to either continue to the Arabian Peninsula or to return to Ethiopia without assistance, these irregular migrants were looking for help when IOM launched its voluntary repatriation project.
- 31 Of the above indicated number, the emergency interim care, family tracing, reunification and reintegration of 481 minors repatriated by IOM in 2011 entrusted to UNICEF Ethiopia, which in turn subcontracted the activity to the Global Development PLC, a research and consultancy wing of the New Generation University College. This study exclusively focuses on the project implemented by the joint activity of the UNICEF and New Generation University College. The implementation of this project officially commenced on March 31, 2011 with a half-day orientation workshop given to the project social workers & supervisors by UNICEF, Ethiopia branch at its headquarters in Addis Ababa. The same day, UNICEF handed over the first batch of returnees (39 minors repatriated from Yemen) to the project implementing agency, i.e., to the Global Development PLC of the New Generation University College (NGUC).

The implementation phase and its challenges

- 32 The implementation of the project was divided into two successive phases:
1. a one month emergency interim care followed by family tracing and reunification of minors repatriated from Yemen covering a period from March 31, 2011 – April 30, 2011; and
 2. a three month full-fledged interim care, family tracing and reunification of minors covering a period from May 1, 2011 – July 31, 2011.
- 33 According to the initial agreement reached between UNICEF and the Global Development PLC, of the New Generation University College, during the first phase (March 31, 2011 –April 30, 2011), a total of 239 Ethiopian minors repatriated from Yemen have been received by the NGUC project Office and provide emergency interim care, family tracing and reunification. The rest of 242 minors were received during the second phase and given similar services. Though it was included in the project

contract, no reintegration activity was carried out due to financial shortages. Below is a description of the entire activity.

Major activities accomplished by social workers during the two phases

34 The social workers of the NGUC/UNICEF project composed of 12 individuals including 10 social workers comprising of two psychologists, a psychiatric nurse, four clinical nurses, on record and data encoding officer, a sociologist, a medical doctor, a social work supervisor, and a project coordinator carried out the following tasks as planned.

- **Receiving and transfer of minors** from the IOM temporary shelter to the NGUC/UNICEF facility;
- **Registration of the incoming minors;**
- **Induction or provision of orientation for the minors** concerning the organization taking care of them, the service to be provided, the duration of their stay at the temporary facility, the rules to be observed and the code of conduct to be adhered to for the sake of security, personal hygiene, interpersonal relations and cross-cultural communications;
- **Documentation** – encoding of detailed information pertaining to each child/minor into the main register provided by UNICEF including biography of each minor: family history, literacy rate, place of residence immediately before departure, preference for reunification, etc.;
- **Family Tracing**—mainly individual based tracing assisted by phone calls has been regularly carried out. Owing to the emergency nature of the project, neither group/mass tracing nor pre-unification field trip for family tracing has been carried out;
- **Health Care** – Immediately up on arrival, every batch of minors has been given orientation as to how to take care of personal and environmental health/hygiene. Further, the minors with health problems have been identified by the project physician and referred to the clinic or hospital for treatment as the case may be;
- **Psycho-Social Help** – two psychologists and one psychiatric nurse have been assigned to regularly assess the mental well-being of the minors and provide guidance and counselling services whenever necessary. Special consideration has been given to those minors who have spent a year and more in a Yemeni prison with a view to deal with post-traumatic disorder, if any;
- **Conflict Resolution** – Anticipating the possible eruption of interpersonal and inter-group conflict among minors with diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds, inductions on interpersonal and intergroup relations have been provided on a regular basis beginning from the arrival of the minors. Varieties of conflict resolution mechanisms have been implemented to defuse conflicts whenever they happened. Despite the frequency of such conflicts, the team managed to resolve them amicably;
- **g. Cross-Cultural Education** – Owing to the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nature of the returnees, the social workers have designed an induction program whereby the incoming minors were versed into Ethiopian cultural diversity and shared values. The spirit of tolerance and peaceful coexistence has been promoted upon arrival up to the departure of the minors. Though at times inter-ethnic

clashes flared out in the temporary facility between minors of different ethnic backgrounds, nonetheless the team managed to avoid serious conflicts;

- **x. Reunification**-during the two phases, which covered four months (March 31 – July 31), a total of 481 minors (9 females and 472 males), were received and reunified with their parents/guardians in 12 field trips (see the tables below).

Table 3. Regional Distribution of Minors.

S/N	Region	No. of minors	Male	Female
1	Amhara	290	283	7
2	Oromia	115	115	-
3	Tigray	50	49	1
4	SNNPR	9	9	-
5	Afar	11	10	-
6	Harari	6	5	1
Total		481	472	9

Source: Project social Work Supervision & Coordination Office.

- 35 As could be seen from the above table, the migrant producing regional states of Ethiopia were 6 in number. These are Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, Southern Nations & Nationalities Region, Afar and Harari. The overwhelming majority of child labour migrants came from Amhara region, particularly from Oromo special zone (Kamissie area).
- 36 Factors such as rural poverty, lack of employment opportunities and the perception of Arab countries as providers of job opportunities and good salaries even for the illiterate and unskilled labour forces have been mentioned by the returnees as major causes for their migration. Yet, the overwhelming majority (85 percent) responded that family and peer pressure are the most compelling push factors forcing them to migrate,² whereas information disseminated by brokers about the benefit of migration and job opportunity in Arab countries have served as pull factors.
- 37 Assessment of literacy rate for 355 minors indicated that 37.7 % of the returnees were illiterate who have never attended any form of schooling and cannot read and write. In contrast, those who attended grade 11-12 constituted only 0.6 % (see table 4). This shows that the overwhelming majority of child labour migrants are either the low achievers who could not join higher education or the illiterate one. Asked what type of job they expect upon migrating to the Middle East, most of the minors replied, simple field works such as shepherding and watering plants. For female minors, of course, domestic service was the answer. Others replied, any form of manual work.

Table 4. Literacy rate of Ethiopian minors repatriated from Yemen

Literacy rate	No of minors	Percentage
Illiterate	134	37.7%
1-6 grade	131	36.9%
7-10 grade	88	24.8%
11-12 grade	2	0.6%
Total	355	100%

Source: Project Social Work Supervision & Coordination Office.

- 38 As can be seen from the above table, illiteracy rates among the returnee is very high. The majority of illiterate migrants came from the Oromo special zone of Amhara regional state. Several reasons were mentioned for this by the returnees during the in-depth interview and group discussions the current researcher had with them. Among others, the respondents mentioned the following contributing factors: lack of schools closer to their residence; reluctance of parents to send children to school; and lack of money to pay for school fees, school uniform, learning materials such as exercise books and text books. Those who dropped out of school responded with similar reasons, but some of them indicated preference of work to school because of its higher return, especially when the job outside the country is successfully secured. The issue related to lack of schools in proximity to their residence is a contested reason due to the fact that currently, there is a policy and practice of having at least one primary school at each *kebele* in rural Ethiopia.

The reunification process

- 39 Reunification field trips have been scheduled on a weekly basis, and minors were accompanied by social workers either to their doorsteps or to the nearest town. Upon arrival at the appropriate destination, the local Women, Children and Youth Affairs, the Labour & Social Affairs Bureau or representatives of the local police force were invited to witness the reunification process. The reunification process was culminated by the handing over of the child to the parents or the guardians and issuance of a certificate of reunification cementing the act. Overall, during the project life span, 444 minors were reunified in their original places of domicile or in the nearest Woreda centres. The remaining 37 returnees were reunified in Addis Ababa, because their parents personally came and received them.

Reintegration and its challenges

- 40 As indicated earlier, in its broader sense, reintegration refers to the achievement of a sustainable return i.e. the ability of returnees to secure the political, economic and social conditions to maintain their life, livelihood and dignity (UNHCR 2004:3). It is the most important component, and probably the ultimate goal of any voluntary

repatriation program be it repatriation of failed asylum seekers or child labour migrant stranded somewhere. In other words, despite the existence of perennial debate concerning the provision of individual assistance to returnee minors versus broader community based development intervention, reintegration remains a crucial activity to address the root causes of economic migration.

- 41 Viewed from the perspective of reintegrating Ethiopian minors repatriated from Yemen, provision of targeted economic assistance to individual returnee and broader community based development intervention are necessary, but challenging.
- 42 The rationale for targeted economic assistance emanates from the fact that the overwhelming majority of the returnee minors lack marketable assets (land or property) due to their age status and any marketable skill due to rampant illiteracy. Moreover, since they have spent large sums of money (by Ethiopian standards) in the course of migration and didn't profit from it, it makes sense to think that, now they are economically less secure than before migration. Thus, upon return, they need temporary assistance whatsoever to survive and readapt themselves to the previous environment (if at all the environment is the same) and to look forward to survive. So provision of temporary targeted assistance is vital to rehabilitate the returnee and avert re-migration. The challenge, however, is that provision of financial assistance has a negative impact. While creating a dependency syndrome among the beneficiaries, it might also initiate new migration with a view to accessing similar rewards.
- 43 When it comes to community based development intervention, one can see its long-term effect. Investing in development of educational infrastructure and income generating schemes, for example, has more significant effects than individual assistance. It addresses the root cause of migration. Nonetheless, careful identification of intervention areas and huge resource capacity is needed to carry out this activity.
- 44 Well cognizant of this fact, UNICEF Ethiopia initially included the reintegration component into the project agreement under discussion. Lately, however, on grounds of financial shortage, this crucial component has been cancelled. Ongoing repatriation activity carried out by IOM also excludes the reintegration component because of similar reasons. This, I think, is the biggest failure of the effort to sustainably address the plight of Ethiopian child migrants voluntarily returning from Yemen.

Conclusion

- 45 The case study presented above indicated that international migration from Ethiopia has been steadily increasing over the last couple of decades. Motives of migration have also exhibited significant shifts from political to economic reasons. Not only adult migration, but also the number of unaccompanied minors migrating in search of better opportunity is rising, especially during the last decade. Yet, not all of the labour migrants going abroad succeed in attaining their objectives. Most of the recent migrants, particularly those who use Yemen as a gateway to Saudi Arabia and other rich Gulf States were caught in the middle of a fire, because of the political unrest in Yemen and closure of the border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Apart from being subjected to untold difficulties including crossing vast and hostile desert lands along the way, hunger, thirst, physical abuse and emotional stress; crossing the Gulf of Aden, they faced even more brutal treatment in the hands of traffickers & the Saudi border

guards. Arbitrary arrest, deportation and violation of their human rights were awaiting them out there. Even though these abuses were recorded by journalists, no solid scholarly work has been produced so far to critically assess the magnitude of this phenomenon of child migration itself and attendant problems. Review of existing literature indicated that most of the available studies focus either on political asylum seekers or the plight of Ethiopian domestic workers in the Middle East.

- 46 Official documents are also silent on child labour migration from Ethiopia owing to the fact that minors under the working age seeking job opportunities abroad often go unrecorded and use illegal routes to migrate. So far only IOM and other partners like UNICEF, UNHCR and DRC (Danish Refugee Council) are closely following and trying to address the plight of this segment of Ethiopian society. The current study, albeit sketchy, stands out as a single attempt to assess the process of voluntary repatriation, emergency interim care, family tracing, reunification and reintegration of Ethiopian child labour migrants from Yemen.
- 47 In a nutshell, the conclusion drawn by the current study is that emergency interim care, family tracing, reunification and reintegration of child labour migrants is indeed a daunting task that needs meticulous planning, and careful implementation. It needs careful recruitment of a multi-disciplinary professional staff (social workers) well-versed in protection of child rights, and careful examination of multiple psychological and physical traumas that the youth underwent at different levels: in the process of migration, in the host country and upon return. It also needs a multi-disciplinary approach to care provision, and building of a multi-lingual and culture sensitive team of experts to address cross-cultural issues and conflicts. The greatest lesson to be drawn from the current project, however is that, despite the importance of all components of voluntary repatriation programs, reintegration constitutes the most crucial component that should not be overlooked as it is the most viable way one can break out of the vicious circle of re-migration.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Soldier-settlers in Menelik's army were allotted fertile lands with tribute paying local tenants in lieu of their military services. This automatically made them landlords who afforded to invite their kinsmen as managers of their newly acquired fortunes or simply as beneficiaries of the new power relation, which favored the northern migrants to the detriment of the local population.
2. Indeed, independent child migration is part of a family's survival strategy as the migration of a child decreases the dependency ratio in the household, even when the child does not earn enough to save (because there is a decrease in household consumption demand). In addition, some migrant children are able to save and send remittances, sometimes contributing to the education of their siblings. Peer pressure also represents one of the strongest factors driving out-migration (see VAN DE GLIND 2010). Interview with returnees from Yemen also confirmed that success stories of their fellow friends and associates who migrated to the Middle East and returned with large sums of money or helped their parents obtain a better life at home inspired them to look for similar opportunities.

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Urban Redevelopment Project and Community Participation: The case of Senga Tera Fird Bet 1 in Addis Ababa

Ezana Haddis

p. 301-313

- 1 The recent studies conducted in the areas of urban renewal in Addis Ababa tend to focus on the impact of the project or responses of the local community (e.g. GOSSAYE 2001; LISHAN 2010; GEBRE 2008 and ELIAS 2008). The research conducted by MESAY in 2008 investigates land development practice, rather than the planning process. BIZUNEH (2010), EYOB (2010), FRENCH and HEGAB (2011(or FRANSEN and SAMSON (2010) have conducted a rapid assessment on the Urban Redevelopment Pilot Project, named Senga Tera Fird Bet 1, recently implemented in Addis Ababa. These researchers have concluded that this project had been *state-driven* and relegated to information sharing (FRANSEN and SAMSON, 2010).
- 2 The area concerned by the implementation of Senga Tera Fird Bet 1 is an intermediate urban land between the main city centre and the biggest market place of the city, named *Markato* (ORAAMP 2002). This was one of the reasons that made the area to be selected as pilot urban redevelopment project. A Local Development Plan (hereinafter LDP) was developed to guide the redevelopment. The project resulted in the resettlement of a significant proportion of the former residents of the area. About 153 private homeowners were relocated to Nifas Silk-Lafto Sub-city and Kolfe Keraniyo, which is located about 10 kilometres away from the redevelopment area (ADDIS ABABA CITY ADMINISTRATION 2010). 80 homeowners preferred to redevelop plots on the site according to the new building standard. In addition, 50 homeowners preferred to be resettled in government built condominium housing units. 890 public tenants have bought condominium housing with 20 years mortgage after paying 20% down payment. The majority of those who bought condominium housing went to Gofa (Nifas Silk Lafto) and Gotera (Chirkos) condominium sites, which are located 5.3 km and 3.7 km

respectively away from the redevelopment site. For 185 households who could not afford paying the down payment, substitute *Kebele* housing that is found in similar or worse condition were given within the same Sub-city (ADDIS ABABA CITY ADMINISTRATION 2010).

- 3 In the continuity of these several studies, this article proposes to go deeper into the exploration of the factors hindering the active involvement of the local affected populations in the process management of the Senga Tera-Fird Bet 1 project. This work associates quantitative methods with qualitative approaches, including fieldwork activities and in-depth interviews on the research area, conducted from June to August 2011.

Interpreting community participation

- 4 The concept of participation is a well-researched and much talked about concept taking different forms as in community participation, citizen participation, public participation, participatory governance, participatory planning, stakeholder participation, participatory development, and so on (HUMAN 2007). Participation in its broadest sense can be defined as a process through which stakeholders' influence and share control over development initiatives and decisions and resources which affect them (WORLD BANK 2011). Similarly (COHEN and UPHOFF 1980) define it as a process that *includes people in decision-making processes, in implementing programs, their sharing in the benefits of development programs and their involvement in efforts to evaluate such programs*. In all the definitions of participation, stakeholder or groups or people are at the centre of development: A stakeholder "is an individual or group influenced by and [/or] with an ability to significantly impact (either directly or indirectly) — the topical area of interest" (ENGI and GLICKEN 1995: 1).
- 5 OAKLEY (1991) identified three interpretations of participation. These are: first paramount consideration of participation to achieve programme objectives. In this case participation is a means to achieve improved programme results. If people contribute their ingenuity, skills, and other resources, more people can benefit, implementation is facilitated, and the outcome responds better to the demand of the target groups (MOSER 1989). The second consideration of participation consists in properly leading institutions and organizations to development (OAKLEY 1991). Participation builds up a self-reliant and co-operative spirit in communities; it is a learning process whereby people become capable of identifying and dealing actively with their problem (UNCHS 1984, cited in MOSER 1989). In this case participation is an institution building exercise. The third interpretation views participation as empowerment (OAKLEY 1991). Participation in this case is conceived as an end in itself, people have the right to participate in the planning, implementation and management of matters that affect their lives (MOSER, 1989).
- 6 In practice, there are different levels of participation. ARNSTEIN (1969: 262) identified through eight levels of participation a continuum ranging from the most exploitive and underpowered to the most controlling and empowered. This ladder of participation can be summarized into three categories. The first one is *non-participation* and includes the first two rungs, i.e. manipulation and therapy. In this category citizens are not involved genuinely in planning and development process rather intervention will be imposed on

the stakeholders by the of the power holders. The second category is *tokenism*, which includes the next three rungs of *informing*, *consultation* and *placation*. In this case citizens have the voice to hear and to be heard, however, they do not have the power to make sure that their views are considered. The final one is the one that includes the higher rungs of *partnership*, *delegated power* and *citizen control*. At this level citizens have the decision making power ranging from negotiation in case of partnership to significant control of the decision making power in *delegated power* and *citizen control* (ARNSTEIN 1969). The level of participation depends highly on the motivation of the process.

- 7 The process of participation does not happen in a vacuum; hence it is subject to various influences which inhibit or facilitate its effectiveness (OAKLEY 1991). This influence can be categorized under structural, local and social factors. The following section will try to explain the former two categories briefly.

Structural factors

- 8 The political environment of a country is a critical factor for a successful participatory process. In country where prevailing ideology does not encourage freedom of speech and openness – and the state of affairs is dictated by a government –, it is difficult to undertake a genuine participation (OAKLEY 1991). Therefore, democratization is precondition to foster participatory decision-making (PIETERSE 2000). Participatory planning further, demands decentralized and horizontal administrative system in order to give room for local actor to involve in decision-making. On the other hand, a centralized government structure that gives little room for local decision making will minimize the possibility of authentic participation since decisions flows from top to down without involvement of local actors (OAKLEY 1991). It is important to note that decentralization in terms of decision making over development and finance is a crucial factor in facilitating genuine stakeholder participation. However, decentralization needs to be supported by accountability, transparency and participatory institutional arrangement of the local government (PIETERSE 2000; VAN DIJK 2006). The other structural factor is political interference on local projects and programs by the ruling party to co-opt the direction of the intervention for their political benefit (OAKLEY 1991). All these show that how much the structural political factors are important to realize genuine local level participation. The other most important yet latent structural factor is culture, which the *mental programming* of the leaders and those bottom. Some cultures have relatively distributed power structure whereby there is small power distance between the leaders and the followers and in others power is unequally distributed. The former one is suitable or easier for participatory leadership while the latter culture usually produces autocratic leaders and passive citizens (HOFSTEDE 1983).

Local government level factors

- 9 According to the urban management approach the major objective of local governments is facilitating stakeholder involvement in decision-making and overall urban development (VAN DIJK 2008). However, in practice, there are several factors at the local government level that affect, positively or negatively, the quality of participation. The major factor that affects the process of participation by local governments is the availability of resources. Participatory process demands additional

resources in order to address the social and economic needs of stakeholders. However, in most cases local governments' resources do not match their ambition to participate and often justifying additional expenditure is difficult (LOWNDES, PRATCHETT and STOKER 2001).

The initiation of the project

- 10 Officially, the urban redevelopment project has a purpose of improving the living and housing condition of the inhabitants of slum areas, maintaining sustainable land management and supply system, improving the spatial and physical image of the city. During the interviews I conducted and in public meetings, the city officials often emphasized the last two objectives. They stressed that these areas are an eyesore and need to be revitalized. In addition, regarding the public consultation, the Sub-city officials were justifying the project, by mentioning that the city is the seat of African Union Commission and need to be more attractive: they were then asking its inhabitants to sacrifice for the good of the next generation. In addition, in the well-planned parts of the city outside the Central District, a square meter of land is being leased for up to USD 1,569.06 per square meter (HADRA AHMED 2011). According to the former LDBUR project office head, the City Administration has also the objective of tapping the underutilized inner-city land through densification.
- 11 The nation is guided by a constitution that provides “the government ... [the] duty to hold the land on behalf of the people and it also assures its citizens right to be consulted with respect to policies and projects affecting their community” (FDRE 1994). These provisions were the one of the legal obligations that made the City Administration to consult the public and undertook the redevelopment project on their behalf.
- 12 In addition, article 44 sub-article 2 of the Ethiopian Federal Constitution stipulates that:
“All persons who have been displaced or whose livelihoods have been adversely affected as a result of State programmes have the right to commensurate monetary or alternative means of compensation, including relocation with adequate State assistance.”
- 13 The country has also ratified and adopted Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) that prescribe avoidance of forced eviction and proper participation of the affected group in planning and implementation of development induced resettlement. However, there was no proper resettlement planning that would re-establish the affected group's livelihood in the new settlement, and there was cases of forced eviction (FRENCH and HEGAB 2011).
- 14 On the other hand the Expropriation of Land for Public Purposes Proclamation No. 455/2005 does not mention participation of displaced community in resettlement planning. This proclamation, however, provides that cash “compensation (...) may not, in any way, be less than the current cost of constructing a single room low cost house and the cost of removal, transportation and erection shall be paid as compensation” (FDRE 1994, Article 7, sub-articles 3 and 5). However, a cash compensation of USD 2,701.5 was given, while the minimum government constructed studio-housing unit

costs USD 10,806.00. In addition, the project did not pay removal and transportation cost for the residents, according to the representative of the private homeowners.

- 15 The Federal Urban Housing Development Policy emphasizes the demolishing and redevelopment based on new plan of the inner-city dilapidated slum areas giving particular emphasis to on-site resettlement of the area's residents through participating them in planning and implementation (MINISTRY OF WORKS AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 2009). Though the project was guided by this policy the focus given to the on-site resettlement was weak as evidenced by the resettlement of the huge majority of the residents in other locations.
- 16 On the other hand there is no urban redevelopment strategy on the Federal or City level. City government disregarding the offer of development partners to commission development of shared strategy went ahead with this project by its own after reforming its organization and developing an in-house redevelopment manual. However, this manual was not discussed and owned by other relevant development partners. Due to this the project is only owned and ran by the City Government only, unlike other similar projects worldwide. It had only two partners in its implementation, one of these partners were involved in the project based on their own initiative not in response to the invitation of the City Administration.
- 17 The five-year long Strategic Development Plan also gives direction for public participation in development implementation in general. However, it does not specifically emphasize the participation of the slum dwellers in the redevelopment process, except mentioning the importance of transferring of *Kebele* tenants (public housing tenants) who are living in a dilapidated housing into condominium housing unit. Nevertheless, in the project implementation not all public housing tenants were transferred to low cost condominium housing.
- 18 Apart from lack of a strategy the redevelopment process had not a guideline developed based on the Federal and the City proclamations, policies and plans to direct the implementation of the project. The whole project was guided by a circular signed by the City Manager and the Urban Redevelopment Manual. There were times that the circulars changes from time to time which resulted in lack of consistency during the project implementation. The absence of guideline has also played a positive contribution for responding to the public demand. Therefore, it can be said that lack of detailed guideline has also an advantage of making the project flexible.
- 19 All in all, due to various factors that we will discuss in the following sections, the City government has failed to properly translate active affected group participation and other provisions of the various legal, policy and plan documents. In addition, due to lack of urban redevelopment strategy and guideline owned by relevant stakeholders of the City, the redevelopment process has failed in the mercy of the political leaders. This has tilted the participation process to the City government officials making the affected group less vocal in the process. On the other hand the lack of guideline of the redevelopment process although it made the process less predictable, has also made the process more flexible.

The administrative organization of the project

- 20 The new City Administration, after taking office in May 2008, engaged in restructuring of the organization of the City Administration using the principles of Business Process Engineering (BPR) and established Land Development, Banking and Urban Renewal Project Office, responsible for preparation of new or underdeveloped land for development and handle compensation and resettlement of residents who are relocated from their place of residence for public purposes. Similar organizations were created at the Sub-City and District level reporting to the Managers of respective administration (Land Development, Banking and Urban Renewal Project Office 2009). Therefore, the organization of the project office takes the form of mechanistic stable model, according to (Burns and Stalker 1966; 1961) due to its structured nature and routinized stability. Specifically with this project the major implementing body was the Sub-city Land Development, Banking and Urban Renewal (LDBUR) Project Office and the Sub-city Administration. The city level LDBUR project office was responsible for facilitating the provision of substitute housing and land in other Sub-cities, according to the former head of the office.
- 21 In order to execute the responsibility of the project office has recruited 28 employees in December, 2008 out of the 34 needed, according to the Sub-city process owner. These employees are composed of fresh graduates in the fields of civil engineering, accounting, economics, law and other social sciences. However, according to the former Sub-city project office head, there were some staff working in positions that are unrelated with their academic background due to shortage of relevant professionals. Before they embark on the project, they were trained on how to run the redevelopment project for only two days. Although training was not sufficient enough the employees were able to gain experience by doing as per the circulars and manual according to the Sub-city officials. It was only one employee who was transferred due to lack of communication skill and only 6 houses were over or under estimated for compensation, which shows their good performance technically. However, the key informants the researcher interviewed from the affected group, who were transferred into other public housing, have revealed that one of the project office staff used to mistreat them even sometimes insult them. This shows that the some of the project staff lack communication and proper client handling skill.
- 22 In addition, the former process owner of the Sub-city project office failed to make changes suggested by private homeowners on the MoU sample formant prepared centrally. This, according to him, was mainly because he has not the mandate to do so. Due to this the negotiation process between the private homeowners and the project office was discontinued. They started negotiating with the Sub-city officials which have better decision making power. Therefore, with regard to responding to the public demand and negotiation, it can be said that few of the project officers at the time were less equipped in their attitude and decision making power to work with the residents, as it was revealed in the interviews with key informants form the former residents. In addition, the Sub-city was also slow to take action to penalize the misconduct of the staff member; he was transferred after the end of the relocation of many of the respondents according to the former process owner.

Political leadership

- 23 Since the pilot project was a pioneer endeavour to redevelop the city and an undertaking to gain experience for further redevelopment mission, the City Administration gave emphasis to the project. The pilot project was also a showcase for the general public at large to gain their support for further redevelopment endeavours planned in different inner-city slums of the City. According to the former LDBUR project office head:
- “The Senga Tera-Fird Bet I Pilot Project was ‘a must succeed project’... We believed that if we fail in this project we would not be able to redevelop other parts of the city, and if we succeed it would be easier for the future redevelopment schemes. Hence, the project both at the City and Sub-city level was led by political leaders” (interview, June 2013).
- 24 In order to oversee the smooth running of the project a high level executive committee was established from the City and Sub-city Administration, including the Mayor and the City Manager. This committee used to meet once a week or once in two week and listened to the progress of the project and used to give direction for future implementation. In addition, the then City Manager used to receive reports every three days and used to give guidance on the course of the project, according to the former LDBUR project office head.
- 25 According to the former LDBUR project office head, *the then City Manager had ‘owned’ the project [Senga Tera-Fird Bet I pilot project] as his brainchild and used to monitor and steer its implementation.* The then City Manager can be said the main driver of the project. Most of the Circulars that guide the pilot project were signed by him as evidenced by the researcher. He was also the one who was making final critical decisions, according to the Sub-city officials.
- 26 Furthermore, the Sub-city officials revealed that the higher level City officials, particularly the then City Manager, were behind the affected group participation in a sense that every time a reasonable demand came from the public they used to respond to the public’s demand in consultation with the higher City officials. However, this is not always the case. According to one of the study’s informant who was transferred to another public housing found in a dilapidated condition, the Sub-city and City administration was not able to respond to the public housing tenants’ demand of paying the down payment of the condominium housing in different installments. An interview with the former Manager of Lideta Sub-city confirmed lack of response for this demand since the housing finance was handled by Commercial Bank of Ethiopia.
- 27 Similarly at the Sub-city level the project was led by the political leaders, i.e. the Sub-city Chief Executive, the then Sub-city Manager and Public Relation Advisor to the Chief Executive. It was only the Sub-city political leaders responsible for public communication about the project. The Sub-city manager, particularly, was the one who was shouldering the implementation of the day to day activity of the project.

Decentralized decision and growing power of the Sub-city

- 28 The Sub-city was given the mission to accomplish the project successfully to this end its administration was given with the autonomy to design the detailed implementation planning of the project and run the public consultation under the framework of the

implementation manual and the circulars. Using this relative autonomy the Sub-city administration has decided to give separate housing for dependants living with their parents, facilitate the empowerment of 134 women to own and pay mortgage for their housing, allowing the youth group to demolish the public rental housings and selling back of the private housings to their owners with minimum price in order for them to benefit from its demolishing.

- 29 However, in deciding all this matters the Sub-city administration needed to get the green light from the higher City officials, according to the Sub-city officials. As it is discussed in the previous section the higher City officials, particularly the City Manager used to follow-up the project closely; hence getting the go-head was not difficult.

The planning process

- 30 The Local Development Plan (LDP) defines the road hierarchy, building setback, building regulation sample neighbourhood and the overall design of the site. The LDP implementation strategy was the redevelopment of the area by temporarily resettling the public housing (*Kebele*) tenants – and resettling them back permanently in the condominium housing to be built on the site. It also gave opportunity for the private house owners to buy condominium houses or lands to build their house on the site, through an arrangement of land compensation in the expansion area based on their preference (URBAN INFORMATION AND PLAN INSTITUTE 2009).

The local development plan

- 31 The LDP was improved several times after considering its limitation during implementation. According, the current LDBUR process owner at the Lideta Sub-city the City Urban Information and Plan Institute has made several improvements based on the recommendation of the Sub-city. One among the few changes made was the land allocated for private home owners whose houses were demolished and wanted to rebuild in the site was 0.59 ha assuming that few people are willing to rebuild their houses on the site understudy. However, more than 80 people chose to rebuild their house in that area, therefore, based on the recommendation of the Sub-city the institute has made change the land allocated for this purpose from 0.59 ha to 1.6 ha (FRENCH and HEGAB 2011).
- 32 There was an already developed LDP that includes the area under study dubbed Senga Tera-Fird Bet LDP. The former LDP covers a vast chunk of land. After the site was selected to be the pilot project for the urban redevelopment endeavour of the City, experts of the Urban Land and Information Institute took 26 ha parcel of the land from the bigger LDP and start revising it. Since the plan was outdated they were forced to undertake a survey in order to know the demographic, economic, housing and preference of the residents of the area. The survey questionnaire was to be filled and signed by the household heads. However, key informants from the affected group revealed that the questionnaires were not filled properly.
- 33 Although as mentioned above the survey did not cover the entire households living in the area and not all its sources of information were from household heads; it came up with some interesting insights about the conditions and needs of the residents. It

revealed that about 81.4% have expressed their willingness to participate in the on-site redevelopment project and out of these 79% expressed their willingness to be temporarily resettled in the publicly provided temporary shelters during the redevelopment of the site (Urban Information and Plan Institute 2009). Although this study was questioned by some of the informants including the government officials, it shed some light on how the residents supported redevelopment of the area and on-site resettlement.

- 34 After the collection of data through survey, the planners at the Urban Information and Plan Institute developed the LDP. The former head of the Institute made it clear that there was no any public or stakeholder direct involvement in the planning process except the survey. It can be said that the planners had a strictly technical role of producing a plan based on one way collection of information from the public without validating it in a public forum. One of the key principles of the LDP is participation of stakeholders to determine the local needs and goals, particularly the residents of the locality (ORAAMP 2002). In addition, the LDP development manual of the Ministry of Work and Urban Development stipulates that *relevant stakeholder participation in agenda setting, LDP development and approval* (Ministry of Works and Urban Development 2006). This is why the implementation of the project slightly differed from what many residents preferred.
- 35 Contrary to the proposal of the LDP the implementation of the project, on-site resettlement was given little attention. According to the public housing tenants' committee member, given the lack of trust by the public towards the government in keeping their promises and less effort done by the government in overcoming it, on-site resettlement was the less preferred option. Only 4 residents chose to be resettled on the condominiums under construction, according to the then Sub-city Manager. Similarly for the private homeowners they were given an option to re-build their house on the site individually or in group depending on the plots they had. However, the land compensation that was given for them on the site is less than the land they would receive in expansion area. In addition, they were expected to build a minimum of three store-houses (AACA-LDBUR project office 2010). Hence, these have made the on-site resettlement to the house owners less attractive, according to the private house owners' committee secretary. It is only 80 households who are re-building their house on the site out of 289 private homeowners. Therefore, the final version of the plan and its implementation is slightly different from needs of the residents in the survey. This might be attributed to the lack of mechanism put in place to ensure the demands of the residents in the process of planning and translating it into action.

Public consultations: motive and emphasis for participation

- 36 Following the finalization of the LDP, the Lideta Sub-city Administration called a four series of public consultation in February 2009 in order to inform the residents that their place of residence is going to be redeveloped and to convince them to support the project. The administration called the public for consultation by dividing them into two groups by their home ownership status, since the public housing tenants and private homeowners have different interests. Invitation letter to the public consultation was dispatched to each household in the area to be demolished; however, some of them

received the invitation letter one day before the public consultation, according to the key informants from the affected group.

- 37 However, the turnout was high according to the minutes and the videotapes of the public consultations. Although the major purpose of the public consultation was convincing the public, the officials have considered some of the demands of the residents. These includes revision of the compensation estimate, enabling 134 destitute women to own a condominium housing, giving separate houses for 113 dependants that have established a family of their own under the same roof with their parents, and offering the project to demolish the public rental houses to the youth of the area organized in groups so that they can generate money and involve in construction business.
- 38 The urban redevelopment implementation manual in its section about public consultation says for redevelopment areas ... it is important to consult the residents in order to give them awareness about the project, to involve them and support the project (Land Development, Banking and Urban Renewal Project Office 2009: 10). In addition, all the public officials' informants of the study revealed that the main purpose of the public consultation is to give the proper information about the project and convince them to be part of the project. The public officials described the public consultation as forum for persuading the residents to be part of the projects. The common phrase the Sub-city officials used to mention time and these public consultations consisted in urging the local populations to start the redevelopment project – as it was noted from the public consultation video tapes: the officials were trying to convince the public by giving them several options and promising them they will be better off in the new settlement.
- 39 Moreover, one of the informants of the study who was relocated to an expansion area stated that the Sub-city officials filled them with empty promises about the relocation site and when they actually go to the relocation site the land was poorly serviced and too far from the city center. Although they also mentioned that the public has the right to oppose the redevelopment, in the same forum they were labeling those who opposes as those who get improper benefit by sub-letting the public house at higher prices. Therefore, we can say that the major motivation of the public consultation on the implementation of the project was to convince the public and as an instrument for implementation efficiency by mobilizing support from affected group.

Conclusion

- 40 It can be concluded that the attention given to the project by the City's higher officials because it is a pilot project and the explicit provision of the legal and policy documents towards participation of affected groups has played an important positive role in facilitating the participation process to be more demand responsive. This has indicated that political commitment for a participation process if it is supported by appropriate institutional frameworks facilitates genuine participation (PIETERSE and URBAN MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 2000). In addition, the long and intensive public consultation and negotiation with representatives and the relative autonomy and trust the sub-city had from the city officials has contributed positively in making the process more participatory and demand responsive. According to (VAN DIJK 2006) the local government's role is to facilitate decision making by the local communities. We can

therefore say that the Lideta Sub-city administration has played a critical role in facilitating the participation process of the project.

- 41 The organization of the project in a manner that the sub-city was the principal implementer with close support from the City Administration has made the project to be more responsive to the public's demand. This goes in line with the existence of institutional arrangements with parent organizations in a flexible and demand responsive manner with the involvement of stakeholders facilitates participation (IMPARATO and RUSTER 2003).
- 42 However, the major emphasis on improving the image and efficient land management, and emphasis on results and hard outputs has compromised the quality of the participation. This has resulted in a lack of responses to the basic demands of the public. These factors go in line with (MOSER 1989, 71; BOTES and VAN RENSBURG 2000: 41-58) the studies stressing that such hard issues tend to compromise the quality of the participation.
- 43 The instrumental motive of the participation process and late involvement of the affected group in the process, have compromised the quality of the Participation. This is supported by (DAVIES 2001: 193-216) assertion that implementation stage involvement of the public has less impact in making the project more customized to the beneficiaries. On top of this the technocratic nature of the planning process, poor communication skills of the planner during the presentation and the consultative nature of the public forums made the participation process less effective in responding to the public's demand and create a win-win situation for both parties. According to (HUMAN 2007; INNES 2004: 419-436) poor communication and negotiation skills of staff of local government and consultative level of the participation process (ARNSTEIN 1969: 216-224) compromises the participation process in representing the demands of the public in the final plan. Last but not least the fact that the project has low involvement of partners was another factor that was hindering the process from being a more participatory one.

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Moving to Condominium Housing? Views about the Prospect among Caregivers and Children in Addis Ababa and Hawassa – Ethiopia

Agazi Tiumelissan and Alula Pankhurst

p. 313-325

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This paper was produced as part of the research programme of Young Lives, an international study of childhood poverty, following the lives of 12,000 children in four countries (Ethiopia, India, Peru and Vietnam) over 15 years (www.younglives.org.uk). Young Lives is funded from 2001 to 2017 by UK aid from the Department for International Development (DFID), and co-funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2010 to 2014. The views expressed are those of the authors, and are not necessarily those of, or endorsed by, Young Lives, the University of Oxford, DFID or other funders. A fuller version of this paper including tables is available on the Young Lives Ethiopia web-site www.young-lives-Ethiopia.org

- 1 This paper is based on the second of the three reports resulting from a *Young Lives* relocation sub-study conducted in four sites in Ethiopia: three in Addis Ababa and one in Hawassa, the capital of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Region. This second report focuses on housing and considers how children and caregivers view the prospect of moving to condominium housing, the advantages and risks involved, and their perceptions of their ability to afford the costs.
- 2 The urban landscape in Ethiopia is currently undergoing a fundamental transformation, with whole neighbourhoods in the centre of major cities being cleared for urban development. The urban renewal programmes have the twin objectives of promoting urban growth and providing improved housing for the urban poor. On the

one hand, the clearing of areas without high-value buildings is viewed by developers as freeing urban space for the construction of office blocks, shopping centres and real-estate development. On the other hand, low-cost housing condominium apartments are being constructed by the government and offered to urban residents who were living in the areas that are being demolished and who can afford the down-payment and subsequent monthly payments. Some of these condominiums are in the vicinity of central areas that are being redeveloped, whereas a larger number are being constructed in the suburbs.

- 3 The paper on which this summary is based provides background baseline data on the views of children and caregivers about condominium housing prior to the planned move. It will therefore provide important evidence to compare with experiences of the respondents after the relocation. Despite the desire of most caregivers and children to live in condominiums, the acknowledgement by large proportions of respondents that they will not be able to afford the costs raises important questions about the viability of these low-cost housing schemes for the urban poor and suggests the need to reconsider ways of addressing their needs. The indications from the case studies of the few households who have already moved raise issues concerning the need to consider income generation, employment and services, notably education, alongside low-cost housing schemes.

From an international research project to an inquiry centred on two Ethiopian towns

- 4 The research was conducted in four *Young Lives* sites in two Ethiopian cities. *Young Lives* is an international study of childhood poverty, commissioned and funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The research is conducted in Ethiopia, India, Peru and Vietnam, involving a longitudinal study from 2000 to 2015. In each country 3,000 children were included in the research. The Younger Cohort of 2,000 children, born in the year 2000, were aged 10 or 11 at the time of this study in January 2012. The Older Cohort of 1,000 children were aged 7 to 8 years in 2000 and were around 17 or 18 at the time of this study. In Ethiopia the research is conducted in 20 different sites, in four large regions: Amhara, Oromia, Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Region (SNNPR) and the city of Addis Ababa. In the twenty sites, three rounds of quantitative surveys were conducted. In five of the sites, one site from each region, there have been three rounds of in-depth qualitative studies with a smaller sample of children and caregivers.
- 5 *Young Lives* has also conducted a number of sub-studies, and this summary uses one of the three papers which is a product of one such initiative. It uses data from a cross-sectional study called 'Relocation Sub-study' conducted in four *Young Lives* sites, three in Addis Ababa (Bertukan¹, Duba and Menderin) and one, Leku, in Hawassa, the capital city of the SNNPR. In Bertukan and Menderin the relocation has been raised as an issue of concern in the previous rounds of the main *Young Lives* survey, and residents have been told that they will have to move. Both these sites are in the central part of the city, in areas where relocation is therefore expected to take place, even though the exact timing is still unknown. Likewise the site in SNNPR is in the centre of the city, and some relocation is believed to be likely. The fourth site, Duba, is on the outskirts of Addis Ababa; relocation does not seem to be a major concern here, and the study

included this site for contrast as a 'control' site. However, the main road out of town may stimulate investment, leading to some displacement.

- 6 All four urban sites are in poor areas in either the national capital or a regional capital; however, they each present particular characteristics, which are worth noting.
- 7 **Bertukan** is located in the central part of the capital city in an old quarter developed during the Italian occupation, close to a major market where many of the households find casual employment in the informal sector. The site is heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity (Amhara and Gurage are the largest groups), and also of religion (with Orthodox Christian and Muslim communities included). Many *Young Lives* households rely on informal-sector activities, notably petty trade in the market, street vending, wage labour, the sale of food and beverages, and carpentry. There is a large proportion of female-headed households, and some of the women concerned are involved in commercial sex work, for which the area is known. Several adjacent areas have already been demolished and are being redeveloped, and this neighbourhood is also within the priority areas for redevelopment. Although most of the redevelopment is earmarked for commercial interests, three blocks of condominiums have been built in the area and about a dozen very poor people were able to obtain flats within them with the support of NGOs, although none of these was a *Young Lives* household.
- 8 **Duba** is located on the outskirts of the capital city in an area that was first developed as an industrial zone in the late imperial period. The area is close to a main road and a major river, which is subject to industrial pollution from the factories. It is less congested than the two sites in the centre of the city. The area is mixed in terms of ethnicity, with Oromo, Amhara and Silte being the major groups. The population is predominantly Orthodox Christian. The main forms of livelihood involve wage labour in the informal sector, retail trade, and street vending; some men work in factories. There is relatively good access to health and education services. There are no immediate plans for redeveloping the area, although there has been an increase in industrial development in the vicinity and along the road passing through the area, which may well lead to some displacement along the road².
- 9 **Menderin** is in the centre of Addis Ababa in a very congested area that has a reputation of being one of the poorest parts of the city, with badly constructed make-shift dwellings. The area faces problems of pollution from open sewers and waste in the streets, and air pollution from a cigarette factory. The site is mixed in terms of ethnicity with four major ethnic groups, the Amhara, Gurage, Oromo, and Tigraway. The majority of the population are Orthodox Christians, although there are large Muslim and smaller Protestant minorities. There is an important market in the area. The main forms of livelihood are based on informal-sector activities, including petty trade, street vending, retail selling, woodwork and daily labour; some residents earn wages in government or private organisations. Several adjacent areas have already been demolished and are in the process of being redeveloped, and there also some condominiums that have already been built. The area has been designated for redevelopment, and the residents have been informed they will have to move.
- 10 **Leku** is located in an old neighbourhood in Hawassa, the capital city of the Southern Nationalities, Nations and Peoples Administrative Region (SNNPR). The ethnic composition of the site is heterogeneous, with three major groups among the *Young Lives* sample being the Wolayta, Amhara and Oromo. There are also a few Gurage and some Tigraway and Sidama. In terms of religion the site is also mixed, with Orthodox

Christians and Protestants representing the largest groups. In terms of livelihoods, most people in the community are engaged in informal-sector activities, notably petty trading, daily labour, street vending, or other forms of self-employment. Children are also involved in such activities. There is a high prevalence of female-headed households. The community is considered to be very poor, and a few NGOs have been engaged in distributing aid and educational materials. Some parts of the area are expected to be demolished for renovation, although the boundaries are not yet clear.

- 11 The relocation sub-study was carried out in January 2012, comprising both qualitative and quantitative components. The quantitative survey involved a total of 466 caregivers and 451 children (almost 16 per cent of the *Young Lives* children and 40 per cent of those living in urban areas). Of the 451 children, 299 (64 per cent) are among the Younger Cohort (aged between 11 and 12 years old at the time of the study), whereas 152 (36 per cent) are among the Older Cohort (aged between 17 and 18 at the time of the study). Of the total, 232 (51.4 per cent) are girls and 219 (48.6 per cent) are boys.
- 12 In the qualitative component, interviews were conducted with 79 children and their caregivers, 10 boys and 10 girls in each of the four sites. Since Bertukan and Leku are *Young Lives* qualitative sites, we interviewed the children who are part of our longitudinal qualitative sub-sample³. In the other two sites, a qualitative sub-sample was generated from the main survey sample. The selection criteria included the wealth quintile of the household, home ownership, and other social categories such as religion and ethnicity, in an attempt to include a mix of different categories and equal numbers of boys and girls from both cohorts. Key-informant interviews were also conducted with people from formal and customary institutions in each community. Focus group discussions were conducted with children, taking into account their age and gender cohorts, with separate groups for boys and girls for each cohort. Focus group discussions were also held with their caregivers and with influential community members. The interviews were conducted by researchers who had already worked in the *Young Lives* qualitative-study teams and who were experienced in interviewing children in these sites and familiar with qualitative methods and the ethical issues and procedures that *Young Lives* has been following. The rationale for the study was to understand the views and attitudes of children and care givers towards their home and community environment, and their expectations, fears and hopes about plans for relocation. The three main general topics of discussion were house and home environment, neighbourhood and support networks. The sections used for this paper included questions about ownership, rent and maintenance of the house; utilities; aspects that children like and dislike about their homes and neighbourhood; associations to which they belong; forms of support received from associations or individuals; and support that they provided for others. The data were written up by the researchers based on the protocols used in the field to interview the respondents and were analysed for this paper by considering evidence in terms of topic, site, cohort and gender.

A study revealing the plural challenges of condominium housing

- 13 This paper has considered the views of caregivers and children in four sites in Addis Ababa and Hawassa about the condominium housing programme established by the

government with the intention of providing low-cost housing for the urban poor, especially from sites designated for redevelopment. The paper provides insights into the ways in which the *Young Lives* children and adults perceive condominiums, what they appreciate and what they dislike about them, the extent to which they would wish to live in them, and their assessment as to whether they will be able to afford the costs. The paper also presents the views of officials and formal and informal community leaders, as well as case studies of a few households that have already moved into condominiums. The perspectives and perceptions of adults and children, who will be directly implicated if, as expected, urban redevelopment takes place in the areas where they live, have policy implications in terms of the ways in which the needs of the urban poor can be addressed, their preferences and priorities.

Attitudes towards the impending re-housing

- 14 Both adults and children expressed strong interest in living in condominiums. This was more so in the three sites in Addis Ababa, where more than 70 per cent of the respondents aspire to live in condominium apartments (For caregivers the proportion was 79.8 per cent, 73.1 per cent, 75 per cent and 46.2 per cent in Bertukan, Menderin, Duba and Leku respectively; and for the children it was 78.6 per cent, 82.2 per cent, 70.2 per cent and 56.45 per cent in the same order). However, even in the Hawassa site, where fewer than half the caregivers said they would want to live in condominiums, more than half the children are keen to do so. The proportion of respondents who desire to live in condominiums differs in terms of the sex of children with 74.6 per cent overall for girls, and 68 per cent overall for boys. The difference is greater when the data are disaggregated by age, with a higher proportion of Younger Cohort children wishing to live in condominiums with 74.6 per cent while for the older cohort children the proportion was 65.1 per cent.
- 15 However, in the qualitative material, there were some respondents who were not registered for condominiums and who do not want to live in them, for various reasons. Some of these concerns related to condominiums being uncomfortable, or worries about the durability or strength of the buildings. One family living in a rented condominium in Bertukan said they preferred their previous *kebele* house. This might suggest that people who are living in relatively good housing and compounds may not want to move to condominiums.
- 16 Other concerns related to livelihoods and the needs of people working from home, notably women preparing and selling food and beverages, who felt that they could not do this from condominium housing. Moreover, people expressed doubts about their chances of finding work in the informal sector close to where they would live in the condominiums, unlike in the central areas where they currently live. Some respondents also felt that condominiums were not suitable for the cultural way of life, where coffee is ground and holidays celebrated by slaughtering animals in the compound.

Hopes for a better living environment

- 17 Regarding the positive attributes of condominiums, most caregivers and children perceived them as being clean (84.5 per cent and 83.4 per cent overall respectively) and having proper toilets (80 per cent and 72.7 per cent overall respectively). Whereas in

the three sites in Addis Ababa it was mostly adult caregivers who appreciated the cleanliness of condominium housing, in the site in Hawassa cleanliness was appreciated by a higher proportion of children. However, regarding the importance of having proper toilets, the proportion of caregivers giving positive replies was higher than the proportion of children in all four sites, and especially in the two sites where relocation is expected to take place soon. There was also a gender-related difference among the children, since in all four sites a higher proportion of girls than boys emphasised the advantage of having proper toilets (this was 75.9 per cent overall for girls, and 69.4 per cent overall for boys). Likewise, having a separate kitchen was a feature appreciated by a significant majority of caregivers (80.2 per cent overall for care givers and 69.4 per cent for children), and the proportions were even higher in the two sites where relocation is expected (84.2 per cent in Bertukan and 91.7 per cent in Menderin, which are much higher than the overall average of 80.2 per cent). More than half the total number of caregivers (60.4 per cent overall) also expressed a preference for condominiums because they represent a modern way of living, while somewhat fewer than half of the children (47 per cent overall) appreciated them for this reason, although a higher proportion of girls (53.9 per cent overall) than boys (39.7 per cent overall) expressed this view.

Concerns about the new facilities

- 18 Asked about aspects of condominiums that they disliked, most respondents considered multi-storey buildings as potentially risky, especially for children, because of the external staircases and balconies; a greater proportion of caregivers than of children expressed these concerns in most sites (74.4 per cent overall for caregivers and 66.7 per cent overall for children). The highest proportion expressing these worries was in the Hawassa site, where there has been less exposure to condominiums, which are relatively new to the area (91.6 per cent for caregivers and 66.7 per cent for children). There were also age-related differences, as a higher proportion of Younger Cohort children were more enthusiastic about living in condominiums (74.6 per cent for Younger Cohort children and 65.1 per cent for Older Cohort children); however, they (63.5 per cent overall) seem to be less aware than Older Cohort children (73 per cent) of the danger for children. Most of the caregivers and children agreed that living in condominiums is difficult for the elderly (79.6 per cent and 63.2 per cent overall for care givers and children respectively), for the sick and for pregnant women (79.6 per cent and 62.1 per cent overall for care givers and children respectively). The proportions concerned about this were higher among caregivers than children and were highest in the Hawassa site for both caregivers and children.

Administration of the move

- 19 Registration for condominium housing seems to be closely linked to the likelihood of imminent relocation, since the two sites where relocation is planned have the highest proportions of households registered (87 per cent for Menderin and 66.7 per cent for Bertukan). There are a number of reasons why some people have not registered for condominiums, the most important being the belief that they would be unable to pay even if they were given the opportunity to obtain condominium housing. There was limited knowledge about the costs of down-payments (only 17.2 per cent overall) and

monthly payments (less than 10 per cent overall), the duration of payments and payments options (less than 15 per cent overall), suggesting the need for greater awareness raising.

- 20 Most respondents do not want to get a loan from banks for making the down-payments (60.6 per cent overall); among those who said they would want to get a bank loan, few said they would be able to obtain one (22 per cent overall). The proportion of respondents who said they could get a loan from a relative or that they would have another way of paying was even smaller (14.8 per cent and 7.7 per cent overall respectively). The same was true for monthly payments: only a minority of the respondents want to get loans from banks (26 per cent overall), and fewer respondents think they would be able to get loans (15.3 per cent overall). Very few think they might get loans from relatives for monthly payments (11.8 per cent overall) or that they might have some other way of covering the payment (7.7 per cent overall).

Financial constraints

- 21 Most respondents are not sure where they will end up living after the relocation (43.7 per cent overall), due to their inability to afford any form of alternative housing. A little more than a fifth said they expected to live in condominiums, whereas 16 per cent thought they would be re-housed in *Kebele* houses. Although more than half the respondents in the two sites where relocation is imminent think they will be allocated condominium houses, most respondents said they could not afford the down-payment (more than 80 per cent) and the monthly payments (more than 60 per cent).

Conclusion

- 22 The findings suggest that both the adults and the children appreciate condominiums and have internalised their representation as a modern, ideal way of living, providing potential improvements in their lives, notably with regard to sanitation and privacy. However, some concerns about the quality and durability of the housing were voiced, even though the respondents have not experienced living in them. For instance, the dangers of children falling over the balconies or in the external staircases suggest the need for improved safety features, such as internal rather than external staircases and higher balcony walls. Moreover, consideration should be given to finding ways of providing day-care, nursery and kindergarten facilities so that mothers are relieved of having to constantly watch out for small children to protect them from injury. The difficulties faced by elderly people suggest the need to prioritise allocation for the infirm and disabled on the ground floors.
- 23 Although the views of respondents about living in condominiums are generally positive, their inability to afford the payment is the major problem that leads most to be pessimistic about their chances of living in condominiums. These findings suggest the need to consider a range of options for financing access to condominiums for the urban poor, who simply cannot afford the condominium down-payment and monthly payments if subsidies and support cannot be found. This could include more flexible, longer-term, inter-generational or group loans; the formation of housing co-operatives, possibly linked to *iddir* funeral associations; sponsorship or partial payment from NGOs; donor subsidies; and mobilisation of support from the private sector and the Ethiopian

diaspora. It also raises the question of considering alternatives to the condominium model, since it does not seem to be a realistic option for the very poor without subsidies. Other models might include low-cost housing on the outskirts of the city that would be linked to employment opportunities or skills development.

- 24 Respondents in the qualitative sub-sample also mentioned their concern that their daily work or income-generating opportunities may be affected detrimentally if they are going to be relocated to a place away from the city centre. They also expressed worries about high transport expenses and living costs in the new relocation areas in the outskirts. Two of the families who were living in Bertukan and Menderin and who are now living in their condominiums in other parts of the city also shared this concern, reporting that the major problem they faced in the new area is related to work opportunities and the higher costs and limited availability of transport.
- 25 Other concerns expressed by caregivers and children in the case studies of families who had already moved to condominiums were that the schools for their children are now farther away, so that the families incur transportation costs, and that living costs in the new condominium areas are higher than in their previous locations. Even though this evidence is based on very few case studies, the concerns expressed suggest the need for policy dialogue on these crucial questions. Insofar as the urban poor who live and work in the city centre are to be relocated to the outskirts, and given that the costs of commuting to areas where they used to work are likely to be prohibitive, the development of income-generation activities and employment opportunities in the areas in which new condominium complexes are being built in the suburbs deserve serious consideration. It is also important to ensure that not just housing but other services, notably schooling for children, are available when new condominium areas are being developed. The findings therefore suggest that there is a need to move beyond merely providing housing to considering ways of improving the livelihoods of the urban poor and providing appropriate services alongside housing, notably day-care, kindergarten and primary schooling for the families that move. Some respondents also raised the question of limited play areas for children and the lack of communal spaces and facilities in the condominiums.
- 26 Although so far only three of the households have moved into condominium housing, and none of the *Young Lives* sites has yet been destroyed, two of the sites are due for redevelopment in the near future. The views of those who are likely to have to be relocated and the experiences of those who have already moved into condominium housing provide some indication of both the positive aspects and also some of the worries and potential concerns, particularly about the sustainable affordability for the poor, which deserve to be the subject of policy debate. The study underlines the importance of managing the resettlement process better by creating enhanced awareness about the conditions and options for obtaining condominiums; linking housing issues to access to income-generation opportunities, social support, and services, notably pre-schooling; and reviewing the condominium model to make it more flexible to the needs of poor people.

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FOOTNOTES

1. The children and their families share a great deal of personal information with us over many years. For this reason, pseudonyms have been used – both for the children mentioned here and for their communities – to preserve anonymity.
2. This site was selected as a ‘control’ site, as a comparison with the areas where relocation is expected to take place.
3. One boy selected in Bertukan has moved and could not be located.

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Land Degradation, Urban Crossroads and Migratory Trajectories: The Plural Social Dynamics of HIV Contamination in Kallu Woreda, South Wollo, Ethiopia

Nigusu Aboset

p. 327-332

- 1 According to the 2010 Global Report of the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, the number of people living with HIV/AIDS is about 33.3 millions, out of which 22.5 million are found in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS 2010:21). Ethiopia is one of these Sub-Saharan countries where the burden of HIV is affecting a wide spectrum of the society. Though the studies on this epidemic have mostly focused on urban areas during the last decades, a growing attention is now given to the increase of the prevalence rate among the rural community, which represents around 80 per cent of the Ethiopian population (MOH 2006:13).
- 2 In the same perspective, this article constitutes an introductory attempt to evaluate the nature, impact, and magnitude of HIV infection in the mainly rural areas of the Kallu administrative district—or *woreda* in Amharic language. Among the twenty-one districts comprised within the South Wollo Zone of the Amhara Region, the Kallu *woreda* is often presented as an area where risky socio-cultural practices particularly foster HIV contamination¹. In order to have a better understanding on these negative practices, this qualitative study explores their inscription within the different socio-economic contexts of the Kallu *woreda*. Indeed, in this area, the high HIV prevalence rate seems to be closely related to land degradation, urban crossroads and economic migrations.
- 3 Through the life stories and migratory trajectories of the local populations inhabiting the Kallu *woreda*, this study reveals the plural social factors strengthening women

vulnerability to HIV contamination, along the several forms of economic migrations that are today observed in this administrative district of Northern Ethiopia.

Food insecurity, unemployment and marginalization: the growing socio-economic deterioration of the family households in the Kallu Woreda

- 4 Poverty is one of the major factors that exacerbate the vulnerability of the rural populations vulnerability to HIV/AIDS. Though poverty is a recurrent issue all over the country, its magnitude is particularly strong in the Kallu woreda. As an expert of the local Agriculture Office clearly explains, land degradation and poor productivity are the main causes of the chronic food security that affects the farmers of the Kallu woreda. The 2005/2006 report produced by the Kallu woreda Agriculture Office associates the whole administrative district with a chronically food insecure area². Therefore, the issue of poverty seems particularly acute in Kallu woreda. Especially, the situation of poverty is highly spurred on, when the breadwinner of a household faces health problems. In this mostly rural area, the head of the household often handles the largest share of the agricultural activities. If he became seriously sick, the economic balance of the household would affect all its different members—including the children, who might have to significantly their working load.
- 5 In these rural households, land pressure and growing poverty seem to often constraint the adults as the youngest to move to the urban centres of Kombolcha and Dessie, located in the nearby woreda, and become daily labourers in the local factories, or waitresses in the numerous bars found in these two towns. In the Kallu woreda and its close vicinity, these local migrations to the urban areas tend to strengthen the risks of HIV contamination within the rural households.
- 6 In addition, the misconception regarding the prevention methods of the HIV epidemic probably aggravates the situation. Most of the female informants met in the Kallu woreda during this study clearly stress that they have little opportunity to discuss issues on sexuality in the household. Many of these women confess that their sexual intercourses with their husband often consist in satisfying his wills—whereas the inverse configuration is rarely mentioned. A WAO report in the Amhara Region underlines the plural consequences of this gender inequality:

“There are different challenging problems of women: lack of rights for ownership and access as compared to men, lack of equality, scarcity of resources and services, household job division, cultural problem as women are inferior, economic problems, institutional and in general poverty” (WAO 2004:2).
- 7 Owing to this, women are obliged to migrate from rural areas to urban centres and engage in CSW and other related activities as a means of survival:

I was born in Weraba Tulu Kebele near Harbu town. But, at the age of 17, my family arranged marriage with Kemil. Then, we started living together. However, he was doing what he likes and forced me as an obedient of him. As a result, after I stayed with him for about 4 years, I decided to move to the nearby town in order to look for job. I did this because my parents were suffering from a state of miserable poverty and I don't have any option rather than moving to another area. Afterward, I went to Harbu town and become CSW and send some amount of money (remittance) to my parents per month. However, after I stayed there for about four years, my health status declines from time to time. There, first I went to wedaja bet

(Muslim reconciliation device) but I did not get any relief. Then, I moved to Harbu health centre and checked my blood. Regrettably, the result was HIV positive (Feyza, 25 years old).

- 8 The above case history clearly depicts that as the result of gender inequality and lack of economic opportunities; women are obliged to move to urban centres and engage in risky behaviours. As some informants explained in the *woreda*, women's share the burden of the workload. Despite their contribution to the household economy like childcare, cooking, and feeding the family, they also involve in planting, weeding and carrying harvest. Though women have a multifarious role at home, during divorce, women have no right to share the household resources especially if they are assumed to be guilty. Even if the husband is accountable and considered as the cause of the divorce, they have the right to share very limited household resources. Therefore, divorce indirectly paves the way for women to migrate to the nearby towns and to engage in risky behaviours as coping mechanism:

I live at Agamsa Kebele, near Harbu town when I reached at the age of 16; my family arranges marriage with Seid and started to live together. But, after I stayed with my husband for about 4 years, a big quarrel erupted between us and I demanded divorce. Then, I put my two children in my family house and stretched my tentacles to Afar Region in search of job. I got a job as a housemaid and sent some amount of money for my children. But when I knew the area very well, I became a commercial sex worker as a means of survival. However, after I stayed there for about 6 years, I faced a very serious health problem and returned to my place of origin. Right after, I went to Dessie Hospital for a blood test and the result was HIV positive (Semira, 26 years old).

- 9 The above case reveals that gender inequalities in many ways obliged rural women to practice risky behaviours, which may expose them directly or indirectly to HIV infection.

Poverty, seasonal migrants and sex workers: fostering HIV contamination through hazardous migration trajectories

- 10 Because of chronic food insecurity in the Kallu *woreda*, several members of the local households might migrate to the nearby towns for a certain period of time either in search of job, mainly as daily labourers or other related activities.
- 11 The several interviews and focus group discussions conducted for this study reveal that the members belonging to the lowest socio-economic communities tend to seasonally migrate to the nearby *woreda*, located in the Afar Region, South Wollo Zone, Oromiya Zone and North Wollo Zone. The informants also mention that, most of the time, those who migrate to the Afar Region—locally termed as *bereha* (desert)—are mainly adolescents, engaged in various kinds of activities, including digging out salt from Afedera, working as Commercial Sex Workers (CSWs) and small scale business activities—like selling alcohol or *khat*.
- 12 In addition, the geographical location of the *woreda* is considered by itself as a major potential cause of HIV contamination. The urban centre of the Kallu *woreda*, Kombolcha, is a crossroad on the main route linking the seaport of Djibouti to Addis Ababa. As a result, the town serves as a hub of commerce since a long period of time.

Thus, many truck drivers pass through the *woreda*. From the truck route running from Kombolcha to Djibouti, businessmen and women are engaged in selling and buying activities. Moreover, the secondary urban centres of the Kallu *woreda* like Mitikollo, Degan and Gerba are found on this main route, whereas the smaller town of Harbu is found on another road, in the south of Kombolcha. Thus, the urban centres of the *woreda* attract many unemployed young peasants, living in the surrounding rural areas. They may stay 1-2 years to work in these nearby towns. However, these local migrants may also become the dramatic vectors of HIV contamination. Indeed, most of the time, as the informants stated, these emigrants may have one partner in their place of origin and multiply unsafe relations with CSWs in town.

- 13 In this network of local economic relays, the men and the women who participate in the trade activities along the major roads of the Kallu *woreda* are particularly at risk. As one female key informant summarizes, “*at the sunset, many long distance truck drivers roll in the nearby peri-urban towns and search for a good night time with women*”. Therefore, these sexual relations with multiple partners increase HIV transmission among the surrounding local districts (*kebele*) of Kombolcha’s vicinity.

- 14 Another factor that exacerbates the vulnerability of rural households to HIV/AIDS is the establishment of a military camp. During the *Derg* regime, due to the closeness of the Kallu *woreda* to the former Ethiopian port of Asseb, a strategic military campsite was established in this administrative district of South Wollo. Following the opening of this military camp, small bars, restaurants and *khat bet* (literally, a place where *khat* is chewed and sold) were opened and became the privileged meeting places between the local CSWs and the soldiers who recently arrived in the Kallu *woreda*. Beyond the risks related to their sexual activities with different customers, the precarious situation of these women was also accentuated by their economic dependence to these military men—whom they sometimes married. Their mutation or definitive departure could suddenly end the livelihoods of these women, and condemn them to poverty and more risky activities:

I lived in Afar region for about 3 years. When I returned to my place of origin, Arabo and looked for a better job and becoming a waitress in the nearby military camp of Degan for 8 month. I arranged marriage with Hamza, the ex-soldier without any blood test. However, after a certain period, Hamza left me. As a result, I got married to another person. After 6 years, I faced relentless health problems, went to Degan clinic, and checked my blood. The result was HIV positive. However, I kept the result for about 9 months for myself and finally informed my parents (Fatuma, 34 years old).

- 15 Apart from the seasonal migrations to the nearby towns and *woreda*, others migrate abroad for longer stays, especially in Djibouti and Saudi Arabia. Here again, most of these female migrants work as housemaids, waitresses or CSWs, and often expose themselves to risky behaviours:

I lived abroad, in Djibouti, about 8 years. I fled to Djibouti when I was 19 to look for a job. There I started selling *khat* and alcohol. When I knew the area very well, I decided to change my work and became a commercial sex worker in one of the hotels and had sexual intercourse with many partners. However, after I stayed for 8 years in Djibouti, I returned to my place of origin i.e. Harbu. But, my health deteriorated from time to time. Then, I went to Harbu health centre and had my blood tested and the result was HIV positive (Fedila, 27 years old).

- 16 In general as depicted from the above cases, in times of severe stress on the household economy, men and women tend to migrate to the nearby *woreda* or abroad to get better

incomes and have better lives. As a result, they may practice unprotected sexual intercourse as source of income. This may directly or indirectly foster the potential risks of HIV contamination. In line with this, one of the commercial sex workers in Harbu town clearly pointed out that:

Our source of income is primarily on the market days. It was during these days that people particularly from rural area come to this town and enjoy with us (A 23 years old CSW-Harbu town).

- 17 As a result, the dramatic combination of food insecurity, poverty, migration and gender inequality seems to be highly involved in the important increase of the number of HIV infected individuals in the Kallu *woreda*.

Conclusion

- 18 The first results of this qualitative study in the Kallu *woreda* suggest that the HIV epidemic is locally embedded in plural social dynamics. From land degradation to the migratory trajectories in the urban crossroads of the *woreda* and abroad, the deterioration of the economic situation in the countryside tends to multiply the social marginalization of both female and male migrants, and increase the risks of HIV contamination eventually.
- 19 Beyond the better understanding of the precarious migratory trajectories of those individuals who live their rural homeland to escape poverty and unemployment, the qualitative socio-economic studies conducted in diverse local parts of Ethiopia may also help to improve basic discussions among the households and the public administration, in order to moderate the social discrimination of the peoples affected by HIV and tackle the mostly economic factors that push the poor migrants to adopt risky behaviours.

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FOOTNOTES

1. See the Kallu *woreda* HIV/AIDS Secretary Report, 2005/6
2. Kallu *woreda* Agriculture Office Report, 2005/6

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The Challenges of Urbanization and Inter-Jurisdictional Cooperation in Addis Ababa and the Surrounding Towns of the Oromiya Region


Ketema Wakjira

p. 333-344

- 1 Until the beginning of the 1990s, Addis Ababa monopolized almost all the major political and economic activities in Ethiopia. Almost twenty years after the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, despite the emergence of several urban centres – like Nazareth/Adaama, Hawasa, Mekelle or Bahir Dar – in different parts of the country, the current Ethiopian federal regime has not managed to dislodge the dominant position of Addis Ababa and almost all of the major contending forces still aim to govern the city (GETAHUN BANTI 2007, ASNAKE KEFALE 2009). According to the academic literature on federalism, urbanization and urban growth constitute some of the main challenges for the states based on a federal structure. Both in principle and through practice, the concept of ‘intergovernmental relation’ (IGR) is often presented as an efficient means to cope with these challenges inherent to the constitutional, territorial and political frameworks set by federalism (ELAZAR 1987, BRANDFORD 2004).¹ Thus, the mechanisms and institutions of the IGR basically consist in implementing the efficient federal arrangements to handle the factors generated by urbanization upon inter-municipal governance. In the same perspective, this paper aims to examine the present challenges of the inter-municipality relations between Addis Ababa and the surrounding towns of the Oromiya Region.
- 2 Currently, Addis Ababa has multiple identities: capital city of the federation, the seat of the Oromiya National Regional State and self-governing autonomous city. Moreover, the city is a cosmopolitan and capital of African Union (AU). More specifically, the city is located in Oromiya and surrounded by a number of local governments under Oromiya region. Hence, Addis Ababa and the surrounding local governments of Oromiya are not only interdependent, but they also cannot properly function without

each other. Nevertheless, there has been conflicting urban land use, ambiguous jurisdictional boundary expansion, rapid and informal suburban development, especially at the adjacent areas between the city and surrounding towns of Oromiya. In this regard, it seems urgent to assess inter-jurisdictional governance and the efficiency of IGR mechanisms and institutions in this major configuration affected by rapid urbanization in Ethiopia today.

- 3 Among the five municipal governments of the Oromiya Region sharing direct jurisdictional boundaries with Addis Ababa, this study purposely focuses on the three – Burayu, Sabata and Galan – whose adjacent locations to the respective Kolfe Keranio and Akaki-Kaliti sub-cities tend to follow the main directions of Addis Ababa's expansion (ARAAMP 1999).
- 4 The examination of these three cases tend to reveal that the ethno-territorial framework of the current Ethiopian Federation has largely shaped the nature of the inter-jurisdictional relations between Addis Ababa and these surrounding towns of Oromiya. However, far from moderating the impact of urbanization, the inter-municipal cooperation implemented during the two last decade's has rather generated competing administrations and conflicting interests over urban land management.



- 5 Around the capital city of the both Ethiopian Federation and the Oromiya Region, the challenge of these federal arrangements seems to be closely related to the ambiguous jurisdictional boundaries separating Addis Ababa from the Oromo towns of its conurbation, and the confrontation of ethno-territorial claims they foster.

Uncoordinated development strategies and contradictory urban policies: the institutional failure of inter-municipal cooperation

- 6 For the last two decades, Addis Ababa has greatly changed. The impressive population growth and territorial expansion of the city, as well as the rapid construction of numerous new buildings constitute the most visible aspects of its recent urban

development. However, the ‘*metropolitanization*’ of Addis Ababa has also generated negative consequences – like land pressure, blurry jurisdictional borders or urban planning incoherence – that the institutional devices of the inter-municipal cooperation with the surrounding towns of the Oromiya Region was unable to overcome.

Metropolitanization, inner city re-development and land access

- 7 Nowadays, Addis Ababa constitutes the largest urban set in Ethiopia. In addition, the growth rate of its population has quickly increased within the last decades. In the beginning of the twentieth century, there were approximately 60 000 inhabitants in Addis Ababa. From the number of 443 723 city-dwellers in 1961, the population of the Ethiopian capital city exceeded one million in the second half of the 1970s, and then two millions in the end of the 1970s, to finally reach the number of 2 738 248 in 2007.² In the vicinity of Addis Ababa, the population of the surrounding towns has also significantly increased – the respective number of inhabitants in Burayu and Sabate respectively jumped from 10 027 and 14 076 in 1994, to 121 845 and 110 000 in 2010.³ In spite of this comparable growth rate, the population of Addis Ababa still largely surpasses the number of inhabitants found in the towns of its vicinity and the other urban centres of the country in general.
- 8 This situation raises several issues. First of all, this overwhelming weight of Addis Ababa tends to be contrary to growing urbanization in federal states. In the spirit of federalism, the non-centralization pattern of such regimes aims at eliminating the “worst excesses of resource concentration” within one unique centre, by preventing this “single metropolis syndrome” (ELAZAR 1987: 252, 256). Therefore, several studies conducted on federal states strongly advise to implement an adequate level of inter-governmental cooperation, in order to moderate the impact of Addis Ababa current physical expansion on the whole institutional framework of the Ethiopian federation. Indeed, among the different declensions of its current development, the demographic growth of the federal capital city also closely involves the issue of its rapid territorial expansion (MINWUYELET MELESSE 2005, YIRGALEM MIHATAME 2008).
- 9 In the end of the 1990s, a new urban development plan was implemented in Addis Ababa. The earlier master plans were revised to fit with the concept of *metropolitanization*, legitimating the expansion of the city borders along the expansion of its economic and functional boundaries (ORAAMP 1999-2002). However, during the last decade, this initial focus on the rapid horizontal growth of Addis Ababa has shifted to the urban models, promoting the re-development of the inner city (SISAY HABTAMU 2012). In this perspective, the municipal administration has privileged the current large scale project, centred on low cost housing (condominium) constructions in almost all the sub-cities of Addis Ababa. These urban policies also include the renewal of the slums and squats in the centre of the town, especially in Lideta sub-city.⁴ Meanwhile, almost nothing has been done to cope with the consequences of Addis Ababa’s *metropolitanization* and strengthen inter-municipal cooperation, whereas several reports have proved that the rapid horizontal expansion of the Ethiopian capital city mainly impacts the municipal constituencies of its Oromo vicinity⁵ (ORAAMP 1999/2001).

- 10 Surprisingly, the challenges raised by the territorial growth of Addis Ababa have not been associated with the reinforcement of its inter-jurisdictional networks with these Oromo towns of its vicinity. In the contrary, by merely deciding to enlarge their municipal borders, the city administrations surrounding Addis Ababa have revealed the weakness of the IGR networks, which are supposed to bind together the urban policies implemented by these neighbouring towns. Indeed, since 2005, three sub-rural and at least the same number of sub-urban districts (*Kebele*) – *Gafarsa Nonno*, *Gafarsa Guje* and *Malka Gafarsa*– have passed under the jurisdictional administration of Burayu.⁶ Similarly, the 2007/08 master plan of Sabata town indicates that the municipality gained three sub-urban – *Walate-03*, *Alemgena-02* and *Furi-04* –and several sub-rural districts.⁷
- 11 Beyond the institutional failure of the local inter-municipal cooperation, the rapid and uncoordinated territorial expansion of the Ethiopian capital city and the surrounding Oromo towns, associated with the inner city re-development policies privileged in Addis Ababa, have also boosted the growing conflicts on land issues. As a tangible aspect of territoriality, access to land has become one of the most contested issues in urban Ethiopia today. As for the informants mobilized in this study, these urban land issues constitute the major challenge of inter-jurisdictional governance between Addis Ababa and the Oromo towns of its vicinity. Regarding these urban land issues, there is no more sensitive place in the country than the Ethiopian capital city and its Oromiya suburbs. As quoted by the former President of the Oromiya Region,⁸ “a place without smoke is a place where fire does not show up”– *iddoo abiddi hin jirre aarri hin mul’atu* in Oromo language. By concerning almost all the diverse dwellers of Addis Ababa and the surrounding urban centres of Oromiya, the sharp competition over land access carries a series of major economic, residential and political stakes.⁹

A both federal and regional capital city

- 12 From the ‘city-state’ defined during the transitional period (1991-1995) that followed the collapse of the *Derg* regime,¹⁰ to the capital city of both the Ethiopian Federation and the Oromiya Region, Addis Ababa has experienced different kinds of institutional and governmental frameworks. Since 1991, these changing statuses unveil the competing federal and regional identity of the major Ethiopian urban centre, located in the middle of the current Oromiya Region. Embedded in the controversial construction of the modern state that emerged throughout the late history of the Christian Kingdom of Shewa, the controversial Ethiopian or Oromo identity of Addis Ababa constitutes a recurrent sensitive issue since its foundation in the end of the 19th century (GETAHUN BANTI 2007). In the present regime, this historical controversy is performed through the article 49 (5) of the Federal Constitution, stating “the special interest of the State of Oromiya in Addis Ababa, regarding the provision of social services or the utilization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as joint administrative matters.” Nevertheless, this article 49 (2 and 5) proclaims the autonomous self-government of Addis Ababa and lists the different domains of this institutional proximity “arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromiya.”
- 13 In addition, neither the first nor the Revised Charter of Addis Ababa City Government provide the inter-jurisdictional governance binding the city to the surrounding Oromo towns with any concrete and detailed legal framework.¹¹ Indeed, the first Charter

promulgated in 1997 simply implements the self-governmental structure, through the creation of an autonomous City Council, whose members elect its chairman for a five year long mandate.¹² As for the Revised Charter Proclamation 361/2003, it mainly consisted in improving the former one by establishing the position and administrative prerogatives of the Mayor within the City Council (ASSEFA FISEHA 2009; YIRGALEM MIHATAME 2008). Moreover, the urban policies implemented to promote the Oromo identity of Addis Ababa have aggravated the weakness of inter-municipal cooperation related to the lack of specific formal mechanisms to handle the relationships between the city and the towns of its Oromo vicinity.

- 14 The absence of legal documents detailing the concrete engagements performing the 'special interest' of the Oromiya Region in Addis Ababa has led to the achievement of several projects in the capital city, that do not emanate from its municipal administrative bodies. Therefore, in this blurry institutional device, the authorities of the Oromiya State have manifested their attachment to the federal capital through the ongoing project of building the Oromo Cultural Centre of the Regional State in Addis Ababa. In ten of its sub-cities, they have also planned to construct ten schools teach in Oromo language (*Afaan Oromoo*).¹³ Furthermore, in order to reflect the Oromo memories rooted into both the towns surrounding Addis Ababa and the young history the Ethiopian capital city, the lower administrative districts – *kebele* in Amharic – were renamed with the equivalent Oromo word *ganda* in Burayu, Sabata and Galan. In 2008, the name of Burayu's adjacent lower administrative unit (*kebele/ ganda*) to the district 07, located within the Kolfe Keranio sub-city of Addis Ababa, was renamed *Malka* to fit with its historical appellation.¹⁴ *Malka Gafarsa* was the historic name given to the area.¹⁵ Similar developments are also observed in the towns of Sabata and Galan.¹⁶
- 15 The symbolic apex of this Oromization process seems to be the trend to name Addis Ababa itself with the Oromo word *Finfinnee* and the attempts of street demonstrations following the decision to transfer the capital city of the Oromiya Region in the one hundred kilometre distant town of Adaama – previously called Nazareth – in the Eastern Shewa Zone. Far from the formal objectives of the IGR mechanisms, these Oromo identity claims have reinvested the gap generated by the absence of the legal engagements, defining the concrete inter-municipal cooperation between Addis Ababa and the surrounding towns of the Oromiya Region. With the sensitive issue of urban land access, this shift from the federal jurisdictional logics to the informal registers of ethno-territorial politics probably constitutes the main challenge of the local inter-municipal cooperation, around the ambivalent Ethiopian capital city.

Urban planning incoherence and overlapping administrative boundaries

- 16 In another register, the lack of appropriate urban planning that still characterizes the recent Ethiopian urbanization has also significantly fostered the growing sensitiveness of these urban land issues. Since its foundation, the historical growth of Addis Ababa has been mostly anarchic, without any or little planning interventions (MINWUYELET MELESSE 2004, YIRGALEM MIHATAME 2008), though the city has been the object of very old master plans (YIRGALEM MIHATAME 2008). During the last decades, different and much more elaborated urban plans have been designed for the Ethiopian capital city. Nevertheless, as Yirgalem rightly pointed out, "all the master plans for Addis Ababa

were based on ambiguous and poorly defined problems, in adequate resources, and incomplete information regarding citizens need priorities and values. In most cases, the rational decision of planners were bound by political constraints and operated on the basis of political expediency where the plans had very little social purpose” (YIRGALEM MIHATAME 2008:128).

- 17 Contrary to Addis Ababa, the Oromo municipal administrations of the surrounding towns like Sabata, Burayu and Galan have implemented their new master plans since 2008, including the territorial delimitation of their respective administrative constituencies.¹⁷ However, the master plans of Addis Ababa and these towns of its Oromiya vicinity often remain incompatible and hinder the efficiency of the joint planning efforts. The use of the local urban plans still lacks the required level of cooperation from the city.¹⁸ In addition, the controversial municipal borders constitute the major source of conflicts in the adjacent territorial administrations – like in Case of Burayu and Kolfe-Keraniyo.¹⁹ More convincingly, the limitation to the uncoordinated land use planning was reflected by the overlapping lines, delimitating the boundaries of Addis Ababa and those of the neighbouring towns in the different local master plans – or by the frequent exclusion of some pocket.²⁰ Although the planning efforts depend on the legal and intergovernmental institutions, the efforts made in this line have been inadequate.²¹
- 18 These ambiguous jurisdictional boundaries between the Ethiopian capital city and the surrounding towns of Oromiya also generate inter-jurisdictional governance problems. Though Addis Ababa has lacked clearly defined municipal boundaries for most of its history (YIRGALEM MIHATAME 2008), its institutional status of federal capital remains quite ambivalent within the present Ethiopian federation. Some classify Addis Ababa as a federal district model²² because its ultimate administration is under the federal government to guarantee its self-administration by its residents (WATTS 2008; ASSAFA FISEHA 2009). However, this interpretation based on the federal district model has been largely criticized.²³ Since the city is located in the Oromiya regional state, at least spatially, governing Addis Ababa and its Oromo vicinity has always been intermingled. In addition, the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution guarantees the “special interest of the Oromiya Regional State in Addis Ababa”.²⁴ In this perspective, the ambiguous boundaries and institutional statuses of Addis Ababa tend to aggravate the inefficiency of the local inter-municipal cooperation, between the ambivalent capital city and its close Oromo neighbours.

Identity claims and electoral stakes: an inter-municipal disorder cultivating the Federal/Oromo dilemma of Addis Ababa?

- 19 For more than two decades, the changing institutional statuses of Addis Ababa have challenged the emergence of inter-jurisdictional networks, through the confrontation of competing Oromo and federal identity claims over the capital city of the both Ethiopian Federation and Oromiya Region. In this context, the mobilization of informal practices to obtain land and the recent implementation of the *Oromiya Special Zone Surrounding Finfinnee* (OSZSF) tend to reveal the weight of political solidarities and electoral contingencies in the failure of the local inter-municipal cooperation.

Political solidarities and electoral contingencies

- 20 According to the Urban Lease Hold Proclamation 272/2002, there are three legal ways to access urban land – through lease holding, permit holding and peasant holding. Apart from them, several studies often associate the growing informal/illegal acquisition of land with the rapid suburban expansions of Addis Ababa (MINWUYELET MELESSE 2005, YIRGALEM MIHATAME 2009), or with its overlapping jurisdictional borders with the surrounding Oromo towns (ORAAMP 1999). However, the fieldwork investigations conducted for this study in the three districts of Burayu, Sabata and Galan, reveal a much wider range of local actors who informally or illegally obtained urban lands through self-acquisitions, direct purchases from the peasants or by the intermediary of brokers, speculators and kin networks.²⁵
- 21 Among these diverse actors, some of them are truly homeless, but others are rather in quest of economic values.²⁶ More confusingly, many informants stress that a large part of the local elites are not transparent on these urban land acquisitions. It is even often said that they tend to participate to these informal rent seeking activities.²⁷ Of course, it is very difficult to list and identify “who is an informal actor and who is not”.²⁸ Some informants whose squatted houses were demolished generally associate the issue of urban land access to patron-client relations and loyalty to the EPRDF ruling coalition. Thus, the land seekers who remain or suddenly become outside of these political solidarities are often tempted to privilege the ‘self-acquisition of land.’ This was particularly the case during the 2005 elections, after the triumph of the opposition candidates, presented by the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), in almost all the constituencies of Addis Ababa. Indeed, this historical defeat of the EPRDF in the federal capital city – and the shift of political solidarities they were supposed to implement – rapidly boosted the erection of informal houses during the day, that other squatters frequently demolished the next night to establish their own informal settlements.²⁹
- 22 The sudden boom of these squatted urban lands following the 2005 elections seems to unveil the negative consequences of the prevailing position of the EPRDF coalition’s networks within the inter-jurisdictional devices binding Addis Ababa to the surrounding towns of Oromiya. Whereas political parties are commonly considered as the “primary vehicles” of governmental policies (AGRANOFF 1994:173), the 2005 elections rather reveal their incapacity to cope with the rapid urbanization of the Ethiopian capital by strengthening the local inter-municipal cooperation. Before 2005, the EPRDF domination over all the local municipal governments in Addis Ababa and the surrounding constituencies of the Oromiya Region could perhaps facilitate the implementation of coherent urban policies. However, beyond the boom of informal settlements, the 2005 elections tend to underline the incapacity of the local inter-jurisdictional cooperation to function when Addis Ababa was about to be controlled by the CUD, whereas its vicinity would remain administrated by the EPRDF ruling coalition – through the Oromo People Democratic Organization (OPDO).
- 23 The surprising institutional changes implemented before and after the 2005 elections illustrate this failure. Indeed, the Revised Charter Proclamation 361/2003 established an Interim Administration of Addis Ababa until the election of the City Council’s members and the Mayor in 2005 – to officially fight the “widespread rioting and violence in spring of 2001” in the city (ASSEFA FISEHA 2009, YIRGALEM MIHATAME 2008).

Before 2005, the Oromiya Regional Government did not really pay attention to the towns surrounding Addis Ababa, as the political parties that governed all these cities belonged to the EPRDF ruling coalition. Nevertheless, a year before the 2005 elections, the OPDO controlled Government of the Oromiya Region decided to shift the Oromo regional capital from Addis Ababa to Adaama. The political opportunism of this highly unpopular decision became obvious when the Oromiya Government finally abandoned the project and brought the region's seat back to Addis Ababa, after the CUD Mayor and members of the City Council were evicted from their positions, a couple of months after the May 2005 elections. To legitimize the eviction of the CUD representatives, a "Caretaker Administration" was designed to rule Addis Ababa until the 2008 elections and the total victory of the EPRDF candidates.

- 24 In addition, after attempting to shift the Oromo regional capital from Addis Ababa to Adaama, the governments of both Ethiopian capital city and Oromiya Region also implemented the *Oromiya Special Zone Surrounding Finfinnee* (OSZSF) in 2008. Officially, this 'Special Zone' was designed to foster the local inter-jurisdictional cooperation and especially empower the Oromo populations who had been marginalized in Addis Ababa because of its urban expansion.³⁰ However, the implementation of the OSZSF was also based on more informal reasons and electoral contingencies. To moderate the potential consequences of another electoral victory of the opposition parties in Addis Ababa – like the CUD during the 2005 elections, the creation of the OSZSF mainly aimed at containing the authority of the Ethiopian capital's government to the clearly delimited boundaries of the municipal jurisdiction. Moreover, through its administration by the Oromiya Region, the OSZSF was expected to be an efficient means to territorially circumscribe the policies implemented by the City Council of Addis Ababa.³¹
- 25 Beyond the official and more informal objectives of the OSZSF, this study points out that the creation of this Special Zone rather heightens the attention of the Oromo for these territories surrounding Addis Ababa, than their 'special interest' in the capital city.³² In addition to the informal political strategy it has been following, the nature of the inter-jurisdictional cooperation that the OSZSF intended to develop between Addis Ababa and the surrounding Oromo towns carries a major internal contradiction. Indeed, how this jurisdictional device could strengthen the horizontal inter-municipal cooperation, whereas Addis Ababa remains ultimately accountable for federal government, and the OSZSF administration accountable to the President of the Oromiya Regional State. Paradoxically, to strengthen the local inter-municipal cooperation, the creation of the OSZSF should have come after the legislation on the 'special interest' of the Oromo in the city.³³
- 26 Therefore, the administrative authority of the OSZSF to deal with Addis Ababa is then fundamentally inadequate and is still generating important administrative contradictions. Concretely, during the electoral campaigns of 2008 and 2010, the voter registration was seriously affected by these overlapping administration issues, especially for the residents of Burayu in the both District-07 of Kolfe Keraniyo and Malka Gafarsa.³⁴ These examples show that these conflicting jurisdictional boundaries even concern the local districts whose inhabitants mainly support the EPRDF ruling coalition, in spite of few improvements since the 2010 elections.³⁵

Conclusion

- 27 This preliminary overview of the inter-municipal cooperation between Addis Ababa and the surrounding towns of the Oromiya Region tend to stress the multiple weaknesses of the inter-jurisdictional devices. Since the 1990s, changing development models and contradictory urban policies have been implemented in Addis Ababa, Burayu, Sabata or Galan. The institutional attempts to develop inter-municipal networks have often produced blurry and overlapping jurisdictional boundaries, between the Ethiopian capital city and the emerging towns of its Oromo vicinity. Far from handling the problems generated by the rapid and plural urbanization in and around Addis Ababa, these institutional arrangements and urban planning programs seem to have rather fostered the growing conflicts on urban land access.
- 28 Beyond the failure of these formal inter-jurisdictional devices, this study unveils their incapacity to jugulate the competing identity claims of the Federal/Oromo dilemma around Addis Ababa. Through more informal practices, their administrative weaknesses do not always allow them to oppose the more and more common illegal acquisitions of urban lands. In addition, the inter-municipal networks linking Addis Ababa to the surrounding towns of the Oromiya Region seem to be largely founded on political solidarities to the EPRDF ruling coalition. The electoral crisis of 2005 has probably shown the limit of this system. Indeed, to counter the threat of the opposition's victory in Addis Ababa, several institutional reforms have been experienced to strengthen the authority of the Oromiya Regional Government over the conurbation of the capital city. However, these recent institutional developments might rather aggravate the contradictions of the local land planning projects – as the overlapping administrative borders perturbed the registration of the voters during the 2008 and 2010 elections in district units of Burayu.
- 29 The revitalization of the local inter-municipal cooperation represents a central issue to efficiently face the current challenges of urbanization in and around Addis Ababa. Behind the objective of achieving the sustainable development of the city and the surrounding Oromo towns, these inter-jurisdictional issues may inaugurate new alternatives to improve the concrete decentralization of the Ethiopian federal state frameworks.

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FOOTNOTES

1. For a general overview on IGR, see also VAN WYNSBERGHE 2008.
2. See Central Statistic Authority 2008.
3. See Burayu Town Socio-Economic Study, prepared by Federal Urban Planning Institute (FUPI), 2007, and Sabata Town Finance and Economic Plan, 2010.
4. Interview with an expert of the Urban Planning and Information Centre, Addis Ababa, 2010.
5. See Regulation No. 115/2008 for the establishment of OSZSF and several interviews with key administrative actors of the OSZSF, 2010.
6. Interview with the Head of Burayu Mayor Office and Land Administration Office Process Owner, 2010.
7. Interview with the Head of Sabata Mayor Office and Land Administration Office Process Owner, 2010.
8. Oromiya Region Television and Radio Agency transmission, September 2009.
9. Interviews with an expert of the Urban Planning and Information Centre of Addis Ababa City, and Welete Kebele, Manager of Sabata town, 2010.
10. See the Proclamation No. 7/1992 Article -3 for the Establishment of National Self-Determination, Negarit Gazeta 51st Year No.2, Addis Ababa, 2010.
11. See article 62 of Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter Proclamation No.361/2003 and article 33 of the first Addis Ababa City Government Charter Proclamation No. 87/1997.
12. See the Proclamation No. 87/1997 of Addis Ababa City Government Charter.
13. Interview with an official of the Oromo People Democratic Organization (OPDO), 2010.
14. Interview with the ex-Vice Chairman of the Malka Gafarsa Kebele Administration, Burayu 2010.
15. Ibid.
16. See the Socio-economic Studies on Sabata and Galan, Oromiya Urban Planning Institute, 2007/8.
17. Interviews with the Senior Planning Expert of Oromiya, Urban Planning Institute, Urban Development and Works Engineer of OSZSF, 2010.
18. Interview with the Senior Planning Expert of Oromiya Urban Planning Institute, 2010.
19. Interview with a Surveyor of Malaka Gafarsa Kebele Administration, Burayu town.
20. See The 'Economy' Newspaper, Addis Ababa, February 2009.
21. Interview with the Senior Planning Expert of Oromiya Urban Planning Institute, 2010
22. There are three ways of arranging capital city under federal state system: federal district, city-state or capital city within sub national unit(s) (see WATTS 2008:79-81).
23. See The Reporter Newspaper on the late Ethiopian Prime Minister's explanations on the occasion of Women and Youth Forum, Amharic Version, Addis Ababa, December 2007.
24. See article 49 (5) of the 1995 Federal Constitution of Ethiopia.
25. Interviews and Focus group discussions around Addis Ababa, 2010.
26. Interviews with officials of the Peace and Administration Office, Urban Works and Development Bureaus of Oromiya, and the Manager of Malka Gafarsa Kebele Burayu 2010.
27. Interview with an official of the Kebele 04 Kolfe Keranio Sub-City, Addis Ababa, 2010.
28. Interviews with local land brokers, 2010.
29. Interview with the heads of the Mayor Offices in Burayu and Sabata, 2010.
30. See the Regulation No. 115/2008, implementing the OSZSF and the interviews conducted with its key administrative actors, 2010.

31. Interview with an expert of the Conflict Management and Neighbouring Cooperation OSZSF, 2010.
32. Interviews with a famous lawyer in the Judicial Bureau of Oromiya Regional State, and a Senior Planning Expert of OUPI, 2010.
33. Ibid.
34. Interviews and Focus Group Discussions in Burayu, 2010.
35. Interview with the Head of Burayu Town's Mayor Office, 2010.

AUTHOR

Ketema Wakjira

Urban Planning and the Contemporary Dynamics of Land Formalization in the City of Jigjiga

Rony Emmenegger

p. 345-354

- 1 Africa has increasingly become an urban continent. Initially welcomed for their positive impact on the modernization of post-colonial Africa, urbanization processes have become subject to a variety of reactions and interpretations. It becomes more and more obvious that rapid urban growth and social change have resulted in various social and economic problems and seem to have pitched African cities into profound crisis recently.¹
- 2 As in many African countries, urbanization has also been crucial in Ethiopia's past and present. Today, "at least 70% of the urban population can be considered slum dwellers on the basis of indicators of quality of housing, overcrowded living spaces, quality of infrastructure and services available to the households and to the neighbourhoods, security of tenure and citizenship rights (MoFED 2005)" (MEHERET AYENNEW 2008:453). Since 1991, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) has recognized the challenges related to urbanization processes and has triggered a significant shift in its development policy accordingly. While the policy of Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI – 1993-2003) mainly emphasized the role of rural areas, the Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP – 2005/2006-2009/2010) highlighted the role of urban areas for the development of the country.² Through such efforts, the government has admitted its intention to turn the risks of urbanization into opportunities and to capacitate cities and towns to become "effective vehicles for services delivery and urban poverty reduction" (MEHERET AYENNEW 2008:454).
- 3 All over Africa, urbanization processes have been accompanied by the attempt of colonial and post-colonial states to control and plan the development of the cities. Since colonial times, urban planners have paid great attention on city planning in order to provide the social and physical infrastructure required. Also the Ethiopian

government has put considerable efforts in the practical implementation of the policy measures taken. From a historical perspective, however, the urban history in Ethiopia proves to be much longer; it started even earlier than the pre-colonial urban tradition in most other African countries.³ Already in the fourth century BC, a number of urban centres were established in the Axumite Empire (Northern Ethiopia) and are documented today (FASIL GIORGHIS 2009:49). More recently, also the formation of the modern Ethiopian state since the late 19th century has been accompanied by the emergence of new urban settlements in the country's peripheries. In line with these developments, an urban planning sector has emerged and has shouldered different institutions with the task to shape and reshape the social and physical characteristics of a defined urban space all over the country.

- 4 In this paper, I am focusing on the ways urban planning works in practice, and the ways it has grasped and shaped urban expansion in Jigjiga – the capital of the Ethio-Somali region. Located in the eastern Ethiopian lowlands, Jigjiga emerged as an urban settlement out of a military garrison (*kātāma* in Amharic) in the late 19th century. After a dynamic economic and political frontier history, Jigjiga became the capital of the newly created Ethio-Somali region in 1994, which re-affirmed its role as a centre in the periphery. Since then, the town has left its 'wallflower existence' and emerged as a booming and rapidly growing urban settlement, with new quarters emerging in the hitherto rural surrounding. Moreover, Jigjiga "is one of the few towns in Ethiopia whose pattern of growth was planned at an early state of its evolution" (TIBEBE ESHETE 1988: Chapter 3) and therefore suitable for the investigation of urban planning in practice. As a 'small city' on the global radar, research in Jigjiga is of high relevance given the heterogeneity and complexity of urban forms and functions as well as the neglect of such smaller urban centres in urban theories (BELL and JAYNE 2009:683). Similarly in Ethiopia, a lot has been written about the highland cities as Addis Ababa,⁴ but only little attention has been paid on cities in the peripheries. As a result, the urban literature on peripheral areas remains limited, despite the increasing focus on the margins in Ethiopian studies⁵ and various social science disciplines (DAS and POOLE 2004). Also in the particular case investigated, research on urban Jigjiga is scarce and Tibebe Eshete's master thesis (1988) on "A History of Jijiga Town, 1891-1974" the only academic exception.
- 5 But how can we study the implementation of urban policies or urban planning in practice? According to Long, there are "'rational' models which are based upon the belief that, by bringing more information, thought and analysis into the policy-making process, policies will become more effective" (LONG 2001:30). However, different studies on policy processes have shown that such models are not implemented in a linear and top-down process of decision-making. In contrast, Long calls for an actor-oriented perspective and a focus on "intervention practices as they evolve and are shaped by the struggles between the various participants". As such, his work contributes to a better understanding of planning models and its implementation as inherently political processes that involve negotiations, bargains and transactions between different interest groups and urban stakeholders.
- 6 In this paper, I would like to investigate such intervention practices and urban planning in practice, not by following an actor-oriented approach, but rather by focusing on the recently finalized master plan and its role in the spatial formation of Jigjiga. Epistemologically, the advantage of following the master plan is a two-fold. On

the one hand, the master plan constitutes an intermediary between the national urban policy and local intervention practices. On the other hand, it serves as a mediator in interactions between urban planners and practitioners and urban dwellers that take place in the local urban arena. In more particular terms, I am following the role of the master plan in the context of the rapid urban expansion, and the according allocation of land in the hitherto rural surrounding. This investigation sheds light on one of several dimensions related to land and infrastructure in urban Jigjiga that mark the key themes in my on-going PhD project.

- 7 All over Africa, urban land — and especially its scarcity in the context of urbanization — has brought questions of land administration and access into the centre of academic and public debates. As I will show, the master plan is deeply embedded in the urban arena, where it is crucial for the administration of urban land, as well as the relation between urban dwellers and the city administration. As such, this paper challenges the alarmist discourse of African cities being in crisis; a discourse that implicitly underlines the ineffectiveness and failure of urban planning to manage the problems and make appreciable impact on the situation in the growing cities. Rather than being an account of ‘urban planning in crisis’, this paper aims at providing a more nuanced picture of urban planning, by pointing to the dynamics of urban contestations, and the capacity of both state authorities and city residents to shape urban spaces. As such, the case of Jigjiga also provides a feasible site for moving beyond the stereotypical ‘developmentalist’ view of ‘third world cities’ being “infrastructurally poor and economically stagnant” (ROBINSON 2005:240).
- 8 The following section provides a short overview of the history of the master plan in Jigjiga. The second section shall then show how the recently finalized master plan responds to the rapid urban expansion that Jigjiga has experienced in the last decade. The third section deals with the interaction between government officials and urban dwellers, and the ways land access and property is formally regulated in the expansion area.

Urban planning history

- 9 Urban Jigjiga has emerged as an outcome of the Ethiopian expansion and the following state building process in the Ethiopian periphery. In 1891, the invading highland troops established a military fort close to the water wells of the Jigjiga plains, which later became a base for the Ethiopian military campaigns into the Somali-inhabited lowlands. In 1896/97, Abdalla Taha was appointed first governor of Jigjiga and it was him “who gave the first marks of urban life to Jigjiga” (TIBEBE ESHETE 1988:44). In the following, an urban settlement and market activities developed, favoured by Jigjiga’s location at an important trade route connecting the Ethiopian highlands with the Somaliland ports. Jigjiga shifted from the garrison-like town under the administration of Abdalla Taha, towards the urban character of Jigjiga under Takla Hawaryat, who later administered the town.⁶
- 10 The earliest urban plan was drafted and implemented later under Takla Hawaryat (1917-1920). This plan concerned a planning perimeter of 720 ha and defined areas for settlement, market and military purposes and “shaped the spatial layout and morphology” of the town (TIBEBE ESHETE 1988: 56.). Nevertheless, these early engagements in the field of urban planning came to a stopover with successive

governors, who were more concerned with security related issues rather than urban planning. The Italians prepared the next master plan in 1938, after they had entered Jigjiga on May 5 in 1936. In line with the general modes of colonial planning elsewhere in Africa,⁷ the Italian plan aimed at promoting racial segregation that separated the indigenous people from the Italian nationals. Rakodi argues that such a physical division between colonial authorities and colonial subjects was used for underlining the former's superiority (RAKODI 2006:312). In addition, this strategy went hand in hand with an already progressing ethnic segregation among the colonial subjects (Arabs, Indians, Somalis and different highland groups as Amhara and Oromo – called *Galla* at that time), with significant consequences for the town's spatial development (TIBEBE ESHETE 1988: ch. 4). While this ethnic segregation between Amhara/Oromo and Somali has been blurred until today, it remained reportedly present in the early 1990s and is still anchored in urban dweller's mental map of Jigjiga today.

- 11 In 1941, Jigjiga was occupied by the British 1st Africa Division and served as the headquarters of the Reserved Area from 1941 onwards. While Jigjiga was of crucial military significance during the British occupation, the great emphasis on urban planning and development of the Italians came to an end. When the Ethiopian government regained full authority over the municipality in Jigjiga from 1948 onwards, the British period ended with hardly any progress made in the field of urban planning (TIBEBE ESHETE 1988:94). After the turbulent period that followed,⁸ a new master plan was prepared by the Imperial Ethiopian Government (Municipality Department of the Ministry of Interior) in 1967 (NUPI 1998: 88) The plan outlined the spatial characteristics of the town and divided the city into different zones proposed for different land use purposes.
- 12 In 1974, the Socialist-Marxist government of the *Derg* seized power in Ethiopia and Jigjiga. As in other parts of Ethiopia, socialist ideology became the *modus operandi* and entered the urban arena by a number of proclamations. Most significantly, this concerned proclamation No. 47, 1975 about the "Government Ownership of Urban Lands and Extra Houses"⁹ that made urban land legally a state-owned resource. However, Jigjiga became once more a scene of conflicts and the Ethio-Somali war that followed in 1978/78.¹⁰ As a result, security issues became again much more relevant than urban planning.
- 13 Urban planning regained attention among policy makers when Jigjiga was nominated as the capital of the newly created Somali National Regional State in November 1994 (SCHRÖDER 1998:5). Under the guidance of the National Urban Planning Institute (NUPI) in Addis Ababa, a new master plan was drafted and finalized in 1998. Based on a detailed socio-economic survey, a final report outlined the "existing spatial form and urban land use" as well as the "planning for future land use" (NUPI 1998: 88-97, 1998: 98-111). This report defined a variety of future land use categories and quantifies the relevance of each in absolute (hectares) and relative (percentages) terms (NUPI 1998:100). Nevertheless, this early attempt to shape and reshape the social and physical characteristics of a post-transitional Jigjiga had, according to local informants, hardly any impact on the grounds.
- 14 More recently, a new master plan was initiated in the run of the administrative reorganization of Jigjiga municipality as a city administration with a legislative city council. Under the guidance of the regional government's Works and Urban Development Bureau, the new master plan was elaborated and recently finalized by a

consultant from Addis Ababa (Wondimu Consult). In particular, urban development and planning experts elaborated a general social and economic structural plan as well as a number of Local Development Plans (LDP) that define particular intervention areas and are more practically oriented. These plans were recently finalized in January 2012 and approved as the extended Jigjiga City Structural Plan. They include a multi-layered GIS database that provides the legal basis for engineers and civil servants, in – and for – their everyday administrative practices (SRS 2012).

Urban incorporation

- 15 The nomination of Jigjiga as the capital of the Somali Region heralded the beginning of a progressive urban expansion. Jigjiga's favourable economic and political location has brought Somalis from various places to Jigjiga, where they have tried to make a living and sustain their livelihoods. While Jigjiga, within the given urban perimeter, contained about 24,716 inhabitants according to the national census in 1984 (PDRE 1989:24), its population increased to 65'795 according to the census conducted in 1994 (FDRE 1998:50). Since then, the detected urban population has again doubled and reached a total of 132'102 in 2010 (SRS 2012:76) – the estimated number including unreported cases is even higher. This dramatic demographic increase has been accompanied by an increasing competition for land in the existing urban and surrounding rural arenas. Already in the late 1990s, the NUPI reported such contestations and conflicts and called for appropriate planning measures:

“The conflict of interest on land must [be] resolve[d] by preparing a rational land use plan. Land use plan must be seen as a rational resource allocation method for efficient utilization of land for undertaking basis urban development and a management of conflict of interest that arises from different stakeholders” (NUPI 1998:71).
- 16 In addition, the NUPI report partly anticipated the progressive urban expansion. Although the plan already acknowledged that “land is a resource with a limited supply” and identified the scarcity of urban land as a key challenge, the planning perimeter remained constrained by the pre-existing urban boundary (NUPI 1998: 71). In the gaze of planners was only a gross area of 850.50 ha of which 113 ha was identified as vacant but “considered unsuitable for construction purposes” (NUPI 1998: 98). In addition, the boundaries were seen as interchangeable as the NUPI report shows: “The major natural constraint for development of the town is the existence of a river which appears to divide the town into to eastern and western parts. This area is marshy and flood prone with a slope of 0-1%. The man made constraints in the town are the airport, which occupies a prime site in the future expansion area, and the intensively developing illegal occupation, which surrounds the periphery of the town. The occupation by the military administration at the central part of the town is significant. The town is expanding along Degehabour road” (NUPI 1998: 89).
- 17 As anticipated, Jigjiga has rapidly expanded into the rural surrounding until today where hitherto open rural land has given way to new settlements. Especially during the last decade, a considerable amount of people has settled in the hitherto rural surrounding. Since then, settlements have emerged outside the perimeter of the master plan, beyond the river in the eastern parts of the town and beyond the airport which itself became allocated for different land use purposes. In contrast, the new

master plan stays abreast of these changes and considers a planning area of about 9000 ha (SRS 2012: 8). Moreover, the scope of the planning attempts go even beyond: “The city is in the processes of establishing an administrative boundary of 510 km² which will serve as an urban control boundary. The urban control boundary extends from Hadew in the west to Fara Hodely in the east. In the north to south direction, it extends from Biyeda Dere to Wenber” (*Ibid.*). On this basis, the city administration sets the boundaries of its jurisdiction and sphere of influence – as the following section will illustrate.

- 18 The recent (trans-)formation of this expansion and new settlement area can further be illustrated by the changing techniques for measuring land. Traditionally, the local standards for measuring the hitherto rural land is tied to practical needs and reflects the particular cropping patterns and technologies of the agro-pastoralist society in the Jigjiga plains.¹¹ In particular, rural land used to be measured in *qoodi* (in Somali), encompassing roughly the area two oxen can plough within an hour – approximately 44 m to 44 m. In contrast, the expansion area has been demarcated in rectangular plots that are mapped and measured in meter squares. More generally, the recent expansion of Jigjiga is related to changes in land regulation and access as well as in property regimes. The according changes of the geographical space, its boundaries and division are accompanied by a redefinition of the relation between the political authorities and the citizens, as well as the administration and regulation of land.

Urban property

- 19 The current master plan has brought hitherto rural land into the jurisdiction of the city administration; with considerable consequences for the way urban planners and engineers interact with urban dwellers. In this context, especially the city administration becomes a key actor in the administration and regulation of land access. While the NUPI reported about illegal occupation in the expansion area in the wake of the transitional period, recent field research illustrates how property has successfully become incorporated into the legal system of land administration and governance. Of crucial significance is thereby the current master plan for acknowledging and securing property rights. Here, the master plan is demarcating urban land, determining land use purposes on the ground for the different units created on the map, while equally excluding alternative claims.
- 20 While the previous NUPI master plan was constrained by its judicial boundary, the recently finalized master plan constitutes an essential tool for dealing with the on-going transformations and dynamics in the expansion area. On the one hand, the master plan is, as a map, partially representing the spatial characteristics of an on-the-ground reality of the newly emerged settlements. On the other hand, it outlines the future geographical formation and development of the expanding town with profound consequences for urban administration. First, the master plan provides a kind of ‘legal basis’ – also as a mental map – for the city administration that facilitates the administration of land allocation, the dedication of a certain area to a certain land use purpose, as well as the exclusion of other usages. Second, it makes future developments predictable and therefore contributes to the prevention of possible conflicts between different stakeholders, claiming land for different purposes. Third, it allows city dwellers to get land access and property protected by a formal institution, which

further prevents conflicts between relatives and kinsmen as they occurred in the recent past.

- 21 Archival research in the archive of the city administration in Jigjiga in 2012 showed that this trend clearly manifests in the archive's inventory books, where the number of listed and registered files has nearly doubled since mid-2007. Today, land allocation and the registration of property is one of the key activities of the city administration. For that purpose, a considerable amount of people visit the building of the city administration in the centre, in order to get their cases proceeded. However, interactions between local officials and urban applicants formally start already at the *kebele*¹² level, where city dwellers – the applicants – apply for a recommendation letter. After such a *kebele* recommendation letter is issued, signed and stamped, it becomes stapled together with a short and standardized letter, by which the applicant can request land access at the city administration and apply for getting the according legal certificate. These two papers are the basic requirements for getting one's case considered by the city administration. This means, in practical terms, that one has to open a file in the archive of the city administration that holds the two papers together. In addition, one's case will be registered in the inventory book, will get a specific number and will get authenticated by a stamp that confirms and records the entry of the documents.
- 22 At the city administration, a variety of urban experts at different departments get then shouldered with the task of implementing the urban plan. In particular, the engineer travels to the site in the expansion area, where the requested plot is located. First of all, an engineer has to approve that the plot is located in an area proposed for the intended land use purpose. Second, he measures the plot and approves that it is further in line with the spatial features outlined in the master plan. Finally, the engineer is drawing a sketch of the plot that will later be allocated to the applicant. Analytically, Scott emphasises that “every act of measurement was an act marked by the play of power relations” (SCOTT 1998:27). As such, the master plan provides a crucial tool of the city administration – often used rhetorically in interactions between engineers and applicants – for administering urban land.
- 23 Finally, land access and rights are properly granted with the preservation of the legal certificate, called *carta* in Amharic and *xujad* in Somali. Conceptually, the certificate was introduced in the early 20th century and since then, has been used as the legal acknowledgment, or let's say, the sediment of a bundle of rights.¹³ On the one hand, the document locating the valuable urban land, in a particular moment in time (date) and space (N-S-E-W directions), and gives the concerned valuable a particular form. On the other hand, the document is a meeting point for legal categories and subjects and brings them into relation, including a set of rights and obligations. Thus, the *carta* is both a manifestation or materialization of a particular property and power relations, within a certain spatial-temporal political context.

Conclusion

- 24 In this paper, I have tried to expose the first results of my on-going research on urban planning in practice, by following the formal role of the master plan in the administration of urban land, in the expansion area Jigjiga town. From a historical perspective, different governments have ruled the city throughout the 20th century,

and produced their maps and plans for coping with the social, economic and political challenges that have accompanied the emergence of an 'urban fabric'. However, Jigjiga's strategic location in the Ethio-Somali frontier has also deeply affected urban development, since urban planning attempts had repeatedly given way to more security related issues in the past.

- 25 Urban planning has again been intensified with the nomination of Jigjiga as the capital of the Ethiopian Somali region in 1994. Since then, urban Jigjiga has rapidly expanded into its hitherto rural surroundings. With the current master plan, this expansion area has successfully been brought under the jurisdiction of the city administration. As such, the master plan provides urban experts and practitioners with a detailed picture of the situation on the grounds, and therefore strengthens the city administration's capacity for the administration and regulation of land access. From this perspective, mapping practices appear as attempts to render spatial patterns legible, what constitutes a key source of power. In this sense, the master plan becomes a legitimate and powerful tool for the city administration to bring the expansion area into its jurisdiction, to incorporate the newly emerging urban plots into the city structure, and to implement its development plans and policies. The master plan also provides a shared vision for the future development of Jigjiga in its expansion area. More than a simple administrative tool, the master plan tends to be formally promoted as a social contract and a shared commitment for development, mediating the relation between the city administration and urban dwellers.
- 26 To complete this formal presentation of the past and current urban planning devices in Jigjiga, their concrete practices have to be investigated in the local political arena, where officials and urban dwellers interact and negotiate land access and land rights. This complementary study would mainly consist in assessing the potential gaps between the apparent consensus on the present master plan of Jigjiga and its different social practices.

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FOOTNOTES

1. See e.g. TOSTENSEN 2001.
2. With this plan, the government has elaborated a multi-level strategy that identifies and targets several priority areas in urban development (1. Urban unemployment and poverty, 2. Improving urban governance, 3. Institutional capacity, 4. Infrastructure development, 5. Housing upgrading, 6. Urban environmental issues and 7. Urban civil society) (FDRE 2002:125-127; 2006:161-164). The FDRE has further prepared the Urban Management Sub-program within the National Capacity Building Program (NCBP) and the National Urban Development Policy (NUDP), in order to address the increasing urbanization, strengthen urban governance and achieve sustainable urban development.
3. See e.g. COQUERY-VIDROVITCH 2005, FREUND 2007, RAKODI 2006.
4. See e.g. ANGÉLIL and HEBEL 2010.
5. See e.g. DONHAM and JAMES 1986, JAMES *et al.* 2002, MARKAKIS 2011.
6. See TIBEBE ESHETE 1988.
7. See e.g. CUNNINGHAM and BISSEL 2007, MAMDANI 2006, MYERS 2003.
8. See MARKAKIS 1987:169-181, TIBEBE ESHETE 1991.
9. See also ABERRA JEMBERE and WOLDETENSAY WOLDEMALAK 2011:14.
10. See GEBRU TAREKE 2000, 2002.
11. See also SCOTT 1998:29.
12. The *kebele* is an urban residence association and the lowest tier of the decentralized political system.
13. See also TIBEBE ESHETE 1988:57-67.

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
Livelihood diversification and rural underdevelopment: The challenges of household food security in Damota Gale woreda (Wolayta Zone, Southern Ethiopia)

Bereket Roba and Degefa Tolossa

p. 355-365

- 1 Though poverty remains a serious issue in Ethiopia today, the official statistics indicate that it particularly affects the populations inhabiting rural areas. Indeed, while the general proportion of poor people in Ethiopia was estimated to 29.6% in 2010-2011, it affected 25.7% of the city-dwellers and reached 30.4% in the countryside (MoFED 2012). In addition, around 10% of the Ethiopian population is still exposed to starvation and condemned to seek food assistance, even during the years of good harvest (BEFEKADU DEGEFE and BERHANU NEGA 2000).
- 2 To eradicate poverty and achieve food security – especially in the mostly rural areas of the country, the Ethiopian authorities have designed and implemented a Food Security Strategy (FDRE 2002). For more than a decade, these food policies have privileged (1) the intensification of smallholder agriculture, (2) the expansion of agro-industry and commercial farms, (3) resettlements and (4) livelihood diversification. The success of these strategic policies has been quite mitigated. Regarding agricultural intensification and commercialization, the average land holding remains too reduced to allow their successful implementation (MULAT 2001). Moreover, the resettlement programs conducted by the *Derg* during the 1980s generated important environmental catastrophes and individual traumas (DESSALEGN 2003). However, livelihood diversification has not been really assessed in Ethiopian, though it is often considered as an efficient means to fight rural poverty and food insecurity.

- 3 In developing countries, rural households derive important income shares from non-farming activities.¹ The short-term effects of rural livelihood diversification on farm household's food security are reasonably clear. Non-farming and off-farming incomes provide the rural households with the possibility to purchase food during droughts or harvest shortfalls. Non-farming and off-farming incomes are also sources of savings for rural households to face difficult times in general. On the long-term effects on food security, however, there is relatively little empirical evidence and what exists is inconclusive (GORDON and CRAIG 2001; ELLIS 2001).
- 4 In current Ethiopia, rural livelihood diversification is frequently mentioned too. Based on the survey released in 2000 by the Ethiopian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Devereux (2000) notes that only 44% of rural households surveyed reported any non-farm sources of income. The 2009 report of the Development Bank of Ethiopia reveals that the rural non-farming/off-farming activities are becoming important livelihoods and income sources for a sizeable portion of the rural population. Though these activities are sometimes related to agricultural growth in the some parts of the country, it is also often associated with agricultural underdevelopment (BARDEN 1983, cited in TEGEGNE 2000).² However, whereas the better understanding of these non-farming/off-farming activities seems particularly relevant to fight rural poverty in a country suffering where land scarcity pushes many people to seek alternative means for their survival (DEGEFA 2005), the current knowledge of the rural non-farming/off-farming sectors remains insufficient to implement effective development interventions (WORLD BANK 2003). Due to the lack of reliable information, detailed fieldworks or unbiased investigations, the academic literature on livelihood diversification and food security is still limited in Ethiopia today.³
- 5 To counter this academic shortage, this article aims to examine the local dynamics of livelihood diversification⁴ in the emblematic Wolayta Zone, through the current socio-economic challenges – overpopulation, land scarcity, unemployment, low incomes, etc... – fostering poverty and food insecurity in this former agricultural “Eden” (PLANEL 2008) of southern Ethiopia.⁵ With 11.8% of city-dwellers (PCC 2008), Wolayta is the least urbanized zone of the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR), in the present Ethiopian federation (PCC 2008). The Wolayta Zone is also a densely populated territory, whose settlements are mainly shaped along micro-holding and micro-farming practices (DESSALEGN 2007).
- 6 Thus, this study attempts to question the social dynamics of local livelihood diversification at the household level, in three *kebele* of the Damota Gale district, within the former famous agricultural zone of Wolayta in southern Ethiopia. The first findings of this study indicate that the livelihood diversification strategies are often attempts to cope with the meagre – or inexistent – on-farm production in many local households. Far from providing the rural populations with the capacity to invest – or even improve their living conditions, the current development of off-and non-farming activities rather reflects the plural socio-economic obstacles strengthening the vicious circle of poverty and food insecurity in these rural areas of Wolayta.



The socio-economic roots of rural poverty in three sub-districts of Damota Gale

- 7 This study focuses on Damota Gale, one of the twelve administrative districts *woreda* in Amharic) comprised within the Wolayta Zone. Damota Gale *woreda* is located at about 375 km south of Addis Ababa, and 150 km from Hawassa, the administrative capital of the SNNPR.

Overpopulation, land scarcity and unemployment: The socio-economic roots of rampant poverty in the Damota Gale *woreda*

- 8 Among a total population of 154,610, Damota Gale is mostly a rural district, as 126,926 (82.1 percent) of its inhabitants live in the countryside (PCC 2008). With a territory of 222.5 km², this *woreda* presents a high population density – 695 persons per square kilometre. The annual temperature range is between 15°C and 25°C, and rainfall fluctuates from 1600mm to 2000mm (WARDO 2009). Out of the 31 administrative sub-districts (*kebele* in Amharic) found in the Damota Gale *woreda*, three *kebele* were chosen to reflect the main geographical and socio-economic characteristics of the whole district. Indeed, the two *kebele* of Chocha and Hagaza Doge are located in the vicinity of Boditti town, whereas the *kebele* of Wandara Bolosso is relatively far away from this urban area. Among the 2199 household found in these three *kebele*, a total of 120 households were proportionally selected and examined through both quantitative and qualitative approaches.⁶

- 9 Land scarcity and micro-holding seem to be the consequence of demographic growth and high population density – the average size of the land owned by the local households is around 0.5 hectare, which is often not enough to feed their different members. In addition, the sample of populations selected from these three *kebele* of Damota Gaale reveals the poor social conditions of their members. About half of them (49.2%) are illiterate and 19.2% can only read and write. Only 31.6% attended formal education. Out of these, 16.7% have completed grades 1 – 6, while the rest (12.5% and 2.5%) respectively completed grades 7 – 12 and 12⁺¹ or above. The size of households ranges from 2 in the case of one newly married couple to 13. The average household size for the sample is 6.38 persons. Around 50% of the households comprise between 5 and 7 members.
- 10 Using the three dominant wealth ranking criteria (landholding size, number of oxen possessed and number of cattle other than oxen possessed), identified by the community members, only 2.9% of the sample households reach the rich (*duriyaa*) category. The medium (*gidduwa*) category constitutes 16.3% of the households. The majority of the households (80.8%) fall into the categories of poor (*hiyyeesa*) and destitute (*manquwa*), respectively 46.3% and 34.5%. Dessalegn (2007) comes out with a relatively close estimation, regarding the relative wealth status of people in the rural zone of Wolayta. According to the local standards, he argues that 33.3% and 25% of the rural population are respectively considered as poor (*hiyyeesa*) and destitute (*manquwa*), while no more than 10% could belong to the rich category.

Off-farming seasonal works and urban odd jobs: diversifying livelihoods to cope with social anomie

- 11 In the three *kebele* investigated for this study, many men and youth assume that they work on the lands of other farmers (sharecropping or *kotta* in the local languages) because they lack oxen to plough and/or their own land is not enough to produce more than what their households need for their annual consumption. Sharecropping is not a new off-farming development in the rural territories of Wolayta – and Ethiopia in general. Due to the great age or the disability of their male members, a part of the local households have practiced sharecropping for a long time. However, the present *kotta* arrangements tend to involve a growing number of households, whose own fields and cattle stocks are not enough to feed their inhabitants all the year. Moreover, the interviews and discussions conducted for this study in several households indicate that these off-farming activities seem to become peripheral in the local livelihood diversification strategies, because of the punctual and very low incomes they generate, or the more and more limited number of households offering to hire seasonal workers in the region. As for the other off-farming activities, the households obtaining incomes from the local environmental resource are now challenged by deforestation and high population density in the *woreda*.
- 12 Regarding the non-farming sector, this study suggests that the involvement of the rural households is increasing, but is often limited to odd jobs in towns. Numerous constraints strangle the local economy and foster the perilous migratory trajectories to Hawassa, Addis Ababa or the Middle East. The main socio-economic obstacles mentioned in the three *kebele* of Damota Gale considered here are the lack of start-up capital (43.3%), access to credit services (24.2%), job opportunities in the urban centres

(15%), market conditions (10.8%), knowledge and skills to undertake other activities (5%). Two households (1.7%) also indicate that the low opinion of the local community for off-farming activities and the lack of pack animals are among the main reasons that push them to diversify their livelihoods by entering the non-farming sector.

- 13 For a large majority of the local households, the lack of start-up capital in the poor regional economy is presented as the major obstacle that constrains them to develop non-farming activities. Despite the existence of two major micro-finance institutions (Omo Micro-finance and Wisdom micro -finance) in the *woreda*, the poor access to credit service is reported as a major challenge for most the local households. Though credit service is available in the *woreda*, its access is not easy, as credit is not individually provided. The credit service provision requires group collateral solidarity, where every member of the group is responsible for each other for the repayment of the money. Here, several households-particularly the destitute have no visible property for collateral contribution. So, they are almost always out of the game, as no one is willing to include them in the group to receive credit and become responsible of their share. Thus, the destitute take private moneylenders as ultimate option, whose high interest rate makes it difficult to refund. The long distance to reach to the location of the credit institutions-generally, the town of Boditti-is also presented as an obstacle in the *kebele* of Wandara Bolosso.
- 14 As for the lack of job opportunities in the urban centres, it is generally associated with the low urbanization of the Wolayta Zone (11.8%), which is less than the (16%) national urbanization rate (PCC 2008). In the *woreda* urban centre of Bodditi, the investments of the local business groups are not enough to absorb the abundant labour force of the district and often invest in businesses employing few workers, like grain mills or trucks. The opacity of the local markets and trade networks is also mentioned as a real economic constraint. Complaints are frequently formulated against the “irrational” taxes, required by the municipality of the town-and disproportioned compared to the modest resources of the local households.⁷ Dagnew (1995) also notes that over-taxation toward the poor farmers of the area contributed to poverty and food insecurity in the rural territories of the Wolayta Zone.
- 15 In a more general perspective, the findings of this study in the Damota Gale district tend to fit with those exposed in the other investigations conducted in the Wolayta Zone. Indeed, in his survey, Ayele (2008) writes that 46% of his population sample from the Wolayta highlands stress that the lack of start-up capital constituted the major local challenge. Regarding towns and employment, Dessalegn (2007) notes that the urban centres in Wolayta were not able to provide job opportunities for the rural populations, as they were themselves already affected by unemployment.

Challenging food insecurity and rural underdevelopment: the too limited off/non-farming contribution in the local household economy

- 16 In the three *kebele* of Damota Gale, the meagre incomes generated by the local households through off/non farming activities seem quite limited. Far from improving the economic development of the household economy, this livelihood diversification

rather attempts to insure the survival of its members, threatened by the fragile capacity of the on-farming production to feed them all the year.

Surviving the failure of on-farm production to sustain household food security

- 17 Almost three-fourths of the local households (69.8%) argue that the main reason explaining the involvement of their members in off-farming and non-farming activities is to buy the food they need for their daily consumption. Many women also suggested that the main reason of their engagement in the non-farming activities is to bring dinner for the members of their respective households when they come back home. In addition to food for the dinner, they also added the items they daily purchased—like salt, coffee, spice and gas for lamplight. Except gas, all the other items are related to food. After food imperatives, the women explained their involvement in the non-farming sector for the incomes they generate in order to cover school fees and the cost of the clothes for the children, to celebrate holydays, to pay land taxes or other social contributions (like *idiriya*) and, for only 14.2% of the local households, to save money for the future.
- 18 In the district of Damota Gale, the distress/push factor seems to often force the rural households to diversify their livelihoods. Almost half of the households selected for this study are engaged in sharecropping networks (*qotta*) on the lands of other peasants. Among this moiety, most of the rural households (66.7%) join these off-farming networks because the agricultural production of their own farm is totally insufficient to meet their annual food needs. The primary reason for the local households to engage in these *qotta* arrangements is then to use what they produce for their immediate consumption, to cope with insufficient land holding or low productivity.
- 19 This trend tends to be confirmed with the 22.8% of the remaining households that diversify their livelihoods through such off-farming sectors, because they fear that what they produce from their own land holding could not be sufficient for their annual food consumption. Wandara Bolosso shares the largest part (29.8%) of the total 66.7% households that point out the failure of the agricultural production from their own lands to meet the annual household consumption -and 34% within the Wandara Bolosso *kebele*. Similarly, the households presenting the same reason in Chocha *kebele* constitute 15.8% of the total, and 33% within this *kebele*.⁸
- 20 The meaning of food security is broader than food self-sufficiency because it pays attention to the worries about the future emergence of food shortage, due to insufficient crop and livestock reserves or properties. According to Degefa (2005), households need to ensure that they can produce, purchase on market, or obtain food or cash in the form of transfer, and that there is little variation in annual food supply at home, or from one year to another to feel that they are food secure. He also argues that the feeling of food security is behavioural and reveals the perceptions and fears of food shortage.
- 21 Among the several households visited for this study, their member generally differentiated food security from food self-sufficiency by associating food security with land, livestock and other assets, including remittance from children or other relatives. They considered that a household managing to have a sufficient agricultural production for the whole year could still face severe food shortage because of

unexpected events—thefts, drought, erratic rainfalls, animal death, illness of the male members of the household, etc... In this context, the households relying on solid food reserves, land properties and important livestock, are those who assume that they are food secure. According to this study, almost three-fourths of the households (74.2%) felt that they had not reached food security, while only 11.6% considered that they were food secure and 14.2% that their situation fluctuated during the last years. In the remote sub-district of Wandara Bolosso, the food security issue is paradoxical. Indeed, among the three *kebele* selected for this study, the largest proportions of both food insecure and secure households are found in Wandara Bolosso—respectively 30.8% and 5%, compared to 3.3% in Chocha and Hagaza Doge.

Livelihood diversification along the vicious circle of rural underdevelopment

- 22 Rural livelihood diversification is often presented as a potential motor for rural economic growth, through the additional incomes it generates and the production-consumption linkages it promotes between the sectors of agriculture, industry and services. However, the reasons, means, and outcomes of livelihood diversification are much more heterogeneous (REARDON *et al.* 2006). Asset endowments and cultural aspects can explain patterns of diversification of rural households within a particular location or region. Nonetheless, the income diversification of the rural households does not only depend on their inherent characteristics and asset endowments, but on wider factors, like their access to available employment and investment opportunities (WANDSCHNEIDER 2003). Engaging in economic activities—on a full-employment basis—that are less productive than agricultural production can also be motivated by the need to avoid further income decreases (DAVIS and BEZEMER 2004). In the context of subsistence producers, failing to achieve self-sufficiency in food production has forced numerous local households to involve their members in non-farming sectors, like market-based activities.
- 23 Within any rural area, distress/push diversification attracts the households that are poorly endowed with resources or have lower incomes. These households engage in non-farming activities that are, on average, less rewarding (e.g. in terms of labour productivity) than demand-pull diversification activities, since the higher-return activities typically require higher investment that only the richer households can afford (DAVIS and BEZEMER 2004). A work by Davis and Bezemer on Armenia, Georgia, Romania and many other developing countries also shows that distress-push diversification is what drives the majority of the rural poor into rural non-farm activities employment and income generating activities (DAVIS and BEZEMER 2004). Other scholars stress the strong association between greater livelihood diversification and household food security in Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Tanzania (BARRETT *et al.* 2001; LANJOUW and FEDER 2001). Carswell (2002) also argues that diversification activities make a greater contribution to cash incomes for poorer households in Wolayta (Ethiopia) with 44% of cash income earned from non-farm and off farm activities.
- 24 In Damota Gale *woreda*, the vast majority of households have diversified their livelihood towards non-farming or off-farming activities. However, the number of food secured households remains very low. The first findings of this study tend to show that livelihood diversification has not significantly improved food security in the rural

households of Damota Gale *woreda*. A large majority of these households (88,3%) has diversified its livelihoods through non-farming activities, but only 11,7% (14 households) of the households perceived themselves as food secure, while most of them (66,7%) still considered that they were food insecure. Moreover, none of the food secure households reported that they diversified their livelihoods through off-farming activities. Thus, the diversification of household livelihoods has not significantly improved food security in the three *kebele* of Damota Gale. At least, it seems to provide the local households with more food to face the unexpected hazards throughout the whole year—though this is still not enough to be perceived as a sign of food security. The vast majority (81,7%) of the local households cannot produce enough food for more than seven months—while there are two harvests per year in the region. This means that households need to purchase food on markets for more than five months per year. Here, the meagre amount earned from the off-farming and non-farming activities is often not sufficient to purchase food for such a long period.

Conclusion

- 25 Rooted in the local fieldworks and statistical analyses conducted in these three *kebele* of Damota Gale in the Wolayta Zone, this study stresses that the positive impacts of livelihood diversification cannot be expected in a local configuration where almost half of the households have not significantly improved their on-farming production—which remains the founding condition to secure their annual food consumption.
- 26 Behind land scarcity, overpopulation and dwindling environmental resources, the local dynamics of livelihood diversification unveil that rural underdevelopment—through the lack of ploughing oxen, land access, education or micro-credit facilities—remains the main cause of food insecurity in these rural territories of Wolayta. The unsustainability and inconsistency of the odd jobs generated by off-farming and non-farming activities seem unable to counter poverty and food security in Damota Gale—but rather foster economic migrations to the Ethiopian capital city and beyond the banks of the Red Sea.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Ellis (2000), in this regard, states that 30-50% of rural households in Sub-Saharan Africa earn their income from the non-farm activities. The same author also argues that the share of non-farm activities to be 80–90% in southern Africa and the figure to be roughly 60% in South Asia (ELLIS 1999). According to Bryceson (1999), whilst the incidence of non-farm activities varies from region to region and from household to household within regions, about 40% of African rural households' income is derived from non-farm activities.
2. Even among the poor rural households, some manage to benefit from the opportunities of non-farming economy, by evaluating the wage differential between the two sectors and the riskiness of each type of employment. Meanwhile, other households are pushed into the non-farming activities because of the lack of opportunities in the on-farm sector (BARDEN 1983, cited in TEGEGNE 2000).
3. DEGEFA (2005) argues that most of the academic studies conducted on food security and rural livelihood in Ethiopia has been biased to promote agricultural intensification and commercialization.
4. The concept of 'rural livelihood' is widely used in contemporary writings on poverty and rural development, but its meaning often happens to be elusive, partly because of the different definitions being encountered in different sources. According to ELLIS (2000:10), "a livelihood comprises the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual or household". The term livelihood diversification is defined by HUSSEIN and NELSON as "attempts by individuals and households to broaden income and livelihood strategies away from purely crop and livestock production towards both farm and non-farm activities that are undertaken to generate additional income via the production of other agricultural and non-agricultural goods and services, the sale of waged labour or self-employment in small enterprises" (1998:3).
5. As a concept, food security only appeared in the mid-1970s, during the discussions on international food problems at a time of global food crisis. The First World Food Summit in 1996 defined food security as a condition "when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (FAO 1996:2). Household food security is the application of this concept to the household level, with individuals within households as the focus of concern. In the context of subsistence farmers' households, food security is also defined as the ability to establish access to productive resources such as land, livestock, agricultural inputs and family labour combined to produce food or cash (GETACHEW 1995).

6. Through the systematic sampling technique, this selection was based on the households' lists of these respective *kebele* offices (27 out of the 493 households in Chocha, 43 out of the 789 in Hagaza Doge and 50 out of the 917 households in Wandara Bolosso). The Sustainable Livelihood Framework (version 16.0 SPSS) is the analytical device privileged for data analysis to better address the stated objectives of the research. Livelihood activities are divided into on-farm, off-farm and non-farm activities. The subjective approach, i.e. self-assessment and self-reporting of the households are also mobilized to have a better understanding of the different interpretations on food security in the local households, visited during the several fieldwork sessions (see DEGEFA 2005).

7. One of the participants of women's focus group discussion at Wandara Bolosso *kebele* puts the situation as follows: "I trade malt. My working capital is not more than 40 birr. I always pay 6 birr every month as tax for the municipality; my trade is not always profitable and growing to keep on paying this amount every month. I don't understand what they get if the poor quit such a small trade".

8. On the other hand, all those households (20%) of the total sample, who worked on the lands of other peasants for daily payment provided the main reasons either their land holding is very small to provide them with sufficient food required by the household across the year or they are landless.

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Land Registration and Food Security in Ethiopia: From Federal Policies to the Rural District of Siraro (Oromiya Regional State)


Davide Chinigò

p. 365-381

- 1 After the failure of both state-led agrarian reforms (1950s to 1970s) and market-led agrarian reforms (1980s-1990s) to sustain poverty reduction and agricultural productivity in Africa, today efforts are centred on implementing reforms towards greater individualisation of land tenure in a decentralised context (BENJAMINSEN and HOLDEN 2009; BERNSTEIN 2002, 2004; BERRY 2002). Mainstream development approaches support formalisation of land tenure as a way to both strengthen smallholders' land rights—by improving tenure security and stimulating land productivity on the way towards land consolidation—and market formation (WORLD BANK 2008: 22-24). This position was first elaborated by DE SOTO (2000) who contends that low productivity of African agriculture has its deep roots in the lack of clear and enduring property rights over land. By emphasising that land becomes a *dead capital*, DE SOTO establishes a direct link between formalisation of land tenure, rural modernisation, productivity increase and food security. For a couple of years, this neoliberal interpretation of land reform has a great influence on land policies all over the continent, through the implementation of specific land registration programs, presented as the first meaningful step towards the formalisation of land tenure.
- 2 Since the mid-1970s, land reform constitutes a central issue in Ethiopia. However, contrary to the current neoliberal credo, this reform is historically rooted in the 1974 Socialist Revolution and the land nationalization that brutally ended the former imperial and feudalistic system. When the present ruling coalition of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) took power in the beginning of the 1990s, the 1975 land reform and the state ownership monopoly it implemented were not significantly modified. According to the Marxist-Albanian doctrine initially

promoted by the EPRDF, the 1975 land reform was considered as a way to preserve equity in the distribution of landholdings and avoiding massive rural-out migration or land concentration (HUSSEIN JEMMA 2004).

- 3 Almost three decades after the Socialist Revolution, land reform and food security remain very sensitive issues in present Ethiopia. Indeed, while more than 80% of the population depend on agriculture, poverty is widespread and food security remains extremely critical. This is particularly true in the rural areas of the country, facing recurrent production crisis and population growth, land shortage, landlessness and environmental degradation.
- 4 In addition, in order to boost rural development, poverty reduction and livelihood generation, the Ethiopian authorities have implemented several policies since 2005, whose mitigated results are rather fostering tensions on land and food security issues. To officially concretize the ‘decentralization’ of land management and administration enshrined in the 1994 Federal Constitution, the federal government has recently promoted diverse initiatives to stimulate productivity, improve tenure security and ‘incentivize’ the commercialization of agriculture (MAKKI 2012). Embedded in the broader Agriculture Development-Led Industrialisation Strategy (ADLI), these policies follow the governmental priority on agriculture—the cornerstone of the current Ethiopian development model. ADLI is meant to diversify the economy in the long run through an initial push on agriculture. Today, the Ethiopian authorities tend to pursue a hybrid rural development strategy whereby values of the 1975 land reform are mixed-up with more liberal views about the formalization of land tenure.
- 5 To complement the mostly macro-economic recommendations of the World Bank on land formalization to strengthen rural development in developing countries, this article proposes to question the concrete implementation of land registration from the Ethiopian perspective. Though this process formally follows the current international strategy to eradicate rural poverty in Ethiopia, it also performs the shift of the governmental narratives on land policies from the former ‘equity and food security’ Marxist model, to a more liberalized view of land reform characterized by ‘efficiency and productivity’. Moreover, the local implementation of land registration to promote agricultural productivity seems to generate tensions around tenure and food security between the rural communities and what is often perceived as the growing penetration of the state in rural areas.
- 6 To fairly reveal their plural actors and dynamics, these land programs are investigated from the federal to the local levels. Thus, the first part of this article explores the political process encouraging the Ethiopian authorities in Addis Ababa to privilege this new approach on land formalization and productivity. Then, the concrete implementation of land registration and its impact on food security are locally examined in the Siraro administrative district (*woreda* in Amharic) of the present Oromiya Regional State.



Marxist legacies and international compromises: a short history of land registration in the Ethiopian Federation

- 7 With the financial and technical support of the international community, the Ethiopian government has initiated land registration since the late 1990s. Though these programs remain rooted into the Marxist heritage of the present Ethiopian federation, the several land policies implemented after the controversial elections of 2005 would formally reflect the intention of the Ethiopian government to liberalize the national economy. Informally, their implementation also reveals the growing state control inside the rural territories of the country.

The initial program of land certification

- 8 Assisted by the World Bank, the land registration program initiated in 1998 covers the four most populous regional states—Amhara, Tigray, Oromiya and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR), and aims to provide each farming household with a land-use right certificate (in the name of both the spouses). The state is still vested of the ultimate ownership of land and transfers are therefore limited to short-term leases. A local land registry is kept at village level (*kebele*), and the programme follows two stages of implementation. At an early phase certificates are issued to demarcate plots through ‘traditional’ tools, while a cadastral survey through GPS technology is scheduled in a second phase. With the exception of a few pilot programmes in Tigray and Amhara, the second phase still has to be implemented and is scheduled to start in September 2013. Today the first phase of the programme—distribution of land-use certificates not involving a GPS demarcation—is almost completed. In Oromiya and SNNP the distribution has been slowed by a number of problems such as the pattern of landholdings, shortage of resources and the continual

redefinition of administrative boundaries of *kebele* and *woreda* (HOLDEN, TEWODROS TEFERA 2008: 32).¹

- 9 Land registration is implemented by Land Administration Committees (LACs) established at *kebele* level. With some differences from region to region, LACs are mixed bodies, composed by local officials, elders and other community members. These institutions therefore play a pivotal role during the implementation process and they have the hard task of ensuring strong local participation and mediating potential conflict during the demarcation. A number of recent legislations at federal and regional level empower LACs with even more ambitious tasks ranging from working as court of first instance for minor land disputes, setting-out land-use and environmental protection planning, and incentivising land rental markets (FDRE 2005b). The kind of certificate issued by the LACs varies from region to region, and for instance in Tigray consists of a single piece of paper, while in Amhara and Oromiya is a small book, called “user book”.
- 10 Land registration in Ethiopia is intended to be a first step towards land tenure’s formalization, and therefore aims at improving tenure security, strengthening productivity and food security (DESSALEGN RAHMATO 2009: 181). A number of quantitative studies in the field of agriculture economics have identified significant positive impacts of the programme on reduction of land border disputes (HOLDEN *et al.* 2010), land rental market formation (HOLDEN *et al.* 2011; DEININGER *et al.* 2011), household welfare (HOLDEN, HOSAENA GHEBRU 2011), gender equality (HOLDEN, BEZABIH 2008; HOLDEN, TEWODROS TEFERA 2008; HOLDEN *et al.* 2011), investment and land productivity (HOLDEN *et al.* 2009; DEININGER *et al.* 2008).
- 11 These studies reports that registration was implemented quickly, involved community participation and had overall positive effects. While the government in the past was often criticised for its land policy, international donors are now much more satisfied on the ground that land registration may give an answer to the issue of tenure insecurity. Following Deininger *et al.* (2008:18), farmers benefit from growing subjective tenure security and, as a result, they are more prone to invest in agriculture, therefore increasing land productivity. On the side of land rental contracts, land certification incentivises leases since farmers are more confident to get their land back once the contract expires (HOLDEN *et al.* 2011: 44).

The 2005 elections: a turning point in Ethiopian land policies?

- 12 Land registration has been implemented in Ethiopia since 1998, but it is only after 2005 that its implementation was accelerated (DESSALEGN RAHMATO 2009:192). While the national elections of 2005 have probably modified the government attitude towards the rural world, the significance of this change is still debated. In this paragraph I argue that in the last few years the development agenda for the rural areas has shifted from a notion highlighting ‘equity and food security’ to a one more oriented towards ‘efficiency and productivity’. While this change goes beyond the electoral contest, the 2005 elections have probably speeded-up this process and with it the implementation of land registration.
- 13 The question of land was a major theme in socio-economic and political discussion during the national elections of 2005 (ABBINK 2006; LEFORT 2010; DESSALEGN RAHMATO 2009).

At that time the government land policy was deeply criticised by the opposition, and soon became one of the burning issues of the political debate. For the purpose of this paper, this debate saw two opposing idea of how land reform should inform food security.

- 14 On the one hand EPRDF, the ruling party, supported public ownership of land on the ground that it would preserve poor farmers land rights, avoiding uncontrolled urbanisation and land concentration. This position reflects much of the government orientation towards land policy since it first seized power in the 1990s. Its main objective is strengthening smallholder agriculture as a way to achieve food security. Thus, as put out by some scholars (MAKKI 2012; DESSALEGN RAHMATO 2009; ASPEN 2002), this strategy entails an active state intervention in the rural world through extensive planning of development initiatives, and highlighting a comprehensive project of social engineering in the countryside.
- 15 On the other hand, criticisms towards this position were moved from two main grounds. First, those claiming for more secure forms of land tenure argued that state ownership was inhibiting productivity improvements and local market formation (HUSSEIN JEMMA 2004; DESSALEGN RAHMATO 2009). Following this position, tackling the longstanding food security crisis of Ethiopian rural areas had to involve the transition to individualized system of land ownership. By allowing processes of land concentration in the hands of the most productive farmers, this would generate the rural surplus needed to improve rural food security. Second, the government position was criticised also in terms of the system of power underlying its land policy and rural development agenda. In this regards, state ownership of land was seen as an extraordinary tool for the government to assert power in rural areas (CREWETT *et al.* 2008; MAKKI 2012; DESSALEGN RAHMATO 2009). Shifting towards more individualized systems of ownerships would have therefore meant more social and political enfranchisement for peasants especially in southern regions.
- 16 For the purpose of this paper, the 2005 elections mark a shift in the ruling party/ government strategy towards rural areas. In particular, the post 2005 land policy goes in the direction of accommodating some of the demands brought-up by the oppositions during the electoral campaign. Since then, land policy tried to merge together initiatives towards improving agriculture ‘efficiency and productivity’, without compromising the system of land property relations in place, *i. e.* state ownership of land.
- 17 The solution entailed the adoption of a new federal land law, the Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation (RLAUP) (FDRE 2005b), which was passed in the dying days of the parliament together with a proclamation ruling the Expropriation of Landholdings (EoLP) (FDRE 455/2005a). The new land law is informed by two main political priorities. First, by pointing-out the urgency to establish an information database identifying rural landholdings, it speeded-up land registration and provided for a general framework of its implementation. Second, in order to improve the efficiency of rural development, it fastened decentralisation of land administration and provided a legal background for shifting prerogatives from federal to local bodies. By endorsing ‘decentralisation’ and being strongly informed by a narrative of ‘efficiency and productivity’, the RLAUP can be considered as a main departing point from a rural agenda previously dominated by ‘equity and food security’.

- 18 In broader terms, this shift is also evident in the formulation of the five years development plans—or poverty reduction strategy papers—implemented by the government in collaboration with international donors over the last decade. In 2005 it was adopted the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) (FDRE 2005c), which followed the 2002 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) (FDRE 2002). While the SDPRP mainly focuses on how strengthening smallholder agriculture as a way to achieve food security and in the long run diversifying the rural and urban economy (in line with the ADLI strategy), an ‘accelerated growth strategy is at the core of the PASDEP’ (FDRE 2005c: 27). Under the PASDEP land productivity, commercialisation of agriculture and structural efficiency of local administration to promote a fast growth and economic development are given much more emphasis than before. By confirming that the country will continue to pursue the ADLI strategy, the PASDEP emphasises the need to capture the private initiatives of farmers and support the shifts to diversification and commercialisation of agriculture. Thus, less emphasis is given to peasant agriculture. The ‘accelerated growth strategy’ has to follow two broad trajectories: commercialisation of agriculture and acceleration of private sector development. More recently the implementation of the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) (2010-2015) goes in the same direction and considers modern agriculture as the backbone of economic and social development at all level, in the way to make Ethiopia a middle-income country by 2020 (FDRE 2010).
- 19 These transformations marked a shift in rural development strategy and practice from a strategy emphasising ‘equity and food security’—where smallholder agriculture is the driving force of rural development –, to a strategy entailing ‘productivity and efficiency’. Land registration reflects this strategy’s shift and is aimed at incorporating elements of ‘productivity and efficiency’ into a strategy previously dominated by a narrative of ‘equity and food security’. First, by confirming state ownership of land it pushes ahead the question of equity in the access and distribution of resources. Second, providing for a comprehensive project of land titling, the programme aims to improve the efficiency of agriculture, stimulating productivity and strengthening tenure security.
- 20 Land certification raised considerable expectations among farmers throughout the country and generally the distribution was welcomed by a vast majority of households targeted by the programme (DESSALEGN RAHMATO 2009: 183). Interviews from Siraro confirm this picture: farmers have a positive perception of the distribution since it potentially contributes to land disputes reduction. Nonetheless, given some specific conditions of agriculture in Siraro, land registration—and the underlying relation between increasing tenure security, productivity and food security—is not likely to bring about significant improvements on agriculture and rural development.

Land registration and food security in Siraro: the challenges of decentralization in a rural district of Southern Ethiopia

- 21 Siraro is a *woreda* (district) part of West-Arsi zone of Oromiya region. Its main economic activity is smallholder agriculture that employs over 90% of the total population. The zone was established in 2006 and, as a result, a major reorganisation took place also at

district level. From an administrative perspective Siraro can be considered as a new district. Not surprisingly, implementation of national schemes went slower than in other districts, and land registration does not make an exception to this picture. According to the agriculture office of the *woreda*, in May 2012, 67% of the farmers received a land certificate—first phase of the process, involving ‘traditional’ methods of land demarcation.² The programme is therefore not fully implemented yet.

Food insecurity and welfare state: the relative successes of land registration

- 22 According to a sample of interviews collected between November 2009/February 2010³ and April/May 2012, the livelihood conditions of farmers in Siraro are rapidly deteriorating. Population pressure over land is constantly growing and land shortage, associated with poor farming productivity, is the primary reason behind recurrent food crisis. On average each farmer holds between 0.5 and 1 hectare of land to sustain large households (7-8 members).⁴ While over 90% of the farmers interviewed claim that even ten years before availability of land was much higher, they believe their living conditions are constantly deteriorating. According to over 80% of interviewees rural-out migration is not an option, either because farmers are afraid to lose the land-use right on their plot or because they think urban centres do not offer any real job opportunity.
- 23 As explained by some officials of the Agriculture and Rural Development Office (ARDO) at the *woreda* level, in this precarious context, land registration plays an important role in shaping the food security agenda of the district. According to one of them:
- “Land registration serves two main purposes. First it aims to improve agriculture productivity, making it easier for farmers to invest on land improvements. Second, the titles protect farmers against eviction. Thus, given that land use titles cannot be transferred but only inherited by other family members, land certificates inhibit land concentration and therefore protect the poorest strata of the peasantry”.⁵
- 24 This interpretation highlights two main narratives behind land registration. One is ‘efficiency and productivity’, and heavily draws on a mainstream understanding of land reform. By strengthening tenure security, land registration is supposed to favour investments on land improvements, productivity increase, and local market formation. The second is informed by a narrative of ‘equity and food security’, and contends that by providing a formal certificate, land registration intends to protect farmers from eviction and dispossession. The discourse of equity is the same providing intellectual legitimacy to state ownership of land. Its objective is safeguarding smallholder agriculture as a fundamental economic system to strengthen food security at household level. This interpretation is confirmed by other interviews. One member of the *woreda* Food Security Office noted:
- “What we are expecting from land registration is achieving greater security for farmers. Our district—alongside with many Ethiopian rural districts—bases its economy on smallholder agriculture. (...) Land policy has to play a big role in safeguarding local production, and food security is a priority. Our farmers are happy about land registration because certificates prove *ownership*. (...) Rural economy will therefore benefit in terms of both growing productivity and increased food security”.⁶

- 25 Nonetheless the relation between ‘efficiency and productivity’ and ‘equity and food security’ is not clear enough, and different actors tend to give opposing interpretations. While almost all the local officials interviewed trace a direct link between tenure security and production/productivity increase—in line with federal policy prescriptions and directions from international donors, farmers tend to elaborate *security* in a different way. According to one farmer in Ropi:

“I welcomed the certificate. Now I have a piece of paper showing that the land I cultivate belongs to my family. (...) Land border conflicts are a recurrent phenomenon in our district and usually more powerful farmers prevail. (...) As they actually prove who the land belongs to, certificates will help reducing border conflicts”.⁷

- 26 Official data from the *woreda* ARDO indeed show that the average number of land related conflicts diminished since land registration started to be implemented (around 20% less).⁸ Nonetheless land registration is still at an early stage of implementation and the drop in conflicts is not probably entirely due to the impact of registration. For instance, many farmers acknowledge the benefits of land registration in terms of land dispute settlement, but at the same time they also highlight limits to this interpretation by arguing that it is not land registration in itself that affects the amount of land disputes in the district. According to one old farmer in Ropi:

“I don’t think the certificates will impact much on land conflicts. The main problems of Siraro are land shortage and population growth. I had to split-up my land, and giving one *timad* (0.25 hectares) each to my three sons. (...) Land registration is not bringing us more land. (...) Land disputes are now less because now the *kebele* and elders are both in charge of dealing with land conflicts and adjudications are taken in a more consensual manner”.⁹

- 27 More broadly the Land Administration Committees (LACs) in charge of distributing land certificates and to deal with minor land disputes seem to hold a certain degree of legitimacy among the local farmers. In Siraro, these bodies are composed both of elders from the local community and local officials from the *kebele*. While so far certificates distribution has not involved major conflicts and ‘decisions are taken in a consensual manner’, many interviewees have a good perception of LACs. What is argued is that this ‘mixed body’ is likely to guarantee a certain degree of equity in the adjudication of land disputes. It is therefore clear that farmers acknowledge the importance of LACs as bodies acting closer to the farmers and taking decisions in accordance to their idea of justice.
- 28 Though the farmers have a positive perception of land registration in regards to its impact on border conflicts, they believe that the full implementation of the program will not significantly affect their relations with the local government institutions. Above all, it is not expected to improve food security and/or productivity.

‘Obeying and minimizing the contact with the state’: the plural failures of decentralized land management in Siraro woreda

- 29 A group of farmers in the village of Loke Heda noted:

“It is not clear whether farmers will benefit from land registration. I think the programme is not adding much to what is already in place. (...) We can use it in case of land dispute, (...) with other farmers the certificate may be helpful in settling the

dispute, but if the government wants to take my land, it will do it anyway. (...) Land belongs to the government as much as the sky belongs to God”.¹⁰

- 30 Other farmers appear really frustrated about implementation of land registration because they perceive it as the last of a long series of government programmes imposed from above. As noted by one of farmer in Sambaté:

“They (*local officials*) convene this meeting every month, sometimes every two weeks, but it is just a waste of time (...), and I am compelled to attend it. The main point they make is that they are responsible for land allocation (...), that land registration is important to sustain agriculture. (...) What can I do? I cannot allow myself to not follow what they say”.¹¹

- 31 Farmers feel committed to every government initiated programme, with few opportunities to escape from the interaction with local officials. More recent interviews confirm this picture. One farmer in Alemtena observed:

“Sometimes it is difficult for me to attend all these meetings. I live quite far from the *kebele* centre. But if I do not show-up, then they start thinking I am against the government. But I am not”.¹²

- 32 In reference to a similar situation in the Amhara Regional State, Aspen (2002: 69) argues that the only option available for the peasant population is trying ‘to minimise the contact with the state by obeying only the inescapable demands it imposes on the peasantry, and otherwise to ignore it’. It seems that the experience of land registration in Siraro is well represented by that. The program is perceived as a top-down order and the main priority of farmers do not seem to be whether the program will be successful or not. Rather, their priority is to go along with local officials’ wishes, without investing too much time in it, and without compromising their ability to access to those essential inputs and resources necessary to sustain their livelihoods.

- 33 What seems relevant in the experience of Siraro is therefore the complex relation between land tenure, local administrations and political control. Land registration is implemented within the broader context of decentralisation of land management and administration, which in Ethiopia aims to devolve prerogatives from federal to local bodies. Rather than being informed by a genuine devolution, the literature acknowledges this process is rather a ‘deconcentration’ of power from upper to lower bodies (PAULOS CHANIE 2007, 2009; EMMENEGGER *et al.* 2011). Local administrations, and particularly the levels of *woreda* and *kebele*, are primarily concerned in implementing government-initiated policies rather than representing the interests of their constituencies, in a context where upward accountability is dominant. Land registration does not make exception to that. The federal and regional land proclamations implementing this registration indirectly provide the local officials with a growing authority and singular influence over land allocation and management (PAULOS CHANIE 2009; DESSALEGN RAHMATO 2009).

- 34 In the Siraro context, this study shows that the discourses of ‘equity and food security’ and ‘efficiency and productivity’ underlying land registration are selectively used by local officials to exert greater leverage over land allocation. For instance, most of the farmers interviewed maintain that the ‘government’ retains the power to dispossess them from their land at any time. While this is seldom put into practice, it seems that the threat of dispossession is often used to pressure the farmers who do not strictly submit to the governmental programs, or even attempt to question them—especially

those related to local resettlements and land claims for ‘development purposes’. One farmer observed:

“I have to take care of my land, I have a large family. (...) The *kebele* often asks me to participate in community works, such as road construction and tree planting. All farmers are asked to do so, not only me, and without any remuneration. (...) They claim this is for the benefit of the community, and I do believe it is. (...) If you fail to attend these activities or if you question these decisions you are either blamed to be against your community or even the government. (...) Then they tell you that your land may be used for the *development* of the community, and that you can be given of other lands. But they are far from the *kebele* centre and less fertile”.¹³

- 35 In a context like Siraro where land shortage is by far an overriding problem, population grows fast and landlessness is high, threat of dispossession seems to be an extraordinary tool to pressure farmers. While claims for ‘better development purposes’ or ‘community development’ are justified in relation to the discourse of ‘equity and food security’, similar re-elaborations are raised in relation to ‘efficiency and productivity’. Threat of dispossession is sometimes legitimated by arguing that land can be used in a ‘more productive manner’, or that it is not ‘properly conserved’.

- 36 Finally, as a result of this top-down approach to programme implementation, the case of Siraro shows that the relation between security of tenure and productivity is quite problematic. On the one hand farmers are confident that registration will limit the amount of border disputes, and therefore establishing a more reliable system of conflict resolution. For instance, this will enable them to spend less time in local courts and more time to farm their plot. On the other hand they do not see how the programme will bring benefits in terms of increased productivity. One young farmer noted:

“I do not have enough land even to feed my three children. The cost of fertilisers and seeds is very high and this year the cooperative was late in delivering it. (...) Three month ago they came here measuring my land and then I collected my certificate (...) I don’t see how this piece of paper that I cannot even read is going to make my maize growing faster. The amount of land I have is the same as before and fertilisers and seeds are expensive”.¹⁴

- 37 Access to agriculture inputs is one of the recurrent themes emerging from the interviews in Siraro and which constrain local productivity. While a detailed discussion on how inputs are provided to farmers is beyond the scope of this paper, here I just note that farmers in Siraro entirely depend on an inflexible system of cooperatives directly controlled by the *kebele* and the local party branch. What it is important to stress here is that it is not really the lack of enough ‘security of tenure’ the determinant of Siraro poor performance in agriculture, but rather domestic political economy issues which exacerbate the problems of growing population, land shortage and inflexible access to inputs. For this reason, farmers seem to be little confident on the ability of land registration to support local production and food security.

- 38 The feasibility of constantly updating the land registry created at the agriculture office is a further concern about the long-term feasibility of land registration. Given the highly fragmented system of landholdings of Siraro, that registration provides only use-rights, and that land can be formally transmitted only through inheritance, it is certainly a hard task to keep the registry up to date in a rural district like Siraro. The pattern of landholdings is constantly changing every few years and the techniques of

land demarcation used by the LACs so far seem to confirm these long-term concerns. One official of the *woreda* agriculture office noted:

“Farmers are required to notify any landholding change to the LAC, which then will report to our office (...). This is probably one of the most challenging issues of the programme. Plots are very small in our district, and the pattern of landholdings is in constant change due to the inheritance system (...). I am not entirely sure this is going to work, but we are trying our best”.¹⁵

- 39 Thus, the first phase of land demarcation involves the use of rudimentary tools, such as rope, or is based on identification of physical objects (such as trees or stones) on the plot. These data are then copied down to the certificate given to each farmer, but it is hard to conclude that they provide for a clear and undisputable system of plot demarcation. Costs of maintaining the archives would in short be higher than that requiring land registration in itself. The second phase of the programme will involve the use of GPS, nonetheless it seems that an effective cadastre would require huge investments and technical expertise.

Conclusion

- 40 So far, land registration in Siraro has produced mitigated impacts. The program was generally welcomed among the farmers, as they emphasise its positive impacts on the resolution of land border disputes. It seems that the work of LACs was quite effective, thanks to their ‘mixed bodies’, involving local officials, elders and other community members.
- 41 Land registration reflects two main political narratives on land reform, namely ‘equity and food security’ and ‘efficiency and productivity’. Nonetheless, the relation between food security and productivity seems quite problematic and the land registration programs are not bringing significant change. Though they manage to provide the local farmers with land-use rights, these programs do not offer a clear and undisputable system of demarcation. Thus, land registration is not adding much to the system of current land tenure. Rather, the productivity objective it promotes is failing to counter the socio-economic constraints—population growth, land scarcity, lack of investment capacity, etc...—that already severely affect the rural households. Contrary to the common assumption that tenure security would foster productivity in rural areas, the land registration programs implemented in the remote district of Siraro have not improved food security in the local households.
- 42 The farmers argue that ‘tenure security’ is not limited to administrative registration, as land relations include several other socio-economic registers. The lack of interest manifested by the local households for the recent land programs tends to illustrate their growing popular disgrace. From the regional to the district (*woreda*) and sub-district (*kebele*) levels, these land registration programs are today considered as unquestionable ‘directives’, imposed through the top/down hierarchy of the state administration. Closer to ‘deconcentration’ than effective ‘decentralization’, the management of the local administrative relays involves a quite limited number of almost omnipotent land officers. Behind the welfare state promoted in the official narratives, the land registration policies implemented in Siraro are more and more perceived as a political tool to strengthen the growing state control over these rural territories.

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FOOTNOTES

1. In Ethiopia *kebele* and *woreda* refer respectively to village and district level administration.

2. Data gathered at the *woreda* Agriculture and Rural Development Office, Loke Heda, Siraro.
3. Fieldwork methodology encompassed semi-structured interviews to 100 farmers in Siraro. I made use of qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. An open questionnaire was divided into two main sections. The first aimed to get general information about landholding, household size, crop and farming practices. The second included questions about policies and programmes relevant to land management and administration, including land registration.
4. Data gathered at the *woreda* Agriculture and Rural Development Office, Loke Heda, Siraro.
5. Interview with a local official from the ARDO, Loke Heda, Siraro, 8 February 2010.
6. Interview with a local official from the Capacity Building Office, Loke Heda, Siraro, 4 February 2010.
7. Interview with a farmer in Ropi, Siraro, 27 November 2009.
8. Data gathered at the Agriculture and Rural Development Office, Loke Heda, Siraro, 15 February 2010.
9. Interview with a farmer in Ropi, Siraro, 15 April 2012.
10. Group interview with farmers on the topic of Productive Safety-Net Programme, Siraro, 7 December 2009.
11. Interview with a farmer in Sambaté, Siraro, 28 November 2009.
12. Interview with a farmer in Alemtena, Siraro, 19 April 2012.
13. Interview with a farmer in Ropi, 18 April 2012.
14. Interview with a farmer in Ropi, 16 April 2012.
15. Interview with a *woreda* Official from the ARDO, 5 May 2012, Loke Heda, Siraro.

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Food Aid Targeting in Ethiopia: An Ethnographic Study of the Early Warning System in the North-Western Zones of the Amhara Regional State

François Enten

p. 383-393

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- 1 This article examines the politics of food security through the prism of a measurement tool, called the Early Warning System (EWS). Like statistics, the EWS is both a tool for gathering information and a means of controlling the population (DESROSIERES 2002). In Ethiopia, the recurrence of famines has often led to political upheaval (PANKHURST 1990) and food security remains a key priority, as the Ethiopian government is still dependent on international food aid (LAUTZE *et al.* 2009). Beyond their formal function of assessing food security in the country, these measurement instruments might also be used as political tools. This article aims to show that the quantitative expertise provided by the EWS in Ethiopia is not only based on objective figures or technical factors, but rather on their interplay with more political stakes—like the growing state control inside the rural areas of the country.
 - 2 To unveil this informal side of the food security measurement devices, this work investigates the concrete methods and practices, followed by the EWS experts to produce numeric data. From the quantitative evaluations of global needs at the institutional level, to their impact on the individual distribution of food aid in the villages, this ethnographic study attempts to describe the social dynamics bind to the concrete implementation of the EWS. This study is rooted into several fieldworks, conducted between 2002 and 2004 with both institutional aid experts and villagers—at a time when new evaluation methodologies were being introduced. These fieldworks include four journeys with different “multi-agency” teams, conducting evaluation rounds across the Wello, Wag Hemra—especially in five sub-districts (*qebelê*) of the

Dehanna (*woreda*)—and Oromya zones of the present Amhara Regional State. We also spent time in five *qebelé* in the Dehanna *woreda* located in Wag Hemra zone. The research methods mainly consisted in interviews and participant observation during the meetings held by the experts—or among the local peasants, the evaluation works in the field or food distribution in the villages.

- 3 After a brief presentation of the questions related to the EWS in Ethiopia, the findings of the ethnographic fieldworks reveal the social dimension of these measurement devices, along the production of food aid figures and the distribution process at the *qebelé* levels.

The EWS as a consensual tool

- 4 The EWS are designed to “provide rapid and reliable information” on population food security, so that “appropriate measures can be taken by governments and the international community” to prevent or respond to food crises¹. In theory, by collecting and processing data on agro-pastoral production and food availability, EWS make it possible to pinpoint and quantify food deficits in order to strengthen food security measures and target the distribution of international food aid. The evaluations produced by the EWS are supposed to uphold the humanitarian interests of the population in the face of the donor—or even recipient—countries’ political and economic interests, that may interfere in aid allocation decisions.
- 5 However, the EWS should also be considered a living tool capable of adapting to technical innovations, methodological input, international aid priorities, as well as to political tensions between competing institutional actors (donors, international agencies, NGOs and governments, etc.) for the control of food aid. First introduced during the famines that hit the Sahel region in the 1970s, institutionalisation of the EWS coincided with the reform to an international food aid regime perceived as promoting the political and economic self-interests of the belligerents of the Cold War (HOPKINS 1992, UVIN 1994). The initial model created in 1975, the FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS), was based on the observation of crops and the collection of data supplied by governments (crop failures, market prices of food, etc.) to determine the food supply situation in the form of a Food Balance Sheet². In 1985, given the risk of instrumentalization of the GIEWS, USAID—the leading international food aid donor—set up the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), to which the addition of climate-and satellite-based information meant there was no longer total reliance on governmental data (DEVEREUX 2000).
- 6 From the end of the 1990s, the introduction of Household Economy Approach (HEA) methodologies by NGOs made it possible to cross-reference governmental data on agricultural production with estimations of the population’s economic access to food obtained through collective interviews with samples of the population. Finally, in the wake of the food crisis that struck Niger in 2005, the measurement of child malnutrition criteria by means of epidemiological surveys added the final component to EWS evaluations. The collection of socio-economic and nutrition-based data, initially promoted by NGOs and humanitarian agencies, helped provide a clearer picture of food security and further decrease reliance on governmental sources. But it also made EWS evaluations more complex. Consequently, simplified versions were produced to

facilitate rapid decision-making, a process helped by the fact that the results were published immediately on the Net.

- 7 The evolution of the EWS in Ethiopia has followed a similar path, except the notable fact as the country has been affected by chronic food insecurity, it has mainly aimed to ensure the distribution of emergency food aid. The first African EWS was launched in Ethiopia during the reign of Haile Selassie with the setting up of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) as a late reaction to the 1973 famine. It became institutionalised under Mengistu Hailemariam's regime, which engaged in a "political contract against famine" (LAUTZE *et al.* 2009). Since the proclamation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1995, the EWS has been part of an institutional system covering the whole country and focusing on the allocation of international food aid. Covering up to one-tenth of the country's food requirements, this aid had come to be considered as part of Ethiopia's "national income" (PLANET 2009). In 2003, food aid reached an all-time high, targeting almost 15 million people. Today, however, recourse to emergency aid is declining as a consequence of nutrition monitoring and treatment programmes and the initiatives for fighting food insecurity launched in 2002 by the government and donors: the Productive Safety Net Programme and the resettlement programme³. These three programmes do not sit happily side by side, as emergency aid is inconsistent with the principle of global aid, now designed as a longer-term solution for achieving food independence. Nonetheless, food aid is still being provided to between 2 and 6 million people.
- 8 Successive reforms to the Ethiopian Early Warning Department and the EWS since its creation are the reflection of repeated efforts on the part of international institutions to ensure some distance with the administrative centralisation of the Ethiopian state. During the 1983-1985 famine, western countries' mistrust of the *Derg* resulted in a separation between the Ethiopian EWS and that of the donors. The government, keen not to lose western aid, tolerated this duplication, which enabled donors to entrust the distribution of aid to NGOs, thereby undermining the position of the RRC. Under the current regime, between 1995 and 2009, the RRC was gradually dismantled and renamed DPPC and then DPPA (Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission/Agency), before its powers and responsibility were finally shifted to the Ministry of Agriculture, which set up the Early Warning and Response Directorate (EWRD)⁴. Donors have also sought to diversify the participants in governmental evaluations and the methodologies used. In 2000, multi-agency teams were set up to broaden the range of actors evaluating the annual food aid requirements. Household Economy Approach (HEA) methodologies and nutrition surveys were systematised and specialised support departments set up, such as the Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit (ENCU) in 2001 and the Livelihood Integration Unit (LIU) in 2006. Early Warning Units were also decentralised to the *woreda* and regional levels.
- 9 For a long time, the EWS was seen as over-simplistic, approximate and the cause of inequalities in the distribution of food aid, but today it has become more accurate and diversified. It involves a complex system of institutional interplay and an overlapping of methodologies, all based on the merging of data gathered from peripheral level through to the federal central level. However, it is still largely reliant on governmental data on agro-pastoral deficits, and the reliability of this data is still questionable. Furthermore, although the new methodologies (nutrition or HEA surveys) provide an

accurate picture of samples of the population, when applied to whole geographical areas the results can be approximate.

- 10 Although there is room for improvement, the EWS is still an operational “expert system” (GIDDENS 1991) and a consensual tool among aid partners. As an expert system, the EWS is able to foster in modern institutions the essential trust required for taking global decisions in a delocalised manner. As a tool of consensus, the EWS can also be used as a political arrangement between international agencies and the Ethiopian government, through hard compromises revealing the considerable “negotiating capital” of the latter (WHITFIELD 2009). Obtaining a compromise on the basis of “objective” quantitative evaluations is a key factor in maintaining the influence of institutional donors over food security policies and for maintaining the food aid system. Lastly, in revealing the inadequacies of the government’s agricultural policy, the EWS is a highly sensitive political issue.

The combinatory empiricism of experts

- 11 New methodologies were introduced during the fieldworks conducted between 2002 and 2004 for this study. They clearly indicate that the technical expertise of the EWS was being seriously undermined by the absence of any reliable methodology, and the final results were generally the product of repeated empirical approximations.
- 12 The “multi-agency” evaluation teams were also multi-disciplinary, and composed of five or six Ethiopians from bilateral agencies, the Ethiopian government and NGOs. The evaluations themselves were scheduled to coincide with the *Meher* and *Belg* harvests and their role was to determine the country’s official food aid requirements. In November and June of each year, the teams met with the local administration committees in charge of early warning monitoring in order to compare data on agricultural production and losses in each of the geographical zones concerned. The different stages in the evaluation were based on the different levels of hierarchy in the Ethiopian administration. It was therefore a top-down process, starting at central level in Addis Ababa, then moving down to the region, the zone and finally to the *woreda*. Once the data had been gathered, it would then be merged from the bottom up, starting with the *woreda* and moving up to central level.
- 13 The purpose of these meetings with the administration committees was to reach an agreement on the global number of “beneficiaries” of food aid, calculated on the basis of the year’s agricultural deficits. This exercise, repeated in one *woreda* after another, was part of an already full schedule of briefing/debriefing meetings with each *woreda* and zone committee, as well as visits to each administrative capital, punctuated by endless report writing. As a result, little time was left for data collection in the market place and from the peasants. Therefore, meetings with peasants were often hurried affairs, sometimes no more than a few minutes on the side of the road or through a car window. Consequently, the evaluations were for the most part based on bureaucratic discussions in meetings with committees, written reports and tables of figures. The teams’ role was confined to validating the contents of the *woreda* reports, condensing them into a new report which would then be compiled with reports from every regional administration in the country: and this is what constituted Ethiopia’s annual appeal for international aid.

- 14 This data supplied by the *woreda* teams was itself the product of compilations of weekly and monthly reports sent in by the Ministry of Agriculture's development agents based in the *qebelé*. In the surveys carried out in *qebelé* in the Dehanna *woreda*, it turned out that the data produced by the development agents at source was, at best, the result of a gross visual approximation of the worst affected fields. As for the evaluations by the *woreda*, they consisted in quick visits to evaluate crop yields in a handful of villages. No attempts were made at either level to take proper physical measurements of damaged land; a simple visual estimation of the general state of the crops was used to calculate the percentage of losses. And yet these agents all went on to produce reports containing specific land surface and tonnage figures and very precise percentages. The compilation and revision of these figures formed the basis of both "multi-agency" and FAO evaluations.
- 15 At the briefing/debriefing meetings, most of the members of the multi-agency teams complained repeatedly about the "subjectivity of the methodology" used. They then went on to base their calculations on their own mishmash of FAO *Food Balance Sheets* and socio-economic data inspired by the HEA. To back up their decisions, they drew on a body of past and current data and their own empirical knowledge. At the first briefing in Addis Ababa they had been handed documents by representatives of the DPPC, WFP and FEWS containing data for the previous few years. To revise the data on each *woreda*'s harvest and then negotiate current food aid requirements converted into a number of "beneficiaries", they therefore used three main benchmarks: indicator scenarios, the average of the last five years' data and their empirical observation of the agricultural landscape made during trips out in their cars. At each meeting, the teams dissected the data presented by the *woreda*, looking for errors, over-estimations, oversights and improbabilities in order to eventually come up with a figure consistent with the indicator scenario, the averages and the visual estimations, as well as the results obtained in the other *woreda*.
- 16 The most striking aspect of the EWS measurement tool during the evaluation visits by the "multi-agency" teams was therefore the marked contrast between the unreliable practice of combining methodologies and the absence of physical measurements on the one hand, and the objective-looking, minutely-calculated nature of the final publications of food aid requirements on the other. At the end of the day, this system was allowing the empirical confirmation of an indicator scenario developed during previous visits and using the same processes and approximations, based on the averages of evaluations from previous years. The tool was therefore validating an institutional process that went round in circles, drawing on approximate sources to (re)produce approximations cumulated year after year and serving as the benchmark for new evaluations.
- 17 An analysis of the decision-making processes within the EWS shows that the outcomes of evaluations were in fact the result of haggling—albeit conducted according to formal or imposed modalities—between different groups of actors, i.e. "multi-agency" teams, local authorities and international donors. Decisions were made following a succession of little arrangements, every level in the hierarchy aiming at influencing the direction of aid policy.
- 18 During negotiations with the *woreda* committees, the balance of power was usually tipped towards evaluation team, which was able to dominate its interlocutors with its knowledge of methodologies and of the situation in the *woreda*. However, when it came

to the negotiations with the region, the roles were reversed. The arguments became political and the administrative hierarchy was able to impose its position, whilst complying with the protocol of the negotiations and respecting the expected proportions based on the averages. In mid-November 2002, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, announced the number of food aid “beneficiaries” before the evaluation had even been completed. The regional DPPC’s hierarchy then all tried to persuade our team to upwardly revise the figures in two districts, claiming the existence of “more reliable sources”.

- 19 One method used to artificially inflate the figures and bring them more into line with the official statement was to add the *Belg*-dependant populations likely to be affected in 2003 to the 2002 *Meher*-dependant populations -figures that then had to be deducted following the evaluation of the *Belg* in July 2003 -although the harvests in 2003 and 2004 were anyway much better than in 2002. Once the new Safety Net and Resettlement programmes had been launched, they found themselves in competition with the “free” and emergency food aid programmes. The “multi-agency” team was surprised to discover that certain *woreda* had drastically reduced the quotas of food aid “beneficiaries”. All the experts agreed that orders must have come from Addis Ababa telling the heads of *woreda* administrations to “cut” the food aid figures to avoid this competition with the new programmes. In cases such as these, the experts would be bypassed completely and all their powers in the aid allocation process passed on to senior administrators.
- 20 During the final meetings between donors in Addis-Ababa to consolidate the national data on annual agricultural deficits, any criticism of the shortcomings of the EWS evaluations would be waived aside to move straight on to discussing the amounts and management of the aid due. Although all those involved were aware of the contradictions and methodological inadequacies, the decision-makers had no alternative in fact but to content themselves with approximations if they were to maintain the cooperation essential to preserving the balance in the aid system.

Food aid targeting in the villages

- 21 Once the totals negotiated with the *woreda* had been officially revised and validated, the *woreda* committees would be tasked with establishing the amount of aid to be allocated to each *qebelé*. An allocation would be made to each administrative sub-sector, *deber*, and by village, *gott*, using a basic arithmetical calculation: either an allocation in proportion to the population, or the allocation of an identical number of “beneficiaries” for each village. Calculating how the aid was to be distributed between the *deber* and the *gott* was the responsibility of the members of the *qebelé*’s administrative “cabinet”. As for drawing up the final lists of “beneficiaries”, with the names of the families and the number of “beneficiaries” per family, this was done by the two *gott* chiefs in the course of endless outdoor public meetings with the members of the *qebelé*’s cabinet, the Ministry of Agriculture’s development agents, the different *gott* chiefs and some of the villagers -although last-minute adjustments and modifications were still possible, even on the site or day the food aid was to be distributed.
- 22 The criteria for individual food aid targeting were based essentially on “wealth”, i.e. the number of heads of livestock owned, and on vulnerability criteria. My sources

never mentioned natural disasters or agricultural deficits. Development agents sometimes made visual estimations of land damage or compiled information on ruined crops provided by *gott* chiefs before sending the total to the *woreda* committee, but this data was in fact only ever used for producing EWS figures in bureaucratic spheres and never interfered with the decisions taken locally. In fact there was a clear disconnection between the agronomical criteria for institutional targeting via the EWS and the economic motives that came into play in local targeting. In theory, on the basis of livestock ownership—especially oxen for ploughing the fields—“beneficiaries” were put into categories according to the duration of the aid they were to receive. The number of “beneficiaries” depended on the size of the family, but never went beyond a “quota” of persons per family. Once the *qebelé*’s total “quota” had been met, everybody else could benefit. Just as there were years with good and bad harvests, there were also years with more or less food aid. However, in a setting where there was never enough aid, these criteria were of course always the subject of endless debates and it was impossible to reach an agreement, whether on the order of priority to be given to the most vulnerable (the blind? the elderly? the disabled? single women?), or on ownership (who should be given priority between a family, landless but owning one ox to plough the land, or one with land but no oxen?), or on the intricacies of the separation of property between husband and wife.

- 23 The final lists were drawn up at open-air public meetings where heated discussions could go on until nightfall. During the meetings we attended, the villagers and *gott* and *qebelé* administrators were in very close proximity. The villagers huddled around the secretaries, keeping a careful eye on what was being written down to make sure their name had not been forgotten. This proximity served to guarantee a certain amount of transparency, although the lists could always be changed subsequently. The *gott* chiefs would begin by writing out the lists of “beneficiaries” for their village; these lists were then compiled and read out loud by the Cabinet secretary or the school teacher. This public reading would trigger endless discussions, marked by public interjections - accusations, justifications and explanations about the ownership of assets. These interjections usually began well enough, amidst much joking and laughter.
- 24 But as the day went on, the tension would mount. The women would get to their feet and start shouting to defend their own case, denouncing this or that rich family that had been put on the list or accusing the chief of showing favouritism to his own relatives and friends. During these heated exchanges of accusations, old quarrels and jealousies would rise to the surface and private dramas would be played out in public, sometimes ending in insults, tears and even death threats. Each argument was accompanied by much clamour and such pushing and shoving that the members of the Cabinet had to deal with each case individually and the secretary would eventually confirm the decision. At the end of the day, the lists had been drawn up, but the arguments and the accusations of abusive or unfair allocations would not have been resolved. These public sessions meant the villagers were involved in the allocation process and sometimes managed to get their name on the list, increase the number of “beneficiaries” in their family or even get another family struck off the list. Most of them would end up satisfied, as publically calling for another “beneficiary” to be added to the list usually got the desired result. On the other hand, for anyone who had not been present and had lost out, there was little chance of redress.

- 25 The food aid distribution we attended in the *woreda* town of Amdework was organised to cover four or five *qebelé* at once and took a whole day. The site was set up on a piece of land just opposite the tents where the stocks of food aid had been kept since the WFP lorries had delivered it. The *woreda* administration and ORDA, an Ethiopian NGO, were in charge. At the end of the morning, after much carrying and endless counting and recounting, the sacks of grain and lentils, and containers of oil had been split between the *qebelé*. The distribution could begin. With each *gott* chief, the chief of the *qebelé* read out the names of “beneficiaries” by groups of about ten who then divided up the contents of the sacks on a piece of old sacking that had been lain on the ground. The crowd rapidly quickly split into tiny groups, which concentrated on counting and dividing up the grain one cup at a time.
- 26 Lots were drawn for who should keep the sacks once they were empty. Then the buyers arrived from town. They were sent by the shopkeepers to buy up the oil or the lentils. With the cash they had just been paid, the peasants immediately set about buying coffee, salt, sugar or sewing thread from the stalls that had sprung up around the distribution site. The elders sold part of their share to hire a donkey to carry their sack home or to pay someone to keep their sack overnight if the distribution didn’t finish until late afternoon. Sometimes it went on to the next day. The organisation of the distribution followed a well-oiled routine, under close surveillance and control. There was no more arguing about the lists as the final decisions had been taken at the last public meeting, but sometimes the Cabinet chiefs would add a few dozen “beneficiaries” to the official “quota”, under the pretext that there had been omissions or mistakes when the public lists were drawn up. They would take the equivalent of cupful from every sack distributed for these “last-minute beneficiaries”.
- 27 This explains why people believed these chiefs to be corrupted or that allocations were being made to friends and families or the “rich”. This belief was partly founded: I was told about *qebelé* chiefs who were removed from office for misappropriation and learnt in private interviews that aid was being allocated in defiance of livestock ownership criteria. The allocation and arbitration “committees” set up at the initiative of the NGO Save the Children had had almost no effect, as they were mostly made up of members of the Cabinet or village chiefs, like most of the other “committees” or “associations” in the *qebelé*. Individual complaints were rarely successful, as confronting the members of the Cabinet or lodging a complaint with the courts or the *woreda* called for much time, energy and courage, as well as oratory skills for pleading the case in public and contacts in the right places.
- 28 On the other hand, the allocation of food aid was accompanied by a series of implicit conditions from which no-one was exempt, such as the payment of property taxes, participation in Food for Work programmes, attendance at the *qebelé*’s public meetings and repayment of loans from the *woreda*. Between 2002 and 2004, with the change in aid policy, “beneficiary” registration conditions became much tougher. Food aid was restricted to those able to take part in collective work programmes, excluding *de facto* the sick, the elderly, the disabled or expectant mothers. Food aid was in the hands of the administrative hierarchy, and there was little recourse in the event of a dispute. The village chiefs and the *qebelé* cabinet together formed the membership of all the committees and associations, and were all members of the party in power, the EPRDF—the only party in Wag Hemra at the time. A quick look at their family tree shows that most of them were descendants of the former ruling classes (*Grañ* ‘*ezhmach*’, *Qeñ* ‘

ezhmach', *Ch'qa Ch'um'* or *Qés*) during the reign of Haile Selassie, or even under the *Derg*. Consequently, not only was aid helping to keep the same people in power, it was helping inequality to put down even deeper roots.

- 29 At the end of the day, distributing aid to all economic categories and reducing the number of “beneficiaries” or rations undermined the impact of food security targeted by food aid and the EWS. However, this also contributed towards maintaining the local social equilibrium, strengthening the control of the existing administrative hierarchy on the one hand and social cohesion on the other.

Conclusion

- 30 The findings of this investigation on the EWS carry out a succession of adjustments and readjustments to the figures that are repeated at every level of the decision-making hierarchy. The diversity and segmentation of the groups involved in the evaluation process make it possible to maintain areas of uncertainty and make any incoherencies disappear in the final publications of the figures. This serves to stabilise a global international aid system composed of heterogeneous groups and underpinned by multifarious issues. The resulting figures are a combination of the application of objective food security principles and the consensus formed along non-egalitarian negotiations and the shared interests of the stakeholders. The compilation and “justification” work carried out by the “experts” plays a crucial role in maintaining the trust that is essential to the smooth running of the food aid system. Their professional seal of approval and “laundering” of recycled data ensures that international decision-makers will accept the figures presented to them at face-value. But the mishmash of methodologies and ubiquitous practices, consisting in transforming specific cases into general truths, does not produce reliable evaluations of the detailed situation in each *qebelé*: they simply determine broad trends in the different agro-climatic zones. These approximations explain why certain pockets of food insecurity go undetected. In any case, the EWS offers only the pretence of accuracy, bending down in front of the political stakes behind the figures.
- 31 There is clearly a gulf between the EWS’ bureaucratic conception of food aid distribution and the way it is actually allocated in the villages, where power relationships are cloaked in science and kept out of sight of the experts. Aid originally intended to compensate for food deficits and provide assistance to vulnerable families has become aid based on strict ownership criteria and demanding compliance with collective obligations and, to some extent, on the ability of individuals to justify their needs before the rest of their community. In the villages, the conditions for obtaining food aid are becoming woven into the existing network of social obligations, to which the peasant is subjected.
- 32 The power games played by the *qebelé* administrators during the aid allocation process are yet another means for them to exercise control over the population. As power is locally represented by the members of the *qebelé*’s Cabinet—descendants of the ruling classes, representatives of the current government (*mengist*), as well as members of the majority party, aid becomes a factor sustaining this power, and hence an election issue. Similarly, within a ruling system where hierarchical relations are all, senior administrators, members of the majority party, simply issue orders to the experts to revise the EWS figures, in order to bring them into line of the aid directives issued in

Addis Ababa. Food aid and the EWS—its scientific corollary—thus contribute towards the social and political control exerted by the authorities: the experts are controlled by their hierarchy and the villagers are controlled by the *qebelé*.

- 33 Finally, this case study on the EWS in the Wello, Wag Hemra and Oromyia zones of the Amhara Region suggests that state power (*mengēst*) in Ethiopia is performed through both formal structures—like hierarchical administrative devices and official rules—and more informal influential networks. From the weaknesses of international and national administrations, to the local distribution sites in the remote villages of the country, these EWS networks incarnate a form of interstitial power, sneaking into the gaps of food aid targeting. Far from achieving their initial goals in terms of food security, these measurement tools rather implement a more and more unpopular state control in the rural areas of Ethiopia.

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FOOTNOTES

1. See FAO's website (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, <http://www.fao.org>, consulted in July 2013).
2. The Food Balance Sheet puts in balance the food availability with consumer needs.
3. The Productive Safety Net Programme aimed to build the assets and increase the income of around 8 million "beneficiaries" through targeted contributions of food, money and agricultural packages. The resettlement programme organised the transfer of almost 3 million affected people to more fertile areas. See PANKHURST and PIGUET, 2009.
4. The EWRD is then included within the Disaster Management and Food Security Sector (DRMFSS).

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From Individual Food Security to National Food Self-Sufficiency: The Ethiopian Way, its Impact and some Future Scenarios

René Lefort

p. 395-411

- 1 Ethiopia is one of the countries in the world most affected by food insecurity. In 2011, the Global Hunger Index ranked it 77th out of 81 countries¹. In 2012, it stood number 100 out of 105 countries on the Global Food Security Index.² Poverty and food insecurity obviously go hand-in-hand. It is generally assumed that 90% of the poor in Ethiopia live in the rural areas (SPIELMAN 2011), where they represent 39% of the rural population, whose majority consists in smallholders—60% of the farms count less than one hectare (DAVIS 2010)—and an increasing number of landless peoples.
- 2 They have four main ways of feeding themselves: firstly, by producing more, which is difficult because of the small size of farm plots, low productivity, low market development, due in particular to poor infrastructures, and land shortage exacerbated by demographic growth; secondly, by supplementing their insufficient production by buying food with earnings from agricultural employment and/or non-farm activities. However, the absence of large farms minimises the first option, and non-farm activities, particularly cottage industries, remain very rare. The third option is aid in food or cash. This is the role of the Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Programme (DRMFSP). It covers the Household Asset Building Programme (HABP),³ but above all emergency aid in the event of food shocks and the Productive Safety Net Programme, which reaches almost 8 million chronically food insecure people. Its role is primarily to transfer cash or food to prevent household asset depletion as a result of shocks and to create community assets through collective initiatives (MoARD 2010). With its annual budget of around \$400 million, it is the second largest programme of this kind in Africa. The fourth way proposed to food insecure households is to join a resettlement programme.

- 3 Since it came to power in 1991, the Ethiopian regime has consistently assigned the eradication of poverty as its supreme economic goal. The ruling coalition of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary and Democratic Front (EPRDF) is still assuming that economic growth, and primarily an increase in agricultural production, offered the only sustainable solution. The DRFMSP was perceived as a temporary solution, to be phased out over time.. The primary focus of this article, therefore, is the relationship between this economic strategy and food insecurity, especially amongst the “poor farmers” and the growing number of landless people. Here, we will restrict ourselves to its starting point in the early 1990s, and its arrival point today, without lingering on the intermediate stages (MoFED 2000, 2002, 2006).
- 4 This article first looks into the regime’s U-turn in the early 2000s, and examines the interwoven economic and political background to that U-turn. Previously, the goal had been to achieve food security primarily at individual level. Each of the small farmers was supposed to feed themselves better by increasing its own production mainly through its own labour (a self-centred, “hand to mouth” strategy). Now, however, the goal is to achieve national food self-sufficiency through a market driven strategy at national and international level, based mainly on advances in the upper group of farmers and new mechanised farms (“land leasing” mostly to foreign investors), whereas the food insecure are expected to escape this insecurity through forthcoming new farm and non-farm employment, or through their own small businesses. Then, this article attempts to briefly assess the public action’s impact to tackle food insecurity, as observed by the author in a rural *kebele* in the Amhara region over the last ten years. It finally sketches two possible scenarios for the near future.

From “subsistence agriculture”...

- 5 Shortly after it took power, the EPRDF set an economic strategy that was unusual in two respects. The aim of Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI) was to make agriculture the basis of overall development. “The medium to long-term target is to reduce the *absolute* size of the food insecure rural population substantially” (MoFED 2000: 9). The path to achieving this, restated in 2010, was also unusual:

“For some countries, economic growth is the primary policy goal, and poverty reduction is to be achieved through measures complementary to growth. This is not the approach of the Ethiopian government. Poverty reduction is the core objective of the Ethiopian government. Economic growth is the principal, but not the only, means to this objective” (MoFED 2000: i).
- 6 The goal was therefore to go *directly* to the core of the problem. The rallying cry of this strategy was a “broad-based growth process involving smallholder farmers” (MoFED 2000: 7), in other words the target for state action (PRSP 2000) was each smallholder farmer, individually and collectively.
- 7 The first objective was to increase their own production through their own efforts, by working their own land harder for their own consumption (“hand to mouth” strategy, see below). Additional monetary income (mainly non-farm employment and non-farm activities) and increased aid (food and/or cash) were considered secondary.
- 8 From this first perspective, increasing production by market mechanisms (including more cash crops) and an expanded private sector role, were only secondary objectives, and entry into world markets was perceived no more than a necessary corollary.

“The extremely small ratio of urbanization of the country could well raise market outlet as a critical issue due to inadequacy of domestic demand, thereby making exports a necessity. Part of (the agricultural) production has to be oriented towards exports” (MoFED 2000: 8).

- 9 This production surplus would come primarily from intensifying the mobilisation of the existing workforce. “Our rural development strategy is... not dependent on capital and technology. It aims to use land with intensive labour”.⁴ However, the authorities introduced a large-scale programme to widen and increase the use of inputs—through “packages” (fertiliser, selected seeds, etc., see KIDANEMARIAM 2011)—and to spread the corresponding technologies. In this process, the Agricultural Extension Programme, with its Development Agents (DA) and its Farming Training Centres, was to play a key role. But again “the financial resources allocated by the government and donors should only complement the capacity of our farmers”.⁵
- 10 The development path to follow was thus primarily “endogenous”, or “self-centred”. Self-centred at individual level: each “subsistence farmer” increases his own production with his own resources mainly, until he can fully feed his own family; self-centred at community level: each community does collective work (“development work”, later “social work”), essentially with its own resources, to increase its own assets; and finally, self-centred at national level, since international trade was not considered as a major driving force of economic growth.
- 11 The continuity with the TPLF’s economic strategy and “peasant revolution” prior to taking power, influenced by the “Maoist” or “Albanian” heritage, with its motto of “self-reliance”, is obvious (AREGAWI BERHE 2009, YOUNG 1997). In formal terms, the decision-making body within the basic community unit—the *kebele*—was the Peasant Association, where “poor farmers” were obviously in a large majority. This was the group, particularly its younger members, which the regime targeted, as it did during the armed struggle, to the detriment of the traditional rural elite, whether the better-off fringe of smallholders, mostly dispossessed by the regime’s agrarian reform, and/or the “elders”, amongst whom this elite was over represented (AREGAWI BERHE 2009: 230). For the regime, these “poor farmers” also constituted its natural and inevitable political power base. It believed that this base would become even stronger, and therefore enduring, if the regime’s actions helped it to escape quickly from the depths of poverty.
- 12 Meles Zenawi was certain that this approach would succeed. As recently as 2001, he described his mid-term vision of peasant-workers living a sort of rural idyll, the resources of their labour in the fields (however small), and “agro-processing sectors” providing them with access to a “chic and modern” standard of living (PAULOS MILKIAS 2003: 51).

...to “farming as a business”

- 13 The authorities considered the results obtained sufficiently encouraging to predict, in 2000, that their projects to address food deficit households would result in the majority of the population achieving food security on their own by 2007 (MoFED 2000).
- 14 The great drought of 2002-03 and consequently a deep food shortage came as a reality check: In 2001, an internal TPLF crisis had culminated in a massive purge, including the

expulsion of its “*left wing*”, headed by some of the Front’s historic figures. They were blamed for the strategy and the resulting failure: “the goal was ensuring food security ... detached the farmer from commercialisation”.⁶ Furthermore:

“The sustainability of agricultural development in our country calls for the termination of hand to mouth or subsistence production and entry into an agricultural system which is led by the world market. From this perspective we have to create a climate for rural agricultural business... Thus, the extension system will focus on supporting farmers to produce for the market instead of helping them continue as before”.⁷

- 15 The second major political shock took place at the 2005 elections, with a totally unexpected opposition surge. In the rural areas, the traditional elites,⁸ were in the vanguard of this surge and, playing the role of opinion leaders, successfully carried millions of “poor farmers” with them (LEFORT 2007). The development strategy, including the path towards food security, underwent a paradigm shift. It would evolve into the current Growth and Transformation Plan 20010/11-20014/15 (MoFED 2010).
- 16 In short, although ADLI remained the credo of development, it would seem—if we cut through the ambiguities of official documents—that the driving force of development has changed. “It is necessary to gradually transform the economic base from agriculture to industry” explained Meles Zenawi,⁹ though emphasising the need “to maintain agriculture as a major source of economic growth”. It needed to become “modern and productive with enhanced technology”. In addition, “Ethiopia has no choice except employing free market economy in the time of globalization”. To survive, it must “insert itself into the mercilessly global competition”. Otherwise, it will “fall down” (EPRDF 2006). Hence the priority now assigned to the entities and economic actors most inserted in the market (the “new entrepreneurs”), the constant injunction for an expanded private sector, the objective of increasing exports (target: 30% to 34% of Growth Transformation Plan (GTP) in 2015 compared with 10% in 2010). This would require colossal investment, especially private growth: almost 1000 billion Ethiopian birr, i.e. almost US\$60 billion in 5 years, for which international investments should be decisive.¹⁰
- 17 The regime breaks with its original economic policy. Industry versus agriculture; concentration on the most “capitalistic sectors” versus “broad based development”, in other words the “new entrepreneurs” (in the countryside: the rural elite, massively promoted to “model farmers”) versus “poor farmers”; technology and capital versus human force; world market versus self-centred, etc.
- 18 For agriculture, “smallholders’ agriculture will continue to be the major source of agricultural growth” (MoFED 2010: 20), and the production target—a more than doubling in five years—remains in line with previous plans. But whereas in the 1990s, agriculture was to go directly to feed the peasant producer wherever he was (“hand to mouth”), now the “fundamentals of the (agricultural) strategy include the shift to produce high value crops, a special focus on high-potential areas, facilitating the commercialization of agriculture, supporting the development of large-scale commercial agriculture where it is feasible” (MoFED 2010: 8).¹¹
- 19 This agricultural growth would come essentially from a particular segment of producers, products and geographical areas. There would be three primary focal areas:
 - “to help farmers to graduate from subsistence farming to semi-subsistence/semi-commercial status, practising farming as a business”, so as “to intensify

- marketable farm products—both for domestic and export markets” (MoFED 2010: 8), particularly “high value crops”.
- to do this, there would be a need for “improved agricultural technologies” (MoFED 2010: 20).
 - “to realize this, the extension system will be strengthened” (idem) and there would be a massive injection of finance.
- 20 In this perspective, the “poor farmers” would cease to be the principal actors of agricultural growth, or its main direct beneficiaries, or the primary recipients of public support. They are sidelined. The rural elite would now play this triple role, mainly in the most promising areas “where the investment is likely to generate the best returns” (MoARD 2010).
- 21 “We have devised a plan which will enable us to... be able to feed ourselves by 2015 without the need for food aid”, declared Meles Zenawi.¹² So, the goal of food security by and for each peasant was replaced by the goal of national food self-sufficiency. But how would the millions of food insecure be able to get enough to eat?
- 22 The first answer is that the productivity of “poor farmers” would be increased by “the transfer (to them) of improved agricultural technologies... tested by model farmers” (MoFED 2010: 20). So two major obstacles would have to be overcome. Do the “packages” fit the needs and resources of the poorest peasants? Will this transfer be really done by the “model farmers” and, secondarily, by the Development Agents?
- 23 The Food Security Programme (FSP) (MoFED 2010: 23) as such takes up less than one page of the GTP document’s 85 pages. It will be concentrated in the “moisture deficit areas” because they are the centres of “food insecurity problems”. The only thing new in the document is the implicit recognition that there is no future in farming for the rural food insecure, i.e.:
- “those who have very small plots and landless youth and women... (They) will be encouraged to engage in non-farm income generating activities with adequate support in terms of preparing packages, provision of skill and business management trainings, provision of credit and facilitating markets, so that they can ensure their food security”.
- 24 For the rest, since the FSP had started to “yield results”, three of its components (Household Asset Building, resettlement, emergency assistance) would simply be maintained. As regards the main component of the FSP, the Productive Safety Net Programme, “the objective is to reorient and reduce its size as quickly as circumstances allow”, the key issue being “to accelerate the rate of graduation of the chronically food insecure” (MoARD 2010: 21). However, during its first five years, only 56,895 households graduated (MoARD 2009: 8).
- 25 Budgetary planning highlights this drastic change in priorities. Out of the more than US\$15 billion required in agriculture over the next 10 years, 51% would go towards “to help farmers... practicing farming as a business” as compared with 21% to the DRMFSP, “a major departure from the historical pattern of expenditure which has seen the bulk of expenditure directed towards the DRMFSP” (MoARD 2010: 25). For example, in the three years preceding the launch of the GTP, 60% of spending by the MoARD went to the DRMFSP (idem).
- 26 Implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, all the documents show that the development strategy no longer directly targets the most vulnerable population, but that the improvement in their lot is expected to come indirectly from favourable consequences

of economic growth driven by other actors and sectors. There is a complete about-turn from the views promulgated until 2002, when it was denied that “poverty reduction is to be achieved through measures complementary to growth”. It is primarily expected from the most advanced sectors within and outside agriculture, mainly “the micro and small enterprises sector, which is the most important sub-sector towards employment generation” (MoFED 2010: 27).

- 27 In a sharp break with the focus and ambition of previous planning documents and with the presumption of earlier declarations, these later documents acknowledge that “it is unlikely that full food security can be achieved” even in 2020 (PIF), by impotence: “We can’t afford to give new technology to all of the 12 million rural households in Ethiopia”,¹³ or fatalism: in the era of the market, it is inevitable that “those who take advantage of it will prosper, and the rest will lose mercilessly” (EPRDF 2006).
- 28 This shift in economic priorities from the “poor farmers” to the “new entrepreneurs” / “model farmers”, ie the peasant elite, is concomitant with a major political U-turn, consistent with this new market-driven approach. In contrast with the dictatorship and economic regression of its predecessor, the new regime had initially sought to found its legitimacy primarily in a democratisation process. Thus, in the countryside, the old rural elite, overrepresented in these positions under the *Derg* (hence its nickname *birokrasi*), was uncompromisingly purged and publicly pilloried, while the EPRDF’s recruitment and appointment to posts of local responsibility focused on the youth. However, in the political “opening-up” preceding the 2005 elections, this elite recaptured its former opinion leading role, and used it to spearhead the opposition. A large number of “poor farmers” followed it (LEFORT 2007).
- 29 So, after 2005, the EPRDF dropped its quest for legitimacy through democratisation to build it on a fast economic growth, led by these “new entrepreneurs”. So the rural elite was restored to its place at the heart of both the economic and the political process. It finally received the nod to get rich as fast as possible, the EPRDF betting that in return it will rally to the regime to form the party’s new power base. In the political sphere too, the “poor farmers” were sidelined.

At grassroots level

“The biggest challenge facing (the successive development strategies) is that the well-intended high-level ambitions described in the documents are not translated into concrete actions on the ground” (GATES 2010: 21).

- 30 The author of this article has conducted during the last ten years a series of surveys in a rural *kebele* in the Amhara region, in North Shoa, focusing on the relationship between farmers and local authorities, and its impact on economic change. This *kebele* has a population of around seven thousand, slightly under one third of whom live in a village on a major road, but nine tenths of the working population continues to be employed in agriculture (LEFORT 2005, 2007, 2010).
- 31 Below is a summary of some of the main features relating to food security in this *kebele*, very largely corroborated by other field studies¹⁴.

i)

- 32 The local authorities themselves acknowledge a rise in poverty, without being able to give precise figures or to say whether it is relative or absolute. It naturally impacts small farmers, many single women households and vulnerable people, but the hardest hit are the “jobless”, defined as people without a full-time job, and the increasingly numerous landless. There is no way of knowing to what extent the jobless and landless categories overlap. The authorities set the figure for the former at 600, slightly under 20% of the working-age population (a little over 3000 people) and for the latter also at 600 (as against 1,133 land tax payers), though they are unable to give a source for these figures. A survey conducted by an official in one of the sub-*kebele*, where the entire population is agricultural (apart from 4 primary school teachers), gave a figure of 35% for the proportion of the working-age population with no enough means of living, across all ages.

ii)

- 33 The young are particularly affected, particularly males. A local official gave a figure of 500 for the number of “jobless” in this *kebele* aged 18-35. In a preliminary survey conducted by the author, the provisional and approximate figures showed a near-total absence of independent source of sufficient income (land or work) for 50% of this same age group (35% for women and 80% for men).

iii)

- 34 This pauperisation is primarily explained by:
- demographic growth and land shortage, which means that many young people inherit no land or too little to live from;
 - jobs with “rich” farmers are too few and occasional to provide more than a small supplementary income;
 - stable non-farming jobs account for at most 5% of the working population (excluding public employees);
 - the most vulnerable farmers fall into the debt trap following a shock, and have no choice but to give up all or part of their land via rental and/or sharecropping agreements, which leaves them with few or no assets and even greater vulnerability.
- 35 As a result, the poorest social group—a mix of the poorest farmers and ‘*lumpenproletariat*’—is growing. The two most striking manifestations of this pauperisation are emigration (Arabic countries) and the recent phenomenon—on mornings during periods of big agricultural activity—of hundred-strong crowds of people waiting for work as day labourers.

iv)

- 36 The vast majority of the population has benefited, to varying degrees, from public action upstream and downstream of agricultural production (schools, health,

infrastructures, market opportunities, etc.),¹⁵ but its direct impact on the increase of agricultural production, and thus poverty reduction, has been deeply unequal.

- 37 The Agricultural Extension Programme has not played its expected role, not only for the upper group of farmers (LEFORT 2012) but especially for “poor farmers”. Its acknowledged deficiencies include the preference the Development Agents give to farmers likely to benefit the most and the Programme’s frequent failure to help the most vulnerable farmers. The latter say that they do not have the money they need to implement the methods recommended in the training and that the DAs cannot provide the associated material support. “It’s not for us” is their terse assessment of the Programme. Community “social work”, compulsory on average one day a week, is experienced as a chore that farmers avoid as far as possible, often botch and that achieves results that fall far short of the objectives. Proportionally, the burden weighs most heavily on “poor farmers” and the landless, because their vulnerability obliges them to do what they are told and they very rarely get the exemptions granted to the upper group of farmers. Neither the authorities nor the DAs feel any responsibility for the stagnation, not to say the pauperisation, of “poor farmers”, blaming them entirely for having failed to adopt the production improvement measures that they promulgate and of whose efficacy they are convinced.
- 38 All requests for emergency or continuing aid via the FSP have been rejected, with the authorities pointing to the good official production figures.¹⁶ Local initiatives to find jobs for these young people have only helped a few dozen of them, and only in the village.

v)

- 39 The upper group of farmers has experienced an extremely rapid economic rise, accompanied by the restoration of their political primacy and the reaffirmation of their higher social status.
- 40 It has been able to take full advantage of the new market opportunities, to increase its production of cash crops substantially.
- 41 It underwent a total political rehabilitation immediately after the 2005 elections (LEFORT 2010).
- 42 Apart from their individual qualities (education, entrepreneurship) and their social capital, this group has gained privileged access to agricultural inputs, being specifically targeted by the local authorities to increase the latter’s likelihood of achieving their set production targets, a must for career advancement. In particular, the group has been able to extend its crop area substantially through rental and/or sharecropping agreements with elderly people, women household heads, the disabled and, increasingly, with “poor farmers” who have fallen into the debt trap. The outcome is increasing concentration of land use, which is rapidly erasing the relative egalitarianism that followed the last land redistribution (1997).¹⁷

vi)

- 43 Despite the ritual invocation of the importance of participation, government action is strictly top-down in its purpose and methods, authoritarian in its execution, and

supply driven, in the sense that it is more guided by assigned targets than by citizen demand. This conduct is clearly consistent with the fact that the goals and methods of this process are totally embedded in the political principles and activities of the Party. It has now swallowed up the State. The population defines the power as such, the Party, the State and all their members under a single term: the *mengist*. But the relations between *mengist* and population remain relations of subordination, increasingly intrusive by extending down to hamlet level, partly by historical legacy and partly because “communist engineering” (BAYART 2008) continues to steer Party activities. Which is why, the vast majority of the population maintains an attitude of forced submission allied with defiance and detachment vis-à-vis the local authorities, including vis-à-vis their developmental action.

- 44 Beyond the obvious deepening of economic inequalities,¹⁸ we are therefore seeing the emergence—recent, embryonic but tangible—of what might be called “antagonism” between two polarised classes. On one side are the members of the *mengist* and, more and more, members of the rural elite, ‘*kulaks*’, increasingly bound together by simple social proximity, by the reciprocal material advantages they enjoy and by the social status they acquire. On the other side are the vulnerable, poor farmers and the landless, who are not only unanimous in feeling that they have been abandoned to their fate, but even, for a growing number of poor farmers, that this abandonment is implicitly sought by the *mengist*-rural elite alliance, so that the latter can steadily grab what remaining land they still hold.

A blurred picture

- 45 It is very difficult to reach a reliable assessment of the evolution of the food security, and even more of the impact of the public action in this regard. The statistics are open to doubt, in particular because they are obviously hard to establish in a country like Ethiopia, but also because the criteria used to establish them vary over time and between sources. For example, until the introduction of a procedure for harmonising estimated agricultural production figures, production volumes could vary by up to 20% depending on who was doing the measuring, that is, Central Statistical Agency (CSA) or FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions: that is the difference between a good and a bad harvest. Moreover, the effects of climate change make historical comparisons even more difficult.
- 46 The Food Poverty Headcount¹⁹ fell from slightly over 50% in the early 90s to 34% in 2010/11 (MoFED 2012). Ethiopia is one of the seven countries that made the most progress between 1990 and 2011 according to the Global Hunger Index. In both cases, the improvement is around a third.
- 47 According to EN-DAT, the International Disaster Database,²⁰ the food crisis following the great drought of 1973 affected 3 million people, i.e. around 12% of the population; the 1984 crisis, 19%; the 2003 crisis, 19%. Today, if we add together the chronically food insecure, supported by the PSNP, and those needing emergency aid, we get a figure of almost 12 million, i.e. 14% of the population (WALTA 2012). However, other sources give higher figures, for example 22% in 2009 (DESSALEGN RAHMATO 2011). “A population of six to seven million chronically food insecure, and up to 13 million seasonally food

insecure” (GATES 2010 p.16). On the basis of government statistics, one expert points to a “worsening trend” (DESSALEGN RAHMATO 2011: 48).

- 48 Grain production (cereals, legumes and pulses) (CSA various years) rose from around 7 million tonnes in the early 90s, i.e. roughly 130kg/pers/year, to 213 kg/pers/year in 2007/08, “which is close to meeting the minimum 2100 kcal/day minimum standard” (MoARD: 3).²¹ Current annual production officially stands at more than 23 million tonnes (a tripling in two decades), i.e. more than 270 kg/pers/year (idem) and more than double what it was some 20 years ago. In the light of these figures, Ethiopian should already be food self-sufficient. However, it remains a net importer of cereals, importing more than a million tonnes a year (2010), at a growing cost (almost half a billion US dollars in 2011).²²
- 49 However, a further factor radically alters these figures: “annual losses of up to 30 per cent post-harvest due to inappropriate collection, transport, storage, pest control etc” (MoARD: 10). There had been previous passing mentions of losses, but nothing to suggest such a high figure. If it is accurate, the previous figures would need to be entirely revised, and real availability of grain crops would stand at 190 kg/pers/year, below the required minimum.
- 50 From 2004, used as the base year because it followed a period of severe drought and marks the start of the official boom in agricultural production, and up to 2011 inclusive, the Consumer Price Index grew by 315%.²³ During the same period, the prices of the main cereals consumed by the population—maize, sorghum, *teff* and wheat—grew respectively by 388%, 414%, 394% and 448%.²⁴ There is no way to explain why inflation on these food products would have grown markedly faster than general inflation if, over the same period, their production per head had virtually doubled.
- 51 So the data available on food insecurity trends do not give a precise picture, and in fact even lead to contradictory conclusions. This is also attributable to clear government interference in the establishment of certain data. For example, until 2003, the authorities exaggerated the number of chronically or temporarily undernourished people, to put pressure on donors. By contrast, they subsequently understated them, mainly to show the success of their economic policy (*Christian Science Monitor* 2012, ENTEN 2007, LEFORT 2009, WEISSMAN 2003).

Conclusion: possible scenarios

- 52 What could be the prospects for food security in Ethiopia under the two most common foreseen scenarios?
- 53 In the case of agriculture, which has the most direct relevance to food insecure populations, if present trends continue (mainly population growth, yields, cultivated area) “per capita cereal production could decline by 28 percent by 2025... (This) could leave millions more Ethiopians exposed to hunger and undernourishment” (FUNK *et al.* 2012: 5). With the same trends, “food insecurity could climb to over 50 million people, reducing GDP per farming household by nearly 20 percent by 2020” (GATES 2010: 17). To avoid this scenario, some experts and organisations, such as the international financial institutions, are urging a reduction in government intervention and a full embrace of market mechanisms. “Ethiopia could increase agricultural GDP per smallholder by 95 percent by 2025 through a new trajectory of growth” (GATES 2010: 17), in particular by

raising productivity, placing a further 8 to 10 million hectares under cultivation, irrigating 5 million hectares and increasing private sector involvement (GATES 2010). Indeed, “while Ethiopia has an admirable record of supporting agriculture, its state-led policies have now outlived their usefulness” (SPIELMAN 2010). It is therefore the central role of the State in the economy (the “developmental state”) that is in question and, beyond that, the authoritarianism of the Party, which has become identified with the State. Beyond the technical, financial and institutional problems, “most of all, the farmers in Ethiopia need to be able to make decisions, voice demand, and play a part in developing extension’s priorities and evaluating its outcomes—in short, they need empowerment” (DAVIS 2010: 11). The ‘disempowerment’ of the peasantry is “responsible to a large extent for the failure of agrarian progress” (DESSALEGN RAHMATO 2009: 22). Thus, “the issue of trust between government and community” is crucial (SPIELMAN 2008: 26).

- 54 But in this “liberal” view, the foreseen perspectives largely deal with the global levels of production, and almost entirely omit its distribution. In other words, even if this liberal turn would led to a major increase in the food production and thus to a national food self sufficiency, its champions don’t prove that this would simultaneously lead to a significant decline in the number of food insecure households. Their solutions are aimed at the most enterprising and best resourced economic actors. They are virtually silent about the ways and means that will enable the millions of food insecure, beginning with the landless, to escape their fate in the market economy that they promulgate, within the specific conditions of Ethiopia.
- 55 This “liberal” position is not the one of those that, on the opposite, considers that Ethiopia’s ‘*developmental state*’ shares the main features of a pattern of ‘*developmental patrimonialism*’, which they consider as an optimum political arrangement for the promotion of sustained growth (VAUGHAN 2011). Then, “rents are centralised and leaders take a long-term approach to rent maximisation. The state may retain patrimonial characteristics, but is more likely to be broadly developmental”. Most often, the countries concerned have “a single or dominant party system”, experience showing that “during democratic periods, economic rationality appears to get overwhelmed by short-run political considerations”. If Ethiopia would follow this path, “high growth is likely to continue” (VAUGHAN 2011: 22).
- 56 But, in Ethiopia, this developmental patrimonialism would remain operational under a number of conditions, which one cannot taken for sure they will be fulfilled. Among others:
- -The leadership should not evolve towards a “non-developmental kleptocracy” (VAUGHAN 2011: 8). On one hand, the concentration of wealth in the hands of the politico-economical elite seems obvious, and the corruption is rising.²⁵ On the other hand, the regime has so far repeatedly and patently demonstrates its commitment “*to take a long-term approach to rent maximisation*” (VAUGHAN 2011: 7) in order to sustain a high growth.
 - -The bureaucracy must show “the ability and willingness to say “no” when political leaders wish to embark on impractical or otherwise ill-advised schemes” (VAUGHAN 2011: 16). The dual legacy of Ethiopian culture’s acute sense of hierarchy and of the “communist engineering” that continues to mould the Party, to which almost all civil servants belong, could make this requirement hard to meet.

- -This developmental pattern must be inclusive. But the “revolutionary elite” that emerged from the struggle against the *Derg*, essentially from Tigray, continues to be overrepresented in powerful—political, economic, military or security—institutions at the national and para-state levels. Is it willing and able to smoothly broaden its base, including by integrating the private entrepreneurial elite? If not, the marginalisation of the private sector, national and international, could continue, while the key to success of the GTP—and its Achilles heel—is massive private sector investment. The food insecure—poor farmers or landless—would be among the first losers, since the main outlet that the Plan offers them is to obtain jobs that the private sector would be the first to create in large number.
 - -Any long-term action requires stability. The regime could perpetuate its ascendancy by enlarging and consolidating its political base, i.e. the middle class, including the “new entrepreneurs”, both urban and rural, and focusing its activity there for the growth and benefits that the middle class would get. This seems to be the path followed by the GTP. The major consequence for these food insecure populations is the risk of being abandoned and/or left at the mercy of these “new entrepreneurs”. Poor farmers are an example. The goodwill of the upper group of farmers in passing on their knowledge is the main route to progress implicitly offered them in the Plan, but in reality the pauperisation of the poor farmers is de facto enabling the upper group to expand their assets.
- 57 But even if these conditions are met, and if this ‘developmental patrimonialism’ would continue to nurture a high growth (the GTP aims to double agricultural production within five years), it does mean that it will simultaneously led to a drop in the food insecurity. It has since now shows contradictory outcomes in this regard. And now it doesn’t put the food security as one of its highest priorities.
- 58 In any case, whether the path followed will be ‘developmental patrimonialism’ or ‘liberalisation’, the conception of development that the current leadership promotes and the concrete form that it takes, which have up to now been inseparable from and subordinate to its political agenda, will determine the economic future of Ethiopia, as well as its future trends in food insecurity.

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FOOTNOTES

1. <http://www.ifpri.org/publication.2011-global-hunger-index>, consulted in July 2013.
2. <http://foodsecurityindex.eiu.com/Index>, consulted in July 2013.
3. The HABP has to ensure that “households are able to diversify their income sources and increase productive assets” (SPIELMAN 2011).
4. MELES ZENAWI, “Gingema Papers”, quoted in PAULOS MILKIAS 2003: 13–66.
5. Idem.
6. See EPRDF 2006. It is generally assumed that Meles Zenawi himself drafted this document.
7. Extract of Meles Zenawi’s address to the Ethiopian Federal Parliament, October 16, 2003.
8. This upper group of farmers had been quite successful in maintaining its social ascendancy during the *Derg*. Although it was the victim of a highly egalitarian agrarian reform in 1975, it rose naturally to local administration posts instituted by the *Derg* (DESSALEGN RAHMATO 2009: 16).
9. See ENA 2006.
10. See Ken Ohashi, the World Bank Representative for Ethiopia and Sudan (AF 2011).
11. This is a process known as “land leasing” and as “land grabbing” by its detractors.
12. See AFP 2010. It should be noted that the meeting of this target had been promised by Meles himself or other leaders for years.
13. Esayas Kebede, Head of the Agricultural Investment Agency, see REUTERS 2009.
14. See BEVAN 2010, DAVIS 2010, BELAY KASSA 2002 and 2004, KASSAHUN BERHANU 2012, KIDANEMARIAM 2011, PLANEL 2012, SPIELMAN 2011.
15. In recent years, Ethiopia has dedicated around 15% of government expenditure, i.e. around 5% of GDP, to agriculture, a rate much higher than average for African countries.
16. Officially, the growth in agricultural production has been maintained at the same rate as at national level. In fact, everyone, including local officials, knows that the statistics they provide are false.
17. Some of the farmers I interviewed have increased their farmland fourfold through this process for ten years.
18. “Poverty severity of 2010/11 is higher than of 2004/05 by 17% indicating that inequality in rural started to rise” (MoFED 2012: 8).
19. The Food Poverty Headcount is the percentage of the population who cannot afford sustaining food consumption levels of 2200 kcal/adult/day.
20. See <http://www.emdat.be/result-country-profil> and <http://www.populstat.info/Africa/ethiopic.htm> (consulted in October 2012).

21. In fact, it is generally reckoned that the standard minimum is 2200 kcal corresponds to around 200 kg of cereal equivalent per person per year.
22. See <http://agriexchange.apeda.gov.in> and <http://comtrade.un.org/db> (consulted in October 2012).
23. See <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG/countries?display=graph> (consulted in October 2012).
24. See <http://www.fao.org/giews/pricetool/?seriesQuery=79> (consulted in October 2012).
25. Ethiopia, which in 2010 occupied the 59th rank out of 102 countries in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, is today 120th out of 182 and 24th out of 48 African countries (<http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/#CountryResults>, consulted in October 2012).

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Where Have They Come from and Where Might They Be Heading? A Comparison of Two Food-Insecure Sites in North Omo

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
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- 1 In this paper we compare the longer-term trajectories of two communities in North Omo using data from a longitudinal study of twenty exemplar rural communities which launched in 1995 (WIDE1) with revisits in 2003 (WIDE2) and 2011 (WIDE3). In 2011, although the road distance between Gara Godo ('chasing wild pig') and Do'oma ('harshlands') was only 75 kms, and there were similarities in their vulnerability to drought, regular need for food aid, government development interventions and in some cultural respects, there were a number of important differences between the communities with implications for their trajectories into the future.
- 2 **Gara Godo** in Boloso Sore *wereda* is a long-standing densely settled community occupying a relatively flat *weyna dega* area of Wolayta 12 km from Areka, the *wereda* town. Households are settled in strings of villages and hamlets. All inhabitants are Wolayittan. The ideal farm is adjacent to the house and consists of a front yard with grass and trees used for grazing, a garden area for *enset*, other root crops, fruit and other trees, vegetables, herbs and spices, a coffee plot, and a field for maize and *tef*. Due to population pressure many farms are smaller than the ideal and landlessness is common. Rains are unpredictable and the community is prone to 'green famine' historically relying on seasonal migration and food aid to decrease its food gap. Until 1896, when the area was incorporated into Menelik's empire following a bloody war, Wolayta had a centralised political system headed by a king with clans playing an essential role in political and economic life. A Catholic Mission established a school and clinic at Areka in 1910, Protestants came to the area in 1930, Areka town was established in 1959 and a primary school built in 1962. Derg policies brought land reform, forced 'villagisation', periodic re-allotment of land, producer co-operatives,

and high exactions of cash and grain. A period of extreme food insecurity from 1983-88, led to an estimated 4,000 deaths in Wolayta. In 1984, Redd Barna set up feeding centres in Gara Godo and over the years to 1995 provided food and development aid.

- 3 **Do'oma** (Deramalo *wereda*), which is located on level land near two rivers in the remote semi-arid Gamo lowlands, was created through two re-settlement schemes. The government Relief and Rehabilitation Committee settled people from different parts of the country in Womalo (a sub-*kebele* of Do'oma *kebele*) in 1976 and, although due to drought they were re-located in 1983, some returned to Womalo voluntarily. In 1985

Map 1: Gara Godo (Wolayta) and Do'oma (Gamo Gofa) among the 20 WIDE sites



Map designed by P.Bevan, Samuel Urkato and Shiferaw Neda.

- 4 UNICEF helped drought-affected people from the Gamo highlands settling in the adjacent Do'oma sub-*kebele*. They introduced a cash-for-food programme, provided clothing, seeds, oxen and medicine and established a grinding mill and with the RRC set up a feeding camp in 1986. In 1989 they provided an irrigation scheme. People settled in Womalo and Do'oma villages; farmland was separate. Major crops were maize, sweet potatoes, *tef* and bananas. The *kebele* abuts the *wereda* town Wacha, which on 2011 roads was 223 km from the zone town Arba Minch and 99 km from Sodo.
- 5 In the next two sections we describe the main aspects of the communities in 1995 and 2003 under the headings community features, livelihoods, lives and society and government. We conclude by considering the potential futures of the communities.

Gara Godo 1995

Community features

- 6 The market was relatively big attracting people from distant places and a new town was emerging around the marketplace. The PA was 2½ hours walk from Areka; the

‘roundabout road’ involved a drive of 30 minutes. Tree cover had risen from 3% in 1967 to 7% as a result of intensive planting, mainly eucalyptus. The soil was good with a long growing season although fertiliser was necessary and the many farmers with fertiliser debt could not access it. High population density was attributed to polygyny and the ‘belief in procreation.’

Livelihoods

- 7 Pressure on land was intense with 25% of households thought to be landless: sons were given land from the family plot, which had decreased the size of holdings. Land rental and illegal sales were common. Farmers sold most grain and some coffee though production had declined since the 1970s due to disease and low Agricultural Marketing Corporation prices. The 1980s droughts and epidemics had reduced the number of livestock and prices were high so it was hard to replace them. Butter was a major source of cash income.
- 8 Agricultural labour was no longer a taboo though there were not many opportunities. Men were involved in trading, weaving, blacksmithing, carpentry and Food-for-Work. Long-distance trade had declined since prices in different places were now much the same. Opportunities for seasonal migration to agro-industrial farms in the Rift Valley were fewer. Food-for-Work was practised throughout the year. There was a long history of women’s trading and it had increased; they also sold farm products, wood, food and drinks, and crafts. Women’s work included wood gathering, water-fetching, planting and harvesting, *enset* processing, marketing, livestock caring, housework, childbearing and rearing, spinning and basket-making. Women were more responsible than men for taking care of cattle as well as managing the dairy products and the income from it.

Lives

- 9 Polygyny had increased in the last 20 years. Widows could choose which of the husband’s brothers to marry and manage land on their own. Divorce was frequent but divorced women had no rights to land nor could they inherit land from parents.
- 10 The main sources of water were river, spring and water-well in that order. A wide range of foods was eaten seasonally but there was not enough. The very hungry season lasted from February to May and many people reportedly died in March. Disease was worse during droughts and there were epidemics of meningitis, cholera and malaria said to be due to population congestion. There was a clinic (with no doctor or nurse) in Gara Godo and a hospital in Sodo (43 kms).
- 11 Circumcision for both sexes was an important rite of passage involving ceremonial and feasting and the creation of new fictive kinship ties of ‘eye-parenting’; it took place between the ages of 8 and 12. There was a primary school with 259 pupils in years 1-6 and there was a Grade 7-12 school in Areka. People were said to be aware of the value of education and willing to invest in the future of their children, particularly boys.

Society and government

- 12 The local elites were wealthy, elders, and/or *kebele* leaders. Wolayitta society was composed of over 130 clans. They did not form corporate groups and their main function was the regulation of marriage: clans were exogamous and caste groups endogamous. There was a clan hierarchy: royal clan, free landlords, free peasants, slaves, and castes. 'Despised' potters, blacksmiths and tanners were not entitled to own land. The rich were respected, admired, feared and envied and *kebele* officials respected in the hope they would solve problems and not oppress the people. Modern status symbols like large tin-roofed houses, modern furniture and clothes, and education were becoming more important. There was a 'feeling of inequality' between rich and poor households. Richer households had a big front yard, 2 pairs of oxen, 2+ hectares of land, 10+ cattle and cash and derived their wealth from farming, money-lending, speculation in coffee, *tef*, and maize, and share-cropping in land. Poorer households had no cattle, very small land that they share-cropped out and 1 or 2 shoats. They tended to be exploited and increasing land selling, renting and pawning and the expansion of a dependent wage labour group reflected a process of class formation.
- 13 The dominant religion was Orthodox Christianity followed by Kalehiwot Protestantism. However many associated the Orthodox church with northern domination and it was 'quiescent and languishing' while foreign-based churches were spreading vigorously. There were small congregations of Meseret Hawariat and Mulu Wengel Protestants and a Catholic Mission, which was more than 50 years old. There had been religious conflicts in 1991 and Protestants and Catholics were said to be creating sub-cultures and new social security systems.
- 14 Community decisions were usually made by elders; there were elders' councils in every village. *Iddir*, *equb* and *mehaber* had existed for many years providing mutual support networks without which no household was viable. *Iddir* had been affected by religious competition. The Peasant Association was the primary government organisation; the government nominated elected officials who worked within the local party and in close relationship with central government. Those not following the EPRDF line were dismissed. There was some favouring of kin and acquaintances. The PA was strongly resented because of its 'dual personality and past corruption' and lack of transfer of power to the elders though many acknowledged it was indispensable. Regionalisation was appreciated but the demand for a Wolayta Zone had not been met and migration opportunities had decreased. There was a government extension programme. A development agent taught plant and livestock protection techniques to farmers as well as advising them on how to plant coffee seedlings and graft aged coffee and efficient ways of planting *enset* and banana. The women home economics facilitator gave lessons on home arrangement, childcare, and sanitation and tried to encourage involvement in income-generating activities.

Do'oma 1995

Community features

- 15 Do'oma was situated in a remote area of a distant region and the main road to Sodo (99 km) was bad. As a result output prices were low and prices of imported household

consumables high. In Wacha there were two market days a week, wholesale grain traders, five shops, and a grinding mill. Wacha market was a focus for exchanges between highland and lowland crops. The new *wereda* administrative structure had 'activated town life' in Wacha but the government had recently announced that Deramalo *wereda* was to be abolished.

- 16 The vegetation was savannah with a sizable canopy of trees although tree cover had fallen from an estimated 85% in 1985 to 25% in 1993. The soil was fertile and much was unexploited; there was no need for fertiliser. The area was dry most of the year but during rainy seasons the community was cut off from neighbouring regions. Between 1991 and 1995 there were two droughts and heavy rain damaged crops in 1995. Baboons and worm armies were major threats.
- 17 There were 510 households in Do'oma (54%) and Womalo sub-kebeles; 60% were Gamo, 40% Wolayita and there was one Amhara. The population of Womalo was mixed while only Gamo lived in Do'oma sub-kebele. No one used family planning believing that to have more children/sons was to have more labour.

Livelihoods

- 18 The main (*meher*) rains which came in May were used to produce *tef* and sweet potatoes harvested in August. Maize, sweet potatoes, taro and bananas were cultivated using irrigation during the *belg* season (August to December). Productivity was very low. The Ministry of Agriculture was trying to persuade farmers to grow maize during the *meher*. Most farmers did not have irrigated land and there were shortages of oxen; most 'eked out a living' by renting, sharecropping, and casual wage labour or petty cash trading. There were shortages of farm tools, agricultural inputs and means of transport but not of rain-fed land. The irrigation technology was 'rudimentary' and little water reached the fields due to seepage. Most of the settlers were used to hoe-farming in the highlands and had had to learn how to plough. UNICEF introduced ditch-digging to conserve water for production in 1989 and in 1995 it was generally practised.
- 19 New varieties of maize and *tef* had reduced growing times to 3 months. Cash crops included *tef*, bananas and sugarcane and butter was also sold. There was enormous loss of livestock to disease every year and people sold livestock to cope with famine. The 1995 livestock population was small with most donated by UNICEF.
- 20 There was casual labour for weeding and harvesting. Women did not work in the fields but helped carry the harvest. They milked the cows twice a day, made local drinks, spun cotton and carried out most of the trade. Children were also involved in trade. The major off-farm activities for men were weaving and woodwork, There was some male daily labour and firewood and charcoal-selling. Men traded on a smaller scale than women and a few migrated for trade or to work on state farms mostly when droughts were severe.
- 21 Across the *wereda* there was considerable rural poverty attributed to general shortage of resources, the inability of the agricultural system to accommodate all households and lack of alternative sources of employment and income.

Lives

- 22 There were different kinds of households since some practised polygyny. Husbands led household(s) in home and farm management. Much of women's time was taken up with cooking and the remaining house management tasks were sometimes done jointly; men would fetch water if necessary. Polygyny (up to 4 wives) was said to be 'economical' and a status symbol; the first wife was most favoured. Marriage by betrothal with parental involvement was most common, though there was also abduction and consent. Gender inequality was enshrined in the practice of bride-wealth with its implied transference of rights. The divorce rate was low due to customary norms that prohibited it. Women, including widows, could own land if they could manage and pay the tax as land shortage was not a problem; they could also re-marry. Women could not inherit from parents unless there were no sons.
- 23 The main source of drinking water was the river Zage; despite cases of bacterial diseases drinking water was not seen as a problem. Maize was the staple food and the regular diet also included sweet potatoes, *enset*, milk and a wild plant called *shiferaw*. Malaria was the worst disease; during the fieldwork at least one person died every day. Traditional medicine was extensively used. There was a *wereda* clinic (17 employees including 3 nurses) in Wacha and hospitals in Sodo (93 km) and Arba Minch.
- 24 Boys and girls started to work from the age of 5 and from 10 to assume full responsibility. Boys were circumcised before marriage in a group ritual. The primary school had three Grades with 59 boys and 14 girls enrolled. There was a Grade 1-8 school in Wacha. There was a plan to use the Gamo language in the Latin alphabet. The nearest high school was 73 km; one man had completed high school and joined the *wereda* bureaucracy. People had started to encourage their children to go to school hoping they might get jobs in the expanding government bureaucracies.

Society and government

- 25 The majority of the population was poor: when they settled, they were the most drought-affected people in the area and following settlement experienced a series of droughts, crop failures, and pest and livestock diseases. Some older people who were also community leaders were better off in terms of use of irrigated land and ownership of household assets and livestock. They were getting richer and inequality had increased. Wealth, status and power were correlated; the local elites had strong relationships with the ruling party and played some role in politicising the people. There were some tensions between the residents of Womalo and Do'oma sub-*kebele* associated with 'simmering rivalry' between Gamo and Wolayita elites.
- 26 The community was divided into (non-corporate) clans of 'pure' Gamos and Wolayitas, and a hierarchy of caste groups: potters, blacksmiths and at the bottom of the social pyramid the tanners. Marriage within clans and between caste groups and the 'pure' was taboo. As a result of the Regionalisation policy the distinction between citizens, craft-workers and slaves became more important. Following the fall of the Derg people were free to follow Protestantism; 70% (and growing) were said to be Kalehiwot, 20% Orthodox Christians, with 10% following traditional *gome* beliefs and rules. The fieldworker suggested that cultural beliefs 'hovered in the background' and the stage had not been reached where the adoption of modern beliefs might create tensions.

- 27 The primary decision-makers were the 5-man elected elders' committee. Party affiliations had become very important for positions in the bureaucracy and there were no political opposition groups or serious security problems in the area though Womala was demanding the end of the 'exploitative affiliation' with Do'oma proper. An agricultural extension agent had visited farmers occasionally. As part of the effort to make the area food self-sufficient the RRC gave fertiliser to most farmers in 1994; almost all sold it to private traders in Wacha. The fieldworker advocated site-specific research to develop new technologies and crop varieties suitable for the agro-ecological conditions and the construction of a road and bridges to link Do'oma to markets via the all weather road to Shashemene.

Gara Godo 2011

Community features

- 28 In 2011 Gara Godo had recently lost one of its *sub-kebeles* and the town centre had become a municipality with shops, a large marketplace, a health centre in process of upgrade, private clinics, *kebele* offices, and a Farmers Training Centre. There was a primary school, high school up to Grade 10 and a new primary school was under construction in one of the zones. The federal government brought electricity and the mobile phone network to the town in 2008. There were considerable improvements to roads and transport out of the *kebele* from 2008 when they became good enough for cars, bajaj, motorbikes and donkey carts. Internal seasonal roads and paths were improved so small cars, motorbikes and carts could use them, though there were problems in the rainy season. There were buses to Areka, Sodo, Awassa and Addis and the roads to these towns had recently been upgraded. Drought was still a problem: it was severe in 2008 and the rain was poor in 2011. Around two-thirds of households had demanded food aid in 2008 and received about a week's supply. Numbers using contraception had been steadily increasing.

Community livelihoods

- 29 By 2011 there had been a considerable increase in cash crops, livestock production and seasonal migration. Improved seeds had increased the productivity of *tef*, maize, and bananas, and prices had improved. More fertiliser, improved seeds and pesticides were used though poor farmers could not afford them. There was increased agricultural labour, non-farm business, petty trade and female income-generation. Cash crops included coffee, *tef*, ginger, *boloke*, maize, bananas, mangoes and other fruit, vegetables, eucalyptus, chat and spices. There were improved coffee seedlings and a skyrocketing price associated with the development of high-value regional speciality brands. Land was leased to a second coffee-processing investor in 2011 and the two plants provided seasonal employment. The size of landholdings and communal areas had decreased; 34% of households were landless. 11% of households had participated in the PSNP since 2005. There were problems with persistent crop diseases affecting *enset*, *tef*, sweet potatoes, and coffee. The livestock population had risen due to good prices for fattened bulls and oxen. Milk and butter were sources of cash.

- 30 Agricultural labour was very common and wages had risen. Share-cropping, share-rearing and ox exchanges continued to be common. More than 30% of young men migrated seasonally, mostly to large-scale private farms. There was also short-term, distress and permanent urban migration including young women migrating to be housemaids or construction workers. One young woman had recently migrated to Beirut and a man had died on the illegal migration route to South Africa.

Community lives

- 31 Greater access to credit contributed to diversified income improvement, which increased expenditure on household consumption and assets, education, clothes, festivals and saving. Youth bought imported low-cost jeans and jackets, rural people frequently went to town for leisure, and young people had ‘a shopping mentality’.
- 32 Female participation in farm business and daily labour had increased and many women in the area had been chosen as Model Farmers and Champions. Some were active in local politics and had become leaders. Early marriage had declined since young men were short of resources. Both could choose their partners; girls not in education were likely to marry as early as possible. Marriage choices were based on wealth, love, partners’ interest, age, religion, and clan identity.¹ There were cultural, religious and municipal processes. In 1995 sexual attacks were considered normal and the right of men but this was no longer the case though there were recent examples of abduction. Despite the government ban it seemed likely that most girls were being circumcised secretly. Women’s property rights were frequently violated, due to women’s reluctance to claim it—for various reasons—and the biased attitudes of elders and governmental authorities.
- 33 There were fourteen water-points accessing springs and boreholes although not all were working; there were problems accessing water in the hot season and there had been cholera outbreaks. There was greater awareness of the need for balanced diets and good infant feeding. Infant mortality was said to have declined. Malaria was still a problem. In the *wereda* health workers had identified 55 men and 68 women who were HIV+ and there were 55 people using ART. Those who could not afford or get appropriate cosmopolitan health services used traditional practices such as uvula cutting, milk-teeth extraction, body scarring and branding though attitudes had moved towards the formal services.
- 34 Children still worked for the household but child labour abuse and the burden on girls had decreased. Most children joined school ‘at the right age’ and went to school with adequate food and clothing; increasing numbers of teenagers were studying though poor children had less time for education. Most young men and women combined work, especially trade, and education. Many in the community had completed Grade 10 but the number joining preparatory school in Areka was small. There was a TVET college, university (from 2008) and private colleges in Sodo and a private college in Areka. Some government officials were following distance learning programmes.
- 35 There were 265 dependent male youths; earlier boys mostly worked to support their families but were free to do personal business. They were said to ignore advice from parents and elders. There was a new idea that young people should get credit and launch enterprises. They were seeking friendship with members of the opposite sex rather than marriage and children. Sexual activity at school had increased. In 1995 if a

girl made a mistake she would be harshly punished; now girls discussed with parents. Girls participated in office work, daily labour and trade. Poor girls who wanted to follow fashion were exposed to migration and prostitution. It was possible to continue education after marriage and child-bearing.

Society and government

- 36 Rich, middle-wealth and poor households lived differently; for example rich people had modern beds, furniture and utensils while poor people had old beds and furniture and clay cooking dishes. One farmer had 20 oxen, 15 cows, and 200 coffee trees in addition to other assets; another had 2 oxen, 2 cows, 30 sheep, 40 goats and tin-roofed houses in both rural and urban Gara Godo. Rich farmers benefited from famines since the poor farmers did not have the resources to invest in farming so share-cropped or contracted their lands to the richer ones. Half the households were estimated to be poor and there was a large number of very poor people. 120 households (10%) were headed by people who were old and needed support; the proportion had increased since 2003. Some were PSNP Direct Beneficiaries.
- 37 The elite network contained rich farmers and businessmen, government employees, educated people, *kebele* /party leaders, elders and religious leaders. Elders were involved in conflict resolution and justice decisions but were said to be potentially corruptible. *Kebele* officials consulted elders on various matters and religious leaders taught about development issues. Different kinds of Protestants inter-married and different household members could follow different sects. In 2007 there was a conflict between the Orthodox and Kalehiwot churches over territory. There was more awareness of the importance of 'social capitals' such as *iddir* and concern for poor people.
- 38 The *kebele* Council only had 99 members as the others were in the new *kebele*; they would be augmented but there was an attendance problem. The *kebele* chair and vice-chair and four Cabinet members were replaced in 2010 following a *gimgema* meeting. Sub-*kebele* appointees included 27 Development Team leaders, 27 cell leaders and 1-5s that were small self-help groups. There were 262 paying party members (21% of households). Women and youth organisations were weak. 'People are not willing to work at *kebele* level' though 'people without relations' were excluded. During the 2010 election period the most popular political figures representing the area visited².
- 39 One respondent said that while urban opposition supporters were not happy with all government interventions education, health, infrastructure, peace and good governance were now very attractive. People raised some issues: mismatches between *wereda* directives and community interests sometimes caused conflict; water harvesting had been totally rejected, plumbers were not sent quickly enough to mend water-points; implementation of women's policies was 'insignificant'; the recent fertiliser and seeds had not been compatible with the area; fertiliser and seeds were not reaching poor people; meetings in peak seasons were problematic; and a women's spinning group accused the *wereda* office of 'misusing' money owed to them. An ex-soldier, who supported *kinijit* in 2005, was advised to become a member of the ruling party and then appointed as a *kebele* guard. All community members were said to have some awareness about politics, which was not the case some years ago.

Do'oma 2011

Community features

- 40 In 2011 Wacha was (still or once more) the *wereda* town for Deramalo *wereda*. New public buildings included a Health Post in Womala, a primary school Grades 1-5, a Farmers' Training Centre and *kebele* offices. Electricity came to Wacha in 2008 and poles and wires were (slowly) being erected in Do'oma. A mobile network that only worked during the day came in 2008. An all weather road with bridges from Wacha to the upgraded main road to Sodo and Sawla, which avoided Do'oma, was almost completed in December 2011; there was a bus three times a week. A direct road to the zone capital Arba Minch, which would have reduced the journey from 233 to 98 km was abandoned before completion. Internal roads and bridges were problematic during rain. Motorbike transport started in 2009.
- 41 The community was still vulnerable to drought: there was no rain in 2008 and no spring rain in 2011 and there were reports of deaths of animals and people. Maze National Park expansion had absorbed Do'oma grazing land near the river and around 60 farmers who had been farming the land illegally using traditional irrigation were evicted.
- 42 Movement in and out of the community continued. In 2011 there were only 450 households compared with 510 in 1995. There had been an exodus of Wolaytans (from 40% to 15%), an increase in Gamo (from 60% to 75%) and, since 2005, the addition of settlers from the Jinka area (6%) and Wollo (4%).

Community livelihoods

- 43 The economy was boosted by PSNP (34% of households) and access to credit. PSNP public works beneficiaries could get credit for oxen and more than 90% of households had at least one ox. The road improvements had improved output prices that were also increased by general inflation.
- 44 The irrigation system had expanded through PSNP cash/food-for-work; almost three-quarters of farmers used irrigation, some traditional, although half of these could not get enough water. The dam was in urgent need of more repair than local resources could achieve. There had been conflicts with two neighbouring *kebele* over new use of shared rivers using traditional irrigation methods.
- 45 Fertiliser, which was 'obligatory', improved maize seeds, more ploughing and the planting of seeds in line had improved productivity and this was attributed to extension advice. From 2005 there had been an influx of Amhara migrants; by 2011 there were 25. They focused on high value crops growing onions, tomatoes, red peppers, sesame, haricot beans, and rice on irrigated land and sorghum and black cumin on rain-fed land. They introduced new ways of ploughing, planting and managing oxen, which allowed them to fatten while they worked. 'The Amhara are our DAs' and 'cash crops were becoming common'. A few had started selling eucalyptus at the farm gate.
- 46 In 1997 an investor leased irrigated grazing land to export broomcorn to the US employing more than 500 people; in 2005, said to have connections with an opposition

party, he left suddenly abandoning machinery and buildings. Some grazing and firewood collection had resumed and the land was auctioned to new investors in 2011.

- 47 Around one-third of men did daily agricultural labour earning 20 *birr* a day. There was an increase in local off-farm work opportunities associated with urban development in Wacha; notable were three young long-distance traders, a *delala*, and motorbike transporters who could be summoned by mobile phone. Women had become more involved in farming activities, trade and daily labour. There was seasonal and longer-term male migration for agricultural work on estates near Arba Minch, Jimma, and Weyto, and urban migration for daily labour. Young women walked to Arba Minch to work as housemaids or sex workers.

Community lives

- 48 Polygyny was said to be common in the past, as a woman could not live without a breadwinner; in 2011 if she had her own income she could refuse to marry a man who already had a wife. One respondent had earned enough as a trader to buy a small plot of land and build a house before she married which facilitated her subsequent divorce. The law forbidding marriage until 18 was not being implemented (the point is maturity) and men convicted of abduction in the area were being given prison sentences of three months or less rather than the expected 17 years. The banning of female circumcision was highly resented and the practice continued without legal action. Women's rights to land at the end of a marriage or via inheritance from parents were often not implemented. Women were spending less time on domestic work and some men cared for infants and children and washed their own clothes; four men baked *injera* particularly for feasts.
- 49 Diets in richer households were more balanced. Malaria still killed people every year and there were epidemics associated with food shortages following droughts in 2008 and 2011. Those who could afford cosmopolitan health care had reduced use of traditional health care; four private clinics had been established in Wacha.
- 50 In some households children were getting better food, hygiene, clothes and shoes and had more time to play. The Government required families to send children to school aged seven and 47% were conforming. 42% of the pupils in the new primary school were girls. Many girls combined irregular attendance with trading in Wacha and girls generally had less time to study. The school in Wacha added Grades 9-10 in 2005 and there were plans to add Grades 11-12. Children moved in and out of education for various reasons with many continuing into their twenties and sometimes beyond. The nearest TVET was in Sawla; there were twelve current TVET students including two women at agricultural college. Three men were studying at Arba Minch University and two at private colleges.
- 51 The lives of many young people were different from those of their quite recent predecessors as they negotiated lives that combined education, income-earning, postponed marriage, and friendships with the opposite sex. Most of the older children from richer households lived in towns attending school or college, sometimes married, sometimes working. Pre-marital sex was said to be common. Most young men did not want to stay in the community due to shortage of land and few jobs so did not want a voice in the *kebele*. Many young men who eventually settled in the community had girlfriends but did not marry until their later twenties and then often 'in a bad

economic situation'. They had less chance to abduct and were not good marriage propositions. Some young couples were 'marrying without weddings', with or without the blessing of parents.

Society and government

- 52 It was the better-off farmers who benefited from the growth in cash crops. Fourteen rich farmers were identified with at least 4 pairs of oxen, 4 hectares of land, some irrigated, iron-sheet houses and modern furniture; they could survive the hungry season easily, store products to sell when prices rose, afford hospital treatment and send their children to distant preparatory schools. A number of households had built tin-roofed cement houses at a minimum cost of 10,000 *birr*. Around a quarter of farmers were poor and had to supplement their farm production with daily labour, selling firewood, charcoal etc and PSNP. An ideal-type description highlighted small landholdings without irrigation, no or 1 ox, small poorly maintained houses, little furniture, poor food in the hungry season, and inability to afford education or health services.
- 53 Protestant followers had increased (86%) though Kalehiwot membership had slightly fallen and the Mekane Yesus sect, which came in 2007, was followed by 18% of the community. Women and youth had begun to preach. 14% were Orthodox Christians who still discriminated against craftworker, unlike the Protestants. Social relations were increasingly based on religious affiliation.
- 54 The elected group of elders, sometimes including church leaders, still functioned. They made 'intra-community' rules with associated fines, resolved conflicts, negotiated with people in other communities, detected thieves and decided fines. They were conservative particularly regarding women's rights. They were involved in organising the expulsion of five women from the community who were charged with having the 'evil eye'. There were criticisms that they were not accountable for the fines they took and favoured the rich but they were also described as playing a major role in maintaining social cohesion.
- 55 The majority of Womalo residents voted for opposition parties in the 2005 election and six members of the *kebele* Council had promoted opposition parties³ in both 2005 and 2010 elections although they had reportedly been told they would be excluded from the community that should be uniform in political thinking to keep cohesion. There was a story of an organised physical attack at night on a young man who refused to give up his *kinijit* membership and was forced to move elsewhere.
- 56 The *kebele* administration was re-organised in January 2011 as government and party structures were increasingly melded. 200 of the 450 household heads were members of the *kebele* Council and there was a *kebele* Cabinet, a number of committees, 12 Development Groups (DGs) with between 25 and 48 members sub-divided into 1-5 groups. The leaders of the DGs were also party cell leaders and while 'not all members of the DGs are party members they are considered as members in the new structure'. However, the DGs and 1-5 groups had not functioned in the way expected and most people with unremunerated *kebele* positions did not have the time or commitment to do them well. Community consultation was not common; *kebele* officials, elders and religious leaders discussed development interventions and made the decisions. Households were told what regular contributions of cash, in kind, and work for

developmental projects they should make. Members of *kebele* officials' networks were said to have priority in programmes such as food aid, farmland, credit and seeds. There were four *kebele* chairmen between 2005 and 2011. The penultimate one was removed in December 2010 along with five other officials following a seven-day *gingema* meeting involving *wereda* officials, elders and council members.

- 57 While many interventions were appreciated and some ignored, there was strong resistance to the Park expansion, the imposition of unwanted fertiliser on credit, and the banning of female circumcision. Some said the 2005 and 2010 elections were unfair as the election committee forced people to elect the ruling party. There were occasional conflicts with *kebele* officials during campaigns and a criticism of *wereda* and *kebele* lack of commitment.

The futures of Ethiopia's rural communities

- 58 Looking ahead, it seems likely that **Gara Godo** will continue along a trajectory dependent on increasing internal urbanisation, livelihood diversification, economic growth based on coffee and other cash crops, class formation, women's liberation, and changes in youth livelihoods and lifestyles. Prosperity for rural and urban residents will depend on the weather, international coffee prices, and market linkages for new cash crops such as fruit, ginger and spices. In the absence of external mobilisation, there are unlikely to be challenges from below to the managing elite network, nor struggles among them. The community's trajectory could be threatened by wider political instability and/or competition for resources with historic enemies such as the Sidama.
- 59 **Do'oma** has three possible future trajectories. In Scenario 1, more/all of the community's land is leased for investment. By 2011, three investors from the diaspora resident in Addis Ababa had been given leases for irrigated land in the *wereda*, by the regional investment bureau. In Scenario 2, flood damage to the irrigation dam beyond the capacity of local repair reduces water flow and cash crop production, impoverishing the community. In Scenario 3, the one preferred by Do'oma residents, machinery and experts are sent to repair and extend the dam so that all smallholders have access to irrigated land; high-value cash crop production exported to Ethiopia's cities continues to expand. There is potential for disturbances around ethnicity and if a situation of wider political instability arose there would be support for opposition parties from some quarters. In all scenarios, as time passes the power of conservative elders will decline as adults with more experience of education, Protestant teachings and urban life move into these positions. The customary patriarchal system will come under increasing challenge from women and young people.
- 60 Do'oma and Gara Godo are just two examples of the many types of rural community found in Ethiopia. Through the WIDE study the trajectories of eighteen additional community types will be compared by the end of 2013. In 1995 the relatively isolated WIDE communities were reproducing themselves structurally and, seen as community systems, did not look very different from each other. Between 1995 and 2011 their accelerating connections with the wider world led to changes in their internal system parameters as they increasingly interacted with new contextual parameters. Some of these contextual contingencies varied across the communities and had the potential to trigger diverse structural change processes in the community systems.

FOOTNOTES

1. Marriage between craftworkers/ 'slaves' and other community members was still problematic.
2. The Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn comes from Boloso Sore *wereda*.
3. Two were members of a regional opposition parties, three of *kinijit*, and one of AEUP.

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Where Are Ethiopian Rural Communities Heading? Youth, Education and Migration in Two Food-Deficit Communities of Eastern Tigray and Kambata

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p. 427-440

- 1 The Wellbeing and Illbeing Dynamics in Ethiopia (WIDE) research focuses on twenty villages selected mainly in 1995 as exemplars of the different types of rural livelihoods identified then in the four 'big Regions' (see map 1). We document long-term change in these villages using data made in 1995 and 2003 and new fieldwork data made in 2010-2013. We focus on differences and similarities between and within communities with a view to trying to understand why in certain communities sustainable development processes have emerged and less so in others. In this paper, I compare the trajectories of Harresaw in Eastern Tigray and Aze Debo'a in Kambata in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' (SNNP) Region, two food insecure communities among the twenty WIDE villages.
- 2 This round of research, WIDE3 (BEVAN et al 2012), was carried out by a core team of research leaders including Dr Philippa Bevan and Dr Alula Pankhurst who also led the 1995 and 2003 research. It is funded by the Ethiopia-based Joint Governance Assessment and Measurement donor group through a World Bank-managed trust fund. The most recent fieldwork in Harresaw and Aze Debo'a was conducted in 2011-12 by teams of trained Ethiopian researchers familiar with the research approach and/or the site, each comprising one man and one woman (DOM 2012a-b). This paper is the outcome of a collaborative effort involving them all. In both communities migration has been a longstanding important element in the otherwise quite different local livelihoods. I found that migration in 2011/2 was still important and patterns had significantly evolved especially in recent few years. Harresaw and Aze Debo'a thus

emerged as most similar cases in relation to migration as a key parameter in their trajectories.

- 3 Following this introduction, section 2 outlines what the two communities looked like in 1995. Section 3 presents snapshots in 2011 and what important changes had occurred in each in livelihoods, social fabric and people's lives. The focus is on youth, education and migration. Youth matter: their aspirations and actions will significantly shape the communities' futures. Education and migration are activities mainly practised by young people. In section 4 I look into possible alternative futures for each community. I conclude that Harresaw and Aze Debo'a may be 'prototypical cases' helping to understand a phenomenon of growing significance that is, how international (mostly illegal) migration is changing development prospects for certain rural communities in Ethiopia. This in turn, is located in a broader set of conclusions that the WIDE3 research team endeavours to draw from the ongoing WIDE3 research.

The communities in 1995

- 4 This section describes each of the communities in 1995, focusing on livelihoods—including migration, the status of youth and education; and including a comparison of the main similarities and differences between Harresaw and Aze Debo'a at the time.

Harresaw

- 5 As for Tigray as a whole the history of Harresaw is marked by war before and throughout the Derg and by repeated drought and famine with no time for communities to recover between episodes of high mortality and mass livestock loss. These disasters prompted migration on a very large scale at times. The upcoming of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in 1991 opened an era of peace, security and easier movement for people.
- 6 In 1995 Harresaw was a remote farming community, connected by a 17 km dry-weather road to the small *wereda* town Atsbi. People had 'no hope to get electricity' and there was no phone in the *tabia*. 600 of the 1,100 households were female-headed, in large part due to the war. The community was 99% Orthodox Christian and 100% Tigrayan.
- 7 Erosion was a big problem and the soil fertility had greatly declined. Recurrent drought severely affected the single annual production season in most years (with only two good years in the last decade). The community had not yet recovered from the 1984-5 famine: 150 people had died then, and mass livestock losses meant that there still were farmers without a single animal in 1995. Land was distributed under the TPLF and this established women's rights to land. Up to 100 households who returned after the distribution were landless. There was shortage of land for young men. Most people felt that their landholding was too small.
- 8 Most crop production was for consumption, and insufficient. Fertilizer was little used because too expensive. People also kept livestock although herds were smaller due to losses during droughts and pressure on grazing land. Farmers sold some honey, eggs, goats, butter and *beles* but little else and the market was unreliable with output prices varying hugely with the weather.

- 9 Most households combined farming with various off-farm activities (with 300 people involved in these), indispensable to complement agricultural seasonality and inadequate agricultural income. Trading of salt from Afar was widespread, as well as labour migration (seasonal and as response to shocks). 150 people migrated annually, mostly to Eritrea, a few to Adigrat and Afar and very few to Saudi Arabia, to work as daily labourers, in hotels or as house servants. Earnings were used for consumption, social obligations such as marriages, debt repayment, and investment (cattle) whenever something was left.
- 10 The community, known to have been better-off, was poorer than in the previous generations. But there were large differences between the poor and the very wealthy, among whom were households with relatives in Saudi Arabia.
- 11 There was no such concept as youth. Even when married and living in his own house, a son was subordinate to his father. Young men's main concern was access to land to marry, but as little land was available they had to share their parents' plot. Young men were the majority among migrants.
- 12 There was one primary school with more than a thousand students in grades 1 to 5. Schooling competed with households' need for children's labour, so families might send the older or weaker children while others would herd. Both men and women thought that getting enough education was important to succeed in farming and off-farm activities and to be a better farmer's wife. However, there was no prospect for Harresaw children to go to secondary school, the nearest being at 42 km. No-one had been to college or university.
- 13 The government helped the community by providing extension and fledgling vaccination services and by encouraging Non-Government Organisation (NGO) activities. Under a rehabilitation programme targeting poorer farmers, credit was available to get inputs, oxen, farm implements and small livestock; some of this was free. Extension agents visited and advised a few farmers on a monthly basis and organised soil and water conservation (SWC) activities. Through food-for-work (FFW) the government had started the construction of a dam for irrigation, expected to cover 130 ha. Since 1985 food aid was provided regularly when there was crop failure. It was highly appreciated and had prevented hunger deaths during the 1989-1993 recurrent drought.
- 14 In the local repertoire land was the most cherished possession and it should not be held privately or sold. There was no consensus on whether further redistribution was desirable to address land shortage. Most people believed that the government's focus on rural development and its attempt to 'organise people' and 'try to change their attitude' would benefit the community.

Aze Debo'a

- 15 Aze Debo'a is in Kambata, a highly densely populated area with a longstanding tradition of clan-based organisation. This was only minimally disturbed by the Amhara *gebbar* system during the imperial era as Kambata had very little land to offer. After the fall of the Derg traditional institutions gained power again. The community hated the Derg resettlement, military service and harsh tax policy; land reform created tensions; the literacy campaign was appreciated. The TGE brought new policies but their effect

was not yet clearly felt in 1995. 1985 and 1994 were drought years: an unknown number of people died and many were forced to sell most of their cattle.

- 16 In 1995 Aze Debo'a (843 households) was connected to Durame, the *wereda* and zonal capital, through 4 km of an all-weather road. It was fairly remote as Durame like the Kambata zone as a whole had seen little infrastructure development. There was no electricity and no phone. There were few female-headed households (60) although females largely outnumbered males due to the Derg and migration. Most people were Kambata, and a mix of Orthodox Christians, Protestants and Catholics.
- 17 Floods, soil erosion and greatly decreased soil fertility were aggravated by the changing weather. The *kebele* had abundant water resources but there was no irrigation. The size of landholdings was decreasing as never before. 230 households were landless. Women had no land rights. Some people thought that further land redistribution was needed but this was controversial.
- 18 In this very densely populated area the local economy was mainly *enset*-based subsistence, with some cash crop agriculture (coffee, chat and some eucalyptus), livestock, trade and migration. There was little use of fertilizer because of its cost. Livestock was very important: it was customarily kept in people's house and people took extraordinary care of them. There had been no epizootic but people had fewer livestock due to pressure on grazing land. Households sold eggs, butter and cheese for income.
- 19 Most households combined farming with off-farm activities including agricultural trade on local markets, trade in clothes and selling firewood, and various local services; a few were teaching and health and agriculture agents. Migration was very important. Nearly 50% families had at least one migrant. People without education and money to trade migrated seasonally for daily labour in state sugar plantations and farms in Arssi or on private farms in neighbouring areas. A few migrants had modern professional jobs. Many were car owners or traders in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and elsewhere. But the regionalization policy affected all types of migration.
- 20 There were large differences between wealthiest and poorest households. Migrant children sending remittances was culturally expected and one of the sources of wealth.
- 21 To marry, young men had to get an independent income as physical and psychological preparation to their life as responsible adults. This was becoming difficult as land was not available. Newly-weds established an independent household if they could afford and otherwise lived with relatives/parents. Youth as a social group was emerging in people's concerns.
- 22 Kambata had long valued education. However, due to school costs some households sent only younger/weaker children, keeping at home those better able to help and girls approaching marriage age; they might also consider school performance. 25% of the primary and secondary school age groups were said to be enrolled but there were many early dropouts. People thought that it was very important to be able to read, write and do sums and primary education mattered to be a good farmer. But students became idle after completing. Many high school leavers just assisted their parents in farming; some left to seek a job or were trading. The few college graduates were generally employed.
- 23 The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) had undertaken afforestation programmes and terracing work and was providing outreach extension and irregular vaccination services. Crossbreeding and vet services were available thanks to local Protestant

churches' development branches. There was no credit. Starting in 1964 there had been food aid in bad years, then FFW started in 1970. Since 1982 there was cash for work organised by MOA, sometimes complemented by the Kalehiwot church.

- 24 Generally, the TGE had brought peace and stability and the end of many hated policies. But people disliked the regionalisation policy causing many returns and hindering migration because of ethnic conflict, the lack of credit and the increasing number of jobless educated youth. They thought that devaluation, far from being beneficial to farmers as promoted by the government, was harmful.

Key similarities and differences

- 25 Both communities experienced conflict-and drought-related hardships before and under the Derg, with more local violence and higher famine-related mortality in Harresaw. In Harresaw the TGE was greeted as liberator. People were more reserved in Aze Debo'a. In both areas migration had traditionally been an important strategy to cope with war and famine in Harresaw, land scarcity in Aze Debo'a. In both communities resettlement (moving people) was a terrible memory, in contrast with migration (people moving).
- 26 In 1995 in both communities farming was undermined by deteriorating natural resources, high population growth and the weather vagaries, more pronounced in Harresaw. Land was the most cherished possession but landlessness a growing issue and there was a debate about further redistribution. Migration, trade and other non-/off-farm activities were indispensable complements to farming. Trade seemed to be more important in Aze Debo'a where cash crops were grown and the *wereda* centre more easily accessible. Migration in Aze Debo'a was also more diversified, linked to the higher education level reached on average. However, it was also undermined (especially skilled migration) due to the regionalisation policy which was exerting a double pressure: forcing people who would have migrated otherwise to stay and forcing others to return.
- 27 Government activity in the livelihood field seemed more intense in Harresaw, linked to the post-Derg rehabilitation programme. Irrigation was being developed. In Aze Debo'a people were more critical, highlighting problematic policies including regionalization, devaluation, and the lack of credit.
- 28 In both communities education was valued but competed with households' need for labour/income, especially in poorer families. For young men in both communities one major concern was to raise an independent income and this was becoming increasingly hard. In Harresaw this was linked mainly to lack of access to land. In Aze Debo'a concerns about the lack of return from longer studies and underemployment of more educated youth were emerging whereas going beyond primary education was not an option for Harresaw's children.

The communities in 2012

- 29 This section depicts the communities by end 2011, focusing again on livelihoods, migration, youth and education.

Harresaw

- 30 Erosion, land overuse and low and declining soil fertility continued to be big issues in spite of intensified but long-term government-led rehabilitation activities. Drought recurred regularly. In 2008/9 a severe drought decimated the community's livestock. As in 1995 more than half of the households were female-headed though this was primarily linked to migration rather than war.
- 31 Landlessness had increased with the growing number of newly-formed households. A few had got residential land around the *tabia* centre. Land declared unoccupied according to the new regional land law and wet communal grazing land was reallocated as farmland for landless groups including youth. However, these measures were widely insufficient. Land value was rising. People with no other option rented out land to repay loans.
- 32 A small centre was emerging around the *tabia* administration, with electricity since 2008/9, a wireless phone and mobile network coverage. Rich households invested in houses in nearby towns. An increasing number of families had relatives or children in town for business or studies. The use of mobile phones was rapidly increasing (migrants sent or brought them back), connecting people to markets, relatives and migrants. The main road out of the community was all-weather with daily (but costly) transport. The development of inside roads lagged behind, which hindered livelihood activities and access to markets and services.
- 33 Credit was widely available for farm and non-/off-farm activities, in cash and kind, from the local branch of the regional Micro-Finance Institution (MFI) or from the *wereda* agriculture office through the *tabia* multiservice cooperative. The *tabia* had a justified poor reputation in relation to repayment. Youth could get credit but they were not trusted as they took loans then migrated with the money. Views about credit were mixed, with both success and failure stories. Some loans were 'forced' onto people. When the weather failed the whole community plunged into debt, like after the 2008/9 drought which prompted a sharp increase in illegal migration abroad as the best option to repay failed livestock loans.
- 34 Irrigation was an option for 15-20% of the community and the government was making the community further invest in it through public works. However, this did not fully offset the effect of weather vagaries because all irrigation schemes depended on the rains. With crossbreeding and veterinary services available nearby and recent inflation leading to skyrocketing market prices, livestock production had also emerged as a potential. However, drought and diseases made it a risky business and fodder availability was a constraint. Officials believed that on average, people's agricultural income had much increased in the past four years with higher production and output prices and easier access to markets. Daily labour was on the increase (irrigation, work on migrants' farms) and much better paid than the rate for the government-financed safety net-related public works.
- 35 Households continued to have to rely on non-agricultural livelihood options. This included working on the government safety net public works (hardly more than a small income complement for better-off households), a few new non-/off-farm activities linked to petty urbanisation and services (e.g. running shops and drink houses in the *tabia* or nearby towns, locally paid jobs like phone operator), and trade.

- 36 Migration had if anything increased in importance, with several big changes. Migration to Eritrea had stopped as the border was closed since the 1998/2000 Ethio-Eritrean war. Seasonal agricultural migration had decreased as daily labour jobs were available locally for much of the year. The biggest change was a sharp rise in illegal migration to Saudi Arabia, initially as a coping strategy following the debt crisis prompted by the 2008/9 drought and gradually turning into a way to meet an expanded range of consumption needs and to get investment capital. This had multiple effects at individual, family and community levels. Migration injected new ideas and comparatively large flows of money in the local economy. It deepened the community's links with towns as migrants and their families invested there and landless returnees sometimes decided to live there.
- 37 Thus in spite of the setback of the 2008/9 drought many in the community were on an upward trajectory, with irrigation, livestock production and migration as new sources of wealth. Migrants and their families, in particular, were said to be much better off.
- 38 Attitudes to and expectations from education were in flux. Most families attempted to send their children to primary school, although poorer/more vulnerable households faced more difficulties. The opening of a secondary school in the neighbouring *tabia* made it much easier for girls and boys from Harresaw to attend Gr9-10. An increasing number of youth made it to university, for which families sacrificed a lot. In 2011/2 there were 29 youth studying in various universities and 20 graduates. But children's and parents' expectations were dampened by the many failures at exams, the high costs of pursuing even government-sponsored education, and the lack of job opportunities.
- 39 So, there was a growing 'hopelessness with education' and in contrast, the hope of making rapid gains through migration was snowballing. In spite of high risks and hardships, incentives to migrate to 'change their life' were very high for youth whose access to land, jobs and capital was severely constrained at home. Better-off migrant returnees, trading in shops and living in town instead of farming were the youth's new role model. Support from grown-up children continued to be critical and migration enabled them to support their families better. In contrast youth staying at home fuelled landlessness, which in turn fuelled tension between generations. At the same time, youth's lack of voice in the community was recognised as an issue, and the community believed that the government was paying insufficient attention to the issue of youth joblessness.
- 40 In the expanding 'local modern repertoire', migration divided the progressives into two camps, those who saw it as positive or at least, inevitable, and those for whom it was not desirable.

Aze Debo'a

- 41 Floods and erosion continued to be harmful in spite of increased but long-term government and NGO-supported soil and water conservation activity. People reported decreasing groundwater levels, declining soil fertility, more erratic and less rain. There had been drought in three out of the past five years. In 2008 all crops failed and 35 children and elderly people died of hunger-related causes, allegedly due to *wereda* officials reporting late on the need for emergency food aid.

- 42 With population growth and continued returns, average landholdings had become very small and landlessness had got worse. There was a start in enforcing women's rights to land, introduced through the land certification process. Land was unofficially rented at high prices. Some families were selling plots to get capital for migration.
- 43 Public buildings, a few modern houses and one shop made a small centre along the main road, with electricity since 2009. There was a wireless phone (since 2009) and 200-250 mobile phones as the network reached the *kebele* in 2010. However, the main urbanisation trend seemed to be through intensified links with Durame. The road was being asphalted and with this even easier access Aze Debo'a might well become a distant suburb over time. This urbanising trend was fuelled by investment with migration savings or remittances. Progress in developing inside roads lagged behind and parts of the *kebele* remained inaccessible by car.
- 44 Credit was available in Durame but in the *kebele* only a few small-scale and targeted schemes had been organised by the government and NGOs, with limited success. Many wanted credit to be available although successful people usually got capital through other means (coffee trade, migration).
- 45 More cash crops were planted than in 1995 (eucalyptus in government-promoted woodlots, coffee in response to a booming market) but not by the many households with small plots. A third of the community had invested in hybrid livestock thanks to government crossbreeding services and as a response to skyrocketing market prices. But limited availability of fodder and limited access to capital constrained this potential. Irrigated vegetable and fruit production were undertaken privately by a dozen farmers. The community wanted the *wereda* to help further investment in irrigation said to have high potential but budget constraints had prevented this.
- 46 Agricultural trade seemed to have increased, mainly on local markets. This ranged from small-scale activity for many households with many young women and men getting an income as small-scale retailers, to larger-scale trade in coffee, grain, livestock and eucalyptus. A few coffee traders had links with markets in Addis. Larger-scale trade was a source of wealth for better-off households. There seemed to be potential for greater market integration.
- 47 On the one hand, market prices encouraged local production. However, given the scarcity of land only a few households produced surpluses; and all were affected by continuously rising prices of foodstuff, services and agricultural inputs. The local farming economy was not self-sufficient. Local wage labour, said not to exist in 1995, had become the main income source for 42 adult men and many young men. There were 53 government or NGO employees and 32 businesspeople and skilled workers. A few people offered transport services to raise an income. A few hundred young people (mainly women) worked in a recently built coffee-washing plant for 3-4 months in a year, slightly better paid than unskilled daily labour.
- 48 Migration had remained very important in the local economy, with several significant changes. Male seasonal migration in Ethiopia had decreased, and longer term illegal migration abroad had emerged as a major new trend. Men increasingly went (illegally) to South Africa. Women had started to migrate as well, something unthinkable a decade ago and which came with women's comparatively greater freedom. They migrated in Ethiopia to work in flower factories, private farms and as housemaids in Addis and Awassa. In the past two years they had also started migrating to Arab countries as

housemaids. The investment required, especially to go to South Africa, was considerable and risks were high. But the gains in case of success seemed to also be considerably higher than from migration in the past.

- 49 It is unclear whether the community was wealthier as a whole. People talked about proportionally more poor, very poor and destitute households in 2012 (one estimate was 60%) than there were households in poverty in 1995 and in 2003. But there were very wealthy households and the difference between wealthiest and poorest might have increased. Migration was one factor behind some of this wealth.
- 50 Kambata society has a longstanding tradition of valuing education. So, just 2% of the primary school age children were not enrolled. However, like in 1995 the loss of labour/income of children at school was an issue for poor families. If they were not supported those children often attended irregularly, dropped out early or were not able to continuing their education even if they passed the exams. Generally, expectations of a better life linked to education used to be high. However, these were starting to be challenged: many children failed at exams, unemployed educated youth from the *kebele* numbered in the hundreds, and the prospects of rapid gains through migration lured many. An increasing number of students dropped out, from Gr6 onwards and the school head teacher feared a further snowballing effect.
- 51 Indeed illegal migration abroad was mainly by young people. At home youth lacked livelihood prospects; they were often dependent on their parents longer than in the past. Migration partly mitigated what otherwise might have given rise to intergenerational tensions; it also allowed grown-up children to support their families, as is expected in Kambata society. However, the community was troubled by this situation. Already in 1995 the lack of opportunities for the youth was raised as a big issue over which the government needed to be more active. In 2012 there was a sense that government action was increasingly irrelevant for the youth. In contrast the young generation was fully involved in the Protestant Churches which 95% of the community had come to belong to.
- 52 The local modern repertoire in Aze Debo'a was wide-ranging. Migration was part of it in two ways: for some people it was desirable or at least inevitable whereas for others it was unacceptable. There was a sense that its illegal nature and the lack of any protection by the government were not acceptable. While the much influential Protestant Churches did not directly intervene in this debate, it is likely that the Protestant ethic, stressing the importance of hard work and encouraging people to 'improve their life' and get wealthy, indirectly contributed to strengthen the attraction of migration. Migration also influenced the way in which young people thought about leading their life on their return: many migrants invested in businesses straddling urban and rural livelihoods.

Past and future trajectories

- 53 This section first outlines the past trajectories of the two communities between 1995 and 2012, highlighting similarities and differences. Then in conclusion we focus on possible futures of rural communities in Ethiopia. First in relation to Harresaw and Aze Debo'a, we note that international migration has the potential of shifting the communities on to a structurally new path. We then briefly explain how this is part of an approach that we intend to continue to develop in the course of the WIDE3 research,

of identifying key factors that might lead different types of rural communities to structurally change or reproduce over time.

1995-2012 trajectories

- 54 In 2011/2 there was continued pressure on and perceived deterioration of natural resources and decreasing land fertility in both Harresaw and Aze Debo'a. Government-led rehabilitation activities had intensified but their effectiveness was seen as long term in any instance. The weather had changed, with more erratic rain patterns; drought had continued to recur in Harresaw and seemed to have become more frequent in Aze Debo'a. The young generations faced the prospect of ever more constrained access to land. In Harresaw the government was trying to address this through land reallocation but it was far from being sufficient.
- 55 At the community level agricultural income had increased, thanks to higher livestock production in both and irrigation in Harresaw, expansion of cash crop in Aze Debo'a, high market prices for farm products and easier access to markets. In Harresaw there was a sense that an increasing number of households were on a fairly recently started upward trajectory. In both communities agricultural potentials and returns were unevenly distributed among households and on the whole the farming economy was not self-sufficient.
- 56 Rising and unmet expectations of the young better educated generation, land scarcity and greater weather uncertainty undermining farming, limited access to alternative options and greater exposure to ideas and information from outside all contributed to increased and rising levels of (mainly youth) outmigration. Outmigration was not new in either community but patterns had changed, with less seasonal agricultural migration elsewhere in Ethiopia and more international illegal migration. This also involved young women, which was a new development.
- 57 Economically, in Aze Debo'a lack of access to credit was said to be among the factors pushing people to migrate. In contrast in Harresaw, it was the widespread indebtedness after the 2008/9 drought which prompted a sharp increase in migration abroad in the first instance; in 2011 some youth were borrowing to migrate (under other guises); and migration could still serve to repay debt. In both communities successful migration abroad had a big impact on the migrants' families in terms of consumption and investment. It injected large flows of funds in the local economy but also beyond as migrants and their families invested in urban areas or in businesses linking urban and rural areas and often at least some members of the family migrated there.
- 58 In both Harresaw and Aze Debo'a one factor tying migration more specifically to youth was a growing sense of hopelessness with education (failures at exam, high costs of higher education, unemployment of educated people). Ironically this was occurring at the same time as opportunities to reach higher education levels were opening up for more young people.
- 59 Youth had emerged as a social category in its own right in both communities. Yet, while the government discourse presented them as the future, in practice they emerged mainly as a 'problematic' category (AKUA ANYIDHO et al 2012) and lacked voice. In Aze Debo'a the sense of disenfranchisement might have been stronger possibly leading to opposition to government. In turn, the difficulties faced by the youth in establishing

independent livelihoods undermined the social norm whereby grown-up children support their parents. Under the circumstances, migration had become the best hope for young people to meet these family and social expectations in addition to their own aspirations.

- 60 In both communities, the ‘progressives’ were convinced that non-/off-farm activities were indispensable and beneficial, and the shift of at least a part of the young generation away from farming was seen as somewhat inevitable. But illegal migration abroad sharply divided them into two camps: those for whom it was desirable or at least inevitable and those for whom it was unacceptable. In Aze Debo’a in addition, there were people stating that the government should make legal migration easier and ensure that the rights of migrants are protected. In any instance, migration abroad impacted the communities’ social fabric as much as their economies. It had a powerful influence on youth’s role models.
- 61 The size of this phenomenon in terms of estimates of numbers of people involved, costs and potential returns differed. In Harresaw several hundred people were leaving every year (350-500) including young women (50 in 2011). The cost of the journey amounted to 4,000-5,000 birr. Families rented land, sold assets or got money from migrant relatives to be able to send someone; or individuals borrowed. In Aze Debo’a about 20 young men undertook to migrate in South Africa every year; in 2011, 50 young women left for Saudi Arabia and this was increasing. The trip to Saudi Arabia cost 7,000 birr. For South Africa it was 30,000 birr for the riskier and longer route, and 100,000 birr for a bribed visa allowing direct travel. Families sold land, woodlots and other assets or got funds from relatives who had already migrated; or young men pooled funds and sent one of them who then sent money for the others to join.
- 62 In Harresaw savings/remittances amounted to tens of thousands birr. One man explained that he had 50,000 birr in debt payment, savings and remittances and was able to build a house in Harresaw in addition. Others built houses in Atsbi or Wukro or invested in a truck. Young women might invest in starting-up a shop. In Aze Debo’a returns appeared to be much higher in some cases. For instance one young man who was first robbed 100,000 Rand saved another 1.4 million birr in addition to sending remittances (25,000 birr several times); he invested in a house, a hotel and a truck in Durame. In both cases, some people also involved in illegal activities which could have much higher returns still, but were even riskier.
- 63 So at first glance, migration in Saudi Arabia in Harresaw was more widespread than to South Africa and the Gulf in Aze Debo’a; but returns were potentially much higher in Aze Debo’a for migrants in South Africa, and the trend of young women leaving for the Gulf was only starting.

Possible futures

- 64 In both communities, possible futures will depend on the balance that emerges between farming, agricultural trade and off-/non-farming activities. This in turn will depend on how much it will be possible to make farming less perilous, how fast infrastructure development facilitating further market integration will occur, and how much it will be possible to open up attractive non-/off-farm options, locally and elsewhere, for the growing number of better educated young people. Aze Debo’a may be better placed on the latter two counts: it seems likely that in future it will be further

connected to the zone town Durame and the asphaltting of the main road to other zones and cities should accelerate the development of Durame and its suburbs as a trading and service centre.

- 65 In relation to farming in both communities the limiting factors are structural (small landholdings, deteriorating weather and natural resources). Bar a drastic change in land policy the first factor (landholding size) will not change and the others, only slowly considering the size of investment and time needed to rehabilitate natural resources. Aze Debo'a may again have an advantage as it has yet to tap its irrigation potential, although this would need to be done cautiously. In Harresaw it is not clear that there is much potential for increasing the area under irrigation.
- 66 In all likelihood migration—and within this migration abroad—will remain a necessity. In spite of the high risks migration abroad may well continue to increase in its *illegal* form. Its deep impact on the communities' economy and social fabric and in particular, the strengthening of the rural-urban links which migrant returnees and their families prompt are likely to put the communities on a structurally different trajectory. Whether this trajectory is upward, stagnating or downward will depend (among other factors) on the sustainability of international migration as an option. This in turn will depend on how the government handles this policy issue.
- 67 International examples of countries like the Philippines and Indonesia show the benefits of facilitating legal migration abroad (helping people to move instead of wanting to move people). Although it has costs, politically and economically, this approach may well have to be part of those that the government considers in order to move toward 'green and sustainable development' in some parts of the country.


Further thoughts on rural communities' futures

- 68 In the WIDE 3 research the team is looking at the possible shorter-term futures of the twenty WIDE3 communities as exemplars of sets of Ethiopian communities with similar characteristics. At the time of writing this paper the team has begun to do so for fourteen of them (BEVAN 2013). We have concluded that among these, nine communities (eight of them food insecure like Harresaw and Aze Debo'a) seemed to be on the verge of structural change due to international migration for some, urbanisation or increasing urban linkages for others, and irrigation development for yet others. In the remaining five communities, there was growth in three while the other two were stagnating.
- 69 We have also started thinking more broadly about longer term change of rural communities in today's context in Ethiopia. This led us to reconsider how we think about the aspects of any rural community which, taken together, have a governing influence on its trajectory. We identified four 'big' parameters with ten sub-parameters, as:
- *Place*: terrain, settlement and climate (how 'easy' is it to live and farm in the community); remoteness (access to markets etc.)
 - *State of the local economy*: farming system (what is produced); agro-technologies (how is it produced); livelihoods diversification (what else do people do to earn a living)
 - *Political settlements*: community fault-lines; society-government relations

- *Wider context*: relations with neighbours; cultural imports; strategic location (e.g. what economic plans does the government have for the wider area).

70 We plan to use this new framework with the data on all twenty communities to ‘*identify which of the parameters seemed to be in (how much) control of the way in which each community is working*’ (BEVAN 2013). This paper is one of the blocks on which we will build to develop this approach. Here we suggest that international migration, as a constituent of the ‘wider context’ big parameter, has been playing a major role in shaping the trajectories of Harresaw and Aze Debo’a and one which, for these communities and others in Ethiopia, may well exceed that of most of the other parameters identified so far.

Map: Harresaw (Eastern Tigray) and Aze Debo’a (Kambata) in the WIDE villages



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
Agropastoralism in Transition: Comparison of Trajectories of Two Communities in Oromia and the Southern Region

Alula Pankhurst

p. 441-460

- 1 This paper compares trajectories of two food-insecure agro-pastoral sites: Gelcha in Eastern Oromia inhabited by Karrayu, and Luqa in South Omo in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) in Tsamay territory. The sites are part of the WIDE (Wellbeing Illbeing Dynamics in Ethiopia) project studying longitudinal changes in 20 Ethiopian rural communities since the mid-1990s. The other 18 sites were part of the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey for which baseline data are available from the mid-1990s. To include a couple of pastoralist sites with background data, these two were selected since they were studied by Ethiopian anthropologists, in the later half of the 1990s¹. Some further baseline data were collected in 2003 and research upon which an understanding of the current context is built was carried out 2010 in six sites (BEVAN, DOM, PANKHURST 2010) and in late 2011 and early 2012 in 12 sites².
- 2 Following this introduction section 2 outlines contexts of rapid change from the second half of the 20th century based on anthropological accounts, followed by a comparison of salient similarities and differences. Section 3 presents a picture of the villages in 2012 identifying changes since the late 1990s. Trajectories of the two sites are compared mainly in terms of livelihoods but also briefly considering society and government and women's conditions. Section 4 compares potential future prospects of the sites.

Gelcha (Oromia) and Luqa (SNNP) among the WIDE sites



Map designed by A. Pankhurst.

Historical context and transformations until the late 1990s

Gelcha: A Karrayu site in Eastern Oromia³

- 3 Gelcha is a *kebele* in Fantalle *Wereda*, Eastern Shewa Zone of Oromia Region, inhabited mainly by Karrayu, who migrated from around Borana in the 16th century reaching the current Fantalle area some 200 years ago, and pursued a pastoralist lifestyle until the mid-20th century. Major livelihood changes resulted largely from external interventions from the mid-1960s. Inter-linked factors of external investment, resource-based interethnic conflicts, gradual sedentarisation and greater market integration brought about transformations in the economy and social organisation leading to multiple marginalisations over three decades.
- 4 The establishment of the Metahara Sugar Estate in 1965 led to loss of crucial dry season grazing, burial and sacred sites, and watering points. Karrayu protested but did not receive compensation and there have been clashes over the years, though some Karrayu have obtained employment as guards and others as seasonal labourers.
- 5 The Awash National Park was established in 1968 on about 50% of Karrayu grazing lands. Karrayu protests to the Emperor led to land compensation promises which never materialised; Karrayu settlements within the boundary were destroyed, and fines have been imposed for livestock entering the park. Karrayu lost valuable watering sites, access to dry season grazing, and migration routes, leading to conflicts especially in drought years.
- 6 The expropriation of about 60% of Karrayu territory by the park and plantations has increased resource based competition with neighbouring groups notably Ittu, Arsi Oromo, Afar, Argobba and Amhara, particularly in the context of in-migration of Ittu and Somali groups.

- 7 The sedentarisation of Karrayu and their involvement in agriculture came in response to inter-related factors including loss of land to investments, reduced pasture and land pressure with in-migration of other groups, limitations to seasonal migration in search of pasture with increased inter-ethnic conflict and more permanent settlements in wet season grazing areas due to borehole construction, competition from urban-based herding, and in-migrating Ittus' and town-based Minjar Amhara's involvement in agriculture and livestock rearing.
- 8 Though some poorer pastoralists losing stock settled earlier, permanent settlements began in earnest in the 1970s. Enclosures of land for agriculture (*qonno*) and grazing (*kello*) led to spontaneous privatisation, tenure regime changes and increased pressure on communal grazing. Karrayu formed the Akake development association in response to threat of land enclosures by external investors and in-migrants and sought but did not succeed to deal with investors.
- 9 Karrayu became more integrated into the market economy largely as a result of development interventions since the 1960s, establishment of Metahara and Haro Adi towns, and influx of in-migrant plantation workers. With decreasing herds, recurrent drought and sedentarisation Karrayu rely more on grain and increased sale of livestock to purchase food and consumer goods. Non-agricultural income sources are limited. Though the plantations mainly employ highlanders, Karrayu are engaged as guards and seasonal labourers, and impoverished pastoralists seek alternative livelihoods preparing charcoal, and as urban labourers, and women have become involved in market activities. Processes of sedentarisation and market integration have also led to greater differentiation with the rich better able to keep a foot in both pastoral and sedentary livelihoods.

Luqa: A Tsamay site in the Southern Region

- 10 Luqa is a *kebele* in Bena-Tsamay *wereda* of South Omo Zone in the SNNP Region.⁴ According to genealogical reckoning Tsamay have lived in the Weyto valley for at least 350 years. Luqa area was settled some 70 years ago, though the current *kebele* centre was established in the late 1970s when the road from Arba Minch to Jinka was built. There are more than a dozen ethnic groups in the Weyto and Omo valleys and Tsamay, who number about 10,000, have close relations with neighbouring groups notably Banna, Gewada, Birale, Maale, Hamar, Hor, Borana and Konso, involving marital exchanges, bond-friendships and mutual secondary access to pasture and water resources, and sometimes conflict, recently mainly with Konso in-migrants to the Weyto valley.
- 11 Water was a major constraint on settlement. From the 1940s one individual and then some agnatic groups started digging ponds, and engaging in flood recession hoe-based shifting agriculture with ditches to drain water to fields and ponds. Land access depended on belonging to territorial groups and investing labour in clearing fields. Other sources of livelihood included gathering wild foods, honey and hunting, and collecting incense. Tsamay allowed others secondary land and water access rights and also obtained use rights elsewhere through marital alliances and bond friendships especially during dry season transhumance.
- 12 A major transformation resulted from adopting plough cultivation, started by a Gewada migrant in the 1970s, rapidly spreading, increasing cultivated areas, resulting in land

pressure and decline in communal woodlands. Elders sought to regulate resource use including distribution of irrigated and flood recession land and in 1992 attempted to ban tree cutting. Agriculture remains erratic and cultivation precarious with under 600 ml of rainfall annually. Reliance on livestock⁵ and gathering wild foods are crucial, wild produce constituting up to a third of the diet.

- 13 A second major change came with allocation of 400 hectares on the Weyto River to a private investor growing cotton. The dam resulted in loss of flood recession agriculture and wet season grazing reserves. Tsamay were denied river access and livestock trespassing were fined 30-50 birr leading to resentment and clashes; promises of free access to crop residues did not materialise. The farm cleared land without leaving large trees unlike customary practice. In compensation 100 hectares were provided in exchange for payments, though much of the land was not fertile, the estate controlled the flow, and those who did not receive land felt excluded. Spraying of pesticides affected flora and honey production dropped. The farm attracted migrant workers from Konso and the Southern highlands. Only three Tsamay were employed. The Tsamay 'priest' and a few others were given incentives to promote the farm's aims undermining their legitimacy. In 1995 after a calf that strayed into the settlement violence erupted leading to death of 18 people on both sides, souring relations.
- 14 A settlement of migrants emerged and the area is increasingly deforested with trees used for housing, and migrants introducing charcoal production. Large numbers of male migrants also attracted commercial sex workers. A market emerged and Tsamay were selling beer, smallstock, butter, grain and gourds.

Comparing major similarities and differences

- 15 In both Gelcha and Luqa pastoralism has long been a major part of livelihoods and societal values, and both have undergone considerable changes internally and due to external influences and development interventions with processes of increased involvement in agriculture, sedentarisation, market integration and differentiation. Involvement in agriculture and establishment of settlements began in the mid 20th century and became important in the 1970s, in Luqa largely due to adoption of plough agriculture first introduced by a Gawada migrant, and in Gelcha in response to settlement and farming by migrant Ittu and Harar Oromo, and Somali. Agricultural and grazing land enclosures have increasingly undermined communal tenure regimes. In Gelcha this was partly as protection against in-migrants' land use.
- 16 Both Karrayu and Tsamay have pastoralist values depending on livestock though the former have camels as well as cattle and shoats whereas camels have only recently been introduced in Luqa. Tsamay have had longer involvement in flood recession agriculture and relied on gathering and hunting.
- 17 Both groups have agnatic exogamous clans and wider groupings into two sections as well as generation and age-set forms of politico-ritual organisation, with senior age-sets holding power and younger groups of youth involved in seasonal transhumance. The political role of age-grading institutions has given way to state incorporation processes but they have retained cultural roles.
- 18 Despite similarities there are three important differences in relation to external impacts. First, Gelcha is closer to the Ethiopian state centre on the Djibouti road and in the Awash Valley coveted for irrigated development since the 1960s, whereas Luqa is

much more remote in South Omo and remained isolated much longer; an all-weather road reached the area only in the late 1970s and irrigated development began in the Weyto valley from the early 1990s. Thus processes of incorporation into the national economy and pastoralist marginalisation show similarities but with a time lag of some 30 years in the remoter site.

- 19 Second, Gelcha was surrounded and affected by external development to a much greater extent over longer. The Awash National Park reduced Karrayu grazing areas by half, and the sugar plantation alienated vital dry season grazing, reduced access to the river and water points, and imposed fines for livestock trespassing. Conflict with the park and plantation have been ongoing with serious incidents from the outset and a standing peace committee involving elders. However, the plantation has provided labour for guards, access to cane residues, controlled use of outflow water, access to water from a camp settlement, and to schooling and health facilities for employees. In contrast Luqa is relatively far from the Omo and Mago parks and somewhat removed from the Weyto valley and irrigated development there, though other sites studied by Melese (2009) closer to the river have been affected much more seriously involving loss of customary irrigation and grazing areas, clearing of land, denial of access to the river, spraying of pesticides affecting honey production, and fines for trespassing. Thus Gelcha was 'in the thick of it' whereas Luqa was more of an 'onlooker'.
- 20 Third, the size and scale of external interventions in relation to local context was different. The Awash is a major river and irrigated development was extensive. In contrast the Weyto is a much smaller river, and irrigated development was limited.⁶ Karrayu numbered some 50,000 in the 1994 census whereas Tsamay were about 10,000. There were over 1,000 Karrayu working on the sugar estate but only three Tsamay on the cotton farm. Thus Gelcha by the 1990s had gone through major change with multifarious losses and accommodations, whereas Luqa was only beginning to feel impacts of external influences, though sites closer to the Weyto bore the brunt of effects of commercial agriculture.

The situation in 2012 and changes since the late 1990s

Gelcha

- 21 *a. Livelihood Changes:* The main ecological change was expansion of Lake Beseka submerging land used for grazing and irrigation, affecting ground water making it salty with a high fluoride content. The lake also swamped a school and cut off roads. A discharge canal was viewed as dangerous for children and small animals, and bridges across the canal cannot support vehicles and require seasonal maintenance. Respondents suggested that the main rainy season has become shorter, with rains more intense, starting and stopping earlier and winds have become stronger.
- 22 Conservation work in terracing and watershed management using food for work through the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) was appreciated primarily for the food. Karrayu had traditional rules discouraging tree cutting; awareness on deforestation risks was promoted by Development Agents (DAs) notably in the context of Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) meetings, and militias try to protect forests. However, there is demand for charcoal from urban areas and beyond and poor people

resort to this in secret as a survival strategy. Women had to go further in search of fuelwood. DAs promote enclosing grazing areas which has increased, though it creates conflicts over trespassing livestock and further reduces communal grazing. The community was told to respect the Park area; however in dry seasons and droughts people need pasture, leading to fines and conflicts with incidents even involving killings either side; a permanent committee was set up to resolve conflicts presided by the *Abba Gada*.

- 23 Settlement has become denser with increasing population, involvement in agriculture, wage labour in the sugar estate and further in-migration of Harar Oromo and Somali. Two settlements of in-migrants one Somali and other Oromo from Harar, began irrigation using the estate's discharge canal. Land enclosed by town-based Minjar Amhara was confiscated and given to Karrayu but later returned to them. Agriculture has expanded and about a fifth of the *kebele* land is used for rainfed farming, a tenth for irrigated farming, and forests represent another tenth.
- 24 The *kebele* centre now has an administrative office, full cycle primary school, health post, women's cooperative shop, teachers' houses, store, grinding mill and NGO office; none have electricity or running water though they have latrines. There is also a Farmers' Training Centre (FTC) used for meetings. Mobile reception started in 2009; many households have at least one mobile and communicate with relatives and townspeople, though people complain of high costs.
- 25 Urban linkages have improved with an all-weather road from the *wereda* capital Metahara to Haro Adi (Addis Ketema) town, both about 5 kilometres from Gelcha. Internal roads and bridges have been improved; some Gelcha residents own carts charging five *birr* per person. In emergencies *Bajaj* mechanised three-wheelers can be hired. Some households own bicycles.
- 26 Core livelihoods have been changing with more involvement in farming and some irrigation, though pastoralism remains vital. Rain-fed farming is precarious given rain shortage and unpredictability but gradually land enclosures for farming as well as grazing have spread. Irrigation from the sugar estate discharge canal allowed production of cash crops and some prospered but the flow is limited and sometimes stopped when not needed by the plantation. Attempts by the *wereda* to involve cooperative groups in irrigation with pumps at the Awash were not very successful: fuel and running costs were too high, working collectively was difficult, the main pump was rented out by the *wereda* to Afar, and most youth groups sharecropped out land to in-migrants. A new irrigation scheme is due to reach Gelcha and already people are trying to enclose land in anticipation.
- 27 Farm extension and new technologies have not been useful; despite promotion and training, improved seeds and breeds are not available, though inhabitants have benefited from veterinary services at the *wereda* and availability of drugs on the market.
- 28 A number of drought years particularly in 2001-2, 2004-5 and 2010 resulted in severe livestock losses, leading to food aid provision. In 2010 some households lost more than fifty cattle and many lost up to ten. The PSNP food-for-work and food aid have provided crucial buffers in recent years helping poor households overcome food shortage and avoid distress livestock sales. Community targeting included some wealthier households connected to leaders, with allegations that minority groups and

women were under-represented or excluded, leading to tensions and retargeting by sub-*kebele* committees.

- 29 The water situation showed some improvement in the 2000s with NGO boreholes and access to water from the plantation workers' camp. However, the boreholes became salty with the expansion of Lake Beseka affecting groundwater and were not maintained. Drinking water remains a serious problem, with some using polluted water from the plantation outflow, others from the Awash, those living close to plantation settlements from a pipe, and some purchasing drinking water from Addis Ketema.
- 30 Initiatives to promote women's and youth cooperatives were sponsored by government and NGOs. The women's grinding mill and cooperative shop failed but the livestock fattening and youth sand and stone collecting cooperatives were fairly successful, although they face competition from individuals working informally. Government credit to cooperatives stopped due to debts of former cooperatives and the NGOs have moved on.
- 31 Market linkages increased as reliance on livestock products was affected by herd decreases; purchase of food, spices, coffee husks, *chat* and consumer goods has increased. With smaller herds the diet has become less milk-based; cereals have become more important as well as other foods such as pasta and rice; fish and chickens that used to be taboo are now consumed. Households increasingly purchase plastic and metal utensils.
- 32 Recent inflation has resulted in increasing prices. A few Karrayu involved in trade suggested demand had decreased; those with salaries and pensions as guards were finding it difficult to make ends meet. Diversification involved more rainfed and irrigated agriculture, jobs and wage labour in the plantations and urban areas, and non-farm activities -mainly youth stone and sand cooperatives.
- 33 *b. Changes in society and government:* The role of clan leaders and elders remains strong notably in dispute resolution. Clans are involved in arranging bridewealth and blood money. The *wereda* administration appreciates the clans' role in dispute resolution. However, attempts by clans to punish members for breaking social norms, sometimes involving flogging and dunking in the Awash, have been opposed as infringements of individual rights. The *wereda* administration has sought to involve local leaders in settling disputes with the park and the plantation, and a permanent peace committee with the Park is chaired by the ritual leader, the *Abba Gada*.
- 34 Muslim and *Gada* religious leaders also play key societal roles. Wahabi preachers have become more influential in Koranic schools and mosques. This led to women wearing scarves and boys avoiding trousers, and controversies regarding the number of daily prayers; the *wereda* supported the traditionalists against the new preachers. Though political influence of the *Gada* system was eroded there was a resurgence of *Gada* cultural practices. The *Gebella* age-set rituals which took place in 2011 and 2012 were celebrated with interest from local and regional administration and media and support mustered by the *Abba Gada* from local businessmen.
- 35 Regarding extension services, there are now more workers acting as go-betweens in promoting change, with teachers for the school and kindergartens, two DAs, one for crops and the other for livestock, and two Health Extension Workers (HEWs). The DAs and HEWs are from the same *wereda* and one HEW is from Gelcha itself; they tend to commute from town.

- 36 The formal *kebele* structure involves the new position of *kebele* manager, an employed official from the community, the *kebele* administration with the chairman and cabinet and the *kebele* council with 300 members which last met a year ago.
- 37 Below the *kebele* there are three zones and below these *garé* development teams with about 30 households; at the lowest level the recent 1-5 network structure of six households with a leader is used to mobilise labour for community work. There are about 200 EPRDF members and the party structure goes from *kebele* to zone and cell levels.
- 38 Regarding security there are 20 militias but no community policeman.⁷ The social court's jurisdiction was restricted but it was involved in land boundary disputes. Gelcha residents are not keen on going to the *wereda* court and police and there have been allegations of bribery. However, the militia recently cooperated with *wereda* police to catch car thieves on the main road going past Gelcha. Most disputes continue to be resolved by elders. Livestock theft by unemployed youngsters selling them to hotels and traders has increased. More widely periodic incidents with Afar and Ittu over livestock raiding continue, though peace was made with Arsi Oromo.
- 39 c. *Changes in women's conditions*: Despite resistance from prevailing patriarchal conservative values, women's positions in society have been changing particularly among the younger generation and for politically active and entrepreneurial women.
- 40 In terms of livelihoods some women have been able to gain a degree of independence through involvement in small-scale trade and sale of livestock products, food and beverages. NGO sponsored income-generation activities for women through cooperatives did not work well though loans were useful especially for livestock fattening. A women's cooperative with a grinding mill failed so that grain needs to be taken by horse cart to towns. Due to deforestation women have to go further to collect wood and cane residue for livestock from the plantation. Water wells built by NGOs no longer function and drinking water is brought by women from ponds, the river, outlet canal and for those close to the plantation settlement from a pipe there, while others buy water from town transporting it by cart or bicycle. The gender division of labour has hardly changed; women carry out the bulk of domestic work, build traditional houses, (though now men are building houses following in-migrants using mud and some employ skilled builders), engage in agriculture and some of the work looking after livestock. Children and especially girls going to school increased women's burden particularly tending livestock. Girls help mothers if not at school or after school and some boys bring water by bicycle, herd livestock, sometimes collect firewood, but do not engage in domestic work, though older boys sometimes fry eggs from themselves.
- 41 Politically, despite some formal measures and attempts to organise them, women still have limited involvement in community affairs, apart from a handful of politically active women. There is a woman *wereda* councillor; a women's association was already established in 2001 and a woman's league recently but neither are functional. However, women are now able to talk with men and attend meetings unlike previously when they were even supposed to avoid passing men.
- 42 Women have benefited from interventions in health; two women HEWs commute to the health post from the nearby town, uptake of mother and child services has increased, and contraception is promoted with NGO and government support. There was a significant increase in girls' education with a primary school in the *kebele* and

kindergartens in the three zones. Out of 20 students who took the 8th grade national exams in 2011 five were girls. Very few have gone on to university or private colleges. There are also girls attending quranic education. Children want to go to school and are resisting herding. Though there are few employment opportunities young women (the health extension worker is from the community and completed grade 10) exposure to education for girls is gradually affecting their ability to make their own decisions notably on marital choice.

- 43 Culturally, some marriage customs are being questioned including parental choice of partner, early marriage, abduction, bridewealth, widow inheritance, and polygyny, especially marrying young girls to older men as second wives. Some women are resisting these customs and have been able to insist on divorce, though conservative repertoires are still strong, and women resisting often cannot obtain a share of property and are not allowed to remarry. Muslim education for girls, and wearing of scarves is gaining ground. Female circumcision is strongly believed in and continues to be practiced by most despite promotion against it by NGOs and government through women's organisations and schools.

Luqa

- 44 *a. Livelihood changes:* Forested areas and bushland have been increasingly cleared for farming and wildlife has decreased. Traditional natural resources management and the *kebele* administration with DAs try to prevent tree-cutting though there is limited enforcement. Farming encroachment was stopped from Ero grazing area with concerted efforts of elders and *kebele* officials. An area of 260 hectares on Oro Dangere mountain was demarcated for protection by DAs; bunds were constructed with food-for-work; grass regenerated and some spring water was observed. A youth cooperative was allocated rights to collect incense and resin in exchange for protecting the area, which some people try to use despite the prohibition.
- 45 Terracing was organised along Dengogo hills. The community worked for four days a month and over 250 people participated under the DA through their new structure of 1-5 groups. Check dams were constructed and some improvements were reported by the DA. She noted, however, that there was poor participation and limited willingness to work without food aid and that quality of the work was questionable.
- 46 The climate is said to be changing with temperatures increasing, streams drying up, rains becoming more erratic and sometimes stopping early, resulting in frequent droughts and pastoralists having to go further in search of grazing. Reliance on agriculture is becoming more problematic, with less rainwater bringing fertile soils to fields. In 2010 a severe drought led to serious crop losses; many people migrated to neighbouring *kebeles* in search of grass and water for livestock. Malaria remains a constant threat with a serious outbreak in 2011.
- 47 Settlement density has increased during the EPRDF period with people leaving the hilly areas and moving down to the flat land especially near the *kebele* centre.⁸ The recently completed asphalt road from Arba Minch to Jinka attracted house building and a few shops along the main road over the past three years especially near the centre.
- 48 The *kebele* centre has an office, first cycle primary school, health post, women's cooperative shop, store, teachers' and other extension workers' houses, NGO office, church and private grinding mill. A veterinary post is under construction; residents

brought wood to construct a FTC. Internal roads link the seven sub-*kebeles*, though they require seasonal maintenance.

- 49 There is no electricity in the village except for the solar panel in the *kebele* office used to power the telephone and charge mobile phones. The telephone worked for two years from 2008 until the *kebele* did not settle bills. Mobile reception is available on higher ground 10 to 15 kilometres away; many households have mobiles communicating with relatives and townspeople in emergencies and traders find out about prices and arrange transport of goods. People also enjoy listening to music on mobiles.
- 50 Urban linkages improved since the main road was asphalted and transport has become available. People used to walk to Key Afer market even for minor items spending the night, incurring expenses. Now they can travel on back of trucks or by minibus, paying 10 birr to new town at Weyto and 15 birr to Key Afer returning the same day. There is a new weekly Friday market. People sell livestock, butter, cereals (maize and sorghum), vegetables such as tomatoes and *aleko* (*Moringa* leaves), *sur* (a snuff-like stimulant), *cheqa* (a local beer), wood, charcoal, and handicrafts. In recent years traders began to buy goats and sesame, a new cash crop. People also go to Key Afer to the health centre and a private clinic in Weyto and students to the hostel for pastoralist children in Key Afer.
- 51 The core livelihood system has also been changing with more farming involving digging ditches to fields to collect flood water. According to *Kebele* statistics out of 1,489 hectares about 35% is used for farming, 20% for forest and 11% for private grazing enclosures. Of the remainder 18% could be used for farming, 19% is infertile and 6% bushland. However, farming is precarious and livestock and transhumant pastoralism remain vital for livelihoods. Some enterprising households have been able to acquire irrigated land at the Weyto River.
- 52 Extension services sought to introduce improved maize and sorghum varieties in the early 2000s but the community preferred their own varieties, and seeds were provided too late. In 2011 some farmers obtained improved seeds and fertiliser at the Weyto irrigation; some grew fruits notably mangoes and bananas. The most important innovation was introduction of sesame as a cash crop which people bought from people irrigating at the Weyto after agricultural experts mentioned the high market value.
- 53 Borana camels were introduced by an NGO on credit and have begun to be used for milk and meat but not yet for transport. Borana cattle were also introduced on credit and are popular. Debts for improved goat varieties provided by extension services had not been paid back and introduced Wolayta chickens were liked by some but were said to be susceptible to disease and quarrelsome.
- 54 The area is drought prone;⁹ recent serious droughts were reported in 2008/9 and 2010/11, and many livestock died. Although the *wereda*, unlike others in the zone, was not classified as eligible for PSNP support, food aid was provided; households resorted to selling livestock especially goats to buy grain, and borrowed grain mainly from relatives. There was flooding in 2010 resulting in crops losses, and pests affected crops in 2006/07.
- 55 The water situation improved with several NGO and government built boreholes. However, several are not working and maintenance remains a problem; in contrast traditional ponds are well managed and maintained by localised social groups.

- 56 Women's and youth cooperatives were promoted with NGO support. The women's cooperative had a shop and grinding mill and sold food and drink but failed, though a women's cooperative providing loans for livestock was fairly successful. A youth cooperative is involved in livestock trade and another in protecting an enclosed area to harvest incense.
- 57 Commercial farming has increased on the Weyto River. There are now two more investors and investors are using about 7,300 hectares between them. Luqa residents go regularly to the Weyto market. Market linkages have increased mainly due to the newly asphalted road, creation of a market in the centre and easier access to Key Afer and Weyto markets. A few Tsamay are involved in livestock trade. Those producing sesame as a cash crop have done well. People are worried about increases in grain prices, and items such as soap, salt, batteries for lamps, matchboxes, and clothing. There is very little diversification and virtually no wage labour locally. A few traders employ assistants and the destitute sometimes work for richer households.
- 58 *c. Changes in society and government:* The elders and clan leaders play important societal roles especially in dispute resolution and life cycle rituals particularly men's initiation and reburial rites. The *wereda* appreciates the elders' role involving them in initiatives such as banning harmful traditional practices, but is wary of their involvement in gender-related cases.
- 59 Most Luqa inhabitants are believers in traditional religion though Protestants converts notably to the Kale Hiwot Church, have been gaining ground since the mid-1990s, after some fierce resistance -the earliest convert being flogged -and now represent about 15%, with increasing youth conversions.
- 60 There are more extension workers acting as go-betweens in promoting change, with teachers for the school, two DAs one for crops and the other for NRM, and two HEWs (one still to be assigned) and a vet. Both DAs are women, one coming from the zone and the other from the *wereda*, and the HEW and vet who is also female are also from the same *wereda*.
- 61 The formal *kebele* structure involves the new position of *kebele* manager as an employed official (the current one is from the community and completed grade 5), the *kebele* administration with the chairman who is no longer salaried, the cabinet, and the *kebele* council with 200 council members (29% women), which is supposed to meet every three months but last met after the 2010 elections.
- 62 Below the *kebele* seven villages have development teams and below them 1-5 networks of six households have a leader, a structure established in 2010 after the GTP meeting to encourage development. Almost all households were said to be EPRDF party members.
- 63 Regarding security recently a community policeman was assigned though some people did not know; there are militias at sub-*kebele* level though they are not armed. The social court had its jurisdiction curtailed; it is not considered very effective but settled some disputes notably over land. However, most disputes are resolved by elders and clans. There was an increase in fights in the market place after men drink alcohol. More widely, conflict with Konso over land by the Weyto has continued.
- 64 *d. Changes in women's conditions:* Despite resistance from conservative patriarchal values, there have been changes for some women, especially among the younger generation and some enterprising and politically active women. Some women have earned income

as traders selling food and beverages or fattening livestock for sale. Some benefited from NGO loans for small businesses. Two private grinding mills have reduced women's work though some still grind grain manually. Five water points, two of which are functioning, one of which has a wind vane built by an NGO have reduced time fetching water though maintenance is a problem, and those living far from the centre rely on ponds.

- 65 The gender division of labour has hardly changed; women carry out the bulk of domestic work and engage in weeding, harvesting, and some work looking after livestock (though not milking). Girls help mothers if not at school or afterwards and boys not at school herd, but boys do not engage in domestic work though older ones may cook eggs from themselves.
- 66 Politically, despite formal measures and attempts to organise women, their roles in the community remain limited, apart from a handful of few politically active women. Out of 200 councillors only 58 are women. There is a woman in charge of women's and children's affairs in the cabinet who is also the deputy speaker. The women's association is not functional and the league has not been established.
- 67 Women have benefited from the health centre (downgraded to a health post) with a female HEW, and some mother and child services, and contraception usage was already reported in 2003. Girls' education has benefited from the new primary school (grades 1-4) and UNICEF providing incentives of food for girls attending regularly. Beyond grade 4 there is a hostel for pastoralist children in the *wereda* town. Only a few girls have attended, some escaping abduction or the custom of abandoning *mingi* children believed to bring back luck. There are, however, very few opportunities for boys let alone girls to find employment. Several female extension workers from the *wereda* and zone, including two DAs, a vet and a HEW no doubt serve as role models.
- 68 Culturally, patriarchal values are still very strong and women are married off in exchange for bridewealth. However, with girls' education, *wereda* influence in opposing gender-based harmful traditional practices and spread of Protestantism, customs of early marriage, abduction, bridewealth, widow inheritance, and young women marrying older men as second wives are being challenged. However, women divorcing or refusing widow inheritance cannot obtain property or remarry. There is no custom of female circumcision among Tsamay, and pre-marital sexual relations are allowed, though women have to abort if they become pregnant prior to marriage or the child will be considered *mingi* bringing bad luck and abandoned. There was success in opposing this practice with government and NGO advocacy involving customary leaders.

Comparing major similarities and differences

Comparing livelihoods

- 69 Regarding the ecology in both sites respondents suggest that the rains have become more erratic and the rainy seasons shorter starting later and ending earlier. Both sites have also been prone to serious droughts, most recently in 2010, depleting livestock and triggering the provision of food aid. While Gelcha is part of the PSNP programme, Luqa is in a *wereda* which has not been included.

- 70 Despite customary natural resource management rules for water and tree use, increasing population and settlement has led to deforestation and in both cases private grazing and increased cultivation is undermining communal tenure regimes. However, in Luqa community elders and the *kebele* have been fairly successful so far in resisting infringement on grazing land.
- 71 Interventions for conservation using food for work were more popular for the food with limited interest in the work, though in Luqa a protected area seemed to be regenerating and was given to a youth group to protect and exploit for incense.
- 72 Gelcha faces serious problems of water shortage and pollution, and Luqa water shortage in areas far from the centre. Gelcha faces the added challenge of the Lake Beseka expansion reducing available land and affecting groundwater and irrigation potential so that depending on where they live people use water from ponds, the Awash, polluted discharge from the plantation, from a settlement pipe or purchase water from the town.
- 73 Regarding settlement in both cases there was increasing density, though in Gelcha this was largely due to influx of Ittu, Harar Oromo and Somali in-migrants becoming involved in agriculture some intermarrying and incorporated through clan adoption. In Luqa Tsamay allow migrants secondary access to resources; given labour shortages Tsamay men often marry additional Banna wives, though apart from a few Gewada there are no established groups of migrants unlike the Ittu and Harar Oromo and Somali in Gelcha.
- 74 Major changes in both sites are the development of *kebele* centres with administrative offices, schools, health posts, extension workers' housing, grinding mills, stores and NGO offices. This was more rapid and is likely to change faster in Luqa since the centre is on the newly completed asphalt road.
- 75 The mobile network has transformed communications with relatives and business contacts in town, though in Luqa the coverage currently only reaches certain parts away from the centre. Transport to towns has also improved, with horse carts and bajaj available in Gelcha and lorries and minibuses in Luqa.
- 76 Livelihoods still depend on livestock and pastoralism. Rain-fed agriculture has increased but remains precarious, though there is more potential for rain-fed flood recession cultivation in Luqa with sesame becoming a cash crop and more irrigation in Gelcha from the plantation discharge canal; the Weyto is further in the case of Luqa and only a few have managed to obtain irrigated land. In both cases some of those with irrigation have done fairly well. Agricultural extension and improved seeds have not been very useful in either case, though in Luqa improved breeds of camels and cattle have been popular.
- 77 There was promotion of women's and youth cooperatives with NGO support in both cases, though with limited success apart from livestock fattening in Luqa and sand and stone extraction in Gelcha.
- 78 Both sites have become more integrated into the market purchasing more food and limited consumer goods; a few men have become involved in trading livestock and a few women in small-scale trade.

Comparing society and government

- 79 Both sites had strong customary belief system linked to age and generation grading institutions and exogamous clans linked to wider groupings that are involved in arranging life cycle celebrations notably marriages and securing bridewealth, youth initiation and in Luqa reburials, as well as in conflict resolution particularly relating to bloodwealth payments.
- 80 External religious influences were felt much earlier in Gelcha that became largely Muslim with the influence of in-migrating Ittu from the middle of the 20th century; in Luqa Protestants became active only from the mid-1990s. Whereas Gelcha is now basically Muslim and traditional practices are limited to ritual and cultural age-set ceremonies, Luqa is still largely composed of traditional religion followers though Protestantism has made rapid inroads. In Gelcha there was a split between more conservative and tolerant Muslim tendencies and more fundamentalist and stricter tendencies promoted by Wahabi preachers, with the former so far dominating with *wereda* support.
- 81 Major changes in relation to go-between change agents have been involvement of more extension workers including several teachers, two DAs and two HEWs and in Luqa a vet. Several of these are women including all the HEWs by design and in Luqa the two DAs and the vet. More come from the same *wereda* and some of the HEWs from the *kebele*.
- 82 The *kebele* administration was reorganised with chairmen no longer salaried and the new position of *kebele* managers, and *kebele* councils and representatives on the *wereda* council. The manager has become a link person with the *wereda*; the councils and representatives on the *wereda* council do not seem to be effective.
- 83 Regarding sub-*kebele* organisation there are territorial sub-divisions with development teams of around 30 households and below them a new structure of 1-5 networks comprising six households including a leader, which was promoted under the GTP implementation trainings to promote mobilisation and agricultural development.
- 84 Regarding security in both sites there are militia and in Luqa a community policeman was assigned. The jurisdiction of the social courts was restricted; they are not considered effective though they have solved land boundary disputes. In Gelcha theft of livestock and in Luqa disputes at markets after drinking have been increasing.

Comparing women's conditions

- 85 In both sites patriarchal values continue to predominate but there have been changes for women especially among the younger generation. Economically some enterprising women have become engaged in trade and livestock fattening, and some benefited from NGO loans. There was improvements in reducing women's labour fetching water from boreholes and grinding grain at mills in Luqa whereas the women's cooperative mill in Gelcha failed and the boreholes became salty and broke down. The division of labour involves women bearing the brunt of domestic as well as agricultural and some livestock work, and children going to school has increased their workload.
- 86 Politically, women's formal organisations have not been functional, and they have limited involvement in *kebele* politics except for a few active women, though women's cooperatives have been providing loans which have been useful.

- 87 Major changes in women's health came from expansion of availability and use of contraception and mother and child immunisation. Girls have benefited from going to school and in Luqa there have been incentives for them to do so, though few proceed beyond primary school which in Luqa involves going to the hostel in the *wereda* town, and fewer to secondary or tertiary education let alone obtaining opportunities of employment. However, role models of female extension workers and wider benefits of education about gender issues, notably on women's rights and marital choices are beginning to have an impact.
- 88 Culturally, bridewealth has become less important and parental decision-making on marital choices is beginning to be challenged. Girls are also resisting being married off as second wives to older men, undermining the practice of polygamy. The custom of widow inheritance is also being challenged and some widows refuse the practice or have sought and obtained divorces. There are still few divorce cases and rights of divorcees to property are not enforced and they are expected not to remarry. In Gelcha female circumcision is still strongly believed in, whereas in Luqa the custom is not part of the cultural repertoire. In Luqa the custom abandoning of children born before marriage and considered to bring bad luck was successfully stopped through joint action of government, NGOs and customary leaders. In Gelcha Muslim fundamentalist tendencies are leading to women wearing scarves and some girls attending quranic education.

Trends and possible future(s)

Gelcha

- 89 Based on the current trends dependence on pastoralism is likely to continue for some time though it may decline to some extent given recurrent drought, decreasing communal pasture, limits to transhumance and possible further resource-based conflict with neighbouring groups. Enclosures for grazing and for rainfed agriculture will further undermine communal grazing, but agriculture will remain precarious given limited and erratic rainfall.
- 90 In Gelcha irrigation potential from the sugar plantation outflow is unlikely to increase. However, a major change is the planned irrigation project from the Awash due to reach the village in 2013. This is already generating attempts to enclose land in anticipation, and is likely to result in major changes with more households engaging in irrigated agriculture or sharecropping with migrants.
- 91 Cash crop production could bring about some prosperity and differentiation. The irrigation scheme is also expected to bring much needed clean water and electricity, which could bring about significant changes in health and wellbeing and result in Gelcha becoming more integrated in the market economy. The sand and stone extraction cooperatives could grow as long as there is enough demand and their production is not undercut by private entrepreneurs. There is likely to be further differentiation in the community as some households earn more from cash crops, and invest in other source of income such as shops and bars etc.
- 92 Relations with the sugar plantation and park are likely to continue in a similar vein with some clashes particularly at times of drought but benefits from the plantation in

terms of employment and access to cane residues. Relations could deteriorate if further irrigated expansion is undertaken or the park claims the Fantalle area that was gazetted.

- 93 Another planned change that will bring about major transformations is the proposed incorporation of Gelcha into the Metahara town administration. The centre of Gelcha is only 5 kilometres from Metahara and already the small town of Haro Adi which used to be part of Gelcha was hived off as part of Metahara town administration. The expansion of the town could potentially lead to displacement and closer urban and market linkages.
- 94 Changes in education for the youth and greater integration into the economy may well bring about societal change in generational and gender relations, though youth unemployment and involvement in 'bad habits' is a discouraging factor. Countervailing tendencies to modern urban secular influences are the increase in Muslim fundamentalist attitudes, and the cultural resurgence of conservative customary *Gada* age and generation grading *gebella* rituals. Some youth have been exposed to Protestant sects in towns.

Luqa

- 95 In terms of livelihoods pastoralism is likely to remain important; increasing land enclosures for private grazing and for agriculture can be expected to grow and pressure on communal grazing areas which was resisted so far will increase. The recent trend of sesame production as a cash crop will probably continue assuming market prices and weather trends are conducive, possibly leading to some differentiation.
- 96 Involvement in irrigation at the Weyto may increase despite the distance as long as access can be negotiated with those already irrigating, with the government and the investors. Given the high water table irrigation could be promoted; if the hot spring borehole used by the road construction agency which has completed its work is handed over together with the generator this could enable the development of irrigation and cash crop production.
- 97 The youth incense harvesting cooperative might succeed if members can work well collectively and protect the enclosed area. Further differentiation in the community is likely as some households earn more from cash crops and invest in other source of income such as grinding mills, shops and bars.
- 98 Increased traffic and investment in the Omo Valley as well as tourism potential could stimulate development of road-side settlement by the *Kebele* centre with more shops and cafes, attracting truckers. Relations between local government and peoples over increased investment in the Weyto and Omo Valleys and consequent resource expropriation and potential displacement could have knock-on effects in Luqa.
- 99 Plans to build a second cycle primary school next year with community contributions to add to the first cycle of grades 1-4 will allow students to continue up to 8th grade rather than having to go to the hostel in Key Afer. This should result in more students reaching higher grades and make it easier for girls; some students could go on to secondary and tertiary education and may find employment despite limited opportunities. This could also stimulate inter-generational change and promote improvements in gender relations. Potential plans to upgrade the health post back to a

health centre could lead to more uptake of primary health care at the village level if adequate drugs are available and better-trained HEWs are assigned.

- 100 Further changes in gender relations may come about due to the active policy of promoting women's rights which could lead to abandoning the practices of abduction, polygyny and widow inheritance. Government interventions against customs defined as harmful and the growing influence of Protestantism, particularly among the youth are likely lead to the weakening of traditional male *gore* initiation rituals, and the *gilo* reburial customs.

Trajectory comparisons

- 101 Given the marginal climate and erratic rainfall pastoralism is likely to remain a critical component of livelihoods in both sites for the foreseeable future. However, this is likely to be increasingly constrained with greater pressure on grazing land from investment and agriculture and increasing enclosures will further erode customary resource management. Growing pressure on natural resources may well also exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions leading to less accommodating contexts for secondary use rights by people from other groups.
- 102 Despite risks rain-fed agriculture is likely to increase especially in Luqa where sesame has proved to be a viable cash crop and in Gelcha against competition from in-migrant groups. The potential for irrigation development is imminent in Gelcha with the new scheme due to reach the village soon leading to tensions over anticipatory land-grabbing. This will bring about very significant changes in food security, cash crop production and may affect inter-ethnic relations as in-migrant labour will probably be sought; the irrigation will result in internal differentiation, which may partly depend on the extent of cooperative organisation which has had a poor record so far. In Luqa irrigation from groundwater would require pumping, and greater access to irrigation on the Weyto may well be constrained by distance and competition with investors and Tsamay living closer to the River, with less significant changes in the near future.
- 103 Diversification is likely to involve more fattening and sale of livestock; this is more likely to proceed through individual initiatives rather than the cooperative model which seems to be failing in both sites. However, there is some potential for non-agricultural cooperative activity in both sites: in Gelcha the sand and stone quarrying and in Luqa the youth incense cooperative. In both sites more men may become involved in trading livestock and women in producing and selling food and beverages and other goods. Luqa may well develop as a roadside stop for truckers and some residents may prosper in setting up hotels, shops and providing services.
- 104 Relations with external investments may well not change very significantly unless the scale of investment increases, though knock-on effects from other investment could be significant. Gelcha seems to have reached a *modus vivendi* with the plantation and park, though further conflicts could be sparked by drought or expansion of investment. In Luqa effects of the Weyto and Omo investment do not seem to have been felt much so far, although the development of markets and roadside traffic and improved communications have had some positive effects.

Conclusion

- 105 Gelcha is likely to change faster with the new irrigation scheme providing not just livelihood opportunities but also clean water and electricity. The plan for at least part of the area to become incorporated in the *wereda* town administration, would have far-reaching effects on land use probably resulting in displacement, greater market integration and differentiation.
- 106 In Luqa effects of investment in South Omo are more likely to have indirect or knock-on effects, in part through increase traffic through Luqa and possibly also on relations between Tsamay and investors on the Weyto and relations with other groups affected more directly by investment in the wider Omo Valley, and general government promotion of sedentarisation.
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FOOTNOTES

1. Ayalew Gebre in Gelcha and Melese Getu in Luqa.

2. The research in 2011-12 was carried out by Aster Shibeshi and Tefera Goshu in Gelcha and Asmeret Gebre Hiwot and Demissie Gudisa in Luqa. I gratefully thank them for their contributions. I also wish to thank Ayalew Gebre and Melese Getu for their support and insights enabling me to gain a better understanding of the local contexts. I should also like to thank my colleagues Philippa Bevan, Catherine Dom, Rebecca Carter, Agazi Tiumelissan and Mengistu Dessalegn for their invaluable collaboration and the J-GAM fund for financing the research. I wish to thank Asmeret Gebre Hiwot and Tefera Goshu for comments on this draft.
3. This summary outline of the historical context relies on the book produced by Ayalew Gebre based on his PhD research carried out in 1997-1998 (AYALEW 2001).
4. This summary outline of the historical context relies on the thesis produced by Melese Getu based on his MA and his PhD research carried out in 1997-1998 (MELESE 1995, 1997, 2000)
5. Among households surveyed by Melese average livestock holdings were 18 cattle, 18 sheep and 17 goats (MELESE 1997).
6. In contrast to what was happening on the Omo (ABBINK 2012).
7. There is one in *kebeles* bordering neighbouring groups and one for three *kebeles* in other areas.
8. In 1997 there were 715 people in 127 households in Luqa, by 2011 there were 2,059 people in 566 households suggesting significant in-migration and settlement from the highlands.
9. A 2007 *wereda* report suggests that 2006 was a very bad year and 2000 and 2007 were bad years (EPARDA 2007).

AUTHOR

Alula Pankhurst

Some Considerations on the Limits of Valuing Indigenous Knowledge in Development Interventions: The Case of the Garri Pastoralists of Southern Ethiopia

Francesco Staro

p. 461-470

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- 1 This paper focuses on institutional change related to water resources management among the Garri pastoralists inhabiting southern Ethiopia's lowlands along the Ethio-Kenyan border. I analyze contemporary practices of water management in the light of a participatory model and valorisation of local environmental knowledge, which nowadays constitute a major concern of international development organizations working in these regions.
 - 2 Today a main feature of water usage among these groups is characterized by the spread of private hand-dug water points, a practice that started to grow in number in the early 2000s according to local informants. Ownership tenure does not involve strict and clearly demarcated individual rights, and water access is distributed through personal negotiation and daily bargaining. This kind of water point is quite simple in structure and combines different techniques, as it may either draw from shallow aquifers or collect water run-off. Nowadays private water points are regarded as more important than communal wells which constituted the main water sources in past times.
 - 3 The diffusion of private water points among the Garri questions the relevance of the "community-based natural resource management" model. Privileged in the current development interventions, this model invites to examine the implications of the contemporary distribution and usage of these water points on "participatory development". However, this common approach tends to consider the "local community" as a static and holistic notion, while the usage of natural resources in general rather reflects the plural dynamics of social change. In Southern Ethiopia as in

other parts of the world, the practices of water management are the changing combinations of plural—and often conflicting—social relationships, rooted into different historical layers.

- 4 The case of the Garri illustrates how local knowledge related to natural resource management cannot be viewed simply as the expression of “ecological wisdom”, providing an optimal usage of natural resources (AGRAWAL 1995, SILLITOE 2002). Indeed, the present Garri populations rather consider relation management as a much more relevant type of knowledge. The capacity of activating social relationships of different nature (based on kinship, commercial activities, political alliances) is then openly valued to get water access and cope with the different actors engaged in the local field of natural resource usage (traditional authorities, government officials, NGOs).
- 5 In my analysis, which draws upon the results of field work carried out in Moyale and Hudet in 2011 and 2012, new forms of water point ownership should be considered as a means for reconfiguring “local community”. Changing ideas of property, rights and entitlement to water access must be considered as part of a new form of social organization among Garri groups.

The quest for “indigenous knowledge”

- 6 In southern Ethiopia, valorisation of local knowledge through participative approaches constitutes a backbone of development interventions related to natural resource management. This model started to be implemented in the early ‘90s, following the dismissal of a “top-down”, modernist development approach characterized by high technological transfer.
- 7 Anthropology questioned the possibility of isolating indigenous knowledge as a specific field that can be outlined and put at the disposal of development planners. Firstly, a participatory approach aiming to value indigenous knowledge often assumes that this knowledge is homogeneously distributed within a local “community” (MOSSE 1994). As we will see, the case of the Garri illustrates that current practices of water management results from political differences and economic cleavages within Garri society. This case shows that analysis of natural resource management and knowledge regulating their usage has to be framed in a wider context of social and economic change. From this perspective, a new form of water ownership regime is only one among different factors that must be considered. Other variables must be taken into account such as changes in decision-making process related to water usage due to external interference (colonial and government authorities, NGOs), dynamic of wealth differentiation, linkages with regional commercial markets, migrations and demographic pressure over natural resources (BROKENSHA and LITTLE 1990).
- 8 Secondly, the multiplicity of indigenous knowledge has been stressed. Development discourse takes for granted that local knowledge can assure an optimal usage of natural resources, and especially water, considered as “rare” resources, although conservation may not be the primary goal of natural resource management among local populations, and different logics governing natural resource usage may be at stake. The discursive construction of scarcity as natural and universalized characteristic of water resources, reproduced at local level by relief and humanitarian agencies, contributed to a homogenization of diverse perspectives on water, and to reduce cultural complexity of

this resource (MEHTA 2001). Adopting an anthropological approach to indigenous knowledge implies an acknowledgment of different “ideas” of water, thus recognizing many criteria regulating water management.

- 9 This complexity can be observed from an historical point of view. In semi-arid areas of the Horn of Africa, despite current emphasis on “participation” and valorisation of “indigenous knowledge” in development discourse, local knowledge including knowledge of the environment has long been at the centre of social relationships between pastoralists, colonial and state authorities.¹ During colonial as well as postcolonial times, “indigenous knowledge” was discredited and considered as an obstacle to “modernity”. Different prejudices oriented the implementation of development activities in pastoral areas of the Horn of Africa: nomadic groups came to be represented as «either as unpredictable nuisance or even a threat, or (at best) as a resource to be tapped and exploited in the ‘national’ interest» (DOOMBOS 1993:118). In northern Kenya, these representations legitimated interventions such as demarcation of grazing and water boundaries and the implementation of irrigation schemes (HOGG 1987, BROKENSHA and LITTLE 1990). In southern Ethiopia as well, water constituted the main tool through which colonial and national authorities extended their control over local populations, with “water development” being the cornerstone of a political project to settle nomads (GADAMU 1994). Pastoralists were perceived by external planners as unable to conserve the rangelands, and their practices of resource usage considered as the main “cause” of deterioration of the vegetation and the decrease of stock carrying capacity,² due to overpopulation or land mismanagement. In modernization discourse, water development and irrigation schemes were intended as the “remedy” to incorrect ecological practices of pastoralists, who came to be considered in terms of a “problem”.³
- 10 External interference over water and land management prompted changes in the social organization of local groups. This has to do mainly with modification of local decision-making processes due to a decline in political power of local authorities in natural resource management, where elders were traditionally responsible for deciding the date of opening of dry-season fodder reserves and water points, impeding permanent settlements and persecuting herdsmen who did not comply with the rules.
- 11 From the late 80’s, the top-down, modernist approach that governed interventions in pastoral areas started to be questioned due to the perceived failure of development projects. If official documents issued by international development organizations in the ‘60s were still reporting that “perpetuating nomadism would in the best of cases represent a waste of potential agricultural land” (cited in BOCCO 2000: 202), an emphasis on rehabilitating traditional indigenous knowledge emerged in development discourse as a new paradigm for intervention. Through concepts like «non-equilibrium environment», flexible management and abandonment of blueprint planning, a new development paradigm recognized the need to preserve the mobility of pastoralists, instead of relying them to remain at specific sites. Despite this change in approach, emphasis on valorisation of indigenous knowledge did not mean a step towards recognition of the social embeddedness of natural resource management. In planners’ outlook, “the value of water resource” continued to be determined exclusively by ecological factors without paying attention to multiple social and political relationships.

- 12 In the Convention on Biological Diversity invoked in the 1992 Rio convention, the environmental dimension of development was given special attention, together with the affirmation of the principle of preserving indigenous environmental knowledge. The dimension of “autochthony” became a reference criterion for development projects related to natural resource management, being local population advocated as competent for conservation of nature and culture (DAHOU 2011). The World Bank’s initiative of instituting a “Database of Best Practices on Indigenous Knowledge” exemplifies at best cultural assumptions that characterizes development’s outlook over this issue. Indigenous knowledge is defined as the knowledge which “belongs to a specific ethnic group, which is locally bound, indigenous to a specific area, culture-and context-specific”.⁴ Such a perspective reproduces an idea of knowledge uniformly shared within a given community, which is seen as bounded to local dimension, and separated from economic and political networks.⁵ This approach fails to recognize that indigenous environmental knowledge is not isolated within “tradition”, but reflects recent and ongoing changes between local populations in their environmental relations (ELLEN 1999).
- 13 In southern Ethiopia, attention started to be paid not only to customary regulations for conflict resolution and cooptation of local leaders to mediate and settle disputes (PANKHURST and ASSEFA 2008), but also to local knowledge and traditional social institutions governing natural resource management (HELLAND 1998, OBA 1996). Development agencies started to look up for local interlocutors to implement projects, without acknowledging that forms of local authority had evolved over time due to influences of colonial administrations and Ethiopian governments. Emphasis on indigenous knowledge in development discourse almost coincided with federal restructuring of Ethiopian state and demarcation of regional boundaries alongside ethnic borders. Ethnicity and primordialism influenced both national politics and development discourse (KEFALE 2010), and relief agencies started to implement participatory approach grounded on the assumption of cultural specificity, where each ethnic group is supposed to have its “own” culture.
- 14 Despite change from modernist to sustainable development approach, and the shift from imposition of “scientific rationality” in natural resource management to the valorisation of indigenous environmental practices, “indigenous knowledge” continues to be conceived “as neutral information that can be provided like any other commodity if it is properly organized, archived, and transmitted” (MOLLE 2008:148). This perspective fails to acknowledge that what is important in “indigenous knowledge” is how it is used in different contexts from social actors in order to pursue specific needs. In other words, what is still missing is a recognition of the «political nature of natural resources management» (MOLLE 2008: 133).

Private water point among the Garri

- 15 The Garri are the most important of the pre-Hawiya Somali clans (LEWIS 1955: 26-7; KASSA 1983). Studies analyzing the formation and development of various ethnic groups in this area postulate that southern Ethiopia’s lowlands continuing into northern Kenya were inhabited by population sharing a common culture of camel pastoralism antecedent to Oromo and Somali expansion (TURTON 1975, SCHLEE 1989).

- 16 Historically, the Garri became the main commercial partner of Oromo Borana groups thanks to their prominent role in controlling caravan traders. Alongside with commercial cooperation, relationships between local groups were constructed through local agreements to fetch water at deep wells known as *Tula* in Oromo, perennial water sources whose importance is strategic to run pastoralist activities during dry-season. Among the Borana, every *Tula* belongs to a specific clan, and clan identity is an important reference to accord water access.
- 17 Garri are engaged in different economic activities (pastoralism, commerce, farming and occasional agriculture), which implies that they are not restricted to local kinship relationships as are subsistence-oriented herders (SATO 1996: 292). This is relevant also for contemporary practices of water management, where kinship relations based on clan or lineage membership is only one among many criteria that can be “used” in order to distribute water rights. From the early 2000s, Garri pastoralists inhabiting the areas around Moyale and Hudet started to construct private hand-dug water points. Usually constructed in clusters, these water points are used for watering cattle as well as for domestic consumption. They are closed during rainy season and do not exceed 4 meters deep, collecting rainwater or exploiting a shallow aquifer located not far from small seasonal streams. During excavation, the presence of a type of grass or a tree species can help selecting the location; as the excavation begins, the identification of a limestone (locally known as *katchawa*) confirms the presence of water in the basement. The particular type of ownership and management of private water points has also been stressed (GOMES 2005, STARO 2013). One or more herdsmen may finance construction works, and this gives them entitlement to priority rights and decisional autonomy in defining the watering order.

Which / whose “indigenous knowledge”?

- 18 Private hand-dug wells are shallower compared to traditional ones, and water can be fetched more easily, without the need of involving a large number of people. In a situation of high drop-out rate from pastoralism and settlement in urban areas, this kind of water point turns out to be a suitable strategy to comply with scarcity in labour force to look after herds and manage water distribution. Nowadays pastoral activities are carried out recurring to hire workers, while members of the same clan or lineage carried out these activities previously. The choice of herders to take care of livestock, as a Garri herdsman explains, “is largely a matter of trust”. The practice of private water points cannot be considered simply as a response to water scarcity, or just referring to a “Garri tradition” in natural resource usage.
- 19 A higher degree of independence from traditional social institutions regulating access to natural resources (especially the role of the *abba herega* (“father of the watering order” in Oromo) which used to regulate water access at communal wells before the spread of private water points) comes along with a reconfiguration of clan and lineage belonging, which nowadays is not considered a preference criterion to select the collaborators to run pastoralist activities as it was in the past.
- 20 Two major features characterize management of this type of water point:

A system of turns to water animals

- 21 A three days system regulates water distribution at privatized water points, being the first two days reserved to the owner(s) and the third available for users who have reserved their turn. During the first two days, there are no particular constraints the owner is expected to follow. Therefore he may give priority to those who have financially contributed to the realization of the well, or decide the watering order using different relationships (kinship, commercial alliances, political contracts between lineage groups).
- 22 Allocation of water rights is based on reciprocal relationships of trust and daily negotiations. Water bargaining between Garri herdsmen results in a higher degree of decisional autonomy from *kebele*⁶ interference in natural resource management. This practice allows the Garri to extend their control over the rangeland, and implies a higher degree of decisional independence in planning nomadic movements across administrative boundaries.

Different forms of payment

- 23 Water access can be paid in money, which is coherent with Garri's economic diversification and multiple interconnections with regional markets. For the watering fees, there is a difference between cattle and camels. For camels, the pastoralist is supposed to ask each time access to water for the day by providing in exchange a few litres of milk. For cattle, he will apply to the well's owner by providing an amount of money (usually 100 to 200 birr), which will entitle him to use the water point for the entire dry season.
- 24 If the new form of ownership regime may reflect economic stratification among Garri herdsmen, arrangements regulating water rights are not limited to monetary transactions, and payment-based water access cannot be considered just as a mere source of vulnerability for poorer households. Through water agreements, which are highly flexible and contextual, kinship as well as other type of relationships are continuously re-defined and re-negotiated. Kinship relationships are still relevant for natural resource usage among the Garri, even if agnatic relationship is only one among many criteria that can be used to grant water rights. This in turn corresponds to recognizing flexibility of lineage model among Somali pastoralists, which overlaps with other informal networks of decision-making and is constantly adapted to real situations (LEWIS 1961).
- 25 During interviews, distribution of watering right based on clan or lineage membership has been defined as a "bad habit" that Garri people should erase and forget, even through training activities organized by development organizations. A marginalization of traditional social institutions like the role of the *abba herega* in the decision-making process for water access distribution can thus be observed.

"We need our community to be trained on the issue of lineage relations and the disadvantage that may arise out of it. My community needs lineage memory to be eroded" (Author's interview with Garri pastoralist in Chamuk kebele, Moyale Wereda, 14/11/11).
- 26 These considerations are relevant in order to understand local representations of development, expectations regarding humanitarian interventions, and the impact of

“participatory approach” in the framework of development projects. The demand for external intervention in order to reduce kinship importance as a reference criterion for assigning watering rights is contradictory with development organizations’ attempt to value indigenous knowledge regulating natural resource usage. The focus of traditional social institutions in the framework of development programs may be faced with a situation where these institutions do not respond any more to needs and priorities related to natural resource usage among local population.

Conclusion

- 27 The current quest for indigenous knowledge and community-based natural resource management has to be placed within a wider social and historical process, and observed taking into account a long history of external interference on local environmental practices among southern Ethiopia’s pastoralists, which in turn deeply influences how natural resources are used and shared nowadays. The spread of private water points among Garri pastoralists cannot be considered simply as a practice to cope with water scarcity. This case demonstrates that local knowledge and practices of water management does not deal as much with the need of preserving water, but rather with “managing” social relationships among resource users. Management of private water point is deeply concerned with the need of re-organizing pastoral activities beyond clan or lineage boundaries. This purpose is accomplished through change in ownership tenure, where social relationships of different nature (based on kinship, political contracts between lineages, economic cooperation between herdsmen) are the basis for distribution of water rights.
- 28 Besides, the practice of private water point results a consistent strategy to counteract the high degree of interference from state authorities as far as nomadic movements and access to land are concerned. That is why analysis of impact on pastoralists’ livelihoods should not be limited to assessing economic stratification, weakening of poorest pastoralists and “intrusive penetration” of market economy in Garri society. In this way we wouldn’t take in account cultural complexity of water contracts, and how different relationships are negotiated through the watering order. Adaptation of indigenous knowledge related to water usage serves as a mean of reconstructing local community in a changing social and ecological environment. We should not consider the diffusion of private water points among pastoralist groups as a mere result of the weakening of traditional social institutions regulating water access distribution. Such an analysis risks to reflect an «hegemonic temporal view of environmental change in development discourse» (MOSSE 1999). In this perspective, a mythical time of “equilibrium” – where indigenous knowledge was collectively shared and reproduced – is countered with a time of “decay”, where a break up of indigenous knowledge undermines moral integrity and social cohesion within a given community. This interpretation, which recalls the contraposition between tradition and modernity, prevents from considering different social, economic and political relationships that give rise to change in environmental knowledge.

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FOOTNOTES

1. CORNWALL (2006) analyzes various “permutations” of discourses of participation during colonial and post-colonial times.
2. This concept is good example of how sociocultural complexity of natural resource can be disregarded. The “value” of rangeland is defined only taking into account the size of herds that can be fed, without considering local agreements and social relations regulating grazing rights. As Hobart observes, scientific knowledge “requires the homogenization and quantifiability of what is potentially qualitatively different” (1993:6).
3. A FAO report advocating for construction of irrigation scheme in northern Kenya refers that «(...) no solution of the Turkana problem is possible by which all the people can continue their traditional way of life» (FAO 1964:2).
4. <http://www.unesco.org/most/bpindi.htm>, consulted in September 2012.
5. Social scientists played a major role during colonial and post-colonial times in “mythicizing local community” as a homogeny and unified unit of analysis. Ethnographic attention focused on locality often reinforced a reified and functional vision of agnatic social institutions and kinship relations, seen as a predominant criteria governing social life in rural societies, thus failing to acknowledge multiple networks and agency of social actors (DAHOU 2011).
6. The lowest administrative unit of Ethiopian state.

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Agribusiness, Cultural and Social Changes in the Ethiopian Lowlands

Alain Gascon

p. 471-480

- 1 Since the beginning of the 21st century a growing population and a rising industry demand have generated a continuous rise in the prices of agricultural products all over the world. Large firms, mainly from Asia, have rushed to the southern hemisphere, especially to Africa, in order to secure huge land concessions. Africans have suffered from the undeserved reputation of practising backward subsistence farming. Ironically Africa does have a huge reserve of vacant land available for intensive “modern” production in spite of recurrent food shortages.
- 2 Since 2009 the Ethiopian government made a selection of between 3 and 4 million ha (1/7 to 1/5 of cultivated land) from “empty” land in the western regions to start huge commercial farms (ENGELS 2012). They will concentrate on mechanized monoculture for export when 7 % to 11 % of the 87.1 million Ethiopians have to rely on food aid. Would it not be more sensible to invest in subsistence agriculture? Thousands of displaced agro-pastoralists in the lowlands could hardly be employed in these farms where a few technicians can take care of 1,000 ha. Will these enclaves of machinery facilitate the integration of the western *marches* into the core of Ethiopia? Officials are running the risk of destabilizing the often-troubled Gambēlla region as well as neighbouring (and fragile) South-Sudan.
- 3 This contribution¹ deals with the Gambēlla *kəlləl* where huge concessions have been leased to multinational groups. The Ethiopian government has channelled these agribusiness investments to sparsely populated peripheral regions because they remembered that the previous expansion of commercial farms had been the cause of agitation among the peasantry on the eve of the 1974 Revolution (GASCON 1994). All this when the Gambēlla region was only firmly united to Ethiopia as late as 1956 with the independence of Sudan. During the Sudanese civil war thousands of refugees had found shelter in this *marche* of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian army has had to intervene a number of times since 1991 because of clashes between the native inhabitants and the recent

migrants from the highlands; in neighbouring South-Sudan political unrest still prevails.

The Gambélla Kellel



Map designed by A. Gascon.

A race to the western lowlands

Ethiopia as a victim of land-grabbing: a continuing debate

- 4 The 2008 food crisis in Ethiopia was overcome without any serious unrest. In November 2009 the Agricultural Investment Agency announced through in *The Daily Monitor* that 3.2 million ha of “unused” *sic.*) arable land were available for agro-industry investors. The Internet sites of Ethiopian (*Addis Fortune*, *Abugida Info*) and international newspapers (*IRIN*, *The Guardian*, *The Irish Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *UPI*, *Le Monde*) as well as sites of the opposition (*nazret. com*, *Anywa Survival Organization*, *Anyuak Media*) and of humanitarian and ecology militants (*Oakland Institute*, *MNCH*, *agricultures Network OCHA*) relayed the arguments against the government’s initiative.
- 5 It was easy to collect data about land-grab in Ethiopia: the concession holders were listed in *The Macroeconomic Handbook 2010* and the Ministry of Agriculture gave details on leases and annual rents (MOA 2011). Officials are not reluctant to justify the programme: Wändirad Wändäfräw, Minister of Farms declared, “ *They [the agro-pastoralists] have to abandon their previous way of life*” (VIDAL 2011). As to the late Prime Minister, he said: “ *Where there is land unutilised that could be used by farmers business, then it makes sense for us to encourage private-sector economic development of this business to farming land*” (FITZGERALD 2010). The Ethiopian newspapers published the President’s answer to the letter of the Godarē wäräda officials who had drawn his attention to what they considered to be a land-grab in their district in the Gambélla kəlləl. Conversely the Sudanese government has concealed the fact that its members had grabbed for

themselves irrigated land in the new Merowe Dam Scheme (TALEB 2009). In South-Sudan² and in Somalia warlords have expelled farmers and pastoralists in order to steal their ancestral land (SCHLEE, 2007).

- 6 However this apparent profusion of sources could be explained because the various sites have been copying each other. Entries differ only on figures — the size of the concessions, the rates of the leases, the workers' salaries —, on the locations and on the transcriptions of place names. Therefore I decided to use *Google Earth* to visualise the progression of clearings in the outskirts of the town of Gambēlla. It was difficult to judge on location as until 2010 it took several days in a 4x4 vehicle to reach this very remote region. There are three domestic flights a week to Gambēlla but no transport once you get there and land concessions are heavily guarded.
- 7 A few years ago however I had the opportunity to visit Baqqoo (Wällägga, Oromiyaa) before land was allocated to *Karuturi* in the Gibē valley. In the light of this experience and of the recent study by Dessalegn Rahmato I can reasonably hope to have a critical approach of the reports recently published in the media (DESSALEGN RAHMATO 2011).

Who will win the race?

- 8 The international agribusiness groups who have started farms west and south of Gambēlla have seen smaller businesses settled around them but we lack information about them. The first rose producer in the world, *Karuturi Global* from Bangalore, had already developed its flower production in Holäta and in Wäliso in the vicinity of Addis Abäba (GASCON 2013). The Gambēlla regional government granted a 50-year lease to this Indian group for a 100,000 ha concession (possibly 300,000 ha in the future) on the left bank of the Baro river for *Berr* 20/year/ha (\$ 1.1). They are planning to grow 3,000,000 metric tons of cereals (wheat, sorghum, maize and irrigated rice: 10,000 ha for each crop). Sixty-five thousand hectares will be cleared by huge tractors to make room for 15,000 ha of sugar cane and a nursery of 100,000 palm oil seedlings necessary to plant 20,000 ha of palm-trees. *Karuturi* promised to create 20,000 jobs (expected to rise to 60,000) to be paid *B* 10 a day (in other farms *B* 8). But up to now, only 11 contracts (*B* 2,500-4,500: \$ 200-400 a month) have been signed with local executives under the supervision of seven Indian experts.³
- 9 Generally speaking mechanized farms generate few full time jobs (4 per 1,000 ha) and extra seasonal labour (often women) is required for weeding and harvesting. Because the drainage of the Duma Marshes and the Baro dyke were built too fast to be properly completed, 20,000 ha of maize were flooded by the river in October 2011 and \$ 13 million were lost. In Baaqoo, halfway between Addis Abäba and Gambēlla, *Karuturi* signed for 10,900 ha at a rate *B* 135/year/ha (\$ 8) with a free initial period of six years. Palm trees are going to be planted, and rice and maize (4,000 ha), will be grown in place of subsistence crops: *nug* and *t'ëff*. Oromo peasants were evicted from their grazing land on the pretext that they had no written evidence of their rights.
- 10 Journalists also reported discontent among farmers because promised daily wages dropped to *B* 20-25 to *B* 8 a day while the value of their livestock fell because of shrinking pastures: “*The company came to hurt us, not to help us*” (TAMRAT G. GIYORGIS 2009). *Saudi Star*, the other major group was set up less than 10 years ago by Saudi investors and Sheikh Al-Amoudi, an Ethiopian-Saudi millionaire⁴, to produce flowers for export. He is the managing director of MIDROC, the first private group in Ethiopia

(transportation, industry, tourism, finance, agribusiness, computing) and he was by all accounts one of the late Prime Minister's friends. *Saudi Star Agricultural Development Plc* was granted 10,000 ha free for the initial 6 years and with an option on 300,000 ha south of Gambēlla and 30 km downstream from the Abobo Dam on the Aloworo River (FITZGERALD 2010). The farm has the free use of 22 m³/sec of water from the reservoir built in the *Därg* [the junta] times. It will produce 1 million tons of rice of which two-thirds will be sold in the Middle East. *Saudi Star* is expected to create 3,000-4,000 jobs in the proposed Gambēlla Rice Processing Factory. The group purchased machinery and tractors for \$ 110 million and plans to invest a total of \$ 1.8 billion in projects located in Däbrä Zäyt, in Bēnə Šangul and in Harärgē (VAN KOTE 2012).

- 11 In 2010 the Indian *Ruchi Agri Plc* was granted 25,000 ha by the Gambēlla Investment Agency for 25 years in the Fuñido *wäräda* to grow soya bean. It now plans to expand its farm to 250,000 ha along the banks of the Gilo River. In 2010 *ARS Agrofood Plc* started a 6,000 ha farm in Abobo and Itang with cotton (50%), sesame (30%), soyabean (10%) and groundnut (9%) and created 50 permanent jobs (plus seasonal workers) with Ethiopian and Indian supervisors. This project required a \$ 4.9 million investment and it will yield B 15.6 million (\$ 900,000) the first year and a total of B 172.5 million (\$ 9.95 million) for the next 10 years. *BHO Bio Products Plc* (India) signed an agreement with MOA at the rate of B 111/ha a year (\$ 6) for 27,000 ha of palm, cereals, and pulses in the Itang special district. *Huanan Daf* (China), *Sannati Agro* and *Vedanta* (both from India) will grow sugar cane, rice, pulses, cereals, tea, bio-fuels, and spices.
- 12 In an attempt to fend off criticism *Karuturi* and *Saudi* are planning to finance the official programme of “voluntary” villagization-resettlement concerning 15 000 farmers. *Karuturi* plans to allocate a 1 ha plot to each worker for their own family use. These companies are engaged in road building, construction work, water distribution and keep solar power in mind. Whether these demonstrations of good will manage to convince the Anuak hunters to stop their raids from their shelters in the Gambēlla National Park and to appease the fear of the possible settlement of Indian migrants remains to be seen? (PEARCE 2011)

Regional integration and/or land deprivation?

A 'new frontier' for Ethiopia

- 13 We must bear in mind that 1.1 million ha (VIDAL 2011) or 875,000 ha (VAN KOTE 2012) that is to say one third of the available land for agribusiness were distributed to 896 firms in 2011. The indigenous regional peoples have suffered a major and brutal change as a result this land reallocation process. Nearly 11,000 km² were divided into large 100,000 ha farms for international groups and into 200 ha plots for small Ethiopian entrepreneurs who were granted 42.6 % of the total area (25,802 km²). In 2010 Ethiopia offered three million hectares to Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) while 700,000 tons of food were imported: is this a contradiction? (VIDAL 2011)
- 14 It is not easy to make an assessment of the consequences of the brutal irruption of mechanized monoculture in Ethiopia. Will the Ethiopian balance of payments improve and what of its “balance of food”? We cannot answer this question because the oldest farms have only been operational for four years and because we have little information about smaller local entrepreneurs. In fact, only large groups have published results but

we know nothing about their selection process, about the origin of their funds or about the part played by personal ties with officials. About three-quarters among them seem to have connections with Təgray (the late Prime Minister's *kəlləl*) or with the government coalition (LEFORT 2011).

- 15 Officially the allocation of "virgin" land to private companies is not in contradiction to the Constitution which has established the State as the eminent landowner and attributed the management of natural resources to the regional states. The present regime defeated "barracks socialism" in 1991 and promoted free enterprise but introduced the 1975 Land Reform as well as the *qäbälē*, the local committee that control cities and countryside, in the Constitution. State farms however — former commercial farms nationalized by the *Därg* — were either privatized or distributed to small farmers. Since 1991 the adherents of a *status quo* and the supporters of an open market of land have been engaged in a tough debate, which was reported in the media: will private initiative inevitably boost agricultural production or not? (CREWET and KORF 2008)
- 16 Up to now the increase of food production has partially followed the population increase despite the security of tenure. In absolute terms more Ethiopians do rely on food aid but since 1970 their proportion has remained between 7 and 11% of the total population which rose from 20,000,000 in 1970 to 42,000,000 in 1984 and 87,100,000 in 2011⁵. The opposition site *nazret.com* reported a brutal turning point in 2009: "*After the collapse of its land-led industrialization policy, the TPLF-led EPRDF government has turned to eradicating poverty, without building capacity of individual farmers to produce for themselves [and for] the market and build assets for themselves*" (GANNAT MERSHA 2011).
- 17 The Ethiopian government seems to fear the doubling of the population by 2050: 174 million! The average population density on the highlands (80 % of the population) has already reached 200 inhabitants/km²! In order to avoid falling into "Malthus's trap" the Ethiopians will have to open the "New Frontier" of the lowlands. Unlike the previous regimes that had concentrated the FDIs in the vicinity of the capital the present government is turning them towards the sparsely populated peripheral regions (Gambēlla, Bēnə Šangul and Gumuz, Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples and Oromiyaa). For centuries these *kəlləl* have been the homeland of the Shanqəlla, a derogatory name given by highlanders to the Nilo-Saharan and Omotic speaking people who had provided a large contingent of slaves.

Political unrest in the Gambēlla *kəlləl*

- 18 The Gambēlla *kəlləl*, situated at the *qolla* altitude level (526 m ASL in the capital), extends on the eastern edge of the Sudanese Basin (DESSALEGN RAHMATO 2011). Highlanders are uncomfortable in these malaria and trypanosomiasis prone lowlands even if trypanotolerant cattle can survive in this environment. The average population density is only 11.6 inhabitants per km² but the hilly Mäjänger Zone, to the east, has a higher density of 20. The Baro valley also has a higher density (15 inh/km²) as it gave shelter to 40,000 South-Sudanese refugees who are still crossing the border. The 2008 Census recorded 306,916 inhabitants in the *kəlləl* (253,000 in 2006) among them 75,640 urban dwellers⁶ (24.6 %) including the 38,994 in the capital.
- 19 Besides its high urbanization rate (17 %) —above the national average —, this region has attracted a continuous influx of migrants from the highlands. The 144,703 migrants (47 % of the total) now outnumber the natives i.e. the Nuer (40%), Anuak [Añwaa] (20%)

and Majañgir (6%). Even if persistent unrest has slowed down this trend, the implementation of federalism in 1991 boosted this movement. Since then the regional administration has been using Amharic as its working language but there were very few native civil servants in the local administration. We can be sure that among these newcomers, the *Tāwahədo* [Monophysite] Ethiopian Christians (18 %) came from the highlands, but they were outnumbered by Protestants (70 %) who had been previously converted by missions on both sides of the border.

- 20 The pressure on arable land started before the land rush in the last three years due to a persistent influx of migrants and refugees. The present raids on land featuring foreigners mounting big machines will fuel discontent among indigenous peoples. By choosing the lowlands for the allocation of concessions the government thought to avoid confrontation with farmers and pastoralists but it hasn't clearly been the case in that region. The opposition has accused Umod Ubang, the President of the Gambēlla *kəlləl*, of misusing his regional position and connections and of alienating natural resources to large foreign groups.
- 21 In any case since 2009 the central government and/or the regional governments have dispossessed indigenous peoples of their ancestral land on a large scale. They have dramatically changed the agrarian structure and consequently destabilized the political situation in western Ethiopia (MELAKOU TEGEGN, 2012). However in neighbouring South-Sudan the Anuak have been engaged in a long-aged feud with the Nuer: for centuries, both have been living on the right bank of the White Nile and in the Baro salient (a part of Ethiopia since the 1902 British-Ethiopian treaty). The Nuer have built sedentary villages in the centre and south of the *kəlləl* while the Anuak have been herding cattle in the north and west part of the region. Until the independence of Sudan in 1956 the British had a 1-km² enclave on the right bank of the Baro River in Gambēlla. They had set up a regular transport service on the Baro to the White Nile and Khartoum in order to export coffee, hides and skins that were brought to the river port by caravans and lorries from the Gorē market on the western highlands.
- 22 For a long time the Ethiopian administration cautiously stayed in Gorē *kātāma* (at the *dāga* altitude level) where the British opened a consulate. During the civil war the Sudanese consulate in Gambēlla kept a watch on southern refugees who had fled to Ethiopia. In 1991 in return for the help given by the Sudan, the late Prime Minister ordered the eviction of South-Sudan refugees and closed the camps. Some of them returned to Gambēlla and took part in the struggles for regional power: since the 2003 riots a coalition of members elected by the Nuer and internal migrants with the support of Ethiopian-Eritrean war veterans has dominated the regional Parliament. This majority has the power, be-it partial, to give plots of land to Nuer and Anuak refugees from South-Sudan, which is an excellent opportunity to cultivate its regional clientèle. Political rivalries for natural resources will worsen because it has recently been discovered that the South-Sudan oil fields extended as far as the Gambēlla *kəlləl*.

Conclusion

- 23 Can land dispossession for the benefit of foreign groups with the approval of the local officialdom be considered as the only means to integrate Gambēlla into Ethiopia? Is speculation on land the only way to build roads, houses, schools, a Parliament and a Museum in a remote border region?

- 24 According to some papers, the central government has a deliberate plan to turn the indigenous peoples into a minority in their own territories at the risk of reviving serious conflicts.⁷ One may wonder whether national and regional officials realize how difficult this region is to govern. In the face, this persistent discontent the government has merely tried to satisfy public opinion. They allowed Ethiopian journalists to accuse the president of Gambēlla and to reveal that 57 % of the land leaseholders are Ethiopians, who have been given 400 to 5,000 ha plots. Besides, the free periods in the leases have been dropped and the rents have been increased.⁸ Farmers will have to pay from B 100 to 160/ha a year (\$ 5.5 to 9) for growing tea, soya, sugar cane and cotton, but *Karaturi* and *Saudi Star* are still paying from B 20 and 30/ha a year (\$ 1.1 to 1.6). No one knows whether these measures will be sufficient to defuse violent reactions in the region.

Epilogue

- 25 In the South *kəlləl*, the opponents to the Ethiopian grand dams (*International Rivers*) have become the advocates of dispossessed indigenous peoples (GASCON 2012b.. The Gəlgəḷ Gibē III Dam, with the largest power station in Africa, is due for completion in July 2013. A total of 445,000 ha irrigated schemes (with Indian participation) of cotton and sugarcane are officially planned to improve the livelihood of the downstream population (*Oakland Institute*).
- 26 More than 200,000 agro-pastoralists have been living for centuries in the lower Omo Valley, north of Lake Turkana. Most of them will either be expelled from their grazing land, or deprived of an access to the Omo River (*Survival International*, *Human Rights Watch*). Are Ethiopian lowlanders willing to sacrifice their present way of life, in order make sure Ethiopia becomes the emergent power in the Horn of Africa?

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FOOTNOTES

1. This contribution is a revised version of my article published in *BAGF* 2012 - 3.
2. *Nile Trading and Development* (Texas) leased 400,000 ha for 49 years and \$ 25,000 and AIG 400,000 ha (1 million?) with the help of General Paulino Matip (Oakland Institute 2011).
3. An Indian expert said in a Uganda newspaper that his salary had doubled when he came to Ethiopia (VAN KOTE 2012).

4. *Forbes* : sixty-third fortune in the world.
5. Eritrea is included in the 1970 and 1984 censuses.
6. According to the criteria of the *Central Statistical Agency*.
7. Dereje Feyissa 2006; Chan Gatkuoth and Sommer 2007; Meckelburg 2012.
8. Thanks to Youness Bousema (IEP Bordeaux) for this information (MOA, 2011).

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The Trend of Fiscal Arrangement in Ethiopia: Current Practices and Future Concerns

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p. 481-496

- 1 Federal fiscal arrangement – defining the competence of each tier of government on expenditure and taxation, designing federal state revenue transfer, and institutional arrangement for fiscal relations (AHMAD and BROSIO 2006) – have been adopted for mitigating conflicts and/or for economic efficiency. Although constitutional fiscal arrangements aim at achieving the above objectives, various fiscal issues/challenges emerge within the dynamics of a particular system calling for the adoption of different solutions. Despite strong claims that federal countries do better in this regard, there are practical fiscal issues which call for a timely action to mitigate adverse consequences. Some of the concerns can be related to the constitutional design while others originate from practices.
- 2 One of the effects of the post 1991 governance structure in Ethiopia is the devolution of powers and functions to the newly established regional governments with their concomitant taxing power. This structure brought about local self-administration and new economic dynamism in the country, albeit federal dominance in economic, political and social agenda attached to it. After twenty years of political dominance by the ruling party, the federal government still plays a dominant role in the federal-state or in the state-local fiscal relations leaving the states dependent on the allocation of federal grant subsidy. However, there are mixed trends in the process of intergovernmental fiscal transfer. On the one hand, the recent political dispensation seem comfortable with this centralizing trend as per the ‘developmental state’ agenda of the ruling party. That is, the federal dominance seems to be integrated into the current ‘national economic development’ agenda so that positive developments in the country are to be related to it. But the question whether the agenda is consistent with the constitutional dispensation is yet to be tested. On the other hand, the battle among

states/or locals/ continues for securing a better share of per capita grant which sometimes lead to ethnic divisions.

- 3 Despite growth in the volume of federal revenue transfer to states, inefficiency, lack of accountability and imbalances are also serious concerns. While the immediate question would be on how to ensure subnational fiscal autonomy in terms of tax and implementation capacity, the trend may lead to many unanswered issues related to constitutional design such as clarity in the ‘concurrent power’ and ensuring ‘fiscal accountability’, and the practice of revenue transfer at the federal and state levels. Of course, clarity in the laws can a priori reduce future fiscal conflicts. But, the core issue in the Ethiopian context would be whether the federal state transfer serves as the glue that holds the units together or whether it faces challenges due to the desire for greater access to federal resources, i.e. leading to fragmentation in the form of state creation or secession. Based on the available data and information, and the practice at the federal and state level this paper put forward positive elements in the current fiscal arrangement and identifies some core issues of concern which may have significant impact in future in Ethiopia.

Main features of fiscal constitution in Ethiopia

- 4 In a federal system there should be a clear assignment of revenue sources and expenditure responsibilities to the federal and regional governments so that the transfer system becomes effective. With regard to expenditure assignments, the FDRE Constitution follows a dual structure where each government has legislative and executive powers on matters that fall under the respective jurisdictions (Art 50/2). States hold all the residual power in addition to those explicitly listed in the constitution (Art 52). And both the federal government and the states have to cover their respective financial expenditures but if the federal government allocates grants, it has the power to audit and inspect the proper utilisation of subsidies it grants to the states (Art 94/1 and 2).
- 5 The Constitution divides the tax power into three categories, namely ‘the federal power of taxation’ exclusively assigned to the federal government, ‘the state power of taxation’ exclusive to the states, and ‘concurrent power of taxation’, where taxes are administered by the federal government but shared with the states. The assignment of tax power is very specific which is structured by dividing different sources of tax between the federal government and the states. Those taxes or sources which are not expressly states under the above three categories are regarded as “undesigned” and will be settled by the 2/3rd majority vote of the joint meeting of the two Federal Houses (Art 99).
- 6 As a result of distribution of responsibilities, the fiscal arrangement in Ethiopia shows a huge vertical fiscal imbalance. As it is officially reported in the 2006/07 fiscal year (HoF 2007: 3-4), regional state governments were able to fund with their own revenue around 19% of their total expenditure, while the rest was covered through federal transfers. From the revenue sources assigned to them, they were financing only about half of their recurrent expenditure. Although the states’ revenue has increased over the years its share on their total expenditure remains very low, as the amount of federal transfer has increased at even faster rate. Horizontal imbalances are also significant in Ethiopia. For example, during the same fiscal year, one regional state

government like Benishangul Gumuz covered only 6% of its total expenditure, while Tigray covered 28%.

- 7 To overcome imbalances, federal constitutions mandate the transfer of revenue in the form of sharing tax bases, sharing tax revenues and allocation of grants (SHAH 2007: 21-25). However, the processes, extent and nature of transfers to reach the desired level of equalization vary widely across federations. A related issue is the nature of institutional arrangement to deal with the process of fiscal transfer. Ron Watts (1999: 53) identifies four distinct options,¹ but Ethiopia has opted for a different arrangement by assigning the HoF. One of the possible explanations for assigning fiscal powers to the House could be the fact that the approach curtails the danger of complete control of the process by the centre, and limits the use of ad-hoc and discretionary transfers. But the arguments in favour and against this kind of arrangements are subject to debate in many countries and may also arise in future in Ethiopia.

Some observed trends in fiscal arrangements in Ethiopia

On the distribution of expenditure responsibilities

- 8 As it has been repeatedly mentioned in various literatures, the merits of decentralization are highlighted in both democratic and developmental terms: i.e. “in creating a political channel in highly diversified societies, an instrument of democratization and participation; increase government responsiveness; improve provision of public services; bring local communities closer to government” (SOLOMON 2008: 48-50). These are all objectives which excessive centralization cannot address in a country like Ethiopia.
- 9 Setting aside the historical background to decentralization in Ethiopia, the process of assigning powers and functions to subnational levels of government (decentralized fiscal arrangements) has generated significant interest since the demise of Derg in 1991. The process of according autonomy (through fiscal powers) began through the promulgation of the Transitional Charter, which affirms the political commitment to the rights of “nations, nationalities and peoples” and the establishment of the administrative division of the country into 12 national, regional self-governments. In addition, the Proclamation No.7/1992 defined powers and functions of the central and regional governments as well as of the zonal, *wereda* and *kebele* levels. In 1995, the federal constitution came in to force defining the powers and functions of the federal government and the states, leaving the power and functions of subregional levels to be defined by the states.
- 10 A multi tiered federal system which seeks to achieve the objectives of decentralization mentioned above has to properly determine as to which level of government does what type of expenditure responsibility, as to whether local governments have the power to tax and spend, and at the same time how they become accountable to the citizens. This may go in line with the self-rule aspect of a federal polity. Art 39(3) of the FDRE Constitution reads, “Every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government” which includes establishing institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits through periodic elections provided by

federal and state constitutions. Elections are meant for active citizen participation in government and the establishment of local government administrations that will be transparent and accountable to the electorate (MEHERET 2002: 136). Despite the fact that many of the nationalities exist at local level, these constitutional promises were hardly fulfilled since the devolutionary process stalled at the regional level until 2002. Powers and responsibilities were not devolved to lower levels of administration, there was no check & balance between the legislature and the executive, and *wereda* and *kebele* were accountable to the unelected body at the zonal level (intermediary between *wereda* and regional government). This incomplete process evolved from 1992 to 2002 and commonly called 'first generation decentralization' had a limited effect.

- 11 The observed problems led to the amendment of state constitutions somehow to redefine the relationship between the legislature and the executive, the introduction of district level decentralization to empower *wereda*, and the process of regional – *wereda* grant transfers. The changes introduced are necessary to redefine the responsibilities of each level of subnational government but not sufficient. There are issues of establishing clear jurisdiction and functional boundaries between all tiers of government. However, it can be considered as an encouraging process of assigning responsibilities to zonal, *wereda*, *kebele*, municipality levels,² despite the fact that it is a top – down process from regional level. There is also an upward process of reassigning responsibilities to the federal government through 'delegation' of power over land management, agricultural investment and environmental protection which seems to be a trend in reversal triggering a constitutional clarification. As a result, the devolutionary process that began in 1992 has shown several trends in the process determining powers and responsibilities of subnational governments.

Broadening tax capacity through reforms

- 12 Since 1992, the country undertook various policy measures aiming at fitting into the major political, economic and legal changes introduced as a result of the fall of the former regime. One of such changes is in the fiscal aspects and the change still continues. According to ALEMAYEHU and ABEBE (2005), it was triggered by several factors: the growth of investment, very limited domestic saving, government deficits, growth in government expenditure, and so on. Also the tax revenue contribution to the national GDP was staggering less than 10% during the 1991/92 fiscal year. This was coupled with complex and outdated tax laws, weak tax administration, and the overall failure of the tax system to generate adequate revenues for government expenditure (*ibid*). All these factors led to the overhaul of the country's tax system – tax reform – to enhance the government capacity to raise adequate revenue.
- 13 Besides introducing the division of tax power between central and regional governments, the first stage in the tax reform in Ethiopia focused on modifying the existing rates on various types and categories of taxes, method of assessment of taxable income, introducing some incentives to investment, introducing new deductible (from income) items, and introducing miscellaneous tax related legislations (*ibid*). For instance, the reform reduced the marginal tax rate on income from 89 to 35 percent, and introduced withholding tax on income and on interest income. The reform also targets reforming custom tariff towards encouraging export and introducing VAT.

- 14 The existing challenges called for reform not only modifying and introducing tax policy measures (rates) but also on changing the over all aspects of its administration. As a result the process began in 1999 by scaling up the then ‘Revenue Board’ to a ministerial level to be called “Ministry off Revenue”. The reform program consisted of the following six projects (DEMIREW 2004): Tax Policy and Legislation Project, Tax Payer Identification (TIN) Project, Presumptive Tax Project, Value Added Tax Project, Reorganization and Work Producer Development, Taxpayers Education Project. The reform program on the one hand aims at revising the existing tax laws, introducing and implementing new taxes such as VAT, Turn Over and Excise Taxes. On the other, the reform focuses on the administration by taking measures including issuance of tax payer identification number, computerizing and using appropriate software, building capacity at branches of federal tax offices in the regions through training and recruitment of qualified personnel, revising policies on performance and accountability measures, setting up a tax payer education program and similar initiatives aimed at implementing the new tax laws. In order to fully benefit from these reform efforts, they have to be implemented at the state and local level through the proper implementation of laws and the improvement of the tax administration capacity.
- 15 It is not the purpose of this paper to evaluate whether the reform program fully achieved its objectives or not. It is rather to show the trend observed during the last two decades in improving the actual tax capacity of the federal government. It has shown modest increment in the total tax revenue collected at the federal and state level. For instance, in 2011/12 fiscal year, the total revenue collected by the federal government reached to more than 90 billion birr from less than 70 billion the previous year (ERCA: 2012). The figures have shown increment, however, there are still concerns over the tax system. First, when the total revenue expressed as a share of GDP of the country it is still not more than 11% although the authority aims at registering 17% by 2015.³ Although the figure for the overall revenue shows positive increment it is still far below compared to other sub Saharan countries. Similarly, the gap between the actual and potential revenue capacity of the federal and state governments is clear demonstrating weakness in terms of utilizing the available tax potential. In addition, though the total revenue collected by the states considerably increases, the fiscal imbalance remains intact. The vertical imbalance shows that states are still able to cover a maximum of 19% of their expenditure, that is more than 80% of their funding comes through federal transfer.

On the system of intergovernmental transfers

- 16 The purpose of this section is to review the existing scheme of intergovernmental transfer mechanisms, like comprise revenue sharing and grant instruments, by highlighting the positive trend observed throughout the period.
- 17 Intergovernmental transfers in Ethiopia comprise both revenue sharing and grant instruments. Revenue sharing includes the sharing of taxes related to companies such as profit taxes, VAT, Excises, natural resource revenues, royalties from mining, revenues from petroleum and mining operations, and grants consist of unconditional grant and a recent inclusion of conditional grants. Unconditional grant, in general, remains highly significant source of revenue for regional governments. In fact, it has continued to be important to regional budgets although the volume of states’ own

revenue has increased. We now turn to examining the developments of revenue sharing and allocation of grants.

18 Revenue sharing:

19 *Revenue sharing* refers to the sharing of revenue generated mostly through the federal administration of taxes, but shared with the states based on a certain principle. In this scheme the actual proportion of tax to be allocated to the respective states can be determined by either the *derivation/ origin principle* or the *redistribution/ equity principle* (TER-MINASSIAN 1997: 11-12); Ethiopia follows the former principle.

20 The Constitution assigns joint taxes (also called ‘concurrent taxes’) to the federal and regional governments. Despite controversies over the meaning and application of ‘concurrent tax’, the current arrangement is to divide direct taxes from companies in the proportion of 50:50 and indirect taxes (VAT) in the proportion of 70:30 between the federal and the states respectively. Similarly direct taxes from large-scale mining and petroleum operations are divided in proportion of 50:50, whereas royalties are divided in proportion to 60:40 (HoF, minutes, 2nd ordinary meeting March 13, 2003). The percentage allocated to regional governments, compared to other federations following similar pattern, is not insignificant. And it includes potentially significant sources of revenue such as company profit tax, VAT, Excises, mining and petroleum revenues, large scale agricultural and mining royalties.

21 The current arrangement may encourage states to consider the benefit from joint taxes and to cooperate for an efficient tax administration. If they do so, the arrangement is expected to promote accountability and transparency of the federal government and boost the revenue capacity of the states. Normally, revenue from these sources can be spent on responsibilities and priorities determined by the respective regional governments. As per the available report from ERCA the major share of revenue goes to Addis Ababa, Oromia, Tigray, Amhara and SNNPR, and their share is increasing every year. But interviews held with heads of regional revenue authority indicate that they do not normally consider them as their own revenue sources.

22 Grants:

Grants are broadly categorized into two types: conditional and unconditional grants.

23 *Unconditional grants* are characterized by the absence of significant restrictions on the use of funds, as it is at the region’s discretion to spend the money for any preferred purposes.⁴

24 In principle, designing a mechanism for allocating revenue for general purpose grants has to address two major questions (SOLOMON 2008): how should the total volume of revenue transferred from the centre to the states (as a whole) be determined? And how should this gross amount be distributed amongst the states?⁵ Regarding the first question, in Ethiopia it is the federal government which determines the grant pool, but it is distributed among the states on the basis of a formula approved by the HoF.⁶ Usually a formula based transfer of grants is recommended for developing federations like Ethiopia.

25 A formula is required for distributing federal grants representing about 30 to 35 % of the federal budget and covering 80 to 85 % of regional expenditures. The HoF is engaged in the approval of grant formulas since the introduction of the federal Constitution in 1995. However, the HoF did not have full control of the design of the grant formula until 2002 (Solomon: 2009). Until this time, the former Ministry of

Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDAC), presently Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), was preparing grant formulas and recommending to the HoF for its approval. But beginning from 2002/03 fiscal year, the House became 'fully' engaged in the preparation of a new formula either by commissioning independent consultants or using its own experts. Since 1995, the HoF decided (see Table 1) on grant formulas in 2000, 2003, 2007, 2009 and 2012, with several revisions on the formulas implemented between those years. In developing grant formulas, the HoF usually declares that it strives to equitably distribute financial resources so that regional governments will be able to provide citizens 'equal access to publicly funded social services'. Formulas were subject to revision due to serious complaints made by the regions with small population size. Sometimes they argued that the amount of grant they would receive could not even help them cover their recurrent expenditure. Some of the later complaints were related to issues in which a relatively higher percentage was attached to population size and then the formulas resulted in a dramatic change in their grant share. Furthermore, less populated region felt that the main characteristics of their regions were not fully taken into consideration⁷. Recently, the House is seriously engaged in developing a formula which may help address some of the major causes of complaints by designing approaches to measure expenditure needs and fiscal capacities by setting representative needs and potential revenue sources. Thus, the trend since 2007 has been observed in an attempt to minimize the impact of population asymmetry in the formula (see Annex 1). That is by avoiding a direct allocation of percentage to population size, but focusing on the gap between the revenue capacity and expenditure needs of each state.

- 26 The allocation of a general-purpose grant in Ethiopia has demonstrated a shift from a 'single -state' to a 'two -stage' transfer system. The transfer of federal grant to state has now been followed by the transfer of grant from regional to local governments in most of the states. Transfer at the regional level is expected to enable *wereda* and nationality zones to determine their expenditure priorities and increase their efficiency.
- 27 *Conditional/ specific-purpose grants* are the spending in a specific sector supported by the federal government, allocated in the form of *matching* (cost-sharing) or *non-matching*.
- 28 Since the implementation of fiscal decentralization in Ethiopia, detailed attention has been given to the flow of unconditional grants to regional and local governments due to the fact that such type of grants are relate with the theoretical benefits associated with the autonomy to spend. On the other hand, it has been very difficult to find a comprehensive review of the design and use of conditional grants. It was also hardly possible to find state reports on the use of conditional grants. The reason why regional governments may not give equal attention to conditional grants can be assumed from the reason that the power to prioritize and spend such type of fund is often limited.
- 29 Compared to the nature and purpose of general grant, the use of conditional grants as a transfer instrument in Ethiopia can be inferred from the programs and priorities of the federal government on poverty alleviation, the provision of basic services and infrastructures, agriculture, education and health services. Policy documents such as ADLI -Agricultural Development Led Industrialization, PRSP-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper; SDPRP -sustainable Development and Poverty reduction Program; NDPF; PASDEP-Plan for Accelerated & Sustainable Development to End Poverty; MDG; GTP aim at introducing conditional grants. It is not the purpose of this paper to assess

the volume and nature of conditional transfers through these programs. But one can safely conclude that different specific programs are administered by the health, education, agriculture, water, construction ministries for grant transfers through the use of programs such as: Safety Net Programs, Sector Based support, Resettlement Policy Framework, Protection of Basic Services & Local Investment Grant Project, and programs for Millennium Development Goals.

- 30 In the course of deepening decentralization and broadening the mandates of *wereda*/ local governments in Ethiopia, neither tax base to raise adequate revenue, nor the flow of general grant were sufficient to cover the cost of expenditure needs. Thus, the need for conditional grants has become a clear challenge. Since 2007, the federal government together with development partners have come up with the ‘Protection of Basic Services’ project, using direct budget support to *wereda* to spend only in selected areas such as education, health and water – which can be considered as the experience of allocating conditional grants. The use of conditional grants is now becoming a major instrument in federal regional fiscal relations as it is explicitly included in the federal budget law since the 2010/11 fiscal year, which is designated specifically for the MDG programs. For instance, in the 2011/12 fiscal year (2004 Eth cal.) of the total federal government budget 39.4% is allocated to the regions in the form of general and specific purpose grant. 12.73 % of the total federal budget (or 32.33% of the total grant) is allocated in the form of conditional grant. Similarly, for the 2012/13 fiscal year, 41.03% of the federal budget is allocated to regions – which comprises the 14.51% allocated for conditional grants requested to meet the Millennium Development Goals. A new trend has been observed, shifting from a vague inclusion of specific grants, like the safety net programs, to specific allocation of funds for MDG or Local Investment Programs. The overall outcome of such conditional grant depends on how it is spent, compared to the intended purposes, and if it is adequately administered – or not. However, it is hoped that the negative effects of relying solely on unconditional grants would be minimized.

Some future challenges

- 31 Overall, it can be concluded that the intergovernmental transfer system has a relatively positive impact on regional social and economic development in Ethiopia over the course of more than two decades (see TEGEGN *et al.* 2010). At last, some studies have indicated that the funds transferred through different channels assisted in self-administration and the development of regional infrastructure. However, important criticisms have been aired over the years, particularly with the design and use of the grant formula, the difficulty to address the complex interest of the constituent units, the difficulty to define equalization objectives, lack of incentives for fully utilizing revenue mobilization capacity, and sometimes fiscal profligacy on the utilization of local funds (see SOLOMON 2008). Here, we focus on some selected issues.

Making sense of art. 98 and sharing joint revenue

- 32 Art 98 of the FDRE reads ‘concurrent power of taxation’. But the title and the practical application may have different meanings, despite the fact that the HoF argues for ‘amending’ or ‘giving meaning’ to the same issue. The title ‘concurrent’ may imply that the federal government and the states share the tax bases mentioned under Art 98 –

accordingly enable the states independently access the bases to levy and collect tax in addition to the ones used by the federal government. This interpretation is different from what is followed in practice. In practice, the meaning of ‘revenue sharing’ is followed – where regional governments receive an agreed share of a tax or group of taxes levied and collected by the federal government. According to the decision of the HoF, the sharing of revenue collected from sources mentioned under Art 98 of the constitution is predetermined by a formula which is related to the tax generated by companies/enterprises in a regional government own territory. This approach follows a *derivative* principle consisting in transferring revenue to the local jurisdiction, where taxation occurred (SOLOMON 2008: 213). It can be seen as giving more fiscal autonomy to subnational/regional governments as they can rely on stable rules and are not obliged to spend on specific policy areas. Of course, revenue sharing arrangement has the advantage to minimize administrative and compliance cost at the expense of inefficiency and accountability. Theoretically, ‘tax base sharing’ offers a potential advantage of minimizing vertical imbalance, revenue predictability, flexibility and a sense of ownership to the available tax source (SHAH 2007).

- 33 Regarding revenue sharing, the first challenge emanates from the lack of systematic examination of the merits and demerits of the practical application, as well as the lack of proper judicial notice to interpret the constitutional provision. In a revenue sharing arrangement, as it can be observed in the Nigerian experience, the states from where revenue is generated may need to ensure that they receive a fair share on the basis of their contribution or claim benefit much more than other states.
- 34 The second issue can be related to the nature of revenue sharing as determined by the HoF. Despite the fact that 30% of the revenue collected from indirect taxes, 40% from direct taxes and 50% from royalties go to the states, regional authorities consider the sources of taxes subject to revenue sharing only as federal taxes. They give less attention to the collection of such taxes, compared to sources that fall under their jurisdiction, even though they are delegated to administer shared taxes. As a result, inefficiency and lack of accountability with respect to shared taxes may emerge as a significant challenge in the future.

Making sense of the principles for equalization grant

- 35 In most decentralized or federal systems, several objectives are set for fiscal transfer to subnational levels of government. They aim to address vertical imbalance (improve revenue adequacy); to equalize fiscal capacity horizontally (*interjurisdictional* redistribution); to correct interjurisdictional spill-over effect; to correct for major administrative weaknesses and streamline bureaucracy (SCHROEDER and SMOKE 2003). A number of approaches can be used to allocate transfer to subnational government to fulfil the above objectives. Of course, the use of grant formula to objectively define the transfer has been widely supported. In Ethiopia, the attempt has been to address all objectives through the use of several variables in a single grant formula. This has been seriously criticized since its introduction in 1995 and the situation is now improving (see the discussion on general and specific grants above). But still emphasis is given to addressing the vertical and horizontal imbalance using the grant formula.
- 36 Since 2007, the effort is to estimate the relative fiscal gap between the regions by measuring the relative revenue potential and expenditure needs of regions. The

expenditure needs of the regions estimated on the basis of selected regional expenditures – which make up more than 90% of the total budget –, and the revenue potential on the basis of tax sources – which contribute more than 90% of states total revenue. This approach has to minimize the impact of population size, which has been the major challenge in the previous grant formulas. However, the output of the grant formula depends on the availability and quality of data.

- 37 The effort to fill the gap between expenditure needs and revenue capacity has to be guided by the principles set out under the FDRE Constitution:
- a. Every Ethiopian national has the right to equal access to publicly funded special services -Art 41(3);
 - b. Government has the duty to ensure that all Ethiopian get equal opportunity to improve their economic conditions and to promote equitable distribution of wealth among them -Art 89(2);
 - c. Government shall provide special assistance to nations, nationalities and peoples least developed in economic and social development -Art 89(4);
 - d. The federal government and the states shall respectively bear all the financial expenditure necessary to carry out all responsibilities and functions assigned to them by law. Unless otherwise agreed upon, the financial expenditures required for the carrying out of any delegated function by a state shall be borne by the delegating party -Art 94 (1);
- 38 The federal government may grant the states emergency, rehabilitation, and development assistance and loans, due care being taken that such assistance and loans do not hinder the appropriate development of states. The federal government shall have the power to audit and inspect the proper utilization of subsidies it grants to the states – Art 94(2).
- 39 One of the challenges could be using a single formula combining an economic analysis of expenditure needs and revenue capacity combined with the political and social components of the guidelines enshrined in the Constitution

Allocation of grants and equitable development – the role of the HoF

- 40 Intergovernmental transfer mechanism has the main objective of correcting *vertical* and *horizontal* imbalances and addressing intergovernmental spill-over effects, for equity reasons and for the promotion of an economic union (OATES 1972: 78). The allocation of federal grant in regional socio-economic development is significant since it covers 80-85% of the regional expenditures in Ethiopia (HoF: 2007 and 2009). A study conducted and reported by independent consultants under the auspices of the HoF shows that the role of allocation of grants in regional socio-economic development in general is significant but with ‘uneven development outcomes’ (TEGEGN *et al.* 2010).
- 41 Studies have shown that “under ethnic federalism, ethnic zones have enjoyed relatively high inputs of capital and recurrent government expenditure, and this is a fact that is widely known by those local elites who have masterminded claims for separate recognition” (VAUGHAN 2006: 200). This has been widely observed in ethnical heterogeneous states, but more new claims have also emerged in relatively homogenous regions. This has led to more and more establishment or fragmentation of territorially defined administrative units at subregional levels. In a situation where

revenue proved to be successful, obviously it would be a ground for claiming a regional status.

- 42 The FDRE Constitution requires the HoF to ‘promote the equality of the Peoples of Ethiopia as enshrined in the Constitution and promote and consolidate their unity based on their mutual consent.’ In this particular sphere, the HoF, has to ‘follow up the division of subsidies and joint revenues be effected in accordance with the systems and mechanisms devised.’ Also it ‘shall take measures to bring about balanced development in the socio-economic sectors among the states, and ensure that the essential federal infrastructures for investment in the economic sector are fairly distributed’ (Proc. No. 251/2001). Whether the allocation of grants has helped to achieve the intended objectives, the HoF has to ‘undertake a series of studies on the impact of subsidies and division of revenues on states to achieve balanced development among. It shall therefore take or cause any corrective measures be taken to rectify defects’ (Art 35 and 37/5 of Proc. No. 251). One of the possible explanations for assigning fiscal powers to the House could be the fact that the approach curtails the danger of complete control of the process by the centre, and limits the use of ad-hoc and discretionary transfers. But the arguments in favour and against this kind of arrangements are subject to debate in many countries and may also arise in future in Ethiopia.

Ensuring fiscal discipline and institutional building

- 43 In the process of intergovernmental revenue transfers federations usually face two interrelated challenges: a) respecting the autonomy of constituent units in managing their resources and, b) the need to secure accountability and transparency to avoid misspending of transfers and/ or irresponsible economic management such as lack of fiscal discipline or expectations of unlimited federal bailouts.
- 44 In order to ensure fiscal discipline, the authority to raise and spend public fund should pass the test of accountability. But, ensuring financial accountability of the executive at all levels of governance is still one of the concerns in many societies. That is why Hamilton argued: “if men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself” (THE FEDERALIST no.51).
- 45 As Mark SCHACTER (2005: 230) observed “direct accountability to citizens through the ballot box is not sufficient to ensure a healthy relationship between the governors and the governed” (vertical accountability). There is an additional requirement to ensure that power is exercised wisely, effectively and efficiently through the creation of public institutions (horizontal accountability).
- 46 The power to ensure fiscal accountability can be exercised by public institutions and civil society organizations. Public institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, the internal and external auditing institutions, anti-corruption commission, ombudsman, etc may help in ensuring accountability. But the establishment of such institutions alone is not sufficient. Recent developments in many federations have shown that laws to ensure fiscal accountability are also required. Governments appear to be interested in Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL), argues Steven WEBB, “for two related reasons: for an individual government to control its impulses to run excessive deficits, and for a group

of government in the same country to make and enforce a mutual agreement that each of them would avoid running excessive deficits” (WEBB 2004: 2). Furthermore, if such laws are well designed and rightly implemented, “it is considered as a commitment device. It commits federal, regional and local governments through cooperative framework to follow a certain fiscal discipline...” (ALOK 2008: 109). This cooperation can be through intergovernmental relations or through the use of conditional grants.

- 47 In general, the problem of ensuring fiscal accountability has called on federations to adopt measures aiming at securing fiscal responsibility at the federal and state levels, through coordinated policies, fiscal responsibility laws, use of various forms of conditional grants and the construction of effective institutions. In Ethiopia, although laws – like the Financial Administrative Proclamation –and public institutions seem to be put in place, the above issues should be given appropriate attention.

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APPENDIX

Annex Table 1

The variables included in the grant formulas and their relative weight since 1995.

Year	Variables	Weight in percentage
1994/95		
	Population size	30
	I-distance	25
	Revenue-generating capacity	20
	Capital budget allocated in 1993/94	15
	Geographical Size	10
1995/96-1996/97		
	Population	33.3

	Development level	33.3
	Revenue-generated in the previous year	33.3
1997/98-1999/00		
	Population	60
	Development index	25
	Revenue-generating capacity	15
2000/01-2002/03		
	Population size (est. 2001)	55
	Expenditure need-selected area (education, health, safe drinking water, roads, recurrent budget implications)	20
	Level of poverty	10
	-Revenue-Raising capacity - Execution Efficiency (change in health centres, education participation and length of roads)	11 4
2003/04 – 2006/07 (though the MoFED implemented changes)	Population size	65
	Level of development/exp. Need	25
	Revenue generating capacity (8) and Output performance (2)	10
2007 (was supposed to be implemented until 2012, but immediately changed)	Population	Assuming equal Per capita, but measuring the differences
	Difference in relative revenue raising capacity	Assessing capacity on all state tax sources
	Difference in relative expenditure needs	Agriculture, rural road, primary educ, health and admin services
	Performance incentives	Attempts not to reward or penalize tax effort
2009	-assessing expenditure needs	Admin & general service, Education, health, rural road, provision of clean water, agriculture, micro enterprise, urban works
	-Estimation of revenue capacity	Payroll tax, Agric. Income tax, land use fee, business profit tax, sales tax, VAT, medical fee
	Regional Share determined on the basis of the gap between expenditure needs and revenue capacity	1 % additional grant to Afar, Somali Benishangul Gumuz & Gambela regions

2012	More or less similar approach to 2009 followed	
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FOOTNOTES

1. Ron WATTS (1999:53) identifies four distinct options: a) an independent commission entrusted with the power to determine appropriate transfer formulas (Australia, India, South Africa); b) a constitutionally established intergovernmental council composed of federal and state representatives (Canada); c) the determination of federal grants by the legislature, but with a strong participation by the states through the second chamber (Germany, Switzerland, USA, Belgium); and, d) unilateral control of the federal government, although in practice it involves several discussions between representatives of the federal and the provincial governments.
2. All state constitutions revised; *wereda*, *kebele* and zonal units assumed broader powers and responsibilities, municipalities established by law.
3. The governmental plan to increase tax –GDP ration is indicated in the Growth and Transformation Plan (FDRE 2010: 32-33). Two Ethiopian newspapers assessed the recent performance of ERCA (see ADDIS FORTUNE 2013 and THE REPORTER 2011 for the interview of ERCA Director).
4. However, the centre may not be completely deprived of the power of general auditing and surveillance of the spending of grants.
5. Similar issues could be raised in the process of intra-state transfer of revenue, and similarly the solutions adopted at the federal level could also be used at the state level.
6. But the HoF revenue sharing committee argues that the House enters into an agreement with the council of ministers as to how much to be allocated to the ‘grant pool’
7. Also one cannot ignore the impacts of data, the factors for different expenditure needs, and the local revenue capacity variations between the states.

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‘Ethiopian Studies on the Move’: Papers selected for the 18th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies

Compiled by Eloi Ficquet, chairman of the Conference
p. 499-512

1.01 - Changing environments and movements through transitions: Paleo-anthropological and prehistorical research in Ethiopia. A panel in tribute to Mohammed Umer

Coordination: Asfawossen Asrat, Ethiopia; Katja Douze, France; David Pleurdeau, France; Erella Hovers, Israel; Clément Ménard, France.

ALEMSEGED BELDADOS (Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia): *Archaeological evidence for cultural contacts since the last glacial maximum (LGM): Some examples from the Eastern Sudan and Ethiopia.*

ASFAWOSSEN ASRAT (Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia): *Early modern human migration out of Ethiopia: stalagmite isotopic evidence of a climatic forcing during 130-60 ka.*

BON, François (Université de Toulouse - le Mirail- France): *Long term evolution of LSA lithic industries in the central part of the Main Ethiopian Rift: contribution of open air sites in a fluvio-lacustrine context.*

DOUZE, Katja (University of Bordeaux 1- France): *A Transition after the Transition?* (Co-authors: Asamerew Dessie, L. Bruxelles, K. Douze, L. Khalidi, C. Menard, R. Mensan).

ENDALE, Tamrat (CEREGE- France): *Use of Rock-Magnetic Properties in Revealing Paleoclimatic Changes in the Ethiopian Highland and Rift Valley Lakes.*

HOVERS, Erella (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Israel): *After the Dispersal: Cultural Change or Continuity in the Late MSA/Early LSA of southeastern Ethiopia?* (Co-authors: Zelalem Assefa, D. Pleurdeau, O. Pearson, Asfawossen Asrat).

LEPLONGEON, Alice (Muséum national d'Histoire naturelle, France): *From the Middle to the Later Stone Age: a comparative study of two sites in Eastern Ethiopia (Dire Dawa Region)*

LESUR, Joséphine (MNHN, France): *Beginning of herding in the Horn of Africa: new data from Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somaliland.* (co-authors: Gedef Abawa, X. Guthertz & E. Hildebrand).

MENARD, Clément (Université de Toulouse, Le Mirail- France): *Later Stone Age technological changes: the Mochena Borago Holocene sequence (Wolayta, SNNPR).* (co-authors: X. Guthertz, L. Jallot & J. Lesur).

MUSSI, Margherita (Università di Roma La Sapienza, Italy): *A preliminary re-assessment of Garba III at Melka Kunture, a Middle Stone Age site with archaic Homo sapiens remains.*

ROSSO, Daniela Eugenia (Universitat de Barcelona, Spain): *Stratigraphic and spatial distribution of colorants and colorant processing tools at Porc-Epic cave (Dire Dawa, Ethiopia).* (Co-authors: F. D'Errico, J. Zilhão, R. García Moreno)

TEGENU GOSSA (Arba Minch University-Ethiopia): *Aladi Springs re-investigated: analysis of the MSA and LSA lithic artifacts.*

Ralf VOGELSANG (University of Koeln, Germany): *Early MIS 3 Occupation of Mochena Borago Rockshelter, Southwest Ethiopian Highlands: Implications for Late Pleistocene Archaeology, Paleoenvironments.* (co-authors: Steven A. Brandt, Erich C. Fisher, Elisabeth A. Hildebrand, Stanley H. Ambrose, Joséphine Lesur, Hong Wang)

ZELALEM ASSEFA (Smithsonian Institution, USA): *Survey explorations of caves in southeastern Ethiopia: MSA and LSA archaeology, rock art, and paleo-climate* (Co-authors: D. Pleurdeau, E. Hovers, Asfawossen Asrat, O. Pearson, F. Duquesnoy, Yin M. Lam, Constantinos T/Tsion).

ZEWDU ESHETU (Addis Ababa University- Ethiopia): *Multi-proxy records of temporal changes in climate and environment in Ethiopia.*

1.03 - Archæology and ancient history: Focus on the cultures of the Pre-Aksumite period

Coordination: Iris Gerlach, Germany; Ayele Bekerie, Ethiopia.

GERLACH, Iris (German Archaeological Institute, Orient Department, Sanaa Branch, Germany): *Culture contacts between Saba and Di'amat: new results of the Ethiopian-German cooperation project at the Pre-Aksumite site of Yeha.*

AYELE BEKERIE (Mekelle University, Ethiopia): *Contextualizing the Ethiopic writing system.*

GAJDA, Iwona & DUGAST, Fabienne (CNRS, France): *Reconsidering contacts between Southern Arabia and the highlands of Tigray in the 1st millennium BC.*

FATTOVICH, Rodolfo (University of Naples "l'Orientale", Italy): *Seglamen: A pre-Aksumite site in central Tigray.*

HABTAMU MEKONNEN (Aksum University, Ethiopia): *Archaeological investigation at the ancient sites of Sobeia.*

HITGEN, Holger (DAI (German Archaeological Institute, Germany): *Excavations of the German Archaeological Institute in the pre-Aksumite cemetery of Abiy 'Addi (Yeha).*

HUDSON, Grover (Michigan State University, USA: *Ethiopian and Ancient South Arabian Semitic are not siblings.*

JAPP, Sarah (German Archaeological Institute, Orient Department, Sana'a Branch-Germany): *The archaeological complex of Hawelti: New research of the German Archaeological Institute in Ethiopia.*

MELAKU TEFERA (Haramaya University, Ethiopia): *Religious transformations during axumite era: evedence of archeology of base plate, coinage and rock art.*

SCHNELLE, Mike (DAI, Berlin/Sanaa, Germany): *Grat Be'al Gebri – a monumental half timber complex of the early 1st millennium B.C. in the Ethiopian highland. Comparisons with South Arabian buildings and the continuation of the construction techniques with wood in the Ethiopian building tradition*

YOHANNES GEBRESELASSIE (Mekelle University, Ethiopia): *Unpublished Unvocalized Ge'ez Inscription and a New 'Pre-Aksumite' bronze cauldron from Central Tigray, Ethiopia.*

1.04 - Christians, Muslims, Jews and “Pagans” in medieval Ethiopia: Archæological and historical perspectives

Coordination: Marie-Laure Derat, France; Deresse Ayenachew, Ethiopia; François-Xavier Fauvelle, France.

DERAT, Marie-Laure (CFEE/CNRS, France): *“Pagans” and Muslims in Christian sources produced during Medieval period.*

DERESSE AYENACHEW (University of Debre Berhan, Ethiopia) & FAUVELLE François-Xavier (CNRS-Toulouse University, France France): *From townsmen to herdsmen and traders: A historical survey of Muslim communities in eastern Shoa from the medieval times to the present*

FAU, Jean-François (Senghor University of Alexandria, Egypt): *The Jews in the Horn of Africa in medieval times: between peripheral settlement and Karaite influence.*

FRITSCH, Emmanuel (CFEE - Independant scholar, Ethiopia): *Periodising the Churches of Lalibala.*

GERVERS, Michael (Toronto University, Canada): *The West Portal Ceiling Paintings In The Church Of Yemrehanna Krestos*

MERESSA, Getachew (Addis Ababa Univesity, Ethiopia): *Wuqir Lalibela: An Unknown Rock Hewn Structure in Alamata.*

METASSEBIA BEKELE & YONAS BEYENE (Independent Researchers, ARCCIKCL, Ethiopia): *Reconstructing the past: New archaeological data from Gamo Gofa, South Ethiopia*

POISSONIER, Bertrand (Toulouse University, France): *'Pagans' in Medieval Ethiopia : New Archaeological Data.*

2.01 - Manuscript Studies

Coordination: Alessandro Bausi, Germany; Denis Nosnitsin, Germany.

BAUSI, Alessandro (Hamburg University- Germany): The strange case of a recent Ethiopian edition: Some reflections

BRITA, Antonella (Hamburg University-Germany): *The organization of the knowledge in the hagiographic multiple-text manuscripts: the case of the Gädlä Säma'tat*

GETATCHEW HAILE (College of Saint Benedict and Saint John's University, Collegeville, Minn – USA): *Four unedited miracles of Mary warked at Saydnaya.*

BURTEA, Bogdan (University of Zurich, Switzerland): *Traditional medicine and magic in some Ethiopian manuscripts from European collections.*

DANIEL ASSEFA (CFIPT, Ethiopia): *The term 'Alam in 1 Enoch.*

GIDENA MESFIN (Universlty of Hamburg, Germany): *What is in a name? Ethiopian magic "Asmat" in light of Geez manuscripts.*

GUSAROVA, Ekaterina (Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia): *Ethiopian manuscripts in state and private collections of Saint-Petersburg, miniatures and elements of their decoration.*

HAGOS ABRHA (Mekelle University, Ethiopia): *Stema Codicum/Family tree of the Manuscripts of Gadla Yemat'a (One of the Nine Saints).*

HUMMEL, Susanne (University of Hamburg, Germany): *Variances in the traditions on saint Šārṣä Pētros and the monastery of Däbrä Wärq.*

MERSHA ALEHEGNE (Addis Ababa University- Ethiopia): *Bookishness of Books: Intertextuality [and Fluidity] in the Ethiopian Hagiographical Tradition.*

PISANI, Vitagrazia (Università "L'Orientale" di Napoli / University of Hamburg, Italy/Germany): *Manuscripts and texts on St. Qirqos in the Ethiopian tradition.*

SOKOLINSKAIA, Evgenia (Hamburg University-Germany): *New sources for the traditional history of Ethiopia: an Amharic manuscript from Medra Ruba.*

YOSEF DEMISSIE (Ethiopian National Archives and Library Agency, Ethiopia): *Some problem of erasing and emendation on Ethiopic manuscripts.*

ZARZECZNY, Rafal (Pontifical Oriental Institute, Italy): *Some observations regarding "Gädlä/ Zenä Ἁντωνος" and other texts related to Saint Anthony the Abbot for the future edition of the Ethiopian version of the Vita Antonii (CPG 2101).*

2.02 - Rethinking the 16th century in Ethiopia

Coordination: Anaïs Wion, France.

Wion, Anaïs (CNRS, France): *Rethinking the Ethiopian 16th century: an introduction.*

BOAVIDA, Isabel (Addis Ababa University & University Institute of Lisbon, Ethiopia / Portugal): *Historiographical models and the construction of the history of Ethiopia: the case of the conflicts between Ethiopia and Adal, 16th c.*

BOUANGA, Ayda (Paris 1 University, France): *Upheals in western Šäwa, rethinking administrative organization and Christianization during the late 16th c.*

HELDMAN, Marilyn (Smithsonian National African Art Museum - USA): *Rethinking St. Yared.*

HERMAN, Margaux (Paris 1 University, France): *Rethinking the royal matrimonial practice in the 16th century and its consequences on the status of queen.*

2.03 - Relations between the Ottoman world and Ethiopia from the 16th to the 19th century

Panel coordination: Amélie Chekroun, France.

CHEKROUN, Amélie (Université Paris 1, France): *The role of the Ottomans during the Ethiopian jihād led by Imām Ahmad (1527-1543).*

KROPP, Manfred (Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Germany): *A Two tales of a journey and a triangle of relations Ethiopia - Jemen - Ottoman Empire: al-Ḥaymī's Sīrat al-Ḥabaša versus the biography of al-Ḥaymī in Ibn Abī Riḡāl's Maṭla' al-Budūr.*

LUFFIN Xavier (ULB, Belgium): *The Ethiopian Diaspora according to the Turkish Sources (16th-beginning of 20th century).*

MELIS, Nicola (University of Cagliari, Italy): *Some remarks on the Turkish historiography on the making of Ottoman Africa.*

BEN-DROR, Avishai (The Open University of Israel & The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel): *Rethinking Abdullāhi's reign - Harār at the dawn the of 'glocal' era during the latter part of the 19th c.*

DUCÈNE, Jean-Charles (ULB, Belgium): *The mission of Sadik ül-Müeyyed al-'Azm to Menelik II: a Ottoman vision of Ethiopia.*

2.04 - Ethiopia in Egypt: Form, support and meaning of Ethiopian presence in Egypt from the middle ages to modern times

Coordination: Julien Loiseau, France.

LOISEAU, Julien (University of Montpellier, France): *Abyssinia at al-Azhar: Ethiopian students in 15th Century Cairo.*

CECERE, Giuseppe (IFAO, Cairo, Egypt): *Christian Ethiopian people in Egypt during the Mamluk period. Inquiry in Arabic and Latin sources.*

ZOUACHE, Abbès (CIHAM, France): *Ethiopians in the Fatimid Army (Xth-XIIth).*

AUBER DE LAPIERRE, Julien (EPHE, Paris - France): *Gondar / Cairo - confrontation of Christian paintings.*

BOUDERBALA, Sobhi (IFAO, Cairo - Egypt): *'Habashas in Misr and the end of the World. Egyptian apocalypses from the early Islam relating to the Abyssinians'.*

DE LORENZI, James (CUNY John Jay College - USA): *Heruy Walda Selase, modern Egypt, and the new Queen of Sheba: Historical texture in Ethiopian travel writing.*

2.05 - New perspectives on the study of slavery and slave-trade in Ethiopia and the Horn

Coordination: Giulia Bonacci, France; Jonathan Miran, USA; Matteo Salvatore, Kuwait.

BELCHER, Wendy (Princeton University-USA): *"They have sold us like cattle": Representations of slavery in Ge'ez texts from 18th-century Abyssinia.*

BELROSE, Laury (Paris1 University- France): *Questioning the memories of slavery in Ethiopia: Methods and perspectives.*

DAWIT TEFERI (Freedom Library): *Church paintings as a source of history of slavery: the case of Ura Kidane Mihret (Lake Tana).*

GARRETSON, Peter (Florida State University-USA): *Feqrenna Agelgelot Mahber: Hakim Warqenah and an early Ethiopian NGO.*

MECKELBURG, Alexander (Hiob Ludolf Centre for Ethiopian Studies-Germany): *Slavery and the inheritance of inequality. Preliminary aspects of "social memory" and slavery in western Ethiopia.*

MIRAN, Jonathan (Western Washington University- USA): *From Bondage to Freedom on the Red Sea Coast: Manumitted Slaves in Egyptian Massawa, 1873-1885.*

SALVADORE, Matteo (GUST- Kuwait): *Taken far away: mapping destinations of enslaved Ethiopians in the early-modern and modern era.*

2.06 - Popular movements in Ethiopia: From messianic to revolutionary

Coordination: Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia.

ANDREAS ADMASIE, Samuel (SIDA, Sweden): *Identifying the motive social force of the Ethiopian Revolution: the programme of the National Democratic Revolution, thirty-six years later.*

GEBRU TAREKE (IES-AAU, Ethiopia): *Kefyalew: A revolutionary life.*

KINDENEH MIHRETIE (IES-AAU, Ethiopia): *Messianic prophecies and the religious civil wars of the 17th century in Ethiopia*

AHMED HASSEN OMER (IES-AAU- Ethiopia): *Rural protests in North-Eastern Shäwa and Southern Wällo (Ethiopia): Towards a history of social movement, 1941-1974.*

EYOB BALCHA GEBREMARIAM (Afroflag Youth Vision-Ethiopia): *Youth, generations and social movements in Ethiopia; analysing the nexus.*

TADESSE, Julian (Humoldt University Berlin- Germany): *"A student movement is not a fashion show": The student movement in Ethiopian and the Gender-question.*

TAMRAT HAILE (Haramaya University- Ethiopia): *The Ethiopian student movement: discourse analysis of struggle 1967-1974.*

2.07 - History of Cartography

Coordination: Dorothea McEwan, UK.

CLAPHAM, Christopher (University of Cambridge- UK): *The mid-17th century revolution in Ethiopian cartography.*

DEGE, Sophia (Hiob Ludolf Centre for Ethiopian Studies- Germany): *“Remapping Paradise”: Manuscript evidences of Ethiopian cosmological models and of visualizations of the paradisiacal garden.*

JONAS, Raymond (University of Washington- USA): *Mapping Adwa.*

KURT, Andrew (Georgia State University- USA): *Cartographic reality and non-reality: European maps of Prester John’s African kingdom and of Earthly Paradise.*

LOOP, Jan (University of London- UK): *Planning an Expedition to Sources of the Nile. Ludolf’s early map of the Kingdom of the Abyssinians (1652)’.*

MCEWAN, Dorothea (University of London-UK): *The region of Adwa and Begemder on the manuscript maps of 1864/65 by G. W. Schimper.*

2.08 - Moving boundaries: Dynamics of frontiers and the question of Ethiopia's access to the sea

Coordination: Bahru Zewde, Ethiopia. Markus Hoehne, Germany.

Major General ABEBE T. KAHSAY (Institute of Federal Studies, Addis Ababa University- Ethiopia): *The Legal Basis of Ethiopia’s Right of Access to the Sea.*

BAHRU ZEWE (Addis Ababa University- Ethiopia): *Adwa and Land-Locked Ethiopia.*

CALCHI NOVATI, Gian Paolo (University of Pavia and Rome Sapienza; Ispi, Milan, Italy): *Revisionism vs conservatism in the Horn and the role of Ethiopia.*

CARCANGIU, Bianca (Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, Italia): *Somali Region: inside or outside Ethiopia?*

DIAS, Alexandra (ISCTE-IUL, Lisbon University Institute, Portugal): *Strategies and shifting identities in Northern Ethiopia’s borderlands: perspectives of a borderland group Irob.*

GILKES, Patrick (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia): *Flexible membranes: the relationship between Ethiopia and Somali clans in Somalia.*

HOEHNE, Markus (Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Germany): *Changing nature and utility of (state) borders between Somalia and Ethiopia.*

MORONE, Antonio M. (Pavia University, Italy): *Unsettled Ethiopian-Somali boundary: Human interactions and political confrontation in Ogaden borderland*

SAMUEL NEGASH (Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia): *Ethiopia’s illusive quest for an outlet to the Sea: The case of the Haud-Zeila exchange.*

SEMENEH AYALEW (Addis Ababa University- Ethiopia): *Ethiopia's quest for an outlet to the Sea: Asab in the 1940s and 50s.*

TEKESTE NEGASH & Irma TADDIA (Uppsala University – Sweden / Bologna University-Italy): *Reluctant decolonizers and Italian secret activities in the Horn of Africa.*

3.01 - The Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity in Ethiopia: History and social dynamics of a contemporary religious movement

Coordination: Jörg Haustein, Germany; Emanuele Fantini, Italy.

HAUSTEIN, Jörg (University of Heidelberg, Germany): *Historiography and Identity in Ethiopian Pentecostalism.*

FANTINI, Emanuele (University of Turin, Italy): *Transgression and acquiescence: Pentecostal itineraries in Ethiopian public spaces.*

DEWEL, Serge (INALCO, France): *Why is Pentecostal a rising faith in Ethiopia? Addis Ababa: a case study.*

ENGELSVIKEN, Tormod (Norwegian School of Theology, Norway): *Pentecostalism, missions and Ethiopian identity: Notes on a contentious relationship*

FREEMAN, Dena (UCL, UK): *The spread of Pentecostalism to the countryside: Dynamics of religion and development in rural Ethiopia.*

HAILEGIORGIS, Samson E. (University of Manchester, UK): *Contemporary Evangelicalism in Ethiopia, with emphasis on church unity.*

TIBEBE ESHETE (Michigan State University, USA): *The SIM Youth Center, Hibret Amba Church and the spread of charismatic movement in the Qale Hiwot Church.*

3.02 Proselytisation, education and conversion

Coordination: James Quirin, USA; Shalva Weil, Israel.

WEIL, Shalva (Hebrew University, Israel): *Double conversion among the “Felesmura”.*

QUIRIN, James (Fisk University, USA): *The Head Versus the Hand: Comparative approaches to the education of African Americans and the Beta Israel, 1865-1936.*

ROENNE, Finn Aaseboe (Fjellhaug International University College, Norway): *Conversion and proselytisation in Southern Ethiopia – a historical and comparative perspective.*

LIS, Daniel (University of Basel, Switzerland): *Basel and the Beta Israel 1830-1865. Protestant mission and Jewish identity in Ethiopia.*

PAULAU, Stanislaw (University of Göttingen, Germany): *A mission between witness and proselytism: Anglican mission paradigm in Orthodox Ethiopia of the First half of the 19th c.*

HERMANN, Yodit (SESSTIM, France): *Holy water sites: Spaces of religious confluence or conversion?*

3.03 - Gender and Religion

Coordination: Silvia Bruzzi, Italy; Meron Zeleke, Ethiopia - Germany.

KLEINER, Michael (Goettingen University, Germany): *Some remarks on Wälättä Petros.*

LEE, Ralph (Holy Trinity Theological College- Ethiopia): *Why is the Trinity Feminine?*

BROMBER, Katrin (Center for Modern Oriental Studies- Germany): *Muscular Christianity. The role of Ethiopian YMCA sports in shaping modern masculinities (1950s-1970s).*

BRUZZI, Silvia (University of Bologna- Italy): *Sitti 'Alawiyya and Fascist Pro-Islamic policy.*

DEBELE SERAWIT BEKELE (Bayreuth University- Germany): *Abebech aka Dinknesh Wuletu: Her life as a high priestess, founder and head of the Qallu Chabsa institution in Selale, North Shewa Zone of Oromia Regional State.*

QASHU, Leila (Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada): *The Siinqee institution and Ateetee: Arsi Oromo women's sung prayers as an active practice of women's spiritual and societal powers and a means of upholding their rights*

ZELALEM NEMERA (Haramaya University, Ethiopia): *The sacred power of women in Oromo culture and its implications for gender equality.*

3.04 - Ulamas on the move: Scholarly trends in Ethiopian Islam from the end of the 18th century to the beginning of the 21st

Coordination: Shiferaw Bekele, Ethiopia; Kemal Abdul Wehab, Ethiopia.

SHIFERAW BEKELE (AAU, Ethiopia): *Ulamas on the Move: Introductory Notes on the Dynamism of Islam in Ethiopia since 1800.*

ABBEBE KIFLEYESUS (University of Asmara, Eritrea): *Sufism and Syncretism in Northeastern Shewa.*

ABDELLA KHADIR (Awelya College, Ethiopia): *Sheikh Junaid Bulbula of Bale: His life and his contribution to Islamic education in Bale and Arsi.*

AMIRA ABDULKADIR (AAU, Ethiopia): *The Tigrigna-'Ajami Hagiography of Nejashi: philological and historical analysis.*

ASSEFA MAMO (Bahirdar University, Ethiopia): *Heroic qualities of Epic standards in the Manzuma of a female panegyrist Janoye (d. 2010).*

ENDRIS MUHAMMED (AAU, Ethiopia): *Analysis of Amharic Letters of Shaykh Sayyid Muhammed Sadiq (1897-1977).*

GORI, Alessandro (University of Florence, Italy): *The nobility of learning: šaraf and 'ilm in the Asqārī lineage (Wällo).*

HASSEN MUHAMMED (AAU, Ethiopia): *Shaykh Muhammed Jaju and his Islamic religious reform in Arsi-land.*

ISHIHARA, Minako (Nanzan University, Japan): *Text in Context: Al-Faki Ahmad Umar in Bab al-Wusul.*

KEMAL ABDULWEHAB (AAU, Ethiopia): *The mystic and scholarly contributions of Shaykh Jamāl Al-Dīn Muhammad Al-Annī of Raya (c.1796-1882).*

MUHAMMAD HAKIM (Oromia Cultural Office, Ethiopia): *Shaykh Aḥmad shaykh Sirāj and his contribution to Ethiopian philology.*

MUNA ABUBAKAR (AAU, Ethiopia): *Ametullah a Great Female Ulema of Harar (b.1851), Ethiopia.*

YASIN MOHAMMED (Kotebe Teachers College, Ethiopia): *Islam in Illubabor.*

3.05 - Movements of transformation and change within the contemporary Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC)

Coordination: Joachim Persoon, Ethiopia.

PERSOON, Joachim G. (School of Fine Art and Design, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia): *Movements of Transformation and Change within the Contemporary EOTC.*

TADELE ASFEW (Addis Abeba University, Ethiopia): *The Mahbere Kidusan as a Rejuvenation Movement withing the EOTC.*

CHAILLOT, Christine (Independent Researcher, France): *Changes and methodology in the traditional education of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC).*

ANCEL, Stéphane (Hiob Ludolf Center, Germany): *The reliability of the centre-periphery dichotomy on Ethiopian ecclesiastical matters in the 20th century.*

BERGA SORBALLA, Petros (Univeristy of Utrecht, Netherlands) *Orthodox spirituality and the dialogical philosophy of Mikhail Bakhtin*

HABTE MARIAM MELESE (Holy Trinity Theological College, Ethiopia): *Mission and Evangelical Activities in the Contemporary EOTC.*

4.01 - Concepts of cultural neighbourhood

Coordination: Christina Echi Gabbert, Germany; Sophia Thubauville, Germany.

GABBERT, Echi & THUBAUVILLE, Sophia (MPI Halle/Frobenius-Institute Frankfurt, Germany): *Cultural neighborhood in Ethiopia: An introduction.*

BUFFAVAND, Lucie (Max Planck Institute, Germany): *From clanship and rituals to maize fields and markets. Transformations of the Bodi – Dime relationship.*

DE SISTO, Federica (Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland): *Manjo and Kafecho: Enemies or brothers? Cultural depiction of intergroup relations in Southern Ethiopia.*

EULENBERGER, Immo (Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Germany): *The Nyangatom as neighbours and members.*

KOLBUSZ, Wawrzyniec (University of Warsaw, Poland): *Interethnic contact and cultural neighborhood as a driver of style migration of the South Ethiopian headrests.*

YOSHIDA, Sayuri (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Japan): *Claiming ethnic identity by 'discriminated minority': Petitions by the Manjo and its background in Southwest Ethiopia*

SHELENE GOMES (Independent scholar, Trinidad and Tobago): *Community and personhood in the multi-ethnic Jamaica safari of Shashemene, Ethiopia.*

4.02 - Rethinking the anthropology of Ethiopia - from ethnography to explanation

Coordination: Jon Abbink, Netherlands.

ABBINK, Jon (Africa Studies Center, Leiden, Netherlands): *Rethinking anthropology- some challenges.*

DEBEVEC, Liza (ZRC SAZU & SOAN AAU, Slovenia/Ethiopia): *How to study one's culture and learn about that of others: a comparative analysis of studying and teaching anthropology in Ethiopia and Slovenia.*

GIRKE, Felix (Martin-Luther-Universität Halle, Wittenberg- Germany): *Over the hills and far away: The art of not being governed in Ethiopia.*

MORAND, Katell (Université Paris Ouest Nanterre, France): *Moral voices: the dynamics of Amhara kinship in the light of cognitive anthropology.*

STRECKER, Ivo (Mainz University, Germany): *From ethnography to rhetoric culture theory.*

4.03 - Livelihood, Development and Local Knowledge on the move

Coordination: Masayoshi Shigeta, Japan.

AKLILU HABTU (Mekelle University, Ethiopia): *Community based climate change adaptation: interconnections of environment, livelihood and development*

HILLUF REDDU (AAU, Ethiopia): *Ethnomathematics in Ethiopia: Mathematical objects, games, and thinking developed by indigenous peoples outside school.*

HISADA, Shinichiro (Kyoto University, Japan): *Land use analysis using Participatory 3 Dimension Model and GIS in the Ethiopian agrarian village: Developing interfaces for collaborative action research with local residents.*

KANEKO, Morie (Kyoto University, Japan): *"I have learnt how to make pots myself": Special reference to local knowledge transmission in Southwestern Ethiopia.*

MAMO HEBO (Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia): *Understanding rural livelihoods and social relations in the context of emerging markets: A view from a market oriented milk cooperative in Kofale district, West Arsi Zone.*

NISHI, Makoto (Kyoto University- Japan): *Risk and responsibility in the era of global health: Public health interventions and local responses among the Gurage.*

SAMUEL TEFERA (Kyoto University, Ethiopia): *Livestock mobility, changes and the challenges among the Hamar in southern Ethiopia.*

SOGA, Toru (Hiroasaki University- Japan): *Recent developments in camel trading: A new role for the displaced people of Southern Ethiopia.*

STARO, Francesco (Université Paris 8- France): *Water “privatization” as a form of cultural adaptation: the case of Garri pastoralists of southeastern Ethiopia*

TAKELE MERID (IES, AAU, Ethiopia): *The political ecology of Gedeo’s local knowledge about tree species in relation with their livelihood strategies.*

TANAKA, Toshikazu (Kyoto University, Japan): *The sustainability of indigenous ox-plow agriculture in the central Ethiopian highlands: A focus on working efficiency of tilling practices.*

YIHUNBELAY TESHOME (Dire Dawa University, Ethiopia): *Indigenous conflict management institutions: Case study of the Arsi of Arsi-Robe, Ethiopia.*

ITO, Yoshimasa (Kyoto University, Japan): *Honey gathering activities in the forest area of southwestern Ethiopia and its significance in environmental-sociology*

4.04 - Women on the move and culture change in southern Ethiopia

Coordination: Jean Lydall, Ethiopia; Shauna LaTosky, Ethiopia.

BRÜCKNER, Nadine (University of Leipzig, Germany): *Kara women in motion. Putting into action an association for more development, power and security.*

EPPLÉ, Susanne (AAU, Ethiopia): *Forced movement. How much agency do females have in abduction into marriage? Stories from Bashada, South Omo.*

HANNA GETACHEW (University of Messina, Italy): *Women's knowledge on the move. How Maale women respond and adapt to contact with 'outsiders'.*

LYDALL, Jean (South Omo Research Centre, Ethiopia): *Marriage, residential movement and cultural innovation of women, in the Hamar-Banna-Bashada.*

NIEBLING, Maria (Leipzig University, Germany): *Marriage on the move. Sentiments about marriage from the Hamar of Zogola.*

PEVERI, Valentina (Bologna University, Italy): *Patriarchy upside down. Stories of women's creativity, love calculations, land and cows in Hadiya zone.*

ZEHLÉ, Jana & LA TOSKY, Shauna (AAU & SORC, Ethiopia): *Moving stories from the first generation of Mursi schoolgirls.*

4.05 - Oral Traditions in Ethiopian Studies

Coordination: Alexander Meckelburg, Germany; Sophia Dege, Germany;

BUSTORF, Dirk (Hamburg University, Germany): *Historical consciousness, religious identities and oral historical traditions among the Gurage and Silt’e.*

MARTINEZ, Andreu (Hamburg University, Germany): *The site of Gorgora Nova and its oral traditions.*

OBA-SMIDT, Chikage (National Museum of Ethnology, Japan): *The technique of constructing and preserving history without writing tradition.*

PAPWORTH, Helen (Bangor University, UK): *Oral storytelling in Ethiopia and the links to children's literacy.*

RUBINKOWSKA, Hanna (University of Warsaw, Poland): *Between oral and written tradition: a vision of the State during Haile Sillase I.*

SEID AHMED (Arba Minch University, Ethiopia): *The southward movement of Semetic people along the Omotic states: based on oral tradition.*

4.07 - Diasporas in Ethiopia, Ethiopians in Diaspora

Coordination: Giulia Bonacci, France; Cressida Marcus, United Kingdom.

SHAMSHAD ALI (Mekelle University, Ethiopia): *A Historical overview of the Abyssinians in medieval India.*

HAHN, Wolfgang (Vienna University, Austria): *How Menelik II came to have a mint*

ADJEMIAN, Boris (EHESS, France): *The invention of an Armenian homeland in Ethiopia: färänj and habäsha, through the eyes of a diaspora*

SZÉLINGER, Balázs (Mekelle University, Ethiopia): *Doctors and adventurers: Hungarians in Ethiopia from 1920 to 1935*

BONACCI, Giulia (IRD/CFEE, France): *Mapping the boundaries of otherness: naming Caribbean settlers in Ethiopia.*

CHARPENTIER, Émeline (Université Lumière Lyon II, France): *Ethiopia of Congolese and Burundian refugees.*

MARZAGORA, Sara (SOAS, UK): *The literature of the Ethiopian diaspora in Italy. Mobilizing the heritage of Amharic literature to renegotiate the historical meaning of the 1936-1941 Italian occupation.*

KURTZ, Roger (State U of New York-USA): *Ethiopia and the diasporic Imagination.*

MARCUS, Cressida (University of Oxford, UK): *From without and from within: Ethiopian transnational networks between Christian communities in the USA and Ethiopia.*

SELAM ALEMAYO (Ohio University, USA): *"Development from Abroad": Ethiopian migrants and community-level educational development in Ethiopia.*

MACLEOD, Erin & NIAAH, Jahlani (University of the West Indies, Jamaica): *Ethiopia from a far: Visions and actualization of Jamaican Ethiopianism.*

SCHOVANEC, Josef (Inalco, France): *When religion moves boundaries: taking over Ethiopian legacy as an aim of political action, the example of the Sigd in Israel.*

TALMI COHEN, Ravit (Tel Aviv University, Israel): *Time and Immigration.*

4.08 - Food and society in Ethiopia: change and continuity

Coordination: Jim McCann, USA; Thomas Guindeuil, France; Liza Debevec, Slovenia / Ethiopia.

GUINDEUIL, Thomas (Université Paris 1, France): *Teff's fortune: Tasting cereals and sharing values in Ethiopian Christian kingdom (16th c.-20th c.)*

HANSEMO HAMELA (AAU, Ethiopia): *Differences in understanding about traditional and modern elements of the festive and everyday eating practices among the urban and rural Dirashe of Southern Ethiopia.* (Co-Author: Liza Debevec).

MCCANN, James & HUHNN, Ari (Boston University, USA): *Authenticity and modernity of food in Ethiopia's iconic cuisine.*

ORLOWSKA, Izabela (AAU, Ethiopia): *Ethiopian banquet (gibir): the politics of feasting.*

SALAMON, Hagar (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel): *Cutting into the flesh of the community: Ritual slaughter, meat consumption, and the transition from Ethiopia to Israel.*

4.09 - Rivers and wadis: Circulation and exchange along fluvial networks and water resources

Coordination: Wolbert Smidt, Ethiopia; Eloi Ficquet, France.

BLIESE, Loren (Bible Society of Ethiopia- Ethiopia): *Movement along the Wadis and Rivers of Uwwa Woreda Afar Region.*

FICQUET, Eloi & ARAMIS HOUMED SOULE (EHESS, France / Djibouti): *Reflections on Lower Awash*

GETAHUN MESFIN HAILE (Michigan State University, USA): *The inundations of the Däččatu and the rebuilding of the Mägala embankment in Dire Dawa, 1944-47: A study of some municipal correspondence.*

OSMOND, Thomas (CFEE, Ethiopia): *Awash River in Oromo Historical Narratives.*

SINTAYEHU KASSAYE ALEMU & KELEMEWORK TAFERE REDA (Mekelle University, Ethiopia): *Eastern Nile Riparian: 'New Deal' and Détente.*

SMIDT, Wolbert (Mekelle University, Ethiopia): *The Wer'i River in Tigray: The role of a river in the organisation of socio-political and cultural space.*

YACOB ARSANO (AAU, Ethiopia): *Hydro-diplomacy of the Nile: Prospects and prognosis.*

4.10- Fixity and mobility: Regional studies on the move

Coordination: Thomas Osmond, Ethiopia.

BISAILLON, Laura (York University, Canada): *Imagineering the city and naturalizing difference: The politics of spatial reorganization in Harar.*

BREINES, Markus (University of Sussex, UK): *Re-negotiating self and structures of political power: Tigrayan migration to Addis Ababa.*

FESSEHA BERHE (Mekelle University, Ethiopia): *Saho Muslim societies in Tigray: An overview.*

FUJIMOTO, Takeshi (University of Toyama, Japan): *A vanished town of imperial settlers and an emerging town of local people: An ethnohistorical study of divergent urban vicissitudes in Malo, southwestern Ethiopia.*

KRUCZYNSKI, Arnaud (Paris 1 University, France): *Gurage: A single term, so much histories.*

5.01- Re-building Urban Ethiopia: Cities in Progress / Endangered Cities

Coordination: Pauline Bosredon, Marie Bridonneau, Perrine Duroyaume, France.

BOSREDON, Pauline & BRIDONNEAU, Marie & DUROYAUME, Perrine (Universities of Lille 1, Paris Ouest & Paris 8, France): *The Ethiopian city: A critical approach.*

BJERKLI, Camilla Louise (NTNU, Norway): *Power in waste: exclusion of the urban poor in planning for a modern high-tech integrated solid waste management system in Addis Ababa.*

DEMISSIE FERDISSA (NCCR North-South, Ethiopia): *Effects of ethnic decentralization on multiethnic cities in Ethiopia: the case of Adama and Hawassa towns.*

EZANA HADDIS (Ethiopian Civil Service University, Ethiopia): *Factors influencing Aaffected group participation in urban redevelopment in Addis Ababa: The case of Senga Tera-Fird Bet I Project.*

HAIMANOT WOLDGBRIAL (Addis Ababa Urban Plan and Information Institute, Ethiopia): *Implementation assessment of Addis Abeba urban renewal program.*

OKAZAKI, Rumi (CNRS, France/Japan): *Analysis on the living status of the historical district in Gondar, Ethiopia.*

PIERRAT, Adeline (Paris 1 University, France): *For a modern “Green and Clean Addis Ababa”: A comparison of politics speech and reality about solid waste management.*

EMMENEGGER, Rony (University of Zurich, Switzerland): *Map making in an urban arena: cartography and the regulation of urban land in Jigjiga town.*

AGAZI TIUMELISSAN (Young Lives, Ethiopia): *Attitude and knowledge of people living in areas due for urban redevelopment towards living in condominiums.*

5.02 - Perspectives on young people in urban Ethiopia

Coordination: Axel Baudouin, Norway; Tatek Abebe, Norway.

BAUDOUIN, Axel & AMARE BANTIDER (Trondheim University, Norway / Dilla University-Ethiopia): *The youth’s environmental knowledge and behavior in Southern Ethiopia.*

EMEBET MULUGETA & ERIKSEN, Sissel (AAU, Ethiopia / University of Tromso, Norway): *From childhood in the countryside to street work in Addis.*

KODAMA, Yuka (Institute of Developing Economies, Japan): *Changes in young women's life courses under livelihood diversification in rural Ethiopia.*

NALLET, Clélie (Sciences Po. Bordeaux, France): *Social Trajectories of "Middle Class" Youth in Addis Ababa: "Life is what you make it"?*

TATEK ABEBE (Norwegian Centre for Child Research, NTNU, Norway): *Young entrepreneurs in the local economy of Ethiopia's south.*

TEFEREE MAKONNEN (AAU, Ethiopia): *Migration to Addis Ababa as a survival strategy: An exploration of the working lives of child migrants from Mecha district, North West Ethiopia.*

5.04 - Land tenure and development in the North Ethiopian highlands

Coordination: Harald Aspen, Norway; Svein Ege, Norway.

ASPEN, Harald (Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway): *Rich and poor: Land and wealth in Mäqät, North Wällo.*

DAMTIE ASFAW DERSO (Kotebe College of Teachers' Education, Ethiopia): *Socialist transformation endeavours among the peasantry in Ethiopia from 1974-1991: The case of Dembia, North Gondar.*

EGE, Svein (Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway): *Land and labour in Baba Sää, North Wällo.*

MANTOVAN, Luca (University of Pavia, Italy): *The Economic Structure of Social Stratification in the North Ethiopian Highlands.*

TIZITA MULUGETA (AAU, Ethiopia): *Access to and administration of land: The impact of gender relation on female headed households in Bati woreda.*

TSEGAY BERHE (AAU, Ethiopia): *Protracted conflicts and litigations over custody of Arbeita (church) lands in Tegray: An experience from the village of Magab Ganta Afeshum, Agama, c. early 1960s- mid 1970s.*

YARED BERHE (Mekelle University, Department of Law, Ethiopia): *The impact of Ethiopian urban lease holding law on tenure security of urban landholders.*

5.05- Readdressing the food security question in Ethiopia

Coordination: Degefa Tolossa, Ethiopia; Sabine Planel, France.

ASCHALE DAGNACHEW SIYOU (Wageningen University, Netherlands): *Labour for development: compulsory public works contributions to the Ethiopian productive safety net programme.*

BERKET ROBA (Hawassa University, Ethiopia): *Rural livelihood diversification and its impact on household food security: A case study at Damota Gale Woreda, Wolayta, southern Ethiopia.*

CHINIGO, Davide (University of Edinburgh, Scotland, UK): *Land Registration and Food Security in Ethiopia: The Case of Siraro, Oromiya Region.*

DEGEFA TOLOSSA (AAU, Ethiopia): *Basic concepts and issues on food security, and global and national initiatives to tackle with the problem of food shortage: Lessons that Ethiopia can draw.*

ENTEN, Francois (EHESS, France): *Ethnography of early warning system & food aid targeting in Ethiopia.*

LEFORT, René (Independent researcher, France): *Political economy of food security in Ethiopia. National and local perspectives.*

PLANEL, Sabine (IRD/CFEE, France): *Impacts of agricultural extension policy on poverty and food insecurity.*

5.06 Where are rural Ethiopian communities heading?

Coordination: Alula Pankhurst, Ethiopia.

BEVAN, Philippa (University of Bath, UK): *A comparison of two food-deficit communities in North Omo: What has happened to them during the EPRDF period? And where might they be heading?* (Co-authors: Asnakech Gebrekidan, Meseret Negash, Samuel Urkato, and Shiferaw Neda).

DOM, Catherine (Independent researcher, Belgium): *Where are rural Ethiopian communities heading? A comparison of the progress of two food-deficit communities in eastern Tigray and Kembata since 1991.*

MELESE GETU (OSSREA, Ethiopia): *How far have we moved away from the 'one size fits all' mode and principles of social service delivery of the 1990s in Tsamako country?*

AYALEW GEBRE (AAU, Ethiopia): *Social change: Impact of development interventions in the Gelcha community of the Karrayu pastoralists of the Upper Awash Valley of Ethiopia.* (Co-authors: Tefera Goshu, Aster Shibeshi).

PANKHURST, Alula (Young Lives, Ethiopia): *Agropastoralism in transition: Comparison of trajectories of two communities in Oromia and the Southern Region.*

5.07 - Movements in gender, gendered movements

Coordination: Emezat Hailu, Ethiopia; Thera Mjaaland, Norway; Anne Britt Flemmen, Norway.

AGAREDECH JEMANEH (SJC & IGS, Ethiopia): *Gender and Election in News Papers Narratives: The Case of Ethiopia*

BEYENE, Atakilte (Stockholm Environment Institute, Sweden): *Narratives and changes in marriage and fertility patterns in Shashemene.*

DE ROSIS, Carolina (EHESS, France): *Women living with HIV as agents of social change.*

MJAALAND, Thera (University of Bergen, Norway): *Mapping decision-making; the case of women's contraceptive use in the Tigrayan context.*

MUELLER, Angela M. (University of Hamburg, Germany): *Can substantial change be noticed in female roles on the level of social- and self-perception of female bodies and bodily borders in the Ethiopian context?*

TIGEST K. ABYE (University of Bradford, UK): *The emancipation of Ethiopian women: a stride to equality.*

YONAS TAFESSE (Plan Ethiopia Country Office, Ethiopia): *Women and Land Rights in Wolaita Zone, Southern Ethiopia.*

5.08 Movements in peripheral regions and peripheries on the move

Coordination: Alain Gascon, France; Bezunesh Tamru, France.

ABDILLAH AHMED, Achaa (University of Djibouti, Djibouti): *Inland terminals and dry ports for Ethiopia: Impact on urban development.*

BACH, Jean-Nicolas (Institute of Political Studies, Bordeaux, France): *From Empire to State: Theoretical Notes to Rethink Centres and Peripheries in Contemporary Ethiopia.*

BEZUNESH TAMRU (University Paris 8, France): *Residential mobility in the outskirts of Dere-Dawa: what are the trends?*

GASCON, Alain (Université Paris 8- France): *Agribusiness, cultural and social changes in the Ethiopian lowlands.*

SAID CHIRE, Amina (Université de Djibouti, Djibouti): *L'intégration des Somali-Issa d'Ethiopie en République de Djibouti: de la marge aux hautes sphères de l'Etat*

VOLFF, Benjamin (INALCO, France): *Up and down: central Ethiopian power in movement from Harär to Ogadén at the end of the 19th century, according to the Ethiopian biographies of Ras Mäkwännen.*

5.09- Labor Migrations

Coordination: Zelalem Teferra, Ethiopia. Bina Fernandez, Australia; Marina de Regt, Germany.

BALAC, Ronan (University of Amiens, France): *Migrations and transformations in Ethiopia.*

BJERÉN, Gunilla (Stockholm University, Sweden): *From inter-urban to rural-urban circulation?*

DE REGT, Marina (Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany): *Mobile women, moving lives? The impact of Ethiopian women's migration on gender and lifecycle.*

FERNANDEZ, Bina (University of Melbourne, Australia): *'Contract slaves' and 'Runaways': exploring the boundaries of 'freedom' experienced by Ethiopian migrant domestic workers in the Middle East.*

NICOUE, Delia Evelyne (Universität Bayreuth, Germany): *Domestic work in the Middle East, education in Europe: Questioning the subjectivity of Ethiopian women would-be migrants in Addis Ababa.*

NIGUSU ABOSET (Family Health International Ethiopia, Ethiopia): *Seasonal migration and vulnerability of rural households to HIV/AIDS in Kallu Woreda South Wollo, Ethiopia.*

ZELALEM TEFERRA (IES, AAU, Ethiopia): *The challenges and prospects of interim care, family tracing, reunification and reintegration of Ethiopian child labor migrants repatriated from Yemen.*

5.10- Ethiopian Federalism: Twenty years after

Coordination: Asnake Kefale, Ethiopia; Lovise Aalen, Norway.

AALLEN, Lovise (Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway): *Negotiating federalism and developmentalism in Ethiopia: The impacts of the 'democratic developmental state' for ethnic autonomy and federal development.*

ASNAKE KEFALE (AAU, Ethiopia): *The city of Dire Dawa: Negotiating governance and identity in Ethiopia's ethnic federation.*

ASSEFA FISEHA (Ethiopian Civil Service University, Ethiopia): *Ethiopia's experiment in accommodating diversity: 20 Years balance sheet.*

DESALEGN AMSALU (AAU, Ethiopia): *Aw-Gumuz relations: from integrative traditional institutions to exclusionary ethnic federalism.*

JOSSE-DURAND, Chloé (Institute of Political Studies, Bordeaux, France): *Understanding current ethnic federalism's issues regarding to heritage: The case of the Konso Museum, Ethiopia's first single-ethnic museum.*

KETEMA WAKJIRA (Addis Ababa university-Ethiopia): *Federalism and urbanization: Vitalizing inter-municipal relations between Addis Ababa and neighboring towns of Oromia.*

MARKAKIS, John (University of Crete- Greece): *Federalism and state building in the Horn.*

SOLOMON NEGUSSIE (Institute of Federalism and Legal Studies, Ethiopia): *The trend of fiscal arrangement in Ethiopia: Observations on current practices and identifying some future concerns.*

VAN DER BEKEN, Christophe (Ethiopian Civil Service University- Ethiopia): *Constitutional accommodation of ethnic pluralism at the regional level: The case of Ethiopia's Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region.*

VAUGHAN, Sarah (University of Edinburgh, Scotland, UK): *"Centralised decentralization"? Balancing wereda and kilil in patterns of deconcentration and devolution under Ethiopia's federal "developmental state".*

ZAHORIK, Jan (University of West Bohemia in Pilsen- Czech Republic): *"Sovietization" of the Ethiopian federalism: Where theory does not meet practice.*

ZERIHUN MOHAMMED (Forum for Social Studies- Ethiopia): *Local identity negotiation vs national structure of ethnic federalism: The case of Arsi Oromo and the Sidama.*

6.01- Interrogativity in languages of the Horn of Africa

Coordination: Yvonne Treis, France; Marie-Claude Simeone-Senelle, France; Joachim Crass, Ethiopia.

- SAMUEL ADOLA (Addis Ababa University- Ethiopia): *Interrogative intonation in Oromo*.
- BENIAM MITIKU (AAU, Ethiopia): *Representation of declarative questions in Harari*.
- KAPELIUK, Olga (Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel): *Rhetorical questions in Amharic*.
- KRZYŻANOWSKA, Magdalena (UAM Poznan, Poland/ University of Hamburg, Germany): *A question of Amharic questions with yəhon: a tentative semantic study*.
- ODA, Ongaye (Dilla University, Ethiopia/Leiden University, Netherlands): *Interrogatives in Konso*
- SIMENONE-SENELLE, Marie-Claude (CNRS, France): *Marqueurs de l'interrogation en afar. Approche morphologique, syntaxique et intonative*.
- TREIS, Yvonne (CNRS, France): *Questions in Baskeet*.

6.03- Finiteness in Ethiopian languages

Coordination: Ronny Meyer, Ethiopia; Joachim Crass, Ethiopia.

- BAYE YIMAM (Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia): *Movement in Amharic*.
- BULAKH, Maria (Russian State University for the Humanities, Russia): *Multiple exponence in imperfective paradigms of Transversal South Ethio-Semitic languages*
- CRASS, Joachim (Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia): *Degrees of finiteness in Libido*.
- EDZARD, Lutz (University of Oslo, Norway): *The finite-infinite dichotomy in a comparative Semitic perspective*.
- MEYER, Ronny (Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia): *Finiteness in Gurage languages*.
- MULUSEW ASRATIE (Utrecht University, Netherlands): *Predicate case in Amharic primary and secondary predication*.
- WENINGER, Stefan (Philipps-Universität Marburg, Germany): *Wandering along the border of finiteness: The Ethio-Semitic converb(s) in a diachronic perspective*

6.04- Complex Predicates in Ethiopian Languages

Coordination: Azeb Amha, Netherlands; Anne-Christie Hellenthal, Ethiopia.

- ABDU AHMED (Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia): *The semantics of complex predicates in Amharic counterfactual conditional constructions*.
- AZEB AMHA (Leiden University, Netherlands): *Complex predicates in Zargulla*.
- DARMON, Chloé (Université Lyon 2, France): *Benefactive applicative periphrases with yiw- 'to give' in Xamtanga*.
- DAWIT TILAHUN JEMBERE (Dilla University, Ethiopia): *An overview of Gede'o*.
- HELLENTHAL, Anne-Christie (AAU, Ethiopia): *Complex predicates and clause chains in Sheko*.
- TSUGE, Yoichi (Kanazawa University, Japan): *Converb in Aari*.
- YAREGAL ALLENE (AAU, Ethiopia): *Complex Predicate in Awngi*.

6.05- Ethiopia in Movement: Sociolinguistic perspective

Coordination: Véronique Miguel Addisu, France; Tekeste Negash, Sweden.

BINYAM SISAY (AAU, Ethiopia): *Un-colonized but colonized': contestation between 'local' and 'foreign' languages in education and in the public space in Addis Ababa, a path to development or dislocation?*

HEVER, Ya'ar (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel): *The work of Gäbrä-Iyäsus Haylä-Mariam and the emergence of Chaha as a literary language.*

LANZA, Elizabeth & HIRUT WOLDEMARIAM (University of Oslo, Norway & AAU, Ethiopia): *Ethiopia in movement: Multilingual resources in literacy practices in light of regional language policy.*

MIGUEL ADDISU, Véronique (University of Rouen, France): *Multilingualism and identity in mixed couples: impact of context for language use (the case of intercultural couples living in Addis Ababa).*

MOGES GEBREMARIAM (Mekelle University, Ethiopia): *English language in Ethiopia: A disruption-point in the chains of education for development.*

SAMRAWIT BEKELE (AAU, Ethiopia): *Signage in Addis Ababa under the influence of a globalizing world.*

SAVA, Graziano (CNRS, France): *The traces of an hunter-gatherer past in the lexicon of moribund Ongota.*

SOLOMON DEJENE (Radboud University of Nijmegen, Netherlands): *The power of language in influencing social and religious relations in Ethiopia.*

VOIGT, Rainer (Freie Universität Berlin, Germany): *Oromo literature and orthographies in the 19th and 20th centuries.*

WETTER, Andreas (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Germany) *Linguistic consequences of language death in Ethiopia - the example of Argobba.*

ZELEALEM LEYEW (AAU, Ethiopia): *Color terms in Ethiopian languages: An anthropological linguistics approach.*

7.01- Artistic and literary movements

Coordination: Elizabeth Wolde Giyorgis, Ethiopia; Eloi Ficquet, France.

BALASHOVA, Galina (Institute for African studies Russian academy of sciences, Russia): *African women-writers (creative writing from Ethiopia and Nigeria).*

KONJIT SEYOUM (Asni Gallery, Ethiopia): *Art spaces dedicated to contemporary Ethiopian art since the early 1990s and their evolution.*

LEFORT, Leo (ATELIER Art Gallery, Ethiopia): *Approaching the Ethiopian visual art milieu from its periphery.*

NUR GONI, Marian (EHESS, France): *New photographic works on Ethiopia and Eritrea and their conceptions of movement.*

TEFERI NIGUSSIE (AAU, Ethiopia): *The Arfan Qallo literary and music movement.*

SEMENOVA, Valeria (Peter the Great Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography, Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg, Russia): *Interpreting a painting: Art representation of the Ethiopian state.*

7.02 - Restoration and preservation of Ethiopian heritage: history, practices, and deontology

Coordination: Claire Bosc-Tiessé, France

BOSC-TIESSÉ, Claire (CNRS, France): *Restoration in Ethiopia: an introduction.*

BALICKA-WITAKOWSKA, Ewa (Uppsala University, Sweden): *Preservation and conservation of Ethiopian manuscripts: Problems and challenges.*

CASTELLI, Enrico (Konso Cultural Centre- Ethiopia): *Opportunities and challenges for the Konso Cultural Centre (KCC) in the preservation of the Konso Cultural Landscape.*

LETURCQ, Jean-Gabriel (CFEE, France / Ethiopia): *Networking Ethiopia Museums: a means of fostering heritage conservation?*

MIYAKE, Riichi (Fuji Women's University, Japan): *Study on the Architectural Character and the Building Process of Gunda Gondo Monastery in Tigray, Ethiopia.*

NOSNITSIN, Denis (Hamburg University, Germany): *Lesser Known Features of an Ethiopian Codex.*

ROIG, Raphaël (International Council of Museums, France) *Protecting Ethiopian heritage: preventing illegal trade of cultural and historical assets.*

TEKLE HAGOS (Addis Ababa University- Ethiopia): *The reinstalation and impact of the second largest Aksumite Stela.*

TESHALE ATSEBAHA (Mekelle University, Ethiopia): *Formation and Development of the Outskirt of Mekelle, Aynalem.*

7.03 - Music, contexts and performances in Ethiopia: Continuity, transformations, revolutions?

Coordination: Sréphanie Weisser, Belgium; Getie Gelaye, Germany.

AMBAYE TSEDEKE & TREIS, Yvonne (Saattsa Secondary School, Ethiopia & CNRS, France): *Towards a folk taxonomy of Baskeet songs.*

FERRAN, Hugo (University of Montreal, Canada): *The Ethiopian Evangelical Diaspora of Montreal: Music, Identity and Ambivalence.*

GETIE GELAYE (Hamburg University, Germany): *Musical Performances and Song-lyrics of Azmari Dejen Manchilot.*

MIHIRET MESGANAW ANDUALEM (Hawassa University- Ethiopia): *Omen guidance in the movement of azmaris' life.*

SIMENEH BETREYOHANNES (IES, AAU, Ethiopia): *Performing the Revolution: Music and Politics in Ethiopia (1974-1991).*

STEINHOVDEN, Jan Magne (NLA University College, UK): *Māzmur and Zāfān, -within and beyond the Evangelical Movement in Ethiopia.*

TARSITANI, Simone (Durham University, UK): *Comparison of Oromo and Harari menzuma tradition through the analysis of manuscripts and recorded performance.*

TSE KIMBERLIN, Cynthia (Music Research Institute, USA): *The Korean War (1950-1953) and the Kagnew Battalion: Music, war, and the concept of collective security.*

WEISSER, Stéphanie & FALCETO, Francis (Musical Instruments Museum, Belgium / Independent Researcher, France): *Investigating modes and scales in Amhara secular musical performances. A conceptual and historical study.*

WOUBE KASSAYE (AAU, Ethiopia): *Analysis of Me'eraf.*

7.04 - Ethiopian studies through image, sound and beyond: Perspectives from anthropological/historical films

Coordination: Itsushi Kawase, Japan.

T. KEBEDE (Ethiopia): *Awra Amba, Zumra's Dream Land*

OBA-SMIDT, Chikage (Japan): *Gadaammojjii ceremony in Boorana.*

KAWASE, Itsushi (Japan): *When spirits ride their horses.*

KETCHAM, Makeda, (Ethiopia): *Zar Cult in Tänta, Wällo.*

THUBAUVILLE, Sophia (Germany): *Sidamo: Burial of a high dignitary and two women of his kin.*

FONTAINE, Hugues (France): Charles Martel: "L'Abyssinie au temps de Ménélick" (1909) ; "Amédée Eywinger "Fête du couronnement de la Reine Zaoditou" (1917).

Special roundtable: Human development in the longer range future of Northeast Africa, 2060 AD

Coordination: Jim McCann, USA.

MCCANN, James, F. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer Range, Boston University, USA.

HERAN SEREKE BRHAN, Washington D.C., USA

MASRESHA FETENE, AAU, Ethiopia

MUHAMMAD ZAMAN, College of Engineering, Boston University, USA.

ZERIHUN WOLDU, College of Natural Sciences, AAU, Ethiopia.